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ThenewHOBARTPAPERSNo.1
HAYEKONCOMPETITIONAliberalantitrustforadigitalage?
CentoVeljanovski
July2023
InstituteofEconomicAairs
3
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4
Contents
Theauthor
Summary
Introduction
Hayekoncompetition
Themeaningofcompetition
Complexityeconomics
Bigdataanddigitalsocialism
Firmsandprices
Marketswithoutprices
Theinnovationmachine
Summary
Liberallaw
Lawandlegislation
TheEnglishcommonlaw
Freedomofcontractortrade?
Theruleoflaw
Hayek’slegalliberalism
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8
10
13
24
5
Hayekoncompetitionpolicy
Bigisnotbad
Monopolyasaminorproblem
Labourmonopolies
Hayek’sliberalcompetitionpolicy
Reformofcompanylaw
Intellectualpropertyrightsasmonopoly
Hayek’santitrustproposals
Contestabilityparamount
Banningexclusionarypricediscrimination
Privateenforcement
TheeffectivenessofHayek’santitrust
Summary
Assertiveantitrustandthedigitaleconomy
Bigtechhasamonopolyproblem
Someeconomicsofdigitalonlineplatforms
WhatHayekmayhavesaid.
Digitalmonopolies?
Mergersandbreakups
WherenowforHayek?
References
31
40
50
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Abouttheauthor
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7
CentoVeljanovskiistheManagingPartnerandfounderofCaseAssociates,andIEAFellowinLawandEconomics.Hehasover40years’experienceasanadvisertocompaniesoncompetitionandregulatoryeconomics,hasbeenadirectorofseveralmanagementandeconomicsconsultingfirms,ontheboardoflistedpubliccompanies,andisapasteditorialandresearchdirectorattheInstituteofEconomicAffairs.
Centohashadadistinguishedacademiccareer.HewaseducatedinAustraliaandtheUnitedKingdom,holdingseveraldegreesinlawandeconomicsandwasa‘CommonwealthScholar.’CentohasheldacademicpostsatuniversitiesandresearchcentresintheUK,NorthAmerica,andAustraliaincludingfull-timeappointmentsatOxfordUniversity,UniversityCollegeLondon,MonashUniversityandasVisitingProfessorattheUniversityofToronto.PublicationsincludeSellingtheState–PrivatisationinBritain(1987)EconomicPrinciplesofLaw(2008),TheEconomicsofLaw(2008)andCartelDamages(2020).
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Summary
●Competitionisadiscoveryprocessbetweenrivalfirmsandcanonlybeexplainediftheinformationisimperfect.
●Competitionisthemosteffectivewaytocoordinateeconomicactivitybydisseminatingtheinformationandknowledgeheldbymarketparticipantsinaworldofgeneralisedignoranceandchange.
●Thefreemarketandevolvedcustomarylawsoperatingwithintheruleoflawcreateaspontaneousordernecessaryforandsubjecttoindividualliberty.
●Hayekwasnotanadvocateoflaissez-faireortheunbridledfreedomofcontract.Hesawthenecessityforstateinterventiontofostercompetition,provideservices,andensureindividualliberty.
●Competitiondoesnotmeanamarketwillhavemanyfirms.Monopolyandoligopolymaybemoreefficient,providecheapergoods,andgreaterinnovation,andwillgenerallybeunderconstantchallenge.
●KeytoHayek’snotionofcompetitionandcompetitionpolicyiscontestabilityorpotentialcompetition.
●Anactivepro-competitionpolicyisconsistentwithliberalismwhichremovesgovernmentbarrierstoentry,reducesthelegalprotectiongiventointellectualproperty(patents,copyright,trademarks)andcorporations,andasupportivetaxandmonetarysystem.
●The‘bigisbad’mantranowinfluencingcompetitionpolicywasrejectedbyHayekasproducing‘essentiallyantiliberalconclusionsdrawnfromliberalpremises.’
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●Hayekproposedamodestcompetitionlawthatwouldprohibitexclusionarypricediscriminationbymonopoliesandrendercontractsinrestraintoftradeunenforceable.Theseprohibitionswouldbeprivatelyenforcedbygivingthoseharmedtherighttosuefor‘multipledamages’supportedbylawyerswhoarepaidcontingencyfees.
●Hayek’sfocusoninformationandknowledgeprocessingshouldmakehisapproachrelevantandadaptabletothetrendsnowexperiencedinthedigitalsector.
