信用風險外文翻譯

1、外文資料why credit risk occur? and how to deal with it? adverse selection in loan markets occurs because bad credit risks(those most likely to default on their loans) are the ones who usually line up for loans ; in other words, those who are most likely to produce an adverse outcome are the most likely

2、to be selected. borrowers with very risky investment projects have much to gain if their projects are successful; and so they are the most eager to obtain loans. clearly ，however, they are the least desirable borrowers because of the greater possibility that they will be unable to pay back their loa

3、ns. moral hazard exists in loan markers because borrowers may have incentives to engage in activities that are undesirable from the lenders point of view. in such situations, it is more likely that the lender will be subjected to the hazard of default. once borrowers have obtained a loan, they are m

4、ore likely to invest in high-risk investment projects-projects that pay high returns to the borrowers if successful. the high risk, however, makes it less likely that they will be able to pay the loan back. to be profitable, financial institutions must overcome the adverse selection and moral hazard

5、 problems that make loan defaults more likely. the attempts of financial institutions to solve these problems help explain a number of principles for managing credit risk: screening and monitoring, establishment of long-term customer relationships, loan commitments, collateral, compensating balance

6、requirement, and credit rationing.screening and monitoringasymmetric information is present in loan markets because lenders have less information about the investment opportunities and activities of borrowers than borrowers do. this situation leads to two information-producing activities by banks an

7、d other financial institutions, screening and monitoring. indeed , walter wriston, a former head of citicorp, the largest bank corporation in the united states, was often quoted as stating that the business of banking is the production of information.screening . adverse selection in loan markets req

8、uires that lenders screen out the bad credit risks from the good ones so that loans are profitable to them. to accomplish effective screening, lenders must collect reliable information from prospective borrowers. effective screening and information collection together form an important principle of

9、credit risk management.specialization in lending. one puzzling feature of bank lending is that a bank often specializes in lending to local firms or to firms in particular industries, such as energy. in one sense, this behavior seems surprising because it means that the bank is not diversifying its

10、portfolio of loans and thus is exposing itself to more risk. but from another perspective such specialization makes perfect sense. the adverse selection problem requires that the bank screen out bad credit risks. it is easier for the bank to collect information about local firms and determine their

11、creditworthiness than to collect comparable information on firms that re far away. similarly, by concentrating its lending on firms in specific industries, the bank becomes more knowledgeable about these industries and is therefore better able to predict which firms will be able to make timely payme

12、nts on their debt.monitoring and enforcement of restrictive covenants. once a loan has been made, the borrower has an incentive to engage in risky activities that make it less likely that the loan will be paid off. to reduce this moral hazard, financial institutions must adhere to the principle for

13、managing credit risk that a lender should write provisions (restrictive covenants) into loan contracts that restrict borrowers from engaging in risky activities. by monitoring borrowers activities to see whether they are complying with the restrictive covenants and by enforcing the covenants if they

14、 are not, lenders can make sure that borrowers are not taking risks at their expense. the need for banks and other financial institutions to engage in screening and monitoring explains why they spend so much money on auditing and information-collecting activities.long-term customer relationshipsan a

15、dditional way for banks and other financial institutions to obtain information about their borrowers is through long-term customer relationships, another important principle of credit risk management.if a prospective borrower has had a checking or savings account or other loans with a band over a lo

16、ng period of time, a loan officer can look at past activity on the accounts and learn quite a bit about the borrower. the balances in the checking and savings accounts tell the banker how liquid the potential borrower is and at what time of year the borrower has a strong need for cash. a review of t

17、he checks the borrower has written reveals the borrowers suppliers. if the borrower has borrowed previously from the bank, the bank has record of the loan payments. thus long-term customer relationships reduce the costs of information collection and make it easier to screen out bad credit risks.the

18、need for monitoring by lenders adds to the importance of long-term customer relationships. if the borrower has borrowed from the bank before, the bank has already established procedures for monitoring that customer. therefore, the costs of monitoring long-term customers are lower than those for new

