專利池與公共利益PatentPoolandPublicInterest以飛利浦課件

專利池與公共利益

PatentPoolandPublicInterest

－－以飛利浦專利無效案為視角

TakingPhilips’patentrightinvalidationcaseasanexample張平ByZhanping北京大學(xué)法學(xué)院知識產(chǎn)權(quán)學(xué)院

IntellectualPropertyInstituteofBeijingUniversityLawSchool

2007年4月18日April18th,2007專利池與公共利益

PatentPoolandPubli1PartIThetrendofGlobalEnterprisesPatentStrategy

TechnologyPatenting－PatentStandardization－StandardGlobalization

Marketcontrolledbypatentholder;MonopliedbyafewlargeenterprisesDeficientofcommonpartsanditsnegativeinfluenceoninnovationMonoplypriceLimitcompetitionMoreco-existingstandardsareharmfultoconsumersProductpriceincreasedastheresultofhigheroperatingcostofstandardProblemsPartIThetrendofGlobalEn2Thebirthandevolutionofthepatentpool

Fiercefightoverpatentapplications

SharpIncreaseofPatentAuthorizationProminentOverlapbetweenpatentrightsThecomplexdependentrelationshipsbetweenpatentoperationSubstantialincreaseinoperatingcostofpatents

FormationofPatentThicket

“Explosion”ofPatentSuits

Theindustrialdevelopmentisincreasinglycontrolledbymanydecentralizedandindependentpatentrights,whichmakesthepatentedtechnologynotbeutilizedfullyandefficiently.Therefore,thepatentpoolisborn.

Thebirthandevolutionofthe3TheConceptofPatentPoolPatentPool:akindofpatentassociationinitsessence.Itindicatesthattwoormorepatentholdersgivelicensetoeachotherorthethirdparty,grantingoneormoreoftheirpatentsuponconsultation.Inthetypicalpatentpool,allpatentsincludedareopentoallpartiesinvolved.Tothethirdpartyoutsidethepatentpoolagreement,itusuallyprovidesthelicensingcontractsofstandards.Licensefeesobtainedfrompatentpoolisdistributedtoitsmembersinaccordancewithpredeterminedway.TheConceptofPatentPoolPate4PatentPool&TechnicalStandards

Settinguppatentpoolisoftenbasedonspecialtechnicalstandards:

-----EssentialPatentsPoolinDVBstandardofEuropeUnion

----EssentialPatentsPlatformin3Gstandard

----EssentialPatentPortfolioinMPEG-2standard

----3Cand6CpatentpoolinginDVDstandardPatentPool&TechnicalStanda5Generalproblemsduringdevelopingpatentpool

Evaluationprocedureofnecessarypatentandmaterialconditionquestioning:evaluationexpert

Uncertaintyofpatentdisclosure:internalpatentandexternalpotentialpatent

Unclearnecessarypatent:credibilityofpatentholder

Bundledlicense:Suspicionofunnecessarypatenttying

Toomanytrapsinthecalculationoflicensingfees:questioningitsscientificcontent

Unfairgrant-backclause:exclusivegrant-backintechnicalimprovement

non-questioningclausesofright:concealinvalidpatent

Solutionstodisputejurisdiction:strongbargainingposition

Limitcompetition,hinderinnovation,industrialdevelopmentproblem

Generalproblemsduringdevelo6

PartIICausesofInvalidating

PhilipsChinesePatent

1.Thinkabouttheproblemsthatexistinthepatentpool.

2.Challengethecredibilityofpatentholder.

3.ExperienceinresearchinggoodoperationofIPsystem

4.Concernsaboutthemainlandenterprisesintheawarenessandapplicationofpatent

5.Constructiveconsiderationsonnationalanti-trustlegislationandindustrialinterest

6.AttempttocombineacademicresearchofIPandsocialdemand

……

PartIICausesofInva7PartIICausesofInvalidating

PhilipsChinesePatent1.PatentinvalidationofCitybank,whichsimmeredin20032.Argumentationofdigitalcamerapatentin2003.

