美聯(lián)儲發(fā)布半年度金融穩(wěn)定報告（2024年4月）-Financial Stability Report

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FinancialStabilityReport

April2024

BOARDOFGOVERNORSOFTHEFEDERALRESERVESYSTEM

TheFederalReserveSystemisthecentral

bankoftheUnitedStates.ItperformsfivekeyfunctionstopromotetheeffectiveoperationoftheU.S.economyand,moregenerally,thepublicinterest.

TheFederalReserve

conductsthenation’smonetarypolicytopromotemaximumemploymentandstablepricesintheU.S.economy;

promotesthestabilityofthefinancialsystemandseekstominimize

andcontainsystemicrisksthroughactivemonitoringandengagementintheU.S.andabroad;

promotesthesafetyandsoundnessofindividualfinancialinstitutions

andmonitorstheirimpactonthefinancialsystemasawhole;

fosterspaymentandsettlementsystemsafetyandefficiencythroughservicestothebankingindustryandtheU.S.governmentthatfacilitateU.S.-dollartransactionsandpayments;and

promotesconsumerprotectionandcommunitydevelopmentthrough

consumer-focusedsupervisionandexamination,researchandanalysisofemergingconsumerissuesandtrends,communityeconomicdevelopment

activities,andadministrationofconsumerlawsandregulations.

Tolearnmoreaboutus,visit

/aboutthefed.htm

.

iii

Contents

PurposeandFramework v

Overview 1

1AssetValuations 5

2BorrowingbyBusinessesandHouseholds 15

3LeverageintheFinancialSector 25

4FundingRisks 35

Box4.1.TheBankTermFundingProgram 38

5Near-TermRiskstotheFinancialSystem 45

Box5.1.SurveyofSalientRiskstoFinancialStability 47

Appendix:FigureNotes 49

Note:ThisreportgenerallyreflectsinformationthatwasavailableasofApril1,2024.

v

Afinancialsystemisconsideredstablewhenbanks,otherlenders,andfinancialmarketsareabletoprovidehouseholds,communities,andbusinesseswiththefinancingtheyneedtoinvest,grow,andparticipateinawell-

functioningeconomy—andcandosoevenwhenhitbyadverseevents,or“shocks.”

Consistentwiththisviewoffinancialstabil-

ity,theFederalReserveBoard’smonitoring

frameworkdistinguishesbetweenshocksto,andvulnerabilitiesof,thefinancialsystem.

Shocksareinherentlydifficulttopredict,

whilevulnerabilities,whicharetheaspects

ofthefinancialsystemthatwouldexacerbatestress,canbemonitoredastheybuilduporrecedeovertime.Asaresult,theframeworkfocusesprimarilyonassessingvulnerabilities,withanemphasisonfourbroadcategories

andhowthosecategoriesmightinteracttoamplifystressinthefinancialsystem.1

PurposeandFramework

ThisreportpresentstheFederalReserveBoard’scurrentassessmentofthestabilityoftheU.S.financialsystem.Bypublishingthisreport,theBoardintendstopromotepublicunderstand-

ingbyincreasingtransparencyaround,andcreatingaccountabilityfor,theFederalReserve’s

viewsonthistopic.FinancialstabilitysupportstheobjectivesassignedtotheFederalReserve,includingfullemploymentandstableprices,asafeandsoundbankingsystem,andanefficientpaymentssystem.

MoreontheFederal

Reserve’sMonitoringEfforts

Seethe

FinancialStabilitysection

oftheFederalReserveBoard’swebsiteformoreinformationonhowtheFederalReserve

monitorsthestabilityoftheU.S.andworldfinancialsystems.

Thewebsiteincludes:

?amoredetailedlookatour

monitoring

framework

forassessingriskineachcategory;

?moredataandresearchonrelatedtopics;

?informationonhowwecoordinate,cooper-ate,andotherwisetakeactiononfinancialsystemissues;and

?

publiceducationresources

describingtheimportanceofourefforts.

1.Valuationpressuresarisewhenassetpricesarehighrelativetoeconomicfundamentalsor

historicalnorms.Thesedevelopmentsareoftendrivenbyanincreasedwillingnessofinvestorstotakeonrisk.Assuch,elevatedvaluationpressuresmayincreasethepossibilityofoutsizeddropsinassetprices(seeSection1,

AssetValuations

).

