銀行和非銀行金融機構(gòu)對中國經(jīng)濟增長的影響【外文翻譯】

1、外文翻譯原文TheImpactofBankandNon-BankFinancialInstitutionsonLocalEconomicGrowthinChinaMaterialSource:SAuthor:XiaoqiangCheng&HansDegryseRecentdebateonfinanceandgrowthinChinaboilsdowntothequestiononhowChinesefirmsarefinancedandmonitored.OnestrandofliteraturereasonsthattheChineselegalsystemandformalfina

2、ncialsectoraretooweaktoenforcesoundgovernanceandthusthelaw,financeandgrowthnexusdoesnotholdinChina(e.g.,Allenetal.(2005)andBoyreau-Debray(2003).Chinesegrowththenstemsfrominformalfinancingchannelsandinstitutions.TheotherstrandreasonsthatformalfinanceinChinacontributestogrowth,despitetherelativeweakne

3、ssofthelegalsystem(e.g.Hasanetal.(2006),Ayyagarietal.(2007),RousseauandXiao(2007),or(Demitriadesetal.2008).1Informalfinanceservesfirmswhocannottapformalfinance.However,informalfinancecannotservetheneedsofthehigherendofthemarketsincetheirmonitoringandenforcementmechanismsareinsufficientlydeveloped(Ay

4、yagarietal.(2007).WefindthatbankingdevelopmentplaysanimportantroleinChineseeconomicgrowth.Ourevidencetakentogetherwiththatfromotherrecentpapers(e.g.Hasanetal.(2006),Ayyagarietal.(2007),RousseauandXiao(2007),andDemetriadesetal.(2008),whoalsosupporttheroleofformalfinanceinChinausingdifferentdatasetsan

5、dmethods,showthattheAllenetal.(2005)conjecturesarebecomingverymuchaminorityview.OurpaperthereforeshiftsthebalanceofevidenceawayfromtheviewthatformalfinanceplayedlittleroleinfinancingChineseeconomicgrowth.InChina,mostnon-bankfinancialinstitutionsonlyoperatewithinaprovince.Whilebanks,especiallystate-o

6、wnedbanks,havetheirnational-levelheadquarters,cross-provincebanklendingseldomhappensduetotherestrictionimposedbythecentralbankofChina.Thereforeitissafeforustocomparetheperformanceofthosetwotypesoffinancialinstitutionsatprovinciallevel.Financialdevelopmentofthosefinancialinstitutionsineachprovinceism

7、easured,inaconventionalway,bytheratiosoflocalsavingsandloanstoGDP.Thepaneldatasetweemploycoverstheperiod1995-2003,rightafterthemid-1990sfinancialreformstookplace.Choosingsuchaperiodalsohelpsusalleviatingthereverseimpactfromgrowthtofinancialreforms.Forinstance,theconcernthatfinancialreformswereinitia

8、tedexactlyatthetimethattheeconomywasexpectedtoboomshouldthenbelessofaconcern.Thegrowthrateshaveshownadecreasingtrendduringoursampleperiod,astheChinesegovernmenthasmanagedto“softland"theeconomysincethemid-1990s.Ourresultsshowthatacleardifferenceexistsbetweentheimpactoffinancialdevelopmentofbanks

9、andnon-bankfinancialinstitutionsongrowth.Whilehavingextendedmostoftheirloanstothelargeandmediumsizedfirms,bankscontributesignificantlytolocalgrowth.Thiseffectismorepronouncedinprovinceswithforeignentry.Asacomparison,non-bankfinancialinstitutions,whilegrantingmostoftheirloanstosmallerfirmsinChina,see

10、mtobenotimportantforlocalgrowth.Suchresultsarerobustacrossdifferentspecificationscontrollingforomittedvariablesorreversecausality.Weattributethisdifferencetothefactthatbanks,relativetonon-bankfinancialinstitutions,havebenefitedmuchmorefromtheChineseongoingfinancialreforms.Inparticular,thereformsincl

11、udecommercializationofstate-ownedbanks,marketentryderegulation,andliberalizationofinterestrates.Ourresultssuggestthat,despitetherelativelyweakChinesefinancialsector,atmarginbanksplayedanimportantroleintheallocationoffunds,andinturnspurredgrowth.OurfindingsharpenstheinsightsofAllenetal.(2005)ontheone

12、hand,andAyyagarietal.(2007),Demetriadesetal.(2008),andRousseauandXiao(2007),ontheotherhand,whichmainlyarguethatonlytheinformalandformalfinancialsectordrivegrowth,respectively.Before1994,thefourstate-ownedbanks7weredominatingthewholebankingsector.In1994,threepolicybankswerecreatedtoundertakepolicylen