WilldigitalcamerafollowinthefootstepsofDVD?3.GloballegitimationofDVDpatentbeganin2005.

4.Subsequently,Dongjincase,Dongzhengcase,Dongqiangcase5.decidetotake3Cpatentasthecontactpoint6.InvalidateChinesepatentCN95192413.3,i.e.Transmittingandreceivingmethodofcodedata,anditstransmitterandreceiver.PartIICausesofInvalidati8PartIICausesofInvalidating

PhilipsChinesePatentGroundstobedefinedasrequestofnonprofitpatentinvalidation：Firstofall,itishopedthatthiscasecanpromotethenationallegalconstructionintheaspectofIPanti-trustthroughtheanalysisoflimitedcompetitionandinnovationhindranceinthepatentpoolinglicense.IntellectualpropertymustbeoperatedundertheregulationofAntitrustLaw,whichistheworldwideexperience.However,therearestillinstitutionaldrawbacksintheaspectofIPantitrust.

Standardispublicproduct,butintellectualpropertyisprivateright.

StandardcontainingIntellectualpropertyisthepublicgoodswithimpurities.

ThegovernmenthastoestablishthecorrespondingsystemtopreventIPfrombeingmisused.

PartIICausesofInvalidati9PartIICausesofInvalidating

PhilipsChinesePatentSecondly,mainlandenterprisesshouldbeinspiredofintellectualpropertyprotectionanditsapplicationcapabilities.Asthepatentsystemitselfcannotguaranteethe"purity"ofpatentquality,andtheforeignpatentholderhasstrengthandadvantageintheaspectoflawutilizationandmarketexpansion,alargenumberof“questionablepatents”areseekingmonopolyinterestthroughthelegalway.Presently,internationalpartiesinvolvedhavereviewedtheimpactthatpatentsystemhasbroughtoninnovationandcompetition,andbeguntodiscussthereformofpatentsystem.ThemainlandenterprisesshouldlearntouseIPstrategytoprotectanddevelopthemselves.

PartIICausesofInvalidati10PartIICausesofInvalidating

PhilipsChinesePatentThirdly,advocatingthecombinationoftheoreticalresearchofIPanddevelopmentofnationalindustry.Intheconstitutionoftechnicalstandardpatentpoolandutilizationofforeignpatentpool,ifitisinvolvedwiththeresearchofforeignantitrustsystemandthewaytolearnandapply,onlywhenyouhaveathoroughunderstandingofdomesticpracticecanyoudecidethedirectionofacademicresearch.

PartIICausesofInvalidati11PatentPoolDVDAudioDiskDVD-ROMPlayerDVDAudioPlayerADVDAudioPlayerBDVDAudioPlayerCDVDAudioPlayerDVDVideoPlayerDVD-ROMDiskDVDAudioDiskADVDAudioDiskB1DVDAudioDiskB2DVDAudioDiskB3DVDVideoDiskSinglelayerDuallayerSinglelayerDuallayerPartIII3CPatentPoolandAnalysisofLicensePolicy

PatentPoolDVDAudioDiskDVD-R12PartIII3CPatentPoolandAnalysisofLicensePolicyPatentsoverlapindifferentpatentpool.

Infact,hundredsofpatentsinapatentpoolareonlyconcernedwithscoresofinventions.Patentfamilyisbasicallysameintechnicalfeatures(AppliedInternationally),butdifferentinparts.Causes:Continueapplication,continuepartialapplication,divisionsormakeamendmentstoadjustittothepatentlawindifferentcountries.

PartIII3CPatentPoolandA13Philipscarriesonjointlicenseonbehalfof3C,thepatentsinclude(1)thepatentsbelongtoorpossessedby3Candtheirownaffiliatedcompany.(2)thepatentsbeforethedateoffilingorpriority;(3)NecessarypatentswhichconformtoDVDstandards,andthepatentnecessityisjudgedbyAmericanorEuropeanindependentexperts.