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Introduction
HereIrevisitFriedrichHayek’s(1899–1992)approachtocompetitionandantitrust,andtheirrelevancetothedigitaleconomy.Iaskthequestionsofwhetheralgorithms,bigdata,andonlinedigitalplatformssupersedeoralterHayek’sfaithincompetitionasthemostefficientinformationdiscoveryprocessandwhetherhisviewsoncompetitionpolicyandantitrustprovideguidancetothepresenteffortstoreignin‘BigTech.’
Hayekwasaclassicalliberalandacontroversialthinkerinandoutsideliberalcircles.Hisliberalismisbasedonpromotingeconomiclibertywithinalegalframeworkwhichfacilitatesfreecompetitionandlimitsthecoercivepowersofthestate.Hayek’sliberalismstandsoutfromotherliberaltheoriesbecauseofitsevolutionaryfocusandthepositiverolehegavetothegovernmenttosetthelegalrulesfor,andwherenecessarysupplantandcomplement,themarket.Hewasnotanadherentoflaissez-faire,freeenterprise,conservatismnora‘neoliberal’(whateverthislasttermmeans).Hayekofferedamulti-layeredtheorythatdealswithaworldthatiscomplex,changing,andunpredictable.
HayekwrotehisfoundationalworksduringandafterWWIIwhenEuropeemergedfromtheyokeofNationalSocialismtoconfronttheriseofsocialismanditscommunistrealitieswiththeirdestructiveandanti-liberalpropensities.Evenignoringthesegeopoliticalfactors,Hayekwroteduringamechanicalandanalogueagedominatedbymanufacturingindustries.Hecouldnothaveimagined,letalonepredictedthedevelopmentsindigitaltechnologyandcomputingpowerthataretransformingtheeconomyandsociety.
Hayekregardedfreecompetitionasthebestmethodofdiscoveringanddisseminatingtheinformationneededtocoordinatemarketsandtheeconomy.ThepotentialchallengetoHayek’stheoryisevident.Withthemassiveincreaseincomputingpowerandtheaccumulationandprocessing
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1Weyl,G.(2012)Empiricsandpsychology:Eightoftheworld’stopyoungeconomistsdiscusswheretheirfieldisgoing.BigThink,July25
(/articles/
empirics-and-psychology-eight-of-the-worlds-top-young-economists-discuss-where-
their-field-is-going
).
ofmassiveamountsofdataathighspeedsusingsophisticatedalgorithms,thecostsofacquiring,processing,andusinginformationhavedeclinedmassively.SinceHayek’scaseforthesuperiorityofthecompetitivepricesystemwasbasedinpartontheclaimthatitdoesthesetasksmoreefficiently,itfollowsthatanytechnologicaladvancethatlowersthecostsofundertakingthesametaskswillinsomewayreplaceoratleastaugmentthefunctionsofthepricesystem.Somethinkthetimehascome.GlenWeyl,aneconomistatMicrosoftofferssuchaview:
Yet,increasingly,informationtechnologyisleadingindividualstodelegatetheirmost‘private’decisionstoautomatedprocessingsystems.Choicesofmovies,oneofthelastrealmsoftasteonewouldhaveguessedcouldbedelegatedtocentralizedexpertise,areincreasinglyshapedbyserviceslikeNetflix’srecommendersystem.Whiletheseinformationsystemsaremostlynongovernmental,theyaresufficientlycentralizedthatitisincreasinglyhardtoseehowdispersedinformationposesthechallengeitoncedidtocentralizedplanning.
Informationtechnologythusfundamentallychallengesthestandardfoundationsofthemarketeconomy.Formanyyearstocome,economistswillincreasinglyhavetostrugglewiththischallenge.Somewillharnessthepowerofthedataandcomputationalpowerprovidedbyinformationtechnologytoprovideincreasinglypreciseandaccurateprescriptionsforeconomicplanning.Others,whovaluethelibertariantraditionthathasoftenbeenassociatedwitheconomics,willbeforcedtoarticulateotherarguments,perhapsbasedonprivacy,thatarenotsusceptibletoerosionbytheincreasingpowerofcentralizedcomputation.1
Othersprofoundlydisagree.Thecaseforfreecompetitionisnotsimplythetechnicalconstraintsposedbyalgorithmsandcomputingpowerbutisinherentinthedecentralisedandlocalisednatureofknowledgeandinformationinanincreasinglycomplexdigitaleconomy.