13、dingpreviouslyassignedtothefourstate-ownedbanks.Thelatterthenbecamethestate-ownedcommercialbanks(SOCBshereinafter)forcommercialfinancialbusinessonly.Atthesametime,aseriesoffinancialreformshavebeencarriedoutinordertoimprovetheinternalmanagementandrisk-controloftheSOCBs,andtodelinkthemfromtheirnon-ban

14、kingarms(Li(2001).In1998,theChinesecentralbank(thePeople'sBankofChina(PBOChereinafter),allowedtheSOCBstomaketheirownlendingdecisionsonacommercialbasis.Incontrast,thenon-bankfinancialsectorhasreceivedfewreforms.Thesehavebeendeterredsincethereisnoconsensusontheownershipandfunctionsofthenon-bankfin

15、ancialinstitutions,especiallyoftheruralcreditcooperatives(RCCshereinafter)(He(2006)andXie(1998).Thedevelopmentoflegislationforthetrustandinvestmentcompanies(TICshereinafter)lagsbehindthatofbanks.WhiletheTrustLawdidn'tenadtheendof2001,theCommercialBankingLawenactedalreadyin1995providingalegalfram

16、eworkforstandardizingtheoperationsofthecommercialbanks.Figure1presentsanoverviewofChina'fsnancialinstitutionsattheendof1994,rightafterthecommercialization.Thebankingsectorentailsthreepolicybanksandfifteencommercialbanks,ofwhichthefourSOCBsarebyfarthemostimportantintermsofassets.Oneshouldnoticeth

17、ateachstate-ownedbankhasalargenumberofbranchesinalmosteverycityinChina.Amongtheelevenjointstockbanks,BankofCommunications(BoCom)isthelargestwithChina'sfinancministryitsmainshareholder.ResearchersoftenrefertothefourSOCBsandBoComas“thfivebiggeststate-ownedbanks"Thenon-bankfinancialsectorconsi

18、stsofurbancreditcooperatives(UCCshereinafter),RCCs,TICs,financialcompanies(FCs),andotherinstitutions.TherearemanyUCCsandRCCsinChina,buttheyareisolatedfromeachotheranddonothavecountry-wideheadquartersasbanks.Insum,bankandnon-bankfinancialinstitutionsaretheonlytwotypesoffinancialinstitutionsinChina,ac

19、cordingtotheAlmanacofChina'FinanceandBanking.Commercializationhasseveraleffects.First,theSOCBsgraduallyreducedtheirexposuretothestate-ownedsector,astheproportionofloanstothestate-ownedsectordecreasedfrom82.4%in1994towards64.4%in2002.Overtheperiod1994-2002,theshort-termloansextendedtothenon-state

20、-ownedsectorgrewfaster,especiallystemmingfromSOCBs,suggestingthattheSOCBsweremakinggreatereffortstosupportthenonstate-ownedsectorthannon-bankfinancialinstitutions.8Second,SOCBshadbeenabletoattracthighqualitypersonnel,whicharecrucialtoselectandmonitorprojects.Theevolutionofnon-performingloans(NPLsher

21、einafter)ofSOCBsandnon-bankfinancialinstitutionsillustratesthatcommercializationimprovedtheefficiencyoflending.Table1showsthattheNPLratiointhebankingsectorhadbeencontinuouslydecreasingbetween2000and2003.NexttothefactthattheChinesegovernmenthasinjectedcapitaltoSOCBs,mostoftheNPLswereactuallyduetothep

22、olicylendingduringthepre-reformperiodandlittlehadbeennewlygeneratedaftercommercialization(Zhang(2003a,b)andXu(2005).ThefewavailabledataontheNPLratioofnon-bankfinancialinstitutionssuggestthatthisratiowasmuchhigher(50%)andpossiblyatanincreasingtrend.ChinahasmadeanefforttostimulatecompetitionamongtheSO

23、CBsandalsotointroducecompetitionfromotherbankswithdifferentownershipstructures.In1986and1996,thefirstjointstockcommercialbank(BankofCommunication)andthefirstprivatejointstockcommercialbank(ChinaMinshengBankingCorp.,LTD.(CMBC)werecreated,respectively.Moreover,foreignfinancialinstitutionswereallowedto

24、setuprepresentativeofficesinChinain1981.Foreignbankswereallowedtosetupbranchesinmostimportantcoastalcitiesin1994andwereallowedtoconductRMBbusinessinShanghaiandShenzhentwoyearslater.HowtoreconciletheseresultswithAllenetal.(2005),whoarguethattheChinesefinancialsystemisweakandthatinformalfinanceandinfo