19、customers.long-term relationships benefit the customers as well as the bank. a firm with a previous relationship will find it easier to obtain a loan at a low interest rte because the bank has an easier time determining if the prospective borrower is good credit risk and incurs fewer costs in monito

20、ring the borrower.a long-term customer relationship has another advantage for the bank. no bank can think of every contingency when it writes a restrictive covenant into a loan contract; there will always be risky borrower activities that are not ruled out. however, what if a borrower wants to prese

21、rve a ling-term relationship with a bank because it will be easier to get future loans at low interest rates? the borrower then has the incentive to avoid risky activities that would upset the bank, even if restrictions on these risky activities are not specified in the loan contract. indeed, if a b

22、ank doesnt violating any restrictive covenants, it has some power to discourage the borrower from such activity: the bank can threaten not to let the borrower have new loans in the future. long-term customer relationships therefore enable banks to deal with even unanticipated moral hazard contingenc

23、ies.the advantages of establishing long-term customer relationships suggest that closer ties between corporations and banks might be beneficial to both. one way to create these ties is for banks to hold equity stakes in companies they lend to and for banks to have embers on the boards of directors o

24、f these companies.loan commitmentsbanks also create long-term relationships and gather information by issuing loan commitment to commercial customers. a loan commitments a banks commitment (for a specified future period of time) to provide a firm with loans up to a given a mount at an interest rate

25、that is tied to some market interest rate. the majority of commercial and industrial loans are made under the loan commitment arrangement. the advantage for the firm is that it has a source of credit when it needs it. the advantage for the bank is that the loan commitment promotes a long-term relati

26、onship, which in turn facilitates information collection. in addition, provisions in the loan commitment agreement require that the firm continually supply the bank with information about the firms income, asset and liability position, business activities, and so on. a loan commitment arrangement is

27、 a powerful method for reducing the banks costs for screening and information collection.<<china city commercial bank report,2008>>tells us: chinas city commercial banks, as the last institutions emerging in chinas commercial banking system, were founded in 1995 through shareholding refo

28、rm of the former urban credit cooperatives. they are regarded as “the third echelon” in chinas banking system.in 2007, china accelerated the pace of initial public offerings of its city commercial banks. on july 19th 2007, bank of nanjing went public in shanghai stock exchange, becoming the first ur

29、ban commercial bank stock in shanghai stock exchange. bank of nanjing with a registered capital of cny1.207 billion is the third urban commercial bank that has set up branches in other cities, after the bank of beijing and bank of shanghai. besides bank of nanjing, bank of ningbo also had its ipo on

30、 the same day in the shenzhen stock exchange.bank of beijing (601169) had its ipo in the shanghai stock exchange on sep. 19th 2007. the bank of beijing opened at 23 yuan per share in its market debut, up 84% from its ipo prices of 12.5 yuan. the bank issued 1.2 billion a shares in all, among which,

31、900 million shares were issued on-line. the banks shares were chased by the market and a total of cny1.9 trillion was frozen for subscription.furthermore, bank of hangzhou, bank of chongqing, and bank of tianjin have all expressed their intention to go public clearly. it is inevitable that more chin

32、as urban commercial banks will be listed on the stock market in 2008.china banking regulatory commission requires that domestic city commercial banks should be of a basic rudiment of a modern financial company in 2008. the basic rudiment should cover the following seven aspects: firstly, non-perform

33、ing loan should remain at about 5%; secondly, capital adequacy ratio should be above 8%; thirdly, npl provision coverage rate should reach 100%; fourthly, profit  should continue to grow; fifthly, all information should be fully disclosed; sixthly, the ability to prevent market risk and operati

34、onal risk should be further enhanced; seventhly, operation features, operation mechanism, corporate management, corporate culture and quality of employees should also be further improved. all city commercial banks have made great efforts to meet the above requirements and their efforts are finally p

35、aid off, according to our in-depth analysis in this report on operation conditions and performance of 75 city commercial banks in china.中文譯文信用風險的成因及該如何應(yīng)對？在信貸市場上所以發(fā)生逆向選擇問題，是因為高信貸風險者（那些最有可能在貸款上違約的人們）常常就是那些排著隊申請貸款的人。換言之，那些最有可能造成“逆向”結(jié)果的人，常常就是那些被“選中”得到貸款的人。如果項目成功，那些有著巨大風險投資項目的借款人將大有好處，因而這些人最急于得到貸款。然而，由于他