IntheJointLicenseAgreement,Philipsgrantslicenseenon-exclusiveandnon-transferablelicense.LicenseehasrighttomanufacturelicensedproductsinaccordancewithDVDstandardsinthedesignatedarea,andhasrighttoselltheproductstoallovertheworldortreattheseproductsintheotherway.

PartIII3CPatentPoolandAnalysisofJointLicensePolicy

Philipscarriesonjointlicen14Differentlicensedproductsaregrantedtodifferentlicenseagreement.Eachkindoflicenseagreementmaybedividedintothreeversions,thatis,American,pacific-Asian,andotherareas.Theclausesofthreeversionsarenearlyidentical;themaindifferenceistheapplicablelawandjurisdiction.

Licensefeesarecalculatedbypiecesratherthanbypercentageofsalesprice,anditisnotsubjecttothefluctuationofmarketpriceoflicensedproducts.Licensefeesarenotbasedonquantityofpatentsanddon’tchangewiththeincreaseordecreaseofpatentquantity.

PartIII3CPatentPoolandAnalysisofLicensePolicyDifferentlicensedproductsar15PartIII3CPatentPoolandAnalysisofLicensePolicyLicenseepays10000dollarsinadvance,5000ofwhichispre-paymentsoflicensefees.

3.5%ofsalespriceorfivedollarsischargedaslicensefeesforeachDVDplayer,whichissoldbeforeJuly1stof2000.Thelicensefeesaresubjecttohigherone,

FivedollarsischargedaslicensefeesforeachDVDplayer,whichissoldonorafterJuly1stof2000.

Ifthelicenseefulfilstheobligationsoflicenseagreementcompletelyandsubmitseligibleauditingreport,eachsetmaybecharged3.5dollarsaslicensefees.

Within10yearsstartingfromthedateofentryintoforceofthecontract,ortheduedateonwhichthelastlicensepatentsexpiredintheareaspermitted,subjecttothefirstone.

ClausesofLicenseFeesClausesofLicensePeriodPartIII3CPatentPoolandA16PartIII3CPatentPoolandAnalysisofLicensePolicyTheLawofNetherlandsisapplicabletothelicensingagreementofPlayersintheAsia-Pacificregionsandotherareas.WhenPhilipscompanyisthedefendant,onlythecourtsinHagueofNetherlandshavejurisdictionoversuchcases.

TheLawofNewYorkStateisapplicabletothelicensingagreementofPlayersinUSA.WhenPhilipsCompanyisthedefendant,onlythecourtsinNewYorkorFederalCourtshavejurisdictionoversuchcases.

ClausesofApplicableLawandJurisdiction

PartIII3CPatentPoolandA173Cpatentlicensingagreement

issubjecttoreviewofUSDepartmentofJustice

RelevantregulationsofAmericananti-trustlaw

ThefirstArticleofShermanAct:Everycontract,combinationintheformoftrustorotherwise,orconspiracy,inrestraintoftradeorcommerceamongtheseveralStates,orwithforeignnations,isdeclaredtobeillegal.Everypersonwhoshallmakeanycontractorengageinanycombinationorconspiracyherebydeclaredtobeillegalshallbedeemedguiltyofafelony,and,onconvictionthereof,shallbepunishedbyfinenotexceeding$10,000,000ifacorporation,or,ifanyotherperson,$350,000,orbyimprisonmentnotexceedingthreeyears,orbybothsaidpunishments,inthediscretionofthecourt.

ThesecondArticleofShermanAct:Everypersonwhoshallmonopolize,orattempttomonopolize,orcombineorconspirewithanyotherpersonorpersons,tomonopolizeanypartofthetradeorcommerceamongtheseveralStates,orwithforeignnations,shallbedeemedguiltyofafelony,and,onconvictionthereof,shallbepunishedbyfinenotexceeding$10,000,000ifacorporation,or,ifanyotherperson,$350,000,orbyimprisonmentnotexceedingthreeyears,orbybothsaidpunishments,inthediscretionofthecourt.