1Forareviewoftheresearchliteratureinthisarea,seeTobiasAdrian,DanielCovitz,andNellieLiang(2015),“Finan-cialStabilityMonitoring,”AnnualReviewofFinancialEconomics,vol.7(December),pp.357–95.

viFinancialStabilityReport

2.Excessiveborrowingbybusinessesandhouseholdsexposestheborrowerstodistressif

theirincomesdeclineortheassetstheyownfallinvalue.Inthesecases,businessesand

householdswithhighdebtburdensmayneedtocutbackspending,affectingeconomicactivityandcausinglossesforinvestors(seeSection2,

BorrowingbyBusinessesandHouseholds

).

3.Excessiveleveragewithinthefinancialsectorincreasestheriskthatfinancialinstitutionswillnothavetheabilitytoabsorblosseswithoutdisruptionstotheirnormalbusinessoperationswhenhitbyadverseshocks.Inthosesituations,institutionswillbeforcedtocutbacklending,selltheirassets,orevenshutdown.Suchresponsescanimpaircreditaccessforhouseholdsandbusinesses,furtherweakeningeconomicactivity(seeSection3,

Leverageinthe

FinancialSector

).

4.Fundingrisksexposethefinancialsystemtothepossibilitythatinvestorswillrapidly

withdrawtheirfundsfromaparticularinstitutionorsector,creatingstrainsacrossmarketsorinstitutions.Manyfinancialinstitutionsraisefundsfromthepublicwithacommitment

toreturntheirinvestors’moneyonshortnotice,butthoseinstitutionstheninvestmuchofthosefundsinassetsthatarehardtosellquicklyorhavealongmaturity.Thisliquidityandmaturitytransformationcancreateanincentiveforinvestorstowithdrawfundsquicklyin

adversesituations.Facingsuchwithdrawals,financialinstitutionsmayneedtosellassetsquicklyat“firesale”prices,therebyincurringlossesandpotentiallybecominginsolvent,aswellascausingadditionalpricedeclinesthatcancreatestressacrossmarketsandatotherinstitutions(seeSection4,

FundingRisks

).

TheFederalReserve’smonitoringframeworkalsotracksdomesticandinternationaldevelop-

mentstoidentifynear-termrisks—thatis,plausibleadversedevelopmentsorshocksthatcouldstresstheU.S.financialsystem.Theanalysisoftheserisksfocusesonassessinghowsuch

potentialshocksmayspreadthroughtheU.S.financialsystem,givenourcurrentassessmentofvulnerabilities.

Whilethisframeworkprovidesasystematicwaytoassessfinancialstability,somepotential

risksmaybenovelordifficulttoquantifyandthereforearenotcapturedbythecurrentapproach.Giventhesecomplications,werelyonongoingresearchbytheFederalReservestaff,academ-

ics,andotherexpertstoimproveourmeasurementofexistingvulnerabilitiesandtokeeppacewithchangesinthefinancialsystemthatcouldcreatenewformsofvulnerabilitiesoraddto

existingones.

PurposeandFrameworkvii

FederalReserveactionstopromotetheresilienceofthe

financialsystem

TheassessmentoffinancialvulnerabilitiesinformsFederalReserveactionstopromotetheresil-ienceofthefinancialsystem.TheFederalReserveworkswithotherdomesticagenciesdirectlyandthroughtheFinancialStabilityOversightCounciltomonitorriskstofinancialstabilityandtoundertakesupervisoryandregulatoryeffortstomitigatetherisksandconsequencesoffinancialinstability.

ActionstakenbytheFederalReservetopromotetheresilienceofthefinancialsysteminclude

itssupervisionandregulationoffinancialinstitutions.Intheaftermathofthe2007–09financialcrisis,theseactionshaveincludedrequirementsformoreandhigher-qualitycapital,aninnova-tivestress-testingregime,andnewliquidityregulationsappliedtothelargestbanksintheUnitedStates.Inaddition,theFederalReserve’sassessmentoffinancialvulnerabilitiesinformsdeci-

sionsregardingthecountercyclicalcapitalbuffer(CCyB).TheCCyBisdesignedtoincreasetheresilienceoflargebankingorganizationswhenthereisanelevatedriskofabove-normallossesandtopromoteamoresustainablesupplyofcreditovertheeconomiccycle.

1

Overview

ThisreportreviewsvulnerabilitiesaffectingthestabilityoftheU.S.financialsystemrelatedtovaluationpressures,borrowingbybusinessesandhouseholds,financial-sectorleverage,and

fundingrisks.Italsohighlightsseveralnear-termrisksthat,ifrealized,couldinteractwiththesevulnerabilities.

