股權(quán)制衡論文：董事會(huì)獨(dú)立性、股權(quán)制衡與大股東掏空行為研究

1、. 股權(quán)制衡論文：董事會(huì)獨(dú)立性、股權(quán)制衡與大股東“掏空行為研究【中文摘要】據(jù)以往的研究分析,許多國(guó)家不管是上市公司還是非上市公司,大股東與中小股東之間的利益沖突都表現(xiàn)得非常明顯。在我國(guó),由于體制方面的特殊原因?qū)е铝松鲜泄镜墓蓹?quán)構(gòu)造和外部治理機(jī)制不合理,董事會(huì)、監(jiān)事會(huì)受制于大股東,法律對(duì)中小股東的保護(hù)還很不夠,外部審計(jì)的監(jiān)視作用沒(méi)有充分發(fā)揮,大股東通過(guò)頻繁的關(guān)聯(lián)交易巧立名目侵占上市公司利益的情況普遍存在。諸多因素綜合在一起,促使我們有必要將關(guān)注的焦點(diǎn)從股東與管理者之間的利益沖突轉(zhuǎn)移到股東之間利益沖突上來(lái)。2006年,對(duì)于我國(guó)公司,尤其對(duì)上市公司來(lái)說(shuō)是重要的一年。公司的外部環(huán)境發(fā)生了重大的變化,

2、一是新會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則的公布；二是股權(quán)分置改革根本完成。選取這一期間的樣本可以近態(tài)地觀察大股東“掏空行為及其影響因素的變化,還為這些政策措施的效果評(píng)價(jià)提供實(shí)證依據(jù)。本文試圖用代理理論、信息不對(duì)稱理論、股權(quán)制衡理論等理論和實(shí)證方法,從公司治理角度分析我國(guó)上市公司大股東的“掏空行為。理論方面,從部治理機(jī)制的兩個(gè)方面股權(quán)構(gòu)造、董事會(huì)治理的設(shè)計(jì)進(jìn)展深入的規(guī)分析。實(shí)證方面,本文選取了我國(guó)上市公司2005年-2008年間的6093個(gè)有效樣本,從大股東占款角度,對(duì)公司治理因素與大股東“掏空行為的關(guān)系進(jìn)展了實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)。主要得出了如下結(jié)論：(1)第一大股東的持股比例在股權(quán)分置改革期間以及完成股改后下降速度比擬明顯,且其占

3、款行為也有明顯下降,參加年度控制變量進(jìn)展多變量回歸分析發(fā)現(xiàn),第一大股東持股比例的平方與“掏空存在正相關(guān)關(guān)系,并通過(guò)顯著性檢驗(yàn)。同時(shí)發(fā)現(xiàn)年度控制變量對(duì)大股東占款影響較大,這也提示我們,雖然本文的研究取得了預(yù)期的效果,但是,在今后的研究中要關(guān)注大股東“掏空方式的變化,研究大股東新的、主要的“掏空方式,以便加強(qiáng)管理。另外,從控股股東性質(zhì)來(lái)看,國(guó)有控股股東與“掏空存在顯著的止相關(guān)關(guān)系,說(shuō)明我國(guó)原有的公司制度環(huán)境也是影響大股東“掏空行為的一個(gè)重要方面。其他大股東SH25、SH35與“掏空行為顯著負(fù)相關(guān),說(shuō)明其他大股東對(duì)“掏空行為具有制衡作用,能夠抑制大股東“掏空上市公司。(2)董事會(huì)的治理效果有限,主要

4、表現(xiàn)為獨(dú)立董事比例對(duì)大股東的“掏空行為沒(méi)有明顯的監(jiān)視作用。獨(dú)立董事聲譽(yù)變量與大股東“掏空行為負(fù)相關(guān),在10%的水平下通過(guò)了顯著性檢驗(yàn)。但是,董事長(zhǎng)與總經(jīng)理兩職合一的職權(quán)構(gòu)造則加重了大股東的“掏空行為,與“掏空具有顯著的正相關(guān)關(guān)系。(3)根據(jù)上面的分析結(jié)果,本文進(jìn)一步做關(guān)于股權(quán)制衡、董事會(huì)獨(dú)立性與大股東“掏空行為的研究。分析結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn),在股權(quán)缺乏制衡的情況下,獨(dú)立董事比例與大股東“掏空行為不存在顯著相關(guān)性,而在股權(quán)制衡的情況下,獨(dú)立董事比例與大股東“掏空行為顯著負(fù)相關(guān)。說(shuō)明股權(quán)制衡的環(huán)境更有利于獨(dú)立董事獨(dú)立性的發(fā)揮。然而,獨(dú)立董事聲譽(yù)變量在股權(quán)缺乏制衡的情況下與大股東的“掏空行為表現(xiàn)更為顯著,為負(fù)

