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FinancialInstabilityandStrainsontheFinancialSystem

2PonziSchemeInthe1920s,aBostonfinanciernamedCharlesPonziconvincedinvestorstogivehimfundstouseinarbitragingSpanishpostagestampsinsteadofcapitalgains,heusedmoneyfromnewinvestorstopayoffearlierinvestorsinevitably,peoplelostfaithinhisabilitytopayoffinvestmentsandthewholeschemecollapsed3JunkBondsIn1909,thefirstpublicratingforbondsthatwere“belowinvestmentgrade”wasannouncedthesebondsarenowknownasjunkbondsattheendoftheGreatDepression,42%ofalloutstandingcorporatebondswereratedasjunkby1977,thisnumberhadfallento3.7%thejunkbondmarketgrewduringthe1980swithmorethan22%oftheoutstandingbondsasjunkbonds4JunkBondsTwoeventswouldeventuallyleadtothedemiseofthejunkbondmarketCampeauCorporation(alargeissuerofjunkbonds)defaultedleadingtopanicandlargesell-offsamongjunkbondholdersCongressenactedalawforcingallU.S.thriftinstitutionstosellofftheirjunkbondholdingsbymid-19945The“Dotcom”BubbleInthelate1990s,pricesofinternetstocksincreasedexorbitantlysmallinternetcompanieslaunchedIPOsinvestorsfoughttograbupstocksThebubbleburstinearly2000NASDAQgavebackabout90%oftheprevious5-yeargainoverthenext2?yearsinternetcompaniesfailedandthepaperwealthofinvestorsdisappeared6FinancialIntermediationandRiskFIshavedevelopednumerouswaystomanageriskdiversificationuseofexpertstoevaluateandaccessthecreditworthinessofpotentialborrowersandpotentialinvestmentsuseofvariable-rateloansandforwards,futures,options,swapagreements,andsecuritizations7FinancialIntermediationandRiskHowever,itisimpossibletoeliminateriskRiskisparticularlyacuteandintensifiedinfinancialclaimsbecausepaymentsfromonepartytoanotherareusuallydependentonapaymentfromathirdpartyfinancialclaimsarelayeredanddependentonmultiplepartiesfulfillingcontractsadefaultbyonepartysetsoffachainreactionthatcantriggermultipledefaults8FinancialCrisesAfinancialcrisisisacriticalupsetinafinancialmarketthatischaracterizedbysharpdeclinesinassetpricesandthedefaultofmanyfinancialandnonfinancialfirms9TheAnatomyofaFinancialCrisisRisksInherentinFinancialIntermediationInterest

RateRiskDefaultRiskLiquidity

RiskExchange

RateRiskResultinARandomDefaultCausingaFinancialCrisisCombinewiththeLayeringofFinancialClaims10FinancialCrisesManydifferentfactorsmayincreasetheprobabilityofafinancialcrisisasharp,unexpectedriseininterestratesraisesthelikelihoodofmultipledefaultsafallinstockvaluesmakesitmoredifficultforfirmsorindividualstoborrowunanticipateddeclinesintheoveralllevelofpricescanintensifytheriskofafinancialcrisis11FinancialCrisesAdebtdeflationisarealincreaseindebtburdenscausedbyfallingincomesandpricesPeriodsofdeflationhavenotbeentypicalduringthemiddleandlate20thcenturysomefearofdeflationintheearly2000s,butFedpolicyloweredinterestratestowardoffinflation12FinancialCrisesInrecentyears,manyfinancialcriseshavebeenglobalinnatureacrisisinonecountryquicklyspreadstoothersintheregionthegrowthinworldtrade,theremovalofbarrierstocapitalflows,andtheincreaseincapitalflowsamongnationshasincreasedthelikelihoodofafinancialcrisisspreadingtootherinterdependenteconomies13FinancialCrisesBecauseoftheinherentrisksoffinancialintermediation,agoalofregulatorsistoensurethesafetyandsoundnessofthefinancialsystemcreateasafetynetfordepositorsestablishguidelinesandcriteriaforcountriesthatwishtoparticipateintheinternationalfinancialsystem14TheProblemofMoralHazardThemostseverefinancialcrisisinU.S.historyoccurredduringtheGreatDepressionmorethan1/3ofthebanksfailedCongressrespondedbypassingtheGlass-SteagallActwhichestablisheddepositinsurance15TheProblemofMoralHazardEversincedepositinsurancewascreated,therehasbeenconcernaboutthemoralhazardproblemthatitcausesdepositinsuranceencouragesbankstomakeriskierloans16TheProblemofMoralHazardUntilthe1980s,depositinsurancewaswidelyviewedasanincredibleachievementDuringthe1970s,banksextendedtheirlendingtoless-developedcountriesandtohighlyleveragedbusinessventurestheyalsomademoremortgageswhichincreasedinterestraterisk17TheProblemofMoralHazardBeginningintheearly1980s,bankfailuresescalatedmanyobserversbelievedthatexcessiverisktakingcausedbythemoralhazardproblemwasonereasonwhysomanybanksfailedinthe1980sregulatorswerehesitanttoresolveinsolvenciesquicklyespeciallywhenalargebankwasinvolved18TheProblemofMoralHazard“Toobigtofail”becametheofficialdoctrineofFDICregulatorswhenContinentalIllinoisNationalBankofChicagofailedin1984regulatorsdonotallowabigbanktofailbutinsteadusethepurchaseandassumptionmethodtoresolveaninsolvencyahealthyinstitutionisfoundtotakeovertheassetsandliabilitiesofthefailedbanktheFDICpaysthetakeoverinstitutionthedifferencebetweentheliabilitiesandtheassetsofthefailedinstitution19TheProblemofMoralHazardForotherbanks,theFDICmayusethepayoffmethodtheFDICpaysoffinsureddepositorsandclosesdownthebankcreditors,stockholders,anduninsureddepositorsallloseRegulatorsarerequiredtousetheleast-costmethodtohandleabank’sinsolvencyunlessabank’sfailurecouldthreatenthesafetyandsoundnessofthefinancialsystem20TheProblemofMoralHazardThestrainsofthebankingsystemwereresolvedinthe1990sBanksalsoweatheredthedownturnintheearly2000sRegardlessoftheturnaround,industryexpertsbelievethatthepresentreformsdonotsufficientlydealwiththemoralhazardprobleminherentindepositinsurance21TheProblemofMoralHazardMoralhazardisalsoaconcernamongthosewhoaredesigninganinternationalframeworkforfinancialstabilityexcessiverisktakingmayoccuriffinancialparticipantsthinkthattheInternationalMonetaryFund(IMF)willbailoutacountryincrisis22TheProliferationofFinancialClaimsTherehasbeenaproliferationofnewfinancialproducts,newmarkets,andnewinstitutionstheproliferationoffinancialinstrumentsandthefungibilityoffinancialclaimsinaglobalfinancialsystemaugmentthepotentialfornewstressesandstrainstothefinancialsystem23Off-Balance-SheetActivitiesOff-balance-sheetactivitiesincludestandbylinesofcredit,overdraftprotection,unusedcreditcardbalances,andothercommitmentsforwhichtheFIisliablebutthatdonotshowuponthebalancesheetbanksmustnowconsideroff-balance-sheetactivitiesincalculatingcapitalrequirements24DerivativesDerivativesarefinancialcontractswhosevaluesarederivedfromthevaluesofotherunderlyingassetstheirvaluesfluctuatewiththevaluesoftheunderlyingassetstheuseofderivativesallowsfortheunbundlingofspecificrisksoffinancialassetsintopartssothatthosemorewillingandabletodosobeartheunbundledrisksmakesthefinancialsystemmoreefficient25DerivativesHowever,itisdifficulttounderstandalltherisksinvolvedwithextremelycomplexderivativeslaxoversightcouldleadtolargelossesthatcatchmanagement,regulators,andinvestorsbysurprisethus,someanalystsworrythatderivativesmaybetooriskyforbanks26TheEurodollarandEurobondMarketsEurodollarsaredollar-denominateddepositsheldabroadTheEurobondmarketisthemarketfordollar-denominatedbondssoldinaforeigncountryConcernhasbeenexpressedaboutthepossibilityofaliquiditycrisisintheEurodollarorEurobondmarketcouldspreadtodomesticfinancialmarkets27SummaryofMajorPointsFIshavedevelopednumerouswaystoreduceanddealwithrisksFIsusediversificationandexpertcreditanalysistomanagecreditriskFIsuseadjustablerateloans,forwards,futures,options,swaps,andsecuritizationstomanageinterestraterisksandexchangeraterisksliquidityriskismanagedbytheability

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