36、們極有可能難以償還貸款，他們顯然是最不合意的借款人。 貸款市場上所以存在道德風險，是因為借款人可能有積極性去從事那些被貸款人認為不合意的活動。在這種情況下，貸款人將可能遇到違約的風險。一旦借款人的到貸款，他們可能進行高風險項目的投資，即一旦成功將給借款人帶來很高收益的投資項目。然而，高風險使得他們更有可能難以償還貸款。為了能賺取利潤，銀行必須解決那些可能導(dǎo)致貸款違約的逆向選擇和道德風險問題。銀行解決這些問題的嘗試，有助于解釋它們管理信貸風險的一系列原則，如：篩選和監(jiān)控、與客戶建立長期聯(lián)系、貸款承諾、抵押物、補償余額要求和信用配給等。篩選和監(jiān)控信息不對稱問題所以在貸款市場上出現(xiàn)，是因為與借款者相

37、比，貸款人對于投資機會和借款人的活動所知較少。這種狀況導(dǎo)致銀行和其他金融機構(gòu)發(fā)展出兩種生產(chǎn)信息的活動：篩選和監(jiān)控。的確，美國花旗銀行的前負責人沃爾特·李斯頓的這段話是經(jīng)常被引用的：銀行業(yè)的工作就是生產(chǎn)信息。篩選。貸款市場上存在著逆向選擇問題，要求銀行將風險小的人們從風險大的人們中篩選出來，從而使銀行放款有利可圖。為了進行有效的篩選，銀行必須從每一位借款人那里收集到可靠的信息。有效的篩選和收集信息，構(gòu)成信用風險管理的一項重要原則。貸款專業(yè)化。銀行貸款令人迷惑的特征之一就是，一些銀行常常專事對當?shù)仄髽I(yè)或諸如能源之類的特定行業(yè)發(fā)放貸款。從某種角度來說，這種行為看起來是令人意外的，因為這意味

38、著銀行沒有把它們的貸款組合分散化，因而使自己面臨更多的風險。然而，從另一角度來看，這樣專業(yè)化又是非常有道理的。由于存在著逆向選擇問題，銀行分辨風險高低就是必要的。對于銀行來說，收集當?shù)仄髽I(yè)的信息并確定它們的信用度，較之對一家遙遠的企業(yè)做同樣的事要容易得多。同樣，將自己的貸款集中于特定的行業(yè)，銀行對這些企業(yè)會擁有更多的了解，從而更容易判斷哪些企業(yè)具有按時償還貸款能力。監(jiān)控和限制性契約。一旦貸款發(fā)出，借款者就有從事那些可能會使貸款難以償還的風險活動的動力。為了減少這種道德風險，銀行必須堅持風險管理的原則，在貸款合約中寫入限制借款者從事風險活動的條款（限制性契約）。通過對借款人從事的活動進行監(jiān)控來審

39、視借款者是否遵守限制性契約，一旦它們不遵守則強制他們執(zhí)行，這樣，銀行能保證借款者不從事那些從銀行角度來看有損于銀行利益的風險活動。一家成功的銀行之所以要在審計和收集信息活動上花那么多錢，其原因就在于它們需要對貸款實行篩選和監(jiān)控。與客戶的長期聯(lián)系銀行得到有關(guān)借款人信息的另一條途徑就是同客戶們建立長期聯(lián)系，這是信用風險管理的另一重要原則。如果一位可能的借款人在一家銀行長期保有支票賬戶或儲蓄賬戶，或者曾借過其他貸款，信貸員就能從賬戶上觀察客戶的活動，并對借款者有所了解。在支票賬戶和儲蓄賬戶的余額上可以告訴銀行家，這位可能的借款者掌握的資金流動狀況以及在一年中的什么時候?qū)ΜF(xiàn)金有著最強烈的需求。復(fù)審這位