5、相關(guān)關(guān)系。說(shuō)明控股股東為了裝點(diǎn)門面、掩蓋自身“掏空動(dòng)機(jī),在股權(quán)缺乏制衡的情況下,傾向于選擇聲譽(yù)好的獨(dú)立董事,同時(shí),也說(shuō)明好的獨(dú)立董事聲譽(yù)能提高獨(dú)立董事的責(zé)任感,代表其他股東的利益,監(jiān)視大股東的“掏空行為。另外,董事長(zhǎng)與總經(jīng)理兩職合一變量與大股東“掏空行為的關(guān)系在兩種股權(quán)制衡條件下與前面的研究結(jié)論一致,即二者顯著正相關(guān)?！居⑽恼緼ccording to previous research and analysis, both listed panies and non-listed panies in many countries, it is obvious that large shar

6、eholders and minority shareholders have a conflict of interest. In China, due to the special institutional causes, the ownership structure of listed panies and the internal and e*ternal governance mechanisms are unreasonable, the board of supervisors is subject to shareholder, legal protection of mi

7、nority shareholders is still weak, the supervisory of e*ternal audit did not play a good role, large shareholders assuming a frequent occupation of the interests of the listed panies through related party transactions is widespread. Number of factors bined makes us transfer our focus from the confli

8、ct of interests between shareholders and managers to the conflict of interest between shareholders. In 2006, for our panies, particularly the listed panies are an important year. The panys e*ternal environment has undergone significant changes:firstly, the promulgation of the new accounting standard

9、s; secondly, the split share structure reform is basically pleted. Select samples of this period can help us to find out the recent shareholder “tunneling change of behavior and the influence factors of tunneling, and also can provide an empirical basis to evaluate the effects of these policies and

10、measures.This paper attempts to use the agency theory, asymmetric information theory, and the power balance with shareholder structure theory, from the perspective of corporate governance, to analysis the “tunneling behavior of major shareholders of listed panies in China.Theatrically, from two aspe

11、cts of internal governance mechanisms:ownership structure, board governance, to do some depth analysis. In Evidence, the paper selected years between 2005 -2008, listed panies in China, about 6093 valid samples, from the perspective of the entrenchment of Controlling Shareholders, to analyze the cor

12、porate governance factors and substantial shareholder “tunneling behavior in an empirical test. Main conclusions are as follows:(1) during the reform period and after pletion of the reform, the largest shareholders ownership percentage is declining obviously, and so did its “tunneling behavior. At t

13、he same time, we found that the control variable of annual does greater impact on the regress analysis, it also reminds us that although this study had the desired effect, but in the future research we should focus on “tunneling changes and major “tunneling approach of large shareholders, find ways

14、to strengthen corporate management. Adding the controlling variables of year, there is a significant positive correlation between largest shareholders and “tunneling behavior in the multivariate regression analysis. It passed the significance test. In addition, from the nature of controlling shareho

15、lder, there is a significant positive correlation between the state-owned controlling shareholder and “tunneling. Other major shareholders SH25, SH35 was significantly negatively correlated with “tunneling behavior. (2) The Board of Management has limited effects. The proportion of independent direc

16、tors has no significant effect of the supervision on the major shareholders of the “tunneling behavior. So did the reputation of the independent directors. In addition, if the chairman and general manager are the same person would increase the major shareholderstunneling behavior. (3) In accordance

17、with the above analysis, we did some further research on power balance with shareholder structure, independence of the board and tunneling behavior. The results showed that in the lack of power balance with shareholder structure regress analysis, there is no significant correlation between the propo

18、rtion of independent directors and major shareholders “tunneling behavior. But in the case of power balance with shareholder structure, there is significantly negative related between the equity proportion of independent directors and major shareholders “tunneling behavior. It is indicated that the

19、environment of power balance with shareholder structure is benefit for the independence of independent directors to play. However, the reputation of the independent directors of the lack of power balances with shareholder structure even more significant than the power balances with shareholder struc

20、ture, it has negative correlation with the “tunneling behavior. It is indicated that controlling shareholders in order to cover up their own “tunneling motivation, tend to choose good reputable independent directors under the lack of power balances with shareholder structure. Meanwhile we can also g

21、et an idea that reputable independent directors can protect the benefits of other shareholders. In addition, if the chairman and general manager are the same person, no matter the corporate structure own power balances or not, it has significant positive correlation with “tunneling behavior.【關(guān)鍵詞】股權(quán)制

22、衡 董事會(huì)獨(dú)立性 掏空 大股東【英文關(guān)鍵詞】Power Balance with Shareholder Structure Independence of the Board Tunneling Large Shareholders【目錄】董事會(huì)獨(dú)立性、股權(quán)制衡與大股東“掏空行為研究摘要5-6Abstract6-7第一章 緒論10-151.1 研究背景及研究意義10-121.1.1 研究背景10-121.1.2 研究意義121.2 采取的研究方案12-131.3 本課題的特色與創(chuàng)新之處131.3.1 本課題的特色131.3.2 可能的主要?jiǎng)?chuàng)新131.4 架構(gòu)安排13-15第二章 文獻(xiàn)綜述15-202.1 國(guó)外研究回憶15