Article7"ShermanAct,"Anypersonwhosufferedpropertydamagebecauseofantitrustissues,canbringuplitigationtoAmericanCourtinthedefendant'sresidence,ortheplacetobefoundorexistagency.Regardlessofthesizeofdamage,givetriplecompensationequaltothedamagesandlegalcostandreasonableattorneyfees.3Cpatentlicensingagree183Cpatentlicensingagreement

issubjecttoreviewofUSDepartmentofJusticeIn1998,USDepartmentofJusticemadereviewof3Cpatentpoollicensingagreementinaccordancewiththereviewproceduresofbusinessactivities.3Cjointlicensingarrangementisachievedthroughtwolicensingagreements.Oneistheothermembersof3CsignedlicensingagreementwithPhilips,theotherisPhilipssignedthelicensingagreementwiththemanufacturersofDVDdiscorplayeronbehalfof3C.

Antitrustreviewideas:measuringtheanticipatedpro-competitiveeffectsandthepotentialanti-competitiverisksofjointpatentlicense(orpatentpools).Theconcreteanalyticstepsareasfollows:identifyingwhetherthepatentpoolisthecombinationofcomplementarypatentsornot.Ifso,continuetoexaminewhethertheresultingeffectsoutweightheanti-competitiveeffects.

Examinationof3CpatentpoolmadebytheMinistryofJustice,ispremisedonthefactthatalloflicensedpatentsareefficientpatents.3Cdoesn’tdeclaretogiveupefficiencyhypothesisofanylicensedpatentintheinformation,whichissubmittedtotheMinistryofJusticeby3C.iftheMinistryofJusticereceivedtheinformationweakeningtheabove-mentionedhypothesis,itwouldchangeitsexecutiveintentof3Cjointlicensingarrangement.

3Cpatentlicensingagree193Cpatentlicensingagreement

issubjecttoreviewofUSDepartmentofJustice

However,AmericanDepartmentofJusticefindsthat3Cjointlicensingarrangementislackofmechanismtoeliminateinvalidpatents.TheexternalexpertsengagedbyPhilipsonlyexaminethenecessityofputtingpatentintothepool,notthepatentvalidity.Besides,theallocationoflicensefeesisnotbasedonthenumberofinclusionpatents,therefore,3Cmembersaredeficientofmotivestochallengetheotherpatents.

Link:Reviewof3CpatentlicensingpolicybyDepartmentofJustice

3Cpatentlicensingagre20PartIVPatentDisputesofPhilipsintheWorld

LitigationinUSA

InJune,2004,WuxiMultimediaCo.,Ltd.(HongKong)accused3CLeagueofforcinghisrivalstosuccumbtoillegallicenseandchargingagreementintheSantiagoofUnitedStatesDistrictCourtSoutherndistrictofCalifornia.Itviolatesthe"ShermanAct"andmanyotherlawsandregulations.

InDecemberofthesameyear,WuxiOrientPowerDigitalSci-techCo.,Ltd.theaffiliatedcompanyofHongKongOrientPowerElectronicsGroup,joinedthelitigationastheco-plaintiffandamendedthebillofcomplaint,makingcollectivecomplaintonbehalfofmanufacturerandvendorsofDVDplayers.

PartIVPatentDisputesofPh21PartIVPatentDisputesofPhilipsintheWorldLitigationinHongKong

OnMay23thof2005,PhilipsCompanyaccusedHongKongOrientPowerElectronicsGroupanditsthirteenaffiliatedcompaniesoffailingtoreportproductquantityandpayCDDVDpatentroyaltyof60milliondollars,alsochargeditwithconspiracytobringPhilipsgreatlossandrequestedittomakecompensation.

Chinesepartysaid,PhilipscompanymakingaccusationinHongKongispurposedtodisturbAmericanlitigation.However,Philipsassertedthatthereisnotanyconnectionbetweenthesetwolitigations.

PartIVPatentDisputesofPh22PartIVPatentDisputesofPhilipsintheWorldLitigationinGermany

HongKongOrientPowerElectronicsGroupaccusedPhilipsofpatentrightinvalidationatGermanFederalPatentCourt,whomadethejudgmentoffirsttrialonJune15thof2005.ItheldthatPhilips’EuropeanpatentNo.EP0745307isinvalidinGermany.Philipslodgedanappealandtheappealcourthasmadenojudgment.