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Competitionlawandpolicyarealsoundergoingrevisionandchange,inlargepartbecauseofthegrowthoflargeonlineplatformssuchasMeta,Amazon,Googleandothers.Theirsize,influence,andactionsaretreatedasathreattocompetitioninsomequarters.Thishasledtodebatesaboutthepurpose,structureandenforcementofantitrustlawswhichareseenasantiquated,pricecentric,andfailingtoappreciatethecomplexnatureoftheso-calleddigitaleconomy.
HereHayek’sviewsoncompetition,monopolyandantitrustmeasuresareexplainedandchallenged,andtheirrelevancetothe‘digitaleconomy’iscriticallyassessed.ThediscussionbeginswithanexpositionofHayek’smeaningofcompetitiontogetherwithanassessmentoftheemphasisheplacedontheinformationalefficiencyofprices,dynamiccompetition,andinnovation.Hayeksawmarkets,theeconomy,andsocietyintheirinstitutionalandhistoricalcontext.Partandparcelofthiswaslaw,whichhedefinedascustomarylawsincontrasttodesignedlegislation,thathadevolvedthroughtheinteractionofeconomicforcesandindividualactions,whichhebelievedbetterfacilitatedfreecompetition,liberalismandeconomicgrowth.Themarketwasnotseeninisolation.Hayek’stheoryoflawandlegislationandtheinteractionbetweenthetwoarethenexplained,togetherwithanassessmentofwhytheEnglishcommonlawfailedtoprotectcompetitionasoneliberalconcept–thefreedomtocontract–battledinthecourtswithanother–thefreedomtotrade.Next,Hayek’sdiscussionofmonopolyandanticompetitivebehaviourisexplainedandcriticallyassessed,followedbysometentativestepstodevelopa‘Hayekian’competitionpolicyforthedigitalsector.Throughoutthediscussion,theUSterm‘a(chǎn)ntitrust,’whicharosefromthetrust-bustingoriginsoftheUSShermanActof1890,isusedforaconvenientshorthandforcompetitionlawandthetwotermsareinterchangeable.
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Hayekoncompetition
Hayek’smeaningofcompetitionwasdevelopedinthreearticleswrittenattheendofWorldWarII(1945a,1948):‘Theuseofknowledgeinsociety‘a(chǎn)nd‘Themeaningofcompetition’andhislaterarticle‘Competitionasadiscoveryprocedure’(Hayek1968).TheserepresentaminusculeproportionofHayek’svoluminouswritingswhichafterthe1950sfocusedmainlyonpoliticaltheoryandjurisprudence.
Hayek’s(1948)essay‘Themeaningofcompetition’wasaresponsetotheneoclassicaleconomists’modelofperfectcompetitionwithits‘unrealistic’assumptionsofperfectinformation,rationalbehaviour,instantaneousadjustmentandequilibrium.AsHayek(1948:96)putit:‘“perfect”competitionmeans…theabsenceofallcompetitiveactivities’notingthat‘competitionisasensibleproceduretoemployonlyifwedon’tknowbeforehandwhowilldobest’(Hayek1979:67).
Hayek(1948)madetheobviouspointthatcompetitionisacontestandthereforemeansrivalry.Hethenmadethelessobviousbutmoreimportantpointthatcompetitionwasanefficientmethodofdealingwithimperfectinformationanddecentralisedknowledge.Competitionamongmillionsofindividuals,firms,merchants,andconsumersgeneratedpricesthatencodedtheavailableinformationaboutthevalueofresourcesandmarketcircumstanceswhichenableindividualsandfirmstomakeinformeddecisions.AsHayek(1945a:527)aptlyputit,pricesarea‘systemoftelecommunications’ofthemarket.
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Themeaningofcompetition
ThekeyfeaturesofHayek’sviewofcompetitioncanbesetoutinmoredetail.
Competitionisatheartaninformationproduction,discoveryandtransmissionsystem.Theassumptionofperfectcompetition–thateveryoneknowseverything–ispatentlyunrealistic.AsHayek(1979:68)said‘[C]ompetitionmustbeseenasaprocessinwhichpeopleacquireandcommunicateknowledge.’Morespecifically,Hayek(1948:106)arguedthat:
Competitionisaprocessoftheformationofopinion:byspreadinginformation,itcreatesthatunityandcoherenceoftheeconomicsystemwhichwepresupposewhenwethinkofitasonemarket.Itcreatestheviewspeoplehaveaboutwhatisbestandcheapest,anditisbecauseofitthatpeopleknowatleastasmuchabout16possibilitiesandopportunitiesastheyinfactdo.Itisthusaprocesswhichinvolvesacontinuouschangeinthedataandwhosesignificancemustthereforebecompletelymissedbyanytheorywhichtreatsthesedataasconstant.
