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長學(xué)ChangshaUniversity第三屆摹擬聯(lián)合國The3rdModelUnitedNation英文組EnglishGroup背景文件BackgroundGuideStatementoftheProblemTheworldisinanunusuallyprolongedandwidespreadglobalexpansion—thestrongestinmorethanthreedecades.Economicintegrationandtechnologicalchangehaveplayedacrucialpartindrivingthisexpansionandsustainingitinthefaceofrecentshocksandsomedauntinglonger-termeconomicpolicychallenges.Yetthereremainssubstantialambivalenceaboutthebenefitsofglobalization.Tomany,thecostsseemmorecompellingthanthebenefits.Thesourcesofthisambivalencearevaried.Somearefamiliarandsomenew.Concernsaboutthedistributionalimpactoftradehavebeengivennewforcebythedeclineinlabor'sshareofnationalincome;thelong-termtrendofrisingincomeinequality;theincreaseintheshareofgoodsandservicesthataretradable,andthereforeofthebroaderscopeofthepopulationaffectedbythepressureofcompetition;andtheperceivedaccelerationinthepaceofeconomicchange.Thegreatermobilityoffinancialflowshasincreasedthesenseamongpolicymakersinmanycountriesthattheirjobshavebecomeharder,thattheyarelessthemastersoftheirownfatethaninthepast,andthattheyhaveadiminishedabilitytoshieldtheircompaniesandcitizensfromvolatility.Butdothesechangesineconomiccircumstancesandinperceptionsfundamentallychangewhatweknowaboutthebroadeconomicmeritsofglobalintegration?Idonotbelievethebasiceconomicsofthatjudgmenthavechanged.Fewwouldarguethateconomicintegrationbyitselfissufficienttoachievebroad-basedgainsinincomegrowthbothwithinandacrosscountries.Therelativeprosperityofnationsreflectsdifferentchoicesmadebygovernmentsaboutarangeofpoliciesandinstitutionsbeyondtherealmoftradeandfinancialrestrictions.Butintegrationisanessentialingredientforachievingsustainedgrowth.Reasonablepeoplecandisagreeonthemagnitudeofgainsthatcanbeattributedtotraderatherthanothereconomicpolicies.Buttheevidenceinsupportofthebroadconsensusthatopennessandintegrationcontributesignificantlytobettergrowthoutcomesremainscompelling.Justascompellingistheevidenceagainstthepropositionthatprotectionintheformofrestrictionsontradeincreasesgrowthorreducesinequality.Theworldhasalotofexperiencewithdifferentpoliciesdesignedtoslowthepaceofintegrationortoinsulatepartsoftheeconomyfromitseffects,andthesepolicieshavegenerallybeenassociatedwithworseeconomicoutcomes.Thepoordonotbenefitfromprotectionism.Althoughthebalanceofeconomicevidencehasnotfundamentallychanged,thepoliticsaroundglobalizationandintegrationhavebecomemorechallenging.ThefactthattheUnitedStatesisnowinthefifthconsecutiveyearofexpansionandthatunemploymentisnowat4.4percentdoesn'tseemtohavemadetradeanymorepopular.ArecentPewpollsuggestedthatthatnearlytwo-thirdsofAmericansfeellesssecureabouttheirjobsthaninearliergenerations.Andmanyattributethisincreaseinanxietytotrade.ThisphenomenonofpersistentandperhapsrisingambivalenceaboutintegrationinthefaceofsolidgrowthinaverageincomesisnotuniquetotheUnitedStates.Here,asinmanycountries,thepoliticalconsensusinfavorofeconomicopennessseemsmorefragilethanitoncewas.Thedebateabouthowtorespondtothischallengetendstoseetheeconomicandpoliticalimperativesasinconflict.Themostappealingpoliticalresponse—usuallysomeformofselectiverestrictionontradeorinvestment—isgenerallytheoptionwiththeworsteconomicreturn.Thetypicalpoliticalimpulseistotrytoaddressdirectlythesourceofthecompetitivepressureandtorelieveit,butthesemeasurescannotofferlastingrelief.Theeconomicpriceofprotection,intermsofdistortedincentives,reducedflexibilityandbroadercostsontheeconomyasawhole,seembothmoresubstantialandmoreenduringthananytemporarypoliticalbenefit.Thepolicystrategiesthatofferabetterlonger-termreturndonottrydirectlytorelievethepressuresthatcomefromeconomicandfinancialintegration.Instead,theyfocusonthebroadercomplementofpoliciesandinstitutionsthatimprovethecapacityofeconomiestoadapttochangeandtoabsorbshocks.Thosecountriesthathaveexperiencedthegreatestgainsastheworldhasbecomemoreintegratedhavebeenthosewiththetypeofpolicyandinstitutionalinfrastructurethatfacilitateseconomicflexibilityandresilienceinthefaceofchange.Thepoliciesthatofferthemostpromiseintermsofbroad-basedincomegainsarenotthosethattrytoprovideinsulationfromvolatility,butthosethatmakeiteasiertolivewithvolatility.Intherealmofmacroeconomicpolicy,thismeansfurtherprogresstowardmonetarypolicycredibilityandfiscalsustainability,sothatcentralbanksandgovernmentshavethecapacitytoreacttoadverseshocksandmitigatethedamagetheycancause.Evenwiththeremarkableimprovementsintheconductofmonetarypolicyaroundtheworldoverthepasttwodecades,centralbanksinmanycountriesdonothaveinstitutionalindependence,inlaworinpractice.Andmanystilloperateunderpolicyregimesdirectedatlimitingexchangeratechanges—objectivesthatwillnecessarilyconflictwiththeirabilitytoachievepricestability,astheircapitalaccountsbecomeprogressivelymoreopen.Economieswithflexibleexchangerateregimesgenerallyfarebetterinthefaceofadverseexternalshocks.Andincountrieswherecentralbankcredibilityismorefirmlyestablished,monetaryauthoritiesarebetterabletoreacttoasharpfallinassetpricesoranegativedemandshock.Infiscalpolicy,thesamebasicpointapplies.Wherefiscalsustainabilityismorefirmlyestablished,governmentshavemorescopetorespondtoadversedemandshocksbyreducingtaxesorincreasingexpenditures.WheredeficitsanddebttoGDPratiosarehighandrising,governmentshavelessscopeforcountercyclicalfiscalpolicy.Inthesecasesfiscalstimulusismorelikelytobemetbyariseinriskpremier,reducing,ifnotfullyoffsetting,thedesiredbenefitstogrowth.Eveninthoseemergingmarketsthathaveseenthemostimpressiveprogresstowardfiscalsustainability,fewhavereachedthepointwheretheyhavebuiltmuchofacushionagainstfutureshocks.AndintheUnitedStatesandmanyothereconomies,thedemographicchangesnowworkingtheirwaythroughtheeconomyentailverylargefuturedeficitsandconsequentlyverylimitedfiscalroomformaneuver.Therightmacroeconomicpolicyframeworkiscrucial.Butwehavecometorecognizethatotherissues,traditionallytheprovinceofmicroeconomics,haveavitalroleincontributingtoeffectivemacroeconomicpolicy.Acriticalfactordistinguishinglong-termeconomicperformanceamongcountrieswithrelativelygoodmonetaryandfiscalpoliciesisthedegreeofoverallflexibilitytheyexhibitinlabor,productandfinancialmarkets.Thisisnotsimplyaboutthepresenceorabsenceofregulation.Itisafunctionoftheincentivesregulationcreatesandtheextenttowhichitgetsinthewayofcompetition,impedestheallocationoflaborandcapitaltoindustrieswithahigherreturn,favorsestablishedfirms,andcreatesbarrierstonewentrants.AsthesubstantialbodyofresearchonstructuralreformsbytheOECDhasdemonstrated,whereregulationismorecompatiblewithflexibility,productivegrowthhasgenerallybeenhigher,astechnologicaladvanceshavebeendiffusedandadoptedmorerapidly.TheIMF'slatestWorldEconomicOutlookreportsthat,amongthemajoreconomies,thosewithmoreflexiblelabormarketshaveseensmallerdeclinesinlabor'sshareofincome.Openeconomies,ofcourse,needstrongandresilientfinancialsystems.Asfinancialsystemsdevelopandcapitalmarketsbecomemoreopenandintegrated,savingsshouldbeallocatedmoreefficientlyandrisksdistributedmorebroadly,bothwithinandacrosscountries.Thisprocess,however,ismessyandverychallengingtomanagewell.Thehistoryofeconomiccrisesoverthelasttwodecadesisahistorynotjustoffiscalprofligacyandmonetarypolicymistakes,butoffinancialsystemweakness—oftentheresultofrapidderegulationandcapitalaccountliberalizationinacontextofweaksupervisionandabroadgovernmentguaranteeofbankliabilities.Thedevelopmentofdeeperandmoreresilientfinancialmarketsisimportantforeconomiestobeabletocopebetterwithexchangerateflexibilityandcapitalmobility.Andfinancialstrengthisanimportantpartofthearsenalofmacropolicytools,formonetarypolicyislesseffectiveincushioningtheeffectsofassetpriceanddemandshocksincircumstanceswherethebankingsectorisimpaired.Afinalandcriticaldimensionofthepolicyframeworkthatisimportanttothesuccessfulmanagementofeconomicintegrationisthedesignofthepublicorsocialinfrastructure.Raisingthequalityofeducationaloutcomesisvital,asisthedesignofthenetworkofinsurancemechanisms,fromunemploymentinsuranceandtrainingsupport,tohealthcareandpensionschemes.Asprogressivelylargersharesofthepopulationbecomemoreexposedtothepressuresofcompetition,aseconomiesbecomemoreflexible,governmentshavetodoabetterjobofdesigningprogramsofassistancethatcaneasethecostsofadjustment.Thesepoliciesandinstitutionalreformsarefundamentallytheresponsibilityofnationalgovernments.Internationalinstitutionscanhelp,withtechnicalassistanceandfinancialsupport,butthesechallengesareessentiallynationalchallenges.Thereformsoftheinternationalinstitutionsnowunderwaytomakethemmorerepresentativeofthechangingbalanceofeconomicactivityintheworldarelaudable.Andweshareacommoninterestinabroadrangeofinformalmechanismsforcooperationonpoliciesinthefinancialarena.Butultimatelyitisthequalityofthechoicesnationalgovernmentsmakethatwilldeterminehowtheireconomiesfareinamoreopenglobaleconomy.Globalintegrationisnottheprimarysourceoftheworld'seconomicproblems,norcanitbetheprimarysolutiontothem.Buteconomicintegrationcancontributesignificantlytosustainedgrowth,risingincomesanddecliningpovertyrates.Themosteffectivepolicyresponsetotheconcernsofthosewhofeartheconsequencesoffurtherintegrationistodirectmorepoliticalcapitaltothechallengeofdevelopingtheeconomicandinstitutionalinfrastructurethatwillenablegovernmentsandtheircitizenstoadaptmorereadilytochange.HistoryoftheProblemAShortHistoryoftheIntegratedFrameworkThefirstWTOMinisterialConference,heldin1996,recognizedthattheLeast-DevelopedCountries(LDCs)faceddifficultiesintegratingintotheglobaleconomy.ThisledtotheadoptionoftheWTOPlanofActionforLeast-DevelopedCountries.Thefollowingyear,theWTOconvenedaHighLevelMeetingtodiscussthespecificneedsoftheLDCsandtoformulateaprogrammetostrengthentheirtradecapacities,includingsupply-sideandmarketaccesscapacities.TheoutcomeofthismeetingwaswhatbecameknownastheIntegratedFrameworkforTrade-RelatedTechnicalAssistancetoLeast-DevelopedCountriesorthe"IF"inshort.ThemainobjectiveoftheIFwastoimprovethecapacityoftheLDCstoformulate,negotiateandimplementtradepolicysoastobeabletofullyintegrateintothemultilateraltradingsystemandtotakeupthemarketopportunitiesthispresents.SupportwasofferedtotheIFbysixmajormultilateralagencies,namelytheInternationalMonetaryFund(IMF),theInternationalTradeCentre(ITC),theUnitedNationsConferenceonTradeandDevelopment(UNCTAD),theUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgram(UNDP),theWorldBank(WB)andtheWorldTradeOrganization(WTO).TheachievementsoftheIFduringtheearlyyearsweremodest,withonlyahandfulofLDCsaccessingbenefitsfromtheinitiative.Whenthesixagenciesmetin2000toreviewprogresstheyadoptedanumberofrecommendationsandimplementedinstitutionalchangestoimprovetheIFseffectiveness.TwomainobjectiveswereformulatedfortherevampedIF;firstly,tomainstreamtradeintotheLDCs1PovertyReductionStrategyPapers(PRSPs)orsimilarnationaldevelopmentplans;andsecondly,toassistinthecoordinateddeliveryoftrade-relatedtechnicalassistance.AnewtripartitegovernanceandmanagementstructurewasestablishedtoenabletheIFtobemorecountry-drivenandbettercoordinated.CurrentSituationInLDCsTheNationalEIFFocalPoint(FP)leadstheEIFprocessintheLDC一usuallyaseniorgovernmentofficialappointedbytheLDCandsupportedbyaNationalImplementationUnit(NIU).TheEIFDonorFacilitator(DF)workswiththeFPtofacilitatedonorcoordinationandthedonor/governmentdialogueontradeissuesandAidforTrade.TheDFisarepresentativefromthedonorcommunityactiveinsupportinganLDC'stradeagendaandisidentifiedbythegovernmentandotherdonors.TheEIFNationalSteeringCommittee(NSC)istheseniorlevelforumfordecision-makingandcoordinationamonggovernmentpartnersontrade,theprivatesector,civilsocietyandthedonorcommunity.GloballyTheEIFSteeringCommitteereviewstheoveralleffectivenessoftheEIFandensurestransparencyoftheEIFprocess.TheSteeringCommitteeismadeupofallLDCs,alldonorstotheTrustFund,thesixEIFcorepartneragencies,theESandTFMexofficio,andothersgrantedobserverstatusbytheEIFBoard.TheEIFBoardisthekeydecision-makingbodyfortheEIFprogrammelookingatpolicy,financialandoperationalissues.TheBoardismadeupofthreecapital-basedLDCanddonorrepresentativeseach,membersfromthecoreandobserveragencies,aswellastheESandTFMexofficio.TheEIFExecutiveSecretariat,housedintheWTO,worksinsupportoftheEIFtogetherwiththeEIFTrustFundManager,representedthroughtheUnitedNationsOfficeforProjectServices(UNOPS)asselectedbytheEIFBoard.RelevantWTOActionsTheWorkoftheTaskForceGiventhegrowinginterestintradeanddevelopment,andtheweaknessesnotedabove,theDevelopmentCommitteeoftheWorldBankandIMFattheirmeetinginSeptember2005concluded3thattheIFshouldbeenhancedandprovidedwithadditionalresources.TheWorldBankstaffestimatedthatanamountofbetweenUS$200millionand$400millionwouldbeneededforanenhancedIF,basedontheneedsidentifiedinthecurrent40recipientcountriesandassumingthattheIFwouldbeexpandedtoincludethe“IDA-only”countries.Subsequenttothis,theIFSCestablishedaTaskForcetodevelopproposalsforsuchanenhancement,includingexpandingtheIF'sresourcesandscope,andmakingitmoreeffective.TheTermsofReferenceoftheTaskForceareprovidedinAppendixLTheTaskForceincludedrepresentativesofLDCsanddonors(seeAppendixIIforlistofmembers)and,afteraninitialmeetingchairedbytheAmbassadorofZambia,theAmbassadorofCanadawasinvitedtoassumetheChair.TheTaskForceconducteditsworkintwophases,beforeandaftertheHongKongWTOMinisterial.InitsinitialphasetheTaskForcedevelopedconsensusrecommendationsonitstermsofreferenceandkeyelements.ThesewereapprovedbyMinistersatHongKong.Subsequently,theTaskForcemettwelvetimesbetweenJanuaryandMay,2022,includingasessiontoheartheviewsoftheIFagencies(WTO,WorldBank,UNDP,IMF,UNCTAD,ITC),Toguideitssubstantivediscussions,individualdiscussionpaperswerepreparedbymembersonscope,funding,in-countryperformance,andonmanagement,governanceandadministration.TheTaskForceconductedatwo-dayworkshop,1to2April,atCoppet,Switzerland,todevelopinitialrecommendations.InitsfinalmeetingstheTaskForcerefinedtheserecommendations,ataskconsiderablyaidedbycontributionsmadebytheIFagencies.ThroughoutitsworktheTaskForcebenefitedfromthestrongengagementofitsmembers,ensuringthattherewasalwaysalivelyandinformeddiscussion.TaskForcememberstooktheirresponsibilitiesextremelyseriously.Itwasparticularlygratifyingtonotethattherewasoftenrepresentationfromcapitals(fromboththeLDCsanddonors)aswellfromtheGenevamissions,illustratingtheimportanceattachedtotheworkoftheTaskForcebyitsmembers.TheTaskForcebenefitedfromastrongblendofdevelopmentandtradeexpertiseamongitsmembership.ThepointofdepartureforthesubstantivediscussionsoftheTaskForcewastheHongKongMinisterialDeclaration%whichreaffirmedthecommitment"toeffectivelyandmeaningfullyintegrateLDCsintothemultilateraltradingsystem/1notedthattheMinistersattached"highprioritytotheeffectiveimplementationoftheIntegratedFramework11andrecognizedthe"urgentneedtomaketheIFmoreeffectiveandtimely"(paragraph48),MinistersrequiredtheTaskForcetoreportbacktotheIFSteeringCommitteeby30April2022sothatanenhancedIFcouldbelaunchedby31December2022.ItwasagreedthattheenhancedIFshouldcomprisethreespecificelements:Increased,additional,predictablefinancialresourcestoimplementActionMatrices;Strengthenedin-countrycapacitiestomanage,implementandmonitortheIFprocess;andEnhancedIFgovernance.TheTaskForcerecognizedtheimportanceoftradeliberalizationandthefactthatsuchliberalizationshouldleadtoimprovedeconomicconditionsintheLDCsandassistinmeetingtheMillenniumDevelopmentGoalofreducingpovertybyhalf.Howevertherewasalsoarecognitionthattradeliberalizationinitselfwouldnotbringaboutsuchimprovementsunlessitwashandledinasustainablemannerandintegratedintoacountr/soveralldevelopmentstrategy.TheParisDeclarationonaideffectivenesswasseenasveryimportantinthisprocess,andourrecommendationsdrawontheseprinciples.TheParisDeclarationmakesspecificcommitmentsinthefollowingareas:Strengtheningpartnercountries'nationaldevelopmentstrategiesandassociatedoperationalframeworks(eg,planning,budget,andperformanceassessmentframeworks).Increasingalignmentofaidwithpartnercountries'priorities,systemsandproceduresandhelpingtostrengthentheircapacities.Enhancingdonors'andpartnercountries7respectiveaccountabilitytotheircitizensandparliamentsfortheirdevelopmentpolicies,strategiesandperformance.Eliminatingduplicationofeffortsandrationalizingdonoractivitiestomakethemascost-effectiveaspossible.Reformingandsimplifyingdonorpoliciesandprocedurestoencouragecollaborativebehaviorandprogressivealignmentwithpartnercountries7priorities,systemsandprocedures.Definingmeasuresandstandardsofperformanceandaccountabilityofpartnercountrysystemsinpublicfinancialmanagement,procurement,fiduciarysafeguardsandenvironmentalassessments,inlinewithbroadlyacceptedgoodpracticesandtheirquickandwidespreadapplication.NICANationalIntegrationCouncil(NIC)topromoteandfostersocialintegrationamongSingaporeansandwithnewSingaporeCitizensandPermanentResidentshasbeenformed.ItwillbechairedbyDrVivianBalakrishnan,MinisterforCommunityDevelopment,YouthandSports,andwillbecomposedofleadersfromthecommunity,privatesectorandgovernment.PlansfortheformationoftheNICwerefirstannouncedduringtheCommitteeforSupplydebateinFebruary,andwasannouncedbytheMinisterataMinisterialCommunityWalkaboutTheNICwillencouragecollaborativesocialintegrationeffortsamongthepeople,thepublicandtheprivatesectors.TheNICwilldrivenewintegrationinitiativesinschools,workplaces,thecommunity,andthroughthemedia.EnhancedIntegratedFrameworkTheEnhancedIntegratedFramework(EIF)isamulti-donorprogramme,whichhelpsleast-developedcountries(LDCs)playamoreactiveroleintheglobaltradingsystem.Theprogramhasawidergoalofpromotingeconomicgrowthandsustainabledevelopmentandhelpingtoliftmorepeopleoutofpoverty.Theprogramiscurrentlyhelping47LDCsworldwide,supportedbyamulti-d

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