AsummaryofthedevelopmentsinthefourbroadcategoriesofvulnerabilitiessincetheOctober2023FinancialStabilityReportisasfollows:

Overviewoffinancialsystemvulnerabilities

Assetvaluations

?Equityprice-to-

earningsratiosmovedtotheupperend

oftheirhistoricaldistributions.

?Corporatebondspreadsfelltolevelsthatare

lowrelativetotheirhistoricalaverages.

?Pricesofresidentialrealestateremainedhighrelativeto

fundamentals.

?Pricesofcommercialrealestatedeclinedamiddeterioratingfundamentals.

Borrowingbybusinessesandhouseholds

?Theratiooftotal

privatedebttogrossdomesticproduct

(GDP)declined

further,approachingitshistoricalaverage.

?Thebusinessdebt-to-GDPratioremained

high,butbusiness

debtcontinuedto

declineinrealtermsamidsubduedrisky

debtissuance.Firms’abilitytoservicetheirdebtremainedrobust.

?Householddebtwasatmodestlevels

relativetoGDPand

concentratedamongprime-ratedborrowers.

Leverageinthe?nancialsector

?Thebankingsystem

remainedsoundand

resilient,withrisk-basedcapitalratioswellaboveregulatoryrequirements.

?Nonetheless,some

bankscontinuedtofacesizablefairvaluelossesonsome?xed-rate

assetsheldontheirbalancesheets.

?Leverageincreasedfromalreadyelevatedlevelsatthelargesthedgefunds.

?Broker-dealerleverageremainednear

historicallylowlevels.

Fundingrisks

?Mostdomesticbanksmaintainedhighlevelsofliquidassetsand

stablefunding.

?However,concernsoveruninsureddepositsandotherfactorscontinuedtogeneratefunding

pressuresforasubsetofbanks.

?Structural

vulnerabilities

persistedatmoneymarketfunds,someothermutualfunds,andstablecoins.

?Lifeinsurers

continuedtoholdahighshareofilliquidandriskyassets.

2FinancialStabilityReport

1.Assetvaluations.Valuationsrosefurthertolevelsthatwerehighrelativeto

fundamentalsacrossmajorassetclasses.Equitypricesgrewfasterthanexpected

earnings,pushingtheforwardprice-to-earningsratiototheupperendofitshistorical

distribution.Corporatebondspreadsnarrowedandcurrentlystandatlevelsthatarelowrelativetotheirlong-runaverages.Residentialpropertypricesremainedhighrelativetofundamentalsandpricescontinuedtoriseinrecentmonths.Pricesofcommercialrealestate(CRE)declinedamidweakdemandforofficeproperties(seeSection1,

Asset

Valuations

).

2.Borrowingbybusinessesandhouseholds.Thebalancesheetsofnonfinancial

businessesandhouseholdsremainedsolid,astheratiooftotalprivatedebttogrossdomesticproduct(GDP)declinedfurther,approachingitshistoricalaverage.Although

businessdebtremainedhighwhenmeasuredrelativetoGDP(ortobusinessassetsforpubliclytradedcorporations),businessdebtdeclinedinrealtermsthroughoutlastyear.Firms’abilitytoservicetheirdebtremainedrobustowingtostrongearningsandlow

borrowingcostsonexistingdebt.HouseholddebtremainedatmodestlevelsrelativetoGDP,andmostofthatdebtisowedbyhouseholdswithstrongcredithistoriesorconsiderablehomeequity(seeSection2,

BorrowingbyBusinessesandHouseholds

).

3.Leverageinthefinancialsector.Thebankingsectorremainedsoundandresilient

overall,andmostbankscontinuedtoreportcapitallevelswellaboveregulatory

requirements.Nevertheless,fairvaluelossesonfixed-rateassetsremainedsizable

forsomebanks,andsomebankswithconcentratedexposuretoloansbackedby

commercialrealestatepropertiesexperiencedstress.Outsidethebankingsector,

availabledatasuggestthathedgefundleveragegrewtohistorichighs,drivenprimarilybyborrowingbythelargesthedgefunds.Leverageatlifeinsurancecompaniesremainedarounditsmedian,whiletheycontinuedtotakeoncreditandliquidityrisk.Broker-dealerleverageremainednearhistoricallows(seeSection3,

LeverageintheFinancialSector

).