ForHayekindividualsandfirmsinthemarketarelargelyignorantofthecircumstancessurroundingthesupplyanddemandofthegoodsandservicestheybuyandsell,andtheforcesresponsibleforchangingprices.Pricesconveythenecessaryinformationaboutthedemandandsupplyconditionsintheeconomyonwhichconsumers,producers,distributors,managersandotherdecision-makerscanrelytoplantheiractions.
ForHayekpricesareinformationallyefficientinthecomparativesenseasthebestavailablemeansforeconomisingonanddisseminatingthedispersedknowledgeandinformationonlocalconditionsknownonlybythoseinthemarket(Bowlesetal2017).Individualspursuetheirinterestsgiventheinformationconveyedbypricesandtheknowledgetheyacquire.HereHayekmadeanimportantdistinctionbetweeninformation,statisticaldata,andknowledge.Knowledgeisthelocalisedunderstandingofcircumstancesbyindividuals.Thiscannotbecapturedinstatisticalaggregatesor‘data.’
Competitionisadynamicprocess,nota‘perfect’outcome.Therearenosteady-statesetofprices,productionlevels,investment,and/orinstitutionsintherealworldthatiscontinuouslychanging.ForHayek(1984:325)‘[A]lleconomicproblemsarecausedbyunforeseenevents.’Thecompetitive
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marketisconstantlyinfluxandadaptingtochangingtechnological,economicandamyriadotherfactors.Thefocusontheshortrunisgrosslymisleadingasitfailstoincorporateunpredictableeffectsthatarisefromdevelopmentsinachangingmarketandtechnologicalprogress.Thus,pricingpoliciesandmarketstructuresthatlookanti-competitivecannonethelessbeessentialforthedynamicofthemarketeconomy.
Entrepreneursplayakeyroleinamarketeconomywhichbyitsnatureisinserialdisequilibrium(Kirzner1997,Thomsen1992,Littlechild1986).Entrepreneurssearchoutpresentandfutureprofitableopportunitieswhethertheyarisefrompresentsupplyshortages,arbitrageopportunities,andthesearchanddevelopmentofnewproductsandmoreefficientproduction.Inthiswaytheygenerateanadjustmenttopriceswhichotherscanrelyonassignalstoguidetheirpurchase,productionandinvestmentdecisions.
Hayek(1945a:526)sawfreecompetitionasgeneratingaspontaneousorder:‘Thewholeactsasonemarket,notbecauseanyofitsmemberssurveythewholefield,butbecausetheirlimitedindividualfieldsofvisionsufficientlyoverlapsothatthroughmanyintermediariestherelevantinformationiscommunicatedtoall.’Insteadofdecentraliseddecisionscausingchaos,freecompetitiongeneratesa‘spontaneousorder’inwhichtheexpectationsofbuyersandsellersarerenderedmutuallycompatible,andwhichadaptsquicklytothecontinuouschangesincircumstancesandnewinformation.Pricesmediateindividuals’expectationsbyencodingrelevantinformationonwhichtheycanact.Thereisnodeterministicequilibriumbutaneconomicprocessconstantlyadaptingtochangeandwherepricesadjusttocosts.Thecompetitiveprocessisseenastakingtimetoreacttochangingfactorssothatitmayneverreachastableoutcome,especiallyduringperiodsofrapidtechnologicalchangeandeconomicgrowth.TheideathatfreecompetitiongivesrisetoaspontaneousorderisadistinguishingfeatureofHayek’sconceptofcompetitionandliberalism.ItisinthetraditionofAdamSmith’s(1776)metaphorical‘invisiblehand’.SubsequentempiricalworkprovidessupportforHayek’sviewofthemarketprocessunderlimitedinformation(Smith1982;Al-Ubaydlietal2022).
Hayekwasawarethatmarketswereimperfect.AsHayek(1984:329)said:‘Theanalysisisnotsubstantiallymodifiedbytheundeniabletruththateventhemostperfectmarketpricesdonottakeintoaccountallthecircumstanceswewouldwish–oftendescribedas“external”conditions.’Hisresponsewasthatthemarkethandledthesesituationsbetterthan
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otherwaysoforganisingeconomicactivitywhenaugmentedbysensiblegovernmentinterventions.AsHayek(1984[1991]:329)said‘[T]ravellersdonotthrowawayamapofastrangecountrybecausetheyfinditisnotwhollyaccurate’.
