美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)理事 沃勒：美元的國際地位 The Dollars International Role

Forreleaseondelivery

1:15p.m.EST

February15,2024

TheDollar’sInternationalRole

Remarksby

ChristopherJ.Waller

Member

BoardofGovernorsoftheFederalReserveSystem

at

“Climate,Currency,andCentralBanking,”aconferencesponsoredbytheGlobalInterdependenceCenterandtheUniversityoftheBahamas

Nassau,Bahamas

February15,2024

ThankyoutotheGlobalInterdependenceCenterfortheinvitationtospeaktoyou

today.1MysubjectistheU.S.dollar’sprimacyinglobalfinanceandtheglobal

economy,whichsomefeelisunderthreatasneverbefore.Oneheadlineasserts:“WhytheDollar’sReignIsNearanEnd.”Actually,itturnsoutthisthreatisn’tsonew.That

headlinewasfrom2011.2Itistemptingtowriteoffconcernsaboutthedollar’sstatus

thatneverseemtocometopass,butIdon’tdismissthem.TheroleoftheUnitedStatesintheworldeconomyischanging,financeisalwayschanging,andIthinkitisimportantforpolicymakerstoregularlyconsiderifandwhythedollar’srolemightchangeaswell.

That’swhatIaimtodointheseremarks.

Whenpeoplerefertothedollaranditsreservecurrencystatus,theytypicallymix

togetheravarietyofrolesthatitplaysontheworldstage.SoIwouldliketostartby

clarifyingthesemanyroles.First,theterm“dollar”oftenreferstophysicalU.S.currencyanditsusearoundtheworld.However,incertaincontexts,itisusedtodescribefinancialassets,suchasU.S.Treasurysecurities,thataredenominatedinandpromiseredemptioninU.S.dollars.Finally,theword“dollar”isusedtodescribeitsuseasthesettlementunit

ofaccountininternationaltransactions.Iwillusetheword“dollar”throughoutthis

speechtorefertothesevariousconcepts,andIhopeitwillbeclearwhichoneIam

referringtoasIspeak.

Formanydecades,theU.S.dollarhashadanoutsizedroleintheglobaleconomy,supportedbythesizeandstrengthoftheU.S.economy,itsstabilityandopennesstotrade

andcapitalflows,andstrongpropertyrightsandruleoflaw.Thedollar’sinternational

1TheviewsexpressedherearemyownandarenotnecessarilythoseofmycolleaguesontheFederalOpenMarketCommittee.IwouldliketothankCarolBertaut,StephanieCurcuru,andJustinPiercefortheir

supportinpreparingthistext.

2SeeEichengreen(2011).

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rolehasclearbenefitsfortheUnitedStates,loweringtransactionandborrowingcostsfor

U.S.households,businesses,andgovernmentandwideningthepoolofcreditorsand

investors.ThewidespreaduseofthedollarcanhelpinsulatetheU.S.economyfrom

shocksfromabroad.

Therestoftheworldalsobenefitsfromthedollar’sinternationalrole.Thedollar

servesasasafe,stable,anddependableformofmoneyaroundtheworld.Itservesasa

reliablecommondenominatorforglobaltradeandadependablesettlementinstrumentfor

cross-borderpayments.Indoingso,itreducescostsofengagingininternational

transactionsforhouseholdsandbusinessesincludingthoseoutsideoftheUnitedStates.

RecentcommentarywarningofapossibledeclineinthestatusoftheU.S.dollar

raisesconcernsabouttheeffectsofsanctionsagainstRussia,U.S.politicaldysfunction,

theriseofdigitalassets,andChina’seffortstobolsterusageoftherenminbi.Other

commentaryhaswarnedof“geoeconomicfragmentation”andwhethertradeand

financialflowscouldrealigninwaysthatadverselyaffectthedollar’soutsizedrole.

Againstthisbackdrop,it’susefultoreviewwhethertherehasbeenanychangeinhowthe

dollarstacksupagainstthestandardmeasuresbywhichweassessacurrency’s

acceptanceasaninternationalcurrency.

Acceptanceasan“internationalcurrency”istypicallyassessedalongthree

dimensions:itsuseasastoreofvalue,asamediumofexchange,andasaunitof

account.Alarmistheadlinesnotwithstanding,thedollarcontinuestodominateinallthree

ofthesemeasures,andgenerallybyalargemargincomparedwithanyothercurrency.3

3SeeMaggiori,Neiman,andSchreger(2019).

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The“storeofvalue”dimensionrelatestotheabilitytosaveinagivencurrency

andretrievethosesavingsinthefuturewithoutasignificantexpectedlossofpurchasing

power.Akeymeasureoftheconfidenceinacurrencyasastoreofvalueisitsusein

officialforeignexchangereserves.Atalmost60percentofglobalreservesin2022,theU.S.dollarisbyfarthedominantreservecurrency.4Thenextleadingcompetitortothedollaristheeuro,withashareofroughly20percent.Althoughsomehavepointedtoa

decreasingshareofreservesheldindollars,thedollarshare—thoughdownsomewhat

fromthemid-2000s—isactuallylittlechangedfromthemid-1990s.Andwhiletherehasbeenanincreaseintheshareheldinrenminbi,thatshareistrivialatabout2percent.To

theextentthattherehasbeengradualdiversificationinreservessincethemid-2000s,it

hasbeenintoawiderangeofothercurrencies,suchasCanadianandAustraliandollars.

ThemajorityofglobaldollarreservesareheldinU.S.Treasurysecurities,with

thedepthandliquidityoftheU.S.Treasurymarketreinforcingthedesirabilityofthe

dollarasastoreofvalue.Currently,foreigninvestorsholdaboutone-thirdofTreasury

securitiesoutstanding.Therehasbeenasteadydeclineinthisshare:Foreigninvestors

heldroughlyhalfofTreasurysecuritiesoutstanding10yearsago.Amajorreasonforthe

decline,however,isthatoverthepastdecade,thestockofglobalforeignexchange

reserveshasgrownmuchmoreslowlythanthestockofTreasurysecuritiesoutstanding,soforeignofficialinvestorsareaccountingforadecliningshare.Foreignprivateinvestor

demandforU.S.Treasurysecurities,bycontrast,hasbeensustainedandhaskeptpace

withtheincreasedissuanceinrecentyears.Theroughlyone-thirdofTreasurysecurities

currentlyheldbyallforeigninvestorsisnowbroadlycomparablewithsharesof

4SeeBertaut,vonBeschwitz,andCurcuru(2023).

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sovereigndebtheldbyforeigninvestorsintheeuroarea,theU.K.,andJapan.5TheU.S.

benefitsfromforeigndemandforU.S.