25、rmalinstitutionspromotegrowth,andAyyagarietal.(2007),(Demitriadesetal.2008),andRousseauandXiao(2007),whofindthatformalfinanceleadstogreaterfirmgrowth?Wefindthatonlybankingdevelopmentleadstogreatergrowth,inlinewithsomeofthefindingsofAyyagarietal.(2007),(Demitriadesetal.2008),andRousseauandXiao(2007),

26、whereasthedevelopmentofnon-bankfinancialinstitutionsseemsnottocausegrowth.ItisclearthattheChinesefinancialinstitutionsdohaveinefficienciescomparedtotheirinternationalcounterparts.Butcomparedtootherdomesticfinancialinstitutions,theChinesebankshavebenefitedgreatlyfromfinancialreformsandthuschangeddram

27、aticallyfromonlygrantingpolicyloanstostartingallocatingcapitalandmonitoringprojectsaccordingtocommercialstandards.ThispapercontributestotherecentdebateontheroleofformalandinformalfinanceforgrowthinChinausingsomenewperspectives.Inparticular,wearguethatnon-bankfinancialinstitutionsinChinahavecharacter

28、isticsofbothinformalandformalfinanceanddeservespecialattention.ThereforecomparisonoftheheterogeneitybetweenthosetwotypesoffinancialinstitutionsallowsgainingfurtherinsightsonwhethertheformalortheinformalfinancialsectorleadstogrowthinChina.Non-bankfinancialinstitutions,whichhavelongbeenignoredbythefin

29、anceandgrowthliterature,arethusbroughtunderthespotforthefirsttime.Inaddition,wearethefirsttolinkfinancialreforms,financialdevelopmentandgrowth.Banksandnon-bankfinancialinstitutionsthusserveasthe"referencegroup"foreachotherinidentifyingtherefor-finance-growthnexus.Usingaprovince-levelpaneld

30、atasetovertheperiod1995-2003,wefindthatbankdevelopment,inparticularbankcredit,greatlycontributestoprovincegrowth.Forinstance,anincreaseofbankloanstoGDPratiofromthelowesttothehighestinoursampleincreasesfutureannualgrowthby8.5percentagepoints.Incontrast,inmostspecifications,thedevelopmentofnon-bankfin

31、ancialinstitutionsisnotcorrelatedwithgrowth.Weattributethisdifferencetobankshavingbenefitedmorefromthereformprocesssuchascommercialization,entryderegulationandliberalizationthannon-bankfinancialinstitutions.Banksmayhavebeenabletograduallybuildupacommercialculture,gettingridoftheinterventionfromthelo

32、calgovernment,attractbetterqualitypersonnel,andimprovetheirviabilityduringopening-upforforeigninstitutions.Comparedtobanks,non-bankfinancialinstitutionswerelargelyunderdeveloped.ThisargumentisalsoconfirmedbyChina'gecentattemptstoreformurbanandruralcreditcooperativesbytransformingthemintolocalcom

33、mercialbanks.Thedifferentfindingsonthedevelopmentofbanksandnonbankfinancialinstitutionsshowthatthereform-finance-growthnexusalsoapplieswithintheformalfinancialsectorinChina.譯文銀行和非銀行金融機構(gòu)對中國經(jīng)濟增長的影響資料來源：斯普林格數(shù)據(jù)庫作者：陳曉強和漢斯迪格瑞斯在最近一次的辯論中，中國的經(jīng)濟增長歸結(jié)為中國的企業(yè)是如何資助和監(jiān)督的問題。原因之一是中國法律制度和正規(guī)金融部門的執(zhí)行和治理太弱并且不夠健全，從而在法律、金融和增

34、長之間的關(guān)系不成立，中國經(jīng)濟的增長來自于非正規(guī)的融資渠道和機構(gòu)(Allen,2005和Boyreau-Debray,2003)。另一條鏈的原因，在中國，正規(guī)金融對經(jīng)濟增長的貢獻是不可忽視的，盡管法律制度相對疲軟。非正規(guī)金融服務(wù)公司也有挖掘正規(guī)金融的潛力。然而，非正規(guī)金融無法滿足的一些東西，比如他們的監(jiān)督和執(zhí)行機制是不夠發(fā)達的，滿足不了市場的需要(Ayyagari,2007)。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，銀行業(yè)的發(fā)展在中國經(jīng)濟增長中的重要作用。我們的證據(jù)是其他一些最新的論文，如Hasan(2006),Ayyagari(2007),RousseauandXiao(2007年)和Demetriades(2008)表明

35、支持作用正規(guī)金融在中國用不同的數(shù)據(jù)集和方法，以及Allen(2005)的猜測正在成為一個非常少數(shù)人的觀點。因此，從平衡的證據(jù)視角認為，正規(guī)金融融資中發(fā)揮了經(jīng)濟增長作用不大。在中國，大多數(shù)非銀行金融機構(gòu)的經(jīng)營范圍內(nèi)只有一個省。盡管銀行，特別是國有銀行，有其國家一級總部，由于銀行貸款跨省的情況很少見，因為中國央行施加的限制。因此，這是我們比較安全的省級金融機構(gòu)的兩種類型的性能。在每個省的金融機構(gòu)的發(fā)展衡量的傳統(tǒng)的方式是財政，由當?shù)氐膬π詈唾J款占GDP勺比率。我們采用的面板數(shù)據(jù)集包括1995-2003年期間，右后90年代中期發(fā)生的金融改革。選擇這樣一個時期也幫助我們從經(jīng)濟增長減緩的影響，相對金融改革

36、來說。例如，該金融改革始于當時正是擔心經(jīng)濟有望進一步升溫然后應(yīng)是一個關(guān)注較少的增長率都表現(xiàn)出在我們的樣本期間下降的趨勢，研究中政府所達到的“軟土地”自90年代中期的經(jīng)濟。我們的研究結(jié)果表明，一個明顯的差異對銀行和非銀行金融機構(gòu)的金融發(fā)展對經(jīng)濟增長的影響是存在的。雖然能延長貸款一般是最大的大中型企業(yè)，銀行對當?shù)亟?jīng)濟增長作出重大貢獻是不可忽視的。這種效應(yīng)與國外入境的省份更加明顯。作為比較，非銀行金融機構(gòu)，同時給予他們的貸款在中國的大部分小公司，似乎是不適合當?shù)氐闹匾l(fā)展。這樣的結(jié)果是在對省略變量或相反的因果關(guān)系控制不同規(guī)格。我們認為這對銀行，相對于非銀行金融機構(gòu)，都是由于中國正在進行的金融改革很好

37、。特別是，改革包括國有銀行，市場準入自由化，利率自由化和商業(yè)化。我們的研究結(jié)果表明，盡管中國的金融業(yè)相對較弱，但在銀行的保證金中發(fā)揮了資金分配的重要作用，并反過來刺激經(jīng)濟增長。1994年以前，四大國有銀行占據(jù)了整個銀行部門。1994年，三家政策性銀行的建立是為了進行政策性貸款以前分配給四家國有銀行。后者則成為商業(yè)性金融業(yè)務(wù)只國有（國有商業(yè)銀行）的商業(yè)銀行。與此同時，金融改革已進行了一系列以完善內(nèi)部管理和風險控制的國有商業(yè)銀行，并從他們的脫鉤非銀行部門他們（Li,2001）。1998年，中國央行（人民銀行）銀行，允許國有商業(yè)銀行要在商業(yè)基礎(chǔ)上自行作出貸款決定。相比之下，非銀行金融機構(gòu)已收到一些改

38、革。這些已經(jīng)卻步因為沒有對所有權(quán)和非銀行金融機構(gòu)職能的共識，特別是農(nóng)村信用社（Xie,1998）。培養(yǎng)對信托投資公司立法的發(fā)展（國際信托）落后于銀行。雖然沒有制定信托法，直到2001年底，商業(yè)銀行法頒布于1995年已提供了一個規(guī)范的商業(yè)銀行業(yè)務(wù)的法律框架。銀行業(yè)需要三家政策性銀行和商業(yè)銀行十五，其中四個國有商業(yè)銀行目前最重要的是在資產(chǎn)方面。每個人都應(yīng)該注意，每個國有銀行在中國幾乎每個城市的分行多。其中十一股份制銀行，交通銀行（交行）與中國銀行是財政部的主要股東最大。研究者經(jīng)常提到的四個國有商業(yè)銀行和“五大國有銀行的”交銀。非銀行金融機構(gòu)包括城市信用社（以下簡稱信用社），農(nóng)村信用社，抽動，財務(wù)公司（FCS）的，和其他機構(gòu)。有許多城市信用社和農(nóng)村信用社在中國，但他們相互隔離，不具備在全國范圍內(nèi)為銀行總部?？傊y行和非銀行金融機構(gòu)是僅有的兩個在中國金融機構(gòu)類型，根據(jù)中國的金融年鑒得出。商業(yè)化已經(jīng)有很多影響了。首先，國有商業(yè)銀行逐步減少他們暴露在國有部門，作為貸款的比例，國有經(jīng)濟在1994年下降64.4%,對從2002年的82.4%。在1994-2002年期