Hayekdidnottreatthepricingsysteminisolationandseparatefromthelegal,institutionalandmoralfeaturesofsociety.Priceswerenotthesolemeansofimpartinginformationandincentives.Laws,morals,languageandpersonalrelationshipsservedasimilarfunctiontosupportthecompetitiveprocessandliberty.Hesawtheorganisationofproduction–thefirm,corporatestructures,verticalintegration,contracts,etc–andlawsasdeterminedbytechnologicalandeconomicforcesthatworkedtogethertocreatebothspontaneousmarketandlegalorders(discussedfurtherbelow)
Finally,ofparamountimportancetoHayek’sconceptionofcompetitionwasthatitpromotedindividualfreedomandaliberalsociety.AsHayek(1945b:45–6)states:
Liberalism…regardscompetitionassuperiornotonlybecauseinmostcircumstancesitisthemostefficientmethodknownbutbecauseitistheonlymethodwhichdoesnotrequirethecoerciveorarbitraryinterventionofauthority.Itdispenseswiththeneedfor‘conscioussocialcontrol’andgivesindividualsachancetodecidewhethertheprospectsofaparticularoccupationaresufficienttocompensateforthedisadvantagesconnectedwithit.
Complexityeconomics
Hayek’s(1967)attackonperfectcompetitionwasmorethanthecommonplacecriticismsoftheassumptionsofrationality,perfectinformationandstaticequilibrium.Itwasatheartadifferentvisionofeconomicsanditstheorising.Hayekeschewedthesimplification,mathematisation,anddeterministicpredictionsofmainstream‘neoclassical’economics.Itslargelymathematicalmodels,whichhavegrowningreaterprominencesinceHayekwrote,hadstrippedeconomicsofitshistorical,political,institutional,andpsychologicalcontextandrelevance.AsW.B.Arthur(2021:137)putsit:‘Bydefinition,equilibriummakesnoallowanceforthecreationofnewproductsornewarrangements,fortheformationofnewinstitutions,forexploringnewstrategies,foreventstriggeringnovelevents,indeedforhistoryitself.’InHayek’s(1974)NobelMemoriallecture,aptly
17
entitled‘ThePretenceofKnowledge’,hewrites,‘thesocialsciences,likemuchofbiologybutunlikemostfieldsofthephysicalsciences,havetodealwithstructuresofessentialcomplexity,i.e.,withstructureswhosecharacteristicpropertiescanbeexhibitedonlybymodelsmadeupofrelativelylargenumbersofvariables’.Inshort,Hayekembracedthecomplexityoftheeconomyandsocietytodevelopabroadpoliticaleconomyandlegaltheoryofthedevelopmentofmarketsandtheirinstitutions.Hayek(1967)wouldhavemuchincommonwithtoday’sdevelopingfieldof‘complexityeconomics’(seeArthur2021).
Bigdataanddigitalsocialism
Hayek’sviewoncompetitionwasfashionedinthe1930sdebateoverthefeasibilityof‘efficient’centralplanningwherehejoinedMises(1934)tochallengetheviewsofAbbaLerner(1934),OscarLangeandFredTaylor(1938)(alsoDickenson1933,Taylor1929)whosawacentrallyplannedeconomy,andthenmarketsocialism,asviableandefficientalternatives.Theseeconomistsarguedthatacentralplannercouldgatherdatasuppliedbystate-runenterprisestoreplicateefficientmarketprices.Hayekshowedconvincinglythatcollectingmarketdatabyfiatwouldnotbefeasible,asmuchconsistedoflocalisedknowledgeonlyknowntoindividualparticipantsinthemarket.Adecentralisedmarketwassimplymoreefficientinproducingandprocessinginformationandknowledgethanacentralplanningorganisation.
Sincethe1930sdebateoverthepossibilityof‘socialistcalculation’,theworldhasradicallychanged.Thecommunicationsandinformationsystemsofthedevelopedeconomieshaveadvancedbeyondeventhemostoptimisticvisionsofevenadecadeago.Thedevelopmentofdataprocessing,computingpower,andthepenetrationofcomputers,smartphones,theinternet,andonlineserviceshavebeenphenomenal.Thesehavereducedtheprocessingcostsandaccessibilityofinformation.Algorithmsandartificialintelligence(AI)holdouttheprospectofcoordinationwithoutthedecentralisedformationofmarketprices.Immenseamountsofpersonalandotherdataarecollectedandusedbyonlineplatformswithpricesoftenplayingnodirectrole.Thesedevelopments,knownas‘bigdata,’raisethespectreofdigital‘markets’drivenbymachine-basedpricingsoftwarewithsomelegalscholarsexcitedlypredicting‘theendofcompetitionasweknowit’(EzrachiandStucke2016:233).Therearestrongreasonstobescepticaloftheseexaggeratedclaims(Veljanovski,2022c,d).Itisdoubtfulthatalgorithmic
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pricingalonewouldhavecausedHayektomodifyhisviewsorcallforantitrustintervention.
Notsurprisingly,somehavebeguntoresuscitatethecaseforaplannedeconomyoratleastsomeformof‘digitalsocialism,’e.g.,WangandLi(2020)andPlaka(2020).AsOscarLange(1967),aprincipalprotagonistinthe1930sdebate,claimednearlythreedecadeslater(andahalf-centuryago):‘Letusputthesimultaneousequationsonanelectroniccomputerandweshallobtainthesolutioninlessthanasecond.Themarketprocess…appearsold-fashioned.’
Hayek(1982[1984]:59)indeedsawtheproblemconfrontingthecentralplannerasinpartoneofthelimitationsofcomputingpower.Hedidsuggestthatthenumberofequations,parametersandalgorithmsneededtocoordinateaneconomywithoutmarketswoulddefythe(then)processingcapacityofcomputers:‘[E]ventoday[in1982]thesolutionof100,000equationsisstillanunachievedambitionoftheconstructorsofcomputers’statingthattheonlywaytosolvetheseequationsisto‘observethepracticalsolutiongivenbythemarket‘a(chǎn)ndthat‘therealproblemistheimpossibilityofconcentratingalltheinformationrequiredinthehandsofasingleagency.’
Thisremainsso,asseenfromthegeneralinabilityofthemostsophisticatedmacroeconomicmodelstocomeclosetoforecastingeconomicgrowth,productionandinflationforthenextyearletaloneinreal-timeorinthefuture.Butevenifcomputershadthetechnicalcapacitytomodelandprocesstheactionsofmillionsofindividuals,firmsandintermediariesinreal-timethiswouldnotsolvethe‘knowledgeproblem.’Hayek’scorethesiswasnotaboutcomputingpowerbutrathertheinaccessibilityofknowledgewhichisdecentralised,fragmented,ever-changingandonlyrevealedwhenacteduponbyindividualswhopossessthatknowledge(Lavoie1985[2015]).Asonecommentatorputit:
Informationisnotknowledge.Takeawaythemarketthatproduceseconomicdata,andgovernmentswouldbeflyingblind.Whattoproduce?Howmuchshouldbeproduced?Whatproductionprocessesshouldbeused?Whoshouldbeemployedinproduction?Eliminatethefreedomofindividualstochoose,andcentralplannerswouldhavenowaytoanswerthesequestionsdespitepossessingmountainsofpastinformationontheirharddrives.
19
2Kelly,M.and
Lew
,P.(2018)Whybigdatawon’tsavecentralplannersfromthe
knowledgeproblem–Consumerdatahavetocomefromsomewhere,andthatsomewhereismarkets.FreeEnterpriseEducationFEEBlog,April11.
(/
articles/why-big-data-won-t-save-central-planners-from-the-knowledge-problem
).
Suchknowledgesimplycan’tbegeneratedotherwisethanbythemarketprocess.Allthedataintheworldcan’tchangethat.2
Firmsandprices
Hayek’scaseforfreecompetitionwasoftenexplainedincontrasttocentralplanning,andhencetopresentitasanuncompromisingchoicebetweenthetwopolareconomicsystems.Inlaterlife,heofferedamorenuancedanalysiswhichbetterdrewouthiscentralclaimthatmarketsandinstitutionsevolvetoeconomiseoninformationcostsandfostereconomicgrowth.
ItfollowsfromHayek’sfocusontheinformationprocessingcosts,thatanytechnologicalinnovationthatchangesthecostsandbenefitsofassembling,processinganddisseminatingdatawillinfluencethewayproductionisorganised.Theywillaffecttheboundarybetweenthemarketandnon-market,andthelawsandinstitutionsthatarisespontaneouslytosupportorsupplantthemarket
ThiswastheNobelwinninginsightmadebyRonaldCoase(1937,1992)whichreceivesnorecognitionfromHayek.Coase(1937:388)askedthequestion–Ifmarketsarecostlesswhydofirmsexist?Hayek’sanswerwasthattheyev
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