Inthefirsttrial,OPEC(OrientPowerElectronicsCompany)arguedthatEuropeanpatentEP0745307hasnooriginalityandsubmittedfivecomparativedocumentstothecourt,whoadoptedoneofthem,i.e.AmericanpatentUS5208665.EuropeanpatentEP0745307containsfifteenclaimsaltogether.Claim1to6areinvolvedwithakindoftransmittingwayofcodedata;claim7to12isconcernedwithareceivingmethodofcodedata;claim13isaboutakindoftransmitter;claim14isregardingasortofreceiverandclaim15isreferredtoakindofimagesignal.

PartIVPatentDisputesofPh23PartIVPatentDisputesofPhilipsintheWorldGermancourtheldthattherearefivetechnicalfeaturesinthefirstindependentclaim,butfourofthemhavebeenmadepublicinthecomparativedocumentUS5208665.Testimonybyexpertsconfirmedthattheremainingtechnicalfeatureiscommonsenseforthepublic.Therefore,thefirstclaimhasnooriginality.Neitherdoindependentclaims7,13,14and15,becausetheyonlycontainthetechnicalfeaturesoftheobjectinthefirstEnglishclaimsactually.Forsubordinateclaims2-6and8-12,theplaintiffchallengesthevalidityofthesesubordinateclaimsinasubstantiveway,whilethedefendantdidn’telaborateonthetechnicalcharacteristics,whichcanbeconsideredtobecreative,andthecourthasnotfoundtheexistenceofthesetechnicalfeatures,andthereforethesesubordinateclaimsareinvalid.

PartIVPatentDisputesofPh24PartIVPatentDisputesofPhilipsintheWorldLitigationinTaiwan

CDRmanufacturersinTaiwansignedjointpatentlicenseagreementwiththethreeforeigncompaniessuchasthePhilips,Sonyin1997(Philipsisrepresentativeofthethreecompanies),In2000,themarketpricehaschanged,whichmakessomeoftheoriginalprovisionsofthepatentlicenseagreementseemtobeunfairtolicensee,sothesemanufacturersrequestthosethreecompaniestoamendtheprovisionsofthepatent,buttheyrefusedtocarryonnegotiationsoverit.Therefore,manufacturersfilearequesttoFairTradeCommissiontomakeantitrustexaminationfortheimpropercompetition,misuseofpatentlicenseofthesethreecompanies.

FairTradeCommissiondecidedthatPhilips(PHILIPS),Sony(Sony)TaiyoYuden(TAIYOYUDEN),thesethreeforeigncompaniesinTaiwanJointCDRproductpatentlicensingtobeinbreachoffairtrading,theywerefined14millionTWD.Inthemeanwhile,alsoorderedthemtostopitspreviousviolationsimmediately.

Presently,thecaseisundertrial.

PartIVPatentDisputesofPh25PartIVPatentDisputesofPhilipsintheWorldInvalidationofPhilipsChinesePatent

OnDecember4thof2005,ZhangpingfromLawSchoolofBeijingUniversitypersonallyrequestedinvalidationofChinesepatentCN95192413.3“Transmittingandreceivingmethodofcodedata,anditstransmitterandreceiver”

OnJanuary4thof2006,ProfessorTaoXinliangfromIntellectualPropertyInstituteofShanghaiUniversity,professorShanXiaoguangfromIntellectualPropertyInstituteofTongjiUniversity,ProfessorZhuXuezhongfromIntellectualPropertyInstituteofZhongnanUniversityofEconomicsandLaw,ProfessorXuJialifromIntellectualPropertyCenterofChinaUniversityofPoliticalScienceandLawrequestedinvalidationofthesamepatenttoreexaminationboardrespectively.

PhilipsstatedtheiropinionsinApril,2006.

FirstoralinstancewasonAugust17thof2006,andthenstartednegotiation.

InformedofsecondoralinstanceinOctoberof2006,andPhilipsrequestedpostponement.

InformedofsecondoralinstanceonceagaininOctoberof2006,andPhilipsrequestedpostponement.

PublishedJointStatementonDecember10thof2006.

PartIVPatentDisputesofPh26PartVAnalyticalconsiderationsonPhilipsPatentInvalidation

PurposeofPhilipsChinesepatentinvalidation

.“Topatentpool,notpatent”:promotingthegoodoperationofpatentpoolthroughempiricalanalysisofthecase.PartVAnalyticalconsiderati27NumberofPatentsandPatentPoolsAboutlitigationandinvestigationNumberoffamiliesAnalysisofPatentfamilyPatentPoolAnalysis

PartVAnalyticalconsiderationsonPhilipsPatentInvalidationLicenseAgreementConcreteClausesJointLicensePolicyAnalysisPurposeofInvalidPatentNumberofPatentsandPatentP28398212407345267196PHILIPS202291711662924PIONEER152582182186666SONY788303819748370290Total36DVD-VIDEOPlayer4DVD-ROMPlayer23DVD-VIDEODualLayerDISC19DVD-VIDEOSingleLayerDISC8DVD-ROMDualLayerDISC4DVD-ROMSingleLayerDISCLGNameofPatentPoolStatisticalTableofPatentQuantityStatisticsandAnalysisofPatentPool-PatentQuantity398212407345267196PHILIPS2022929BasisTotalMaxQtyofPatentFamilyQtyPatentHolderNameofPatentPool58294212SONYPIONEERLGPHILIPS351726125/303REFERNCETITLETITLEREFERNCE6

DVDROMPlayer5311PatentFamilyStatisticalTableAStatisticsandAnalysisofPatentPool-PatentQuantityBasisTotalMaxQtyofPatentFa30BasisTotalMaxQtyofPatentFamilyQtyPatentHolderNameofPatentPooONYPIONEERLGPHILIPS3517135889/788REFERNCETITLETITLEREFERNCE14

DVDVideoPlayer461019PatentFamilyStatisticalTableBStatisticsandAnalysisofPatentPool-PatentQuantityBasisTotalMaxQtyofPatentFa3116countriesinEuropeBraziliandivisionChinesedivisionChina,etc.7countriesMalaysiaUSAInternationalApplication25

SeparateApplication295192413.3（CN1166191）PF（27）AnalysisofPatentFamily16countriesinEuropeBrazilia32ApplicationOpen,ChinaCaseAuthorisedOpenApplicationOpenApplicationOpenApplicationOpenAuthorisedOpenApplicationOpenInternationalProperty20141818181518RightQty.ContentofClaimsFileNo.Thefirst18applicationsaresameasinternationalapplicationin,add19,20CN1585475ＡTwoaffixationtechnologyincludedintheindependentclaim,lackof17,18CN1166191CSameasinternationalapplicationCN1145152ASameasinternationalapplicationUS2004075668SameasinternationalapplicationCA2183257Twoaffixationtechnologyincludedintheindependentclaim,lackof18EP0745307(SE）１、８、１５、１６、１７、１８areindependentclaims.WO9619077ClaimsCrossReferenceTableAnalysisofPatentFamilyApplicationOpen,ChinaCaseA33PartVISolutions

FromAugusttoDecember2006,Philipshadseveraldiscussionswithfiveprofessorsaboutthefollowingproblems:

1.Motivethatfiveprocessorsbringuppublicinterestinvalidation.

2.Impactthatthelicensingmodeofpatentpoolhasoninnovation.

3.Discussiononthesocialeffectofthispublicinterestinvalidation

4.AnalysisofcompetitiveenvironmentforChineseenterprises

5.AnalysisofsocialeffectintheoperationofChineseIntellectualPropertySystem

6.Thecredibilityofpatentholder:“defect”problemofnecessarypatentinpatentpool

7.Internationalresponsibilityofmultinationalcorporationsinthelegalenvironmentconstructionofintellectualproperty

8.Ponderationaboutthepromotingeffectthattheexistingintellectualpropertysystemhasonthesocialdevelopment.

……PartVISolutionsFromAugust34BothPartiesPublishJointStatement

toendthecasewiththelargestsocialeffectandtheleastcostLink:OriginaltextofJointStatementonDecember10thof2006ThoughtsandSummaryoftheCase：1.Socialresponsibilityofascholar.

2.Researchdirectionofappliedlegalscience

3.Implicativeeffectonenterprise4.EmpiricalsupportintheaspectofnationalIPstrategicstudies.

5.StrengthComparison:Law,team,negotiation,media,corporateculture......Interest:Publicorprivateinterest.

BothPartiesPublishJointSta35OthersignificanceofJointStatementNotallpatentsinpatentpoolarenecessarypatents.Many“questionablepatents”,whichtrytogetlicensebymeanoftying,bearthesuspicionofillegalmonopolyandlimitedcompetition.

Thepricingpolicyofpatentpoolisunreasonable.As“questionablepatents”increaseinproportion,revisethepricingpolicyofpatent.Ifthepatentholderpersistsinunreasonablelicensefees,itmaybenecessarytoreviewtheantitrustagain.

Whenenterprisescarryonnegotiationsaboutpatentauthorization,makesurethepatentlistinpatentpool.Aftermakinglegalanalysisofquestionablepatent,youwillbesuretohavemoreinitiativesduringnegotiation.

ThepatentinvolvedinthecaseisnotonlyusedintheDVDplayers,butalsoconcernedwithrelevantvideotechniques.AccordingtotheJointStatement,thereisnoneedpayingroyaltyforthisChinesepatentfromnowon.

OthersignificanceofJointSt36Opentodiscussion1、Necessarypatentevaluation.

2、Patentdisclosurepolicy3、Collectionandcalculationofpatentlicensefees

4、Publicinterestinthetechnicalstandards

5、Securityforanti-monopolysupervisorymechanism

Opentodiscussion1、Necessary37MarketCompetition：

PatentPoolLicensePolicyEVDHVDMPEGLAIEEEATSCVITA……DigitalTV、PortableStore、3G、Wi-MAXMarketCompetition：

P38Differenceofpatentpolicy

indifferenttypesoftechnicalstandards1）“dejure”standards2）“defacto”standardsdejurestandards：TakethepublicinterestasitsbasisPatentpolicybasis：

InterestofmostenterprisesInterestofconsumersSocialpublicinterest“defacto”standards：Takemaximizingtheinterestofpatentholderasbasis

，

Anti-trustregulationisamust.

Differenceofpatentpolicy

i39PatentPolicyinTechnicalStandards

Four-sideBenefits：

1.Theformulation,implementationandmanagementofstandardsbystandardizationorganizations2.Legitimateinterestsofpatentholders3.Interestofstandardutilizers4.InterestofConsumers

Choosethepatentlicensemodewhichisbeneficialtoinnovationandoptimizingcompetitiveenvironment.PatentPolicyinTechnicalSta40ClearpatentthicketOpenthegreenroadtopatentpooljointlicensePatentLicensing：ImportantpartofPatentSystemStandardization:NecessaryforContemporaryIndustryAnti-trust:ThecoreofMarketingEconomicsSystemClearpatentthicket41Thankyou!Thankyou!42專利池與公共利益

PatentPoolandPublicInterest

－－以飛利浦專利無效案為視角

TakingPhilips’patentrightinvalidationcaseasanexample張平ByZhanping北京大學(xué)法學(xué)院知識產(chǎn)權(quán)學(xué)院

IntellectualPropertyInstituteofBeijingUniversityLawSchool

2007年4月18日April18th,2007專利池與公共利益

PatentPoolandPubli43PartIThetrendofGlobalEnterprisesPatentStrategy

TechnologyPatenting－PatentStandardization－StandardGlobalization

Marketcontrolledbypatentholder;MonopliedbyafewlargeenterprisesDeficientofcommonpartsanditsnegativeinfluenceoninnovationMonoplypriceLimitcompetitionMoreco-existingstandardsareharmfultoconsumersProductpriceincreasedastheresultofhigheroperati