4.Fundingrisks.Liquidityatmostdomesticbanksremainedample,withlimitedrelianceonshort-termwholesalefunding.Nevertheless,somebankscontinuedtoface

fundingstrains,likelyowingtovulnerabilitiesassociatedwithhighlevelsofuninsured

deposits,declinesinthefairvalueofassets,andelevatedexposuretoCRE.Structuralvulnerabilitiesremainedinothershort-termfundingmarkets.Primeandtax-exempt

moneymarketfunds(MMFs),aswellasothercash-investmentvehiclesandstablecoins,remainedvulnerabletoruns.Bondandloanfundsthatholdassetsthatcanbecome

illiquidduringperiodsofstressremainedsusceptibletolargeredemptions.Inaddition,lifeinsurerscontinuedtorelyonahigher-than-averageshareofnontraditionalliabilities(seeSection4,

FundingRisks

).

Overview3

Thisreportalsodiscussespotentialnear-termrisks,basedinpartonthemostfrequentlycited

riskstoU.S.financialstabilityasgatheredfromoutreachtoawiderangeofresearchers,aca-

demics,andmarketcontactsconductedfromlateJanuarythroughtheendofMarch(discussed

inthebox“

SurveyofSalientRiskstoFinancialStability

”).Theriskofpersistentinflationary

pressuresleadingtoamorerestrictivethanexpectedmonetarypolicystanceremainedthemostfrequentlycitedrisk,mentionedbynearlythree-fourthsofsurveyparticipants.Theshareofsurveyparticipantsmentioningpolicyuncertaintyasarisktothefinancialsystemstoodatjustunder

two-thirds,significantlyhigherthanintheOctoberreport.Overhalfofallsurveyparticipantsmen-tionedthepotentialeffectoflargerealizedlossesonCREandresidentialrealestate,downfromthree-fourthsofallparticipantsintheprevioussurvey.Roundingoutthetopfive,risksassociatedwiththereemergenceofbanking-sectorstressandwithfiscaldebtsustainabilityinadvanced

economiescontinuedtofeatureprominently.

Inaddition,thereportalsocontainsthebox“

TheBankTermFundingProgram

,”whichdescribestheroletheprogramplayedinprovidingfundingtothebankingsystembeginningwithitsincep-tioninresponsetotheMarch2023banking-sectorstressesupuntilitceasedextendingnew

loansonMarch11,2024.

Surveyofsalientriskstothefinancialsystem

SurveyrespondentscitedseveralemergingandexistingeventsorconditionsaspresentingriskstotheU.S.financialsystemandthebroaderglobaleconomy.Formoreinformation,seethebox“

SurveyofSalientRiskstoFinancial

Stability

.”

Commercialand

residentialrealestate

Persistentin?ation;monetarytightening

Banking-sectorstress

Fiscaldebtsustainability

Policy

uncertainty

April

2024

72%

ofcontacts

surveyed

60%

ofcontacts

surveyed

56%

ofcontacts

surveyed

44%

ofcontacts

surveyed

40%

ofcontacts

surveyed

October

2023

72%

ofcontacts

surveyed

24%

ofcontacts

surveyed

72%

ofcontacts

surveyed

56%

ofcontacts

surveyed

44%

ofcontacts

surveyed

5

1AssetValuations

Assetvaluationsincreasedtoelevatedlevelsrelativeto

fundamentals

SincetheOctoberreport,equityvaluationsincreasedfurther.Valuationsincorporatebond

marketsalsoappearedstretchedascorporatecreditspreads,thedifferenceinyieldsoncorpo-ratebondandyieldsonsimilar-maturityTreasurysecurities,narrowedsincethepreviousreport,fallingtolevelsinthelowerrangeoftheirhistoricaldistributions.Liquidityinshort-termTreasurymarketsremainedlowbyhistoricalstandards,althoughmarketliquiditywasconsistentwithele-vatedmeasuresofinterestratevolatility.Nonetheless,Treasurymarketliquidityconditionscouldamplifytheimpactofshocksonassetvaluations.

Residentialrealestatevaluationsremainednearthepeaklevelsseeninthemid-2000s.

CREmarketconditionscontinuedtodeteriorate,especiallyfortheofficesector,andpricescon-tinuedtodeclineagainstabackdropofhighvacancyratesandweakeningrents.Farmlandpriceswerehistoricallyelevatedrelativetorents,reflectinglimitedinventoriesofland.

Table1.1showsthesizesoftheassetmarketsdiscussedinthissection.Thelargestassetmar-ketsarethoseforequities,residentialrealestate,Treasurysecurities,andCRE.

Treasuryyieldsdecreasedslightlyandremainhighrelativetothepast15years

YieldsonTreasurysecuritiesdecreasedslightlysincetheOctoberreportbutremainedclose

totheirhighestlevelsoverthepastdecadeandahalf(figure1.1).Amodel-basedestimateof

thenominalTreasurytermpremium—ameasureofthecompensationthatinvestorsrequireto

holdlonger-termTreasurysecuritiesratherthanshorter-termones—remainedlowrelativetoits

long-runhistorydespiteedgingupthroughMarch(figure1.2).Whileinterestratevolatilityimpliedbyoptionsdeclinedatouch,itremainedelevatedbyhistoricalnorms(figure1.3).Thisvolatility

reflected,inpart,uncertaintyabouttheeconomicoutlookandtheassociatedpathofmonetary

policy,whichlikelyheightenedthesensitivityofTreasuryyieldstonewsaboutoutputgrowth,infla-tion,andthesupplyofTreasurysecurities.

6FinancialStabilityReport

Table1.1.Sizeofselectedassetmarkets

Item

Outstanding

(billionsofdollars)

Growth,

2022:Q4–2023:Q4

(percent)

Averageannualgrowth,

1997–2023:Q4

(percent)

Equities57,17522.29.2

Residentialrealestate56,4153.66.2

Treasurysecurities26,22710.08.2

Commercialrealestate22,518?6.36.4

Investment-gradecorporatebonds7,5335.48.1

Farmland3,4207.75.8

High-yieldandunratedcorporatebonds1,631?2.66.2

Leveragedloans11,397?1.113.2

Pricegrowth(real)

Commercialrealestate2?1.33.1

Residentialrealestate32.12.7

Note:Thedataextendthrough2023:Q4.GrowthratesaremeasuredfromQ4oftheyearimmediatelyprecedingtheperiodthroughQ4ofthe?nalyearoftheperiod.Equities,realestate,andfarmlandareatnominalmarketvalue;bondsandloansareatnominalbookvalue.

1

2

3

Theamountoutstandingshowsinstitutionalleveragedloansandgenerallyexcludesloancommitmentsheldbybanks.Forexample,linesofcreditaregenerallyexcludedfromthismeasure.Averageannualgrowthofleveragedloansisfrom2000to2023:Q4,asthismarketwas

fairlysmallbeforethen.

One-yeargrowthofcommercialrealestatepricesisfromDecember2022toDecember2023,andaverageannualgrowthisfrom

December1999toDecember2023.Bothgrowthratesarecalculatedfromequal-weightednominalpricesde?atedusingtheconsumerpriceindex(CPI).

One-yeargrowthofresidentialrealestatepricesisfromDecember2022toDecember2023,andaverageannualgrowthisfromDecember1998toDecember2023.Nominalpricesarede?atedusingtheCPI.

Source:Forleveragedloans,PitchBookData,LeveragedCommentary&Data;forcorporatebonds,Mergent,Inc.,FixedIncomeSecuritiesData-base;forfarmland,DepartmentofAgriculture;forresidentialrealestatepricegrowth,CoreLogic,Inc.;forcommercialrealestatepricegrowth,CoStarGroup,Inc.,CoStarCommercialRepeatSaleIndices;forallotheritems,FederalReserveBoard,StatisticalReleaseZ.1,“Financial

AccountsoftheUnitedStates”

Figure1.1.NominalTreasuryyieldsremainedclosetothehighestlevelsinthepast15years

Percent,annualrate

Monthly

2-year

10-year

Mar.

199920042009201420192024

Source:FederalReserveBoard,StatisticalReleaseH.15,“SelectedInterestRates.”

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

AssetValuations7

Monthly

Mar.

Figure1.2.Anestimateofthenominal

Treasurytermpremiumremainedrelativelylow

Percentagepoints

199920042009201420192024

2.5

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

0.0

?0.5

?1.0

?1.5

Source:DepartmentoftheTreasury;WoltersKluwer,BlueChipFinancialForecasts;FederalReserveBankofNewYork;FederalReserveBoardstaffestimates.

1086420?2

Monthly

Median=4.71

Mar.

Figure1.5.Anestimateoftheequitypremiumfellfurtherbelowitshistoricalmedian

Percentagepoints

199420002006201220182024

Source:Refinitiv,InstitutionalBrokers’EstimateSystem,NorthAmericanSummary&Detail

Estimates,Level2,Current&HistoryData,Adjusted

andUnadjusted,

/en/

data-analytics/financial-data/company-data/ibes

-

estimates

.

Figure1.3.Interestratevolatilityfellslightly

butcontinuedtobeelevatedbyhistoricalnorms

Basispoints

Monthly

Mar.

Median=80.22

2006200920122015201820212024

250

200

150

100

50

0

Source:FordatathroughJuly13,2022,BarclaysandS&PGlobal;fordatafromJuly14,2022,onward,ICAP,SwaptionsandInterestRateCapsandFloorsData.

Measuresofequitymarketvaluationsrosefurtherfromalreadyhighlevels

Theratioofpricestoexpected12-monthearnings,ortheP/Eratio,increasedsincetheOctoberreportandcurrentlysitsintheupperendofitshistoricaldistributionsince1989(figure1.4).

ThedifferencebetweentheforwardP/Eratioandthereal10-yearTreasuryyield—ameasure

oftheadditionalreturnthatinvestorsrequireforholdingstocksrelativetorisk-freebonds(theequitypremium)—declined,onnet,sincetheOctoberreportandcurrentlystandswellbelowitshistoricalmedian(figure1.5).2Equitymarketvolatilitywassubdued,andoption-impliedvolatility

Figure1.4.Theprice-to-earningsratioofS&P500firmsincreasedtolevelsfurtheraboveitshistoricalmedian

30

27

24

21

18

15

12

9

6

Ratio

Monthly

Mar.

Median=15.64

198919962003201020172024

Source:Refinitiv,InstitutionalBrokers’EstimateSystem,NorthAmericanSummary&Detail

Estimates,Level2,Current&HistoryData,Adjusted

andUnadjusted,

/en/

data-analytics/financial-data/company-data/ibes

-

estimates

.

2Thisestimateisconstructedbasedonexpectedcorporateearningsfor12monthsahead.Alternativemeasuresoftheequitypremiumthatincorporatelonger-termearningsforecastssuggestmoreelevatedequityvaluationpressures.

8FinancialStabilityReport

remainedinthelowerquarterofitshistoricaldistribution(figure1.6).

Spreadsincorporatedebt

marketsnarrowedtolowlevels

Yieldsforbothinvestment-andspeculative-

gradebondsfellabitsincetheOctoberreportandcurrentlystandnearthemedianoftheirrespectivehistoricaldistributions(figure1.7).Whilethedeclineincorporatebondyields

wasmodest,itneverthelessoutpacedthat

ofcomparable-maturityTreasurysecurities,

and,asaresult,corporatebondspreads

narrowedtolevelsthatarelowrelativeto

theirhistoricaldistributions(figure1.8).Theexcessbondpremium—ariskpremiummea-surethatcapturesthegapbetweencorporatebondspreadsandexpectedcreditlosses—remainednearitshistoricalmean(figure1.9).Market-basedforecastsofcreditquality

(one-year-aheaddefaultprobabilities)of

nonfinancialfirmshavemildlyimprovedsincetheOctoberreportbutremainsomewhatele-vatedbyhistoricalstandardsforspeculative-gradeissuers.

Figure1.6.Volatilityinequitymarketsdecreasedtolevelsslightlybelowthehistoricalmedian

Percent

Option-impliedvolatility

Realizedvolatility

Median=19.12

Mar.

Monthly

19962000200420082012201620202024

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

Source:CboeVolatilityIndex?(VIX?)accessedvia

BloombergFinanceL.P.;FederalReserveBoardstaffestimates.

Figure1.7.Corporatebondyieldsfellslightlytolevelsneartheirhistoricalmedians

Percent

Monthly

Triple-B

High-yield

Mar.

199920042009201420192024

24

22

20

18

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

Source:ICEDataIndices,LLC,usedwithpermission.

Figure1.8.Corporatebondspreadsnarrowedtolowlevelsrelativetotheirhistoricaldistributions

12

11

10

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

PercentagepointsPercentagepoints

Monthly

Triple-B(leftscale)

High-yield(rightscale)

Mar.

199920042009201420192024

24

22

20

18

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

Source:ICEDataIndices,LLC,usedwithpermission.

AssetValuations9

Figure1.9.Theexcessbondpremiumfell