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《網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全技術(shù)》英文習(xí)題集Chapter1IntroductionANSWERSNSWERSTOQUESTIONS1.1WhatistheOSIsecurityarchitecture?TheOSISecurityArchitectureisaframeworkthatprovidesasystematicwayofdefiningtherequirementsforsecurityandcharacterizingtheapproachestosatisfyingthoserequirements.Thedocumentdefinessecurityattacks,mechanisms,andservices,andtherelationshipsamongthesecategories.1.2Whatisthedifferencebetweenpassiveandactivesecuritythreats?Passiveattackshavetodowitheavesdroppingon,ormonitoring,transmissions.Electronicmail,filetransfers,andclient/serverexchangesareexamplesoftransmissionsthatcanbemonitored.Activeattacksincludethemodificationoftransmitteddataandattemptstogainunauthorizedaccesstocomputersystems.1.3Listsandbrieflydefinecategoriesofpassiveandactivesecurityattacks?Passiveattacks:releaseofmessagecontentsandtrafficanalysis.Activeattacks:masquerade,replay,modificationofmessages,anddenialofservice.1.4Listsandbrieflydefinecategoriesofsecurityservice?Authentication:Theassurancethatthecommunicatingentityistheonethatitclaimstobe.Accesscontrol:Thepreventionofunauthorizeduseofaresource(i.e.,thisservicecontrolswhocanhaveaccesstoaresource,underwhatconditionsaccesscanoccur,andwhatthoseaccessingtheresourceareallowedtodo).Dataconfidentiality:Theprotectionofdatafromunauthorizeddisclosure.Dataintegrity:Theassurancethatdatareceivedareexactlyassentbyanauthorizedentity(i.e.,containnomodification,insertion,deletion,orreplay).Nonrepudiation:Providesprotectionagainstdenialbyoneoftheentitiesinvolvedinacommunicationofhavingparticipatedinallorpartofthecommunication.Availabilityservice:Thepropertyofasystemorasystemresourcebeingaccessibleandusableupondemandbyanauthorizedsystementity,accordingtoperformancespecificationsforthesystem(i.e.,asystemisavailableifitprovidesservicesaccordingtothesystemdesignwheneverusersrequestthem).Chapter2SymmetricEncryptionandMessageConfidentialityANSWERSNSWERSTOQUESTIONS2.1Whataretheessentialingredientsofasymmetriccipher?Plaintext,encryptionalgorithm,secretkey,ciphertext,decryptionalgorithm.2.2Whatarethetwobasicfunctionsusedinencryptionalgorithms?Permutationandsubstitution.2.3Howmanykeysarerequiredfortwopeopletocommunicateviaasymmetriccipher?Onesecretkey.2.4Whatisthedifferencebetweenablockcipherandastreamcipher?Astreamcipherisonethatencryptsadigitaldatastreamonebitoronebyteatatime.Ablockcipherisoneinwhichablockofplaintextistreatedasawholeandusedtoproduceaciphertextblockofequallength.2.5Whatarethetwogeneralapproachestoattackingacipher?Cryptanalysisandbruteforce.2.6Whydosomeblockciphermodesofoperationonlyuseencryptionwhileothersusebothencryptionanddecryption?Insomemodes,theplaintextdoesnotpassthroughtheencryptionfunction,butisXORedwiththeoutputoftheencryptionfunction.Themathworksoutthatfordecryptioninthesecases,theencryptionfunctionmustalsobeused.2.7Whatistripleencryption?Withtripleencryption,aplaintextblockisencryptedbypassingitthroughanencryptionalgorithm;theresultisthenpassedthroughthesameencryptionalgorithmagain;theresultofthesecondencryptionispassedthroughthesameencryptionalgorithmathirdtime.Typically,thesecondstageusesthedecryptionalgorithmratherthantheencryptionalgorithm.2.8Whyisthemiddleportionof3DESadecryptionratherthananencryption?Thereisnocryptographicsignificancetotheuseofdecryptionforthesecondstage.Itsonlyadvantageisthatitallowsusersof3DEStodecryptdataencryptedbyusersoftheoldersingleDESbyrepeatingthekey.2.9Whatisthedifferencebetweenlinkandend-to-endencryption?Withlinkencryption,eachvulnerablecommunicationslinkisequippedonbothendswithanencryptiondevice.Withend-to-endencryption,theencryptionprocessiscarriedoutatthetwoendsystems.Thesourcehostorterminalencryptsthedata;thedatainencryptedformarethentransmittedunalteredacrossthenetworktothedestinationterminalorhost.2.10Listwaysinwhichsecretkeyscanbedistributedtotwocommunicatingparties.FortwopartiesAandB,keydistributioncanbeachievedinanumberofways,asfollows:(1)AcanselectakeyandphysicallydeliverittoB.(2)AthirdpartycanselectthekeyandphysicallydeliverittoAandB.(3)IfAandBhavepreviouslyandrecentlyusedakey,onepartycantransmitthenewkeytotheother,encryptedusingtheoldkey.(4)IfAandBeachhasanencryptedconnectiontoathirdpartyC,CcandeliverakeyontheencryptedlinkstoAandB.2.11Whatisthedifferencebetweenasessionkeyandamasterkey?Asessionkeyisatemporaryencryptionkeyusedbetweentwoprincipals.Amasterkeyisalong-lastingkeythatisusedbetweenakeydistributioncenterandaprincipalforthepurposeofencodingthetransmissionofsessionkeys.Typically,themasterkeysaredistributedbynoncryptographicmeans.2.12Whatisakeydistributioncenter?Akeydistributioncenterisasystemthatisauthorizedtotransmittemporarysessionkeystoprincipals.Eachsessionkeyistransmittedinencryptedform,usingamasterkeythatthekeydistributioncentershareswiththetargetprincipal.ANSWERSNSWERSTOPROBLEMS2.1WhatRC4keyvaluewillleaveSunchangedduringinitialization?Thatis,aftertheinitialpermutationofS,theentriesofSwillbeequaltothevaluesfrom0through255inascendingorder.Useakeyoflength255bytes.Thefirsttwobytesarezero;thatisK[0]=K[1]=0.Thereafter,wehave:K[2]=255;K[3]=254;…K[255]=2.2.2Ifabiterroroccursinthetransmissionofaciphertextcharacterin8-bitCFBmode,howfardoestheerrorpropagate?Nineplaintextcharactersareaffected.Theplaintextcharactercorrespondingtotheciphertextcharacterisobviouslyaltered.Inaddition,thealteredciphertextcharacterenterstheshiftregisterandisnotremoveduntilthenexteightcharactersareprocessed.2.3Keydistributionschemesusinganaccesscontrolcenterand/orakeydistributioncenterhavecentralpointsvulnerabletoattack.Discussthesecurityimplicationsofsuchcentralization.Thecentralpointsshouldbehighlyfault-tolerant,shouldbephysicallysecured,andshouldusetrustedhardware/software.Chapter3Public-KeyCryptographyandMessageAuthenticationANSWERSNSWERSTOQUESTIONS3.1Listthreeapproachestomessageauthentication.Messageencryption,messageauthenticationcode,hashfunction.3.2Whatismessageauthenticationcode?Anauthenticatorthatisacryptographicfunctionofboththedatatobeauthenticatedandasecretkey.3.3BrieflydescribethethreeschemesillustratedinFigture3.2.(a)Ahashcodeiscomputedfromthesourcemessage,encryptedusingsymmetricencryptionandasecretkey,andappendedtothemessage.Atthereceiver,thesamehashcodeiscomputed.Theincomingcodeisdecryptedusingthesamekeyandcomparedwiththecomputedhashcode.(b)Thisisthesameprocedureasin(a)exceptthatpublic-keyencryptionisused;thesenderencryptsthehashcodewiththesender'sprivatekey,andthereceiverdecryptsthehashcodewiththesender'spublickey.(c)Asecretvalueisappendedtoamessageandthenahashcodeiscalculatedusingthemessageplussecretvalueasinput.Thenthemessage(withoutthesecretvalue)andthehashcodearetransmitted.Thereceiverappendsthesamesecretvaluetothemessageandcomputesthehashvalueoverthemessageplussecretvalue.Thisisthencomparedtothereceivedhashcode.3.4Whatpropertiesmustahashfunctionhavetobeusefulformessageauthentication?(1)Hcanbeappliedtoablockofdataofanysize.(2)Hproducesafixed-lengthoutput.(3)H(x)isrelativelyeasytocomputeforanygivenx,makingbothhardwareandsoftwareimplementationspractical.(4)Foranygivenvalueh,itiscomputationallyinfeasibletofindxsuchthatH(x)=h.Thisissometimesreferredtointheliteratureastheone-wayproperty.(5)Foranygivenblockx,itiscomputationallyinfeasibletofindy≠xwithH(y)=H(x).(6)Itiscomputationallyinfeasibletofindanypair(x,y)suchthatH(x)=H(y).3.5Inthecontextofahashfunction,whatisacompressionfunction?Thecompressionfunctionisthefundamentalmodule,orbasicbuildingblock,ofahashfunction.Thehashfunctionconsistsofiteratedapplicationofthecompressionfunction.3.6Whataretheprincipalingredientsofapublic-keycryptosystem?Plaintext:Thisisthereadablemessageordatathatisfedintothealgorithmasinput.Encryptionalgorithm:Theencryptionalgorithmperformsvarioustransformationsontheplaintext.Publicandprivatekeys:Thisisapairofkeysthathavebeenselectedsothatifoneisusedforencryption,theotherisusedfordecryption.Theexacttransformationsperformedbytheencryptionalgorithmdependonthepublicorprivatekeythatisprovidedasinput.Ciphertext:Thisisthescrambledmessageproducedasoutput.Itdependsontheplaintextandthekey.Foragivenmessage,twodifferentkeyswillproducetwodifferentciphertexts.Decryptionalgorithm:Thisalgorithmacceptstheciphertextandthematchingkeyandproducestheoriginalplaintext.3.7Listandbrieflydefinethreeusesofapublic-keycryptosystem.Encryption/decryption:Thesenderencryptsamessagewiththerecipient'spublickey.Digitalsignature:Thesender"signs"amessagewithitsprivatekey.Signingisachievedbyacryptographicalgorithmappliedtothemessageortoasmallblockofdatathatisafunctionofthemessage.Keyexchange:Twosidescooperatetoexchangeasessionkey.Severaldifferentapproachesarepossible,involvingtheprivatekey(s)ofoneorbothparties.3.8Whatisthedifferencebetweenaprivatekeyandasecretkey?Thekeyusedinconventionalencryptionistypicallyreferredtoasasecretkey.Thetwokeysusedforpublic-keyencryptionarereferredtoasthepublickeyandtheprivatekey.3.9Whatisdigitalsignature?Adigitalsignatureisanauthenticationmechanismthatenablesthecreatorofamessagetoattachacodethatactsasasignature.Thesignatureisformedbytakingthehashofthemessageandencryptingthemessagewiththecreator'sprivatekey.Thesignatureguaranteesthesourceandintegrityofthemessage.3.10Whatisapublic-keycertificate?Apubic-keycertificateconsistsofapublickeyplusaUserIDofthekeyowner,withthewholeblocksignedbyatrustedthirdparty.Typically,thethirdpartyisacertificateauthority(CA)thatistrustedbytheusercommunity,suchasagovernmentagencyorafinancialinstitution.3.11Howcanpublic-keyencryptionbeusedtodistributeasecretkey?Severaldifferentapproachesarepossible,involvingtheprivatekey(s)ofoneorbothparties.OneapproachisDiffie-Hellmankeyexchange.Anotherapproachisforthesendertoencryptasecretkeywiththerecipient'spublickey.ANSWERSNSWERSTOPROBLEMS3.1Considera32-bithashfunctiondefinedastheconcatenationoftwo16-bitfunctions:XORandRXOR,definedinSection3.2as“twosimplehashfunction.”a.Willthischecksumdetectallerrorscausedbyanoddnumberoferrorbits?Explain.b.Willthischecksumdetectallerrorscausedbyanevennumberoferrorbits?Ifnot,characterizetheerrorpatternsthatwillcausethechecksumtofail.c.Commentsontheeffectivenessofthisfunctionforuseahashfunctionsforauthentication.a.Yes.TheXORfunctionissimplyaverticalparitycheck.Ifthereisanoddnumberoferrors,thentheremustbeatleastonecolumnthatcontainsanoddnumberoferrors,andtheparitybitforthatcolumnwilldetecttheerror.NotethattheRXORfunctionalsocatchesallerrorscausedbyanoddnumberoferrorbits.EachRXORbitisafunctionofaunique"spiral"ofbitsintheblockofdata.Ifthereisanoddnumberoferrors,thentheremustbeatleastonespiralthatcontainsanoddnumberoferrors,andtheparitybitforthatspiralwilldetecttheerror.b.No.ThechecksumwillfailtodetectanevennumberoferrorswhenboththeXORandRXORfunctionsfail.Inorderforbothtofail,thepatternoferrorbitsmustbeatintersectionpointsbetweenparityspiralsandparitycolumnssuchthatthereisanevennumberoferrorbitsineachparitycolumnandanevennumberoferrorbitsineachspiral.c.Itistoosimpletobeusedasasecurehashfunction;findingmultiplemessageswiththesamehashfunctionwouldbetooeasy.3.2SupposeH(m)isacollisionresistanthashfunctionthatmapsamessageofarbitrarybitlengthintoann-bithashvalue.Isittruethat,forallmessagesx,x’withx≠x’,wehaveH(x)≠H(x’)?Explainyouranswer.Thestatementisfalse.Suchafunctioncannotbeone-to-onebecausethenumberofinputstothefunctionisofarbitrary,butthenumberofuniqueoutputsis2n.Thus,therearemultipleinputsthatmapintothesameoutput.3.3PerformencryptionanddecryptionusingtheRSAalgorithm,asinFigture3.9,forthefollowing:a.p=3;q=11;e=7;M=5b.p=5;q=11;e=3;M=9c.p=7;q=11;e=17;M=8d.p=11;q=13;e=11;M=7e.p=17;q=31;e=7;M=2.Hint:Decryptionisnotashardasyouthink;usesomefinesse.a.n=33;(n)=20;d=3;C=26.b.n=55;(n)=40;d=27;C=14.c.n=77;(n)=60;d=53;C=57.d.n=143;(n)=120;d=11;C=106.e.n=527;(n)=480;d=343;C=128.Fordecryption,wehave128343mod527=1282561286412816128412821281mod527=352563510147128=2mod527=2mod2573.4Inapublic-keysystemusingRSA,youintercepttheciphertextC=10senttoauserwhosepublickeyise=5,n=35.WhatistheplaintextM?M=53.5InanRSAsystem,thepublickeyofagivenuserise=31,n=3599.Whatistheprivatekeyofthisuser?d=30313.6SupposewehaveasetofblocksencodedwiththeRSAalgorithmandwedon’thavetheprivatekey,Assumen=pq,eisthepublickey.Supposealsosomeonetellsustheyknowoneoftheplaintextblockshasacommonfactorwithn.Doesthishelpusinanyway?Yes.Ifaplaintextblockhasacommonfactorwithnmodulonthentheencodedblockwillalsohaveacommonfactorwithnmodulon.Becauseweencodeblocksthataresmallerthanpq,thefactormustbeporqandtheplaintextblockmustbeamultipleofporq.Wecantesteachblockforprimality.Ifprime,itisporq.Inthiscasewedivideintontofindtheotherfactor.Ifnotprime,wefactoritandtrythefactorsasdivisorsofn.3.7ConsideraDiffie-Hellmanschemewithacommonprimeq=11andaprimitiveroota=2.a.IfuserAhaspublickeyYA=9,whatisA’sprivatekeyXA?b.IfuserBhaspublickeyYB=3,whatisthesharedsecretkeyK?a.XA=6b.K=3Chapter4AuthenticationApplicationsANSWERSNSWERSTOQUESTIONS4.1WhatproblemwasKerberosdesignedtoaddress?TheproblemthatKerberosaddressesisthis:Assumeanopendistributedenvironmentinwhichusersatworkstationswishtoaccessservicesonserversdistributedthroughoutthenetwork.Wewouldlikeforserverstobeabletorestrictaccesstoauthorizedusersandtobeabletoauthenticaterequestsforservice.Inthisenvironment,aworkstationcannotbetrustedtoidentifyitsuserscorrectlytonetworkservices.4.2WhatarethreethreatsassociatedwithuserauthenticationoveranetworkorInternet?Ausermaygainaccesstoaparticularworkstationandpretendtobeanotheruseroperatingfromthatworkstation.2.Ausermayalterthenetworkaddressofaworkstationsothattherequestssentfromthealteredworkstationappeartocomefromtheimpersonatedworkstation.3.Ausermayeavesdroponexchangesanduseareplayattacktogainentrancetoaserverortodisruptoperations.4.3Listthreeapproachestosecureuserauthenticationinadistributedenvironment.Relyoneachindividualclientworkstationtoassuretheidentityofitsuserorusersandrelyoneachservertoenforceasecuritypolicybasedonuseridentification(ID).2.Requirethatclientsystemsauthenticatethemselvestoservers,buttrusttheclientsystemconcerningtheidentityofitsuser.3.Requiretheusertoproveidentityforeachserviceinvoked.Alsorequirethatserversprovetheiridentitytoclients.4.4WhatfourrequirementsaredefinedforKerberos?Secure:Anetworkeavesdroppershouldnotbeabletoobtainthenecessaryinformationtoimpersonateauser.Moregenerally,Kerberosshouldbestrongenoughthatapotentialopponentdoesnotfindittobetheweaklink.Reliable:ForallservicesthatrelyonKerberosforaccesscontrol,lackofavailabilityoftheKerberosservicemeanslackofavailabilityofthesupportedservices.Hence,Kerberosshouldbehighlyreliableandshouldemployadistributedserverarchitecture,withonesystemabletobackupanother.Transparent:Ideally,theusershouldnotbeawarethatauthenticationistakingplace,beyondtherequirementtoenterapassword.Scalable:Thesystemshouldbecapableofsupportinglargenumbersofclientsandservers.Thissuggestsamodular,distributedarchitecture.4.5Whatentitiesconstituteafull-serviceKerberosenvironment?Afull-serviceKerberosenvironmentconsistsofaKerberosserver,anumberofclients,andanumberofapplicationservers.4.6InthecontextofKerberos,whatisarealm?Arealmisanenvironmentinwhich:1.TheKerberosservermusthavetheuserID(UID)andhashedpasswordofallparticipatingusersinitsdatabase.AllusersareregisteredwiththeKerberosserver.2.TheKerberosservermustshareasecretkeywitheachserver.AllserversareregisteredwiththeKerberosserver.4.7Whataretheprincipaldifferencebetweenversion4andversion5ofKerberos?Version5overcomessomeenvironmentalshortcomingsandsometechnicaldeficienciesinVersion4.4.8WhatisthepurposeoftheX.509standard?X.509definesaframeworkfortheprovisionofauthenticationservicesbytheX.500directorytoitsusers.Thedirectorymayserveasarepositoryofpublic-keycertificates.Eachcertificatecontainsthepublickeyofauserandissignedwiththeprivatekeyofatrustedcertificationauthority.Inaddition,X.509definesalternativeauthenticationprotocolsbasedontheuseofpublic-keycertificates.4.9Whatisachainofcertificates?Achainofcertificatesconsistsofasequenceofcertificatescreatedbydifferentcertificationauthorities(CAs)inwhicheachsuccessivecertificateisacertificatebyoneCAthatcertifiesthepublickeyofthenextCAinthechain.4.10HowisanX.509certificaterevoked?Theownerofapublic-keycanissueacertificaterevocationlistthatrevokesoneormorecertificates.ANSWERSNSWERSTOPROBLEMS4.1ShowthatarandomerrorinblockofciphertextispropagatedtoallsubsequentblocksofplaintextinPCBCmode(Figure4.9).AnerrorinC1affectsP1becausetheencryptionofC1isXORedwithIVtoproduceP1.BothC1andP1affectP2,whichistheXORoftheencryptionofC2withtheXORofC1andP1.Beyondthat,PN–1isoneoftheXORedinputstoformingPN.4.2The1988versionofX.509listspropertiesthatPSAkeysmustsatisfytobesecure,givencurrentknowledgeaboutthedifficultyoffactoringlargenumbers.Thediscussionconcludeswithaconstraintonthepublicexponentandthemodulusn:Itmustbeensuredthate>log2(n)topreventattackbytakingtheethrootmodntodisclosetheplaintext.Althoughtheconstraintiscorrect,thereasongivenforrequiringitisincorrect.Whatiswrongwiththereasongivenandwhatisthecorrectreason?Takingtheethrootmodnofaciphertextblockwillalwaysrevealtheplaintext,nomatterwhatthevaluesofeandnare.Ingeneralthisisaverydifficultproblem,andindeedisthereasonwhyRSAissecure.Thepointisthat,ifeistoosmall,thentakingthenormalintegerethrootwillbethesameastakingtheethrootmodn,andtakingintegerethrootsisrelativelyeasy.Chapter5ElectronicMailSecurityANSWERSNSWERSTOQUESTIONS5.1WhatarethefiveprincipalservicesprovidedbyPGP?Authentication,confidentiality,compression,e-mailcompatibility,andsegmentation5.2Whatistheutilityofadetachedsignature?Adetachedsignatureisusefulinseveralcontexts.Ausermaywishtomaintainaseparatesignaturelogofallmessagessentorreceived.Adetachedsignatureofanexecutableprogramcandetectsubsequentvirusinfection.Finally,detachedsignaturescanbeusedwhenmorethanonepartymustsignadocument,suchasalegalcontract.Eachperson'ssignatureisindependentandthereforeisappliedonlytothedocument.Otherwise,signatureswouldhavetobenested,withthesecondsignersigningboththedocumentandthefirstsignature,andsoon.5.3WhydoesPGPgenerateasignaturebeforeapplyingcompression?a.Itispreferabletosignanuncompressedmessagesothatonecanstoreonlytheuncompressedmessagetogetherwiththesignatureforfutureverification.Ifonesignedacompresseddocument,thenitwouldbenecessaryeithertostoreacompressedversionofthemessageforlaterverificationortorecompressthemessagewhenverificationisrequired.b.Evenifonewerewillingtogeneratedynamicallyarecompressedmessageforverification,PGP'scompressionalgorithmpresentsadifficulty.Thealgorithmisnotdeterministic;variousimplementationsofthealgorithmachievedifferenttradeoffsinrunningspeedversuscompressionratioand,asaresult,producedifferentcompressedforms.However,thesedifferentcompressionalgorithmsareinteroperablebecauseanyversionofthealgorithmcancorrectlydecompresstheoutputofanyotherversion.ApplyingthehashfunctionandsignatureaftercompressionwouldconstrainallPGPimplementationstothesameversionofthecompressionalgorithm.5.4WhatisR64conversion?R64convertsaraw8-bitbinarystreamtoastreamofprintableASCIIcharacters.EachgroupofthreeoctetsofbinarydataismappedintofourASCIIcharacters.5.5WhyisR64conversionusefulforane-mailapplication?WhenPGPisused,atleastpartoftheblocktobetransmittedisencrypted.Ifonlythesignatureserviceisused,thenthemessagedigestisencrypted(withthesender'sprivatekey).Iftheconfidentialityserviceisused,themessageplussignature(ifpresent)areencrypted(withaone-timesymmetrickey).Thus,partoralloftheresultingblockconsistsofastreamofarbitrary8-bitoctets.However,manyelectronicmailsystemsonlypermittheuseofblocksconsistingofASCIItext.5.6WhyisthesegmentationandreassemblyfunctioninPGPneeded?E-mailfacilitiesoftenarerestrictedtoamaximummessagelength.5.7HowdoesPGPusetheconceptoftrust?PGPincludesafacilityforassigningaleveloftrusttoindividualsignersandtokeys.5.8WhatisRFC822?RFC822definesaformatfortextmessagesthataresentusingelectronicmail.5.9WhatisMIME?MIMEisanextensiontotheRFC822frameworkthatisintendedtoaddresssomeoftheproblemsandlimitationsoftheuseofSMTP(SimpleMailTransferProtocol)orsomeothermailtransferprotocolandRFC822forelectronicmail.5.10WhatisS/MIME?S/MIME(Secure/MultipurposeInternetMailExtension)isasecurityenhancementtotheMIMEInternete-mailformatstandard,basedontechnologyfromRSADataSecurity.ANSWERSNSWERSTOPROBLEMS5.1InthePGPscheme,whatistheexpectednumberofsessionkeysgeneratedbeforeapreviouslycreatedkeyisproduced?ThisisjustanotherformofthebirthdayparadoxdiscussedinAppendix11A.Letusstatetheproblemasoneofdeterminingwhatnumberofsessionkeysmustbegeneratedsothattheprobabilityofaduplicateisgreaterthan0.5.FromEquation(11.6)inAppendix11A,wehavetheapproximation:k1.18nFora128-bitkey,thereare2128possiblekeys.Thereforek1.1821281.182645.2Thefirst16bitsofthemessagedigestinaPGPsignaturearetranslatedintheclear.a.Towhatextentdoesthiscompromisethesecurityofthehashalgorithm?b.Towhatextentdoesitinfactperformitsintendedfunction,namely,tohelpdetermineifthecorrectRSAkeywasusedtodecryptthedigest?a.Notatall.Themessagedigestisencryptedwiththesender'sprivatekey.Therefore,anyoneinpossessionofthepublickeycandecryptitandrecovertheentiremessagedigest.b.Theprobabilitythatamessagedigestdecryptedwiththewrongkeywouldhaveanexactmatchinthefirst16bitswiththeoriginalmessagedigestis2–16.5.3InFigure5.4,eachentryinthepublic-keyringcontainsanownertrustfieldthatindicatesthedegreeoftrustassociatedwiththispublic-keyowner.Whyisthatnotenough?Thatis,ifthisowneristrustedandthisissupposedtobetheowner’spublickey,whyisnotthattrustenoughtopermitPGPtousethispublickey?Wetrustthisowner,butthatdoesnotnecessarilymeanthatwecantrustthatweareinpossessionofthatowner'spublickey.5.4Considerradix-64conversionasaformofencryption.Inthiscase,thereisnokey.ButsupposethatanopponentknewonlythatsomeformofsubstitutionalgorithmwasbeingusedtoencryptEnglishtextanddidnotguessitwasR64.Howeffectivewouldthisalgorithmbeagainstcryptanalysis?Itcertainlyprovidesmoresecuritythanamonoalphabeticsubstitution.Becausewearetreatingtheplaintextasastringofbitsandencrypting6bitsatatime,wearenotencryptingindividualcharacters.Therefore,thefrequencyinformationislost,oratleastsignificantlyobscured.5.5PhilZimmermannchoseIDEA,three-keytripleDES,andCAST-128assymmetricencryptionalgorithmsforPGP.GivereasonswhyeachofthefollowingsymmetricencryptionalgorithmsfordescribedinthisbookissuitableorunsuitableforPGP:DES,two-keytripleDES,andAES.DESisunsuitablebecauseofitsshortkeysize.Two-keytripleDES,whichhasakeylengthof112bits,issuitable.AESisalsosuitable.Chapter6IPSecurityANSWERSNSWERSTOQUESTIONS6.1GiveexamplesofapplicationsofIPSec.SecurebranchofficeconnectivityovertheInternet:AcompanycanbuildasecurevirtualprivatenetworkovertheInternetoroverapublicWAN.ThisenablesabusinesstorelyheavilyontheInternetandreduceitsneedforprivatenetworks,savingcostsandnetworkmanagementoverhead.SecureremoteaccessovertheInternet:AnenduserwhosesystemisequippedwithIPsecurityprotocolscanmakealocalcalltoanInternetserviceprovider(ISP)andgainsecureaccesstoacompanynetwork.Thisreducesthecostoftollchargesfortravelingemployeesandtelecommuters.Establishingextranetandintranetconnectivitywithpartners:IPS
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