40、借款者過去簽發(fā)的支票，能了解他的供應(yīng)者是誰。如果借款者過去在銀行借過款，銀行就有其償還貸款的紀錄?？梢姡c客戶的長期聯(lián)系減少了收集信息的成本，并使甄別信用風險更容易。待添加的隱藏文字內(nèi)容1銀行監(jiān)控的需要，使得與客戶的長期聯(lián)系多了一層重要性。如果借款者過去在銀行借過錢，銀行就已經(jīng)建立過對他的監(jiān)控程序。因此，監(jiān)控長期客戶的成本就比監(jiān)控新客戶的成本低得多。長期聯(lián)系即使客戶受惠，也使銀行受惠。一家過去與銀行有聯(lián)系的企業(yè)將發(fā)現(xiàn)，它們能以低利率取得貸款，因為銀行能很容易地確定借款者的風險狀況，而且在監(jiān)控上也將少花很多錢。對于銀行來說，與長期客戶的聯(lián)系還有另一項好處。當銀行將限制性契約寫進貸款合約時，它們不

41、可能設(shè)想到所有的可能，依然會有借款者的風險活動未被排除在外。然而，如果一名借款者想同一家銀行保持長期聯(lián)系，以便其在未來較容易地以低利率取得借款，他將怎樣行事？這位借款者就會有積極性去規(guī)避那些會惹惱銀行的風險活動，即便在貸款合約中并未對這些風險活動有所約束。的確，如果銀行不喜歡借款者的所作所為，即便借款者沒有違反任何限制性契約，它也有能力阻止借款者去從事這些活動，如銀行可以用未來不再提供新貸款來威脅借款者。這樣，與客戶的長期聯(lián)系甚至可以使銀行防范那些未預(yù)見到的道德風險。與客戶建立長期聯(lián)系的好處告訴我們，公司和銀行之間的密切聯(lián)系可能使雙方受益。建立這種聯(lián)系的途徑之一，就是由銀行持有其貸款企業(yè)的股份

42、，并派員參加這些企業(yè)的董事會。貸款承諾銀行還通過向商業(yè)客戶提供貸款承諾來創(chuàng)造長期聯(lián)系和收集信息。所謂貸款承諾，就是銀行同意在未來某一時期中以某種與市場利率相關(guān)聯(lián)的利率向企業(yè)提供某一限額之內(nèi)貸款的承諾。大部分工商業(yè)貸款都是在貸款承諾安排下發(fā)放的。這樣做對企業(yè)的好處是當它需要貸款時便能得到。對銀行的好處則在于貸款承諾促進了長期聯(lián)系，反過來便利了企業(yè)連續(xù)不斷地提供其收入、資產(chǎn)和負債狀況、經(jīng)營活動等等的信息，因此，貸款承諾安排是一種減少銀行篩選和收集信息成本的有力手段。 <<2008中國城市商業(yè)銀行研究報告>>告訴我們：中國城市商業(yè)銀行，作為中國商業(yè)銀行體系中出現(xiàn)的最后機構(gòu)in

43、 china's commercial banking system, were founded in 1995 through a，于1995年在城市信用社股份制改革的過程中成立。 they are他們在中國銀行體系中regarded as "the third echelon" in china's banking system.被視為“第三梯隊”。 in 2007, china accelerated the pace of initial public offerings of2007年，中國加快了城市商業(yè)銀行首次公開募股its city comme

44、rcial banks.的步伐。 on july 19th 2007, the bank of nanjing went在07年7月19日，南京銀行public on the shanghai stock exchange, becoming the first urban在上海證券交易所上市，成為第一家在上海證券交易所上市的城市 commercial bank stock in the shanghai stock exchange.商業(yè)銀行股票。bank of nanjing南京銀行with a registered capital of cny1.207 billion is the third urban注冊資本cny1.207億，是繼北京銀行和上海銀行之后第三個在其他城市設(shè)立了分行的城市商業(yè)銀行。 besides bank of nanjing, bank of此外，寧波銀行也在同一天于深圳證券交易所exchange.首次公開上市。（中國城市商業(yè)銀行存款總額的變化，20022007見下圖） bank of beijing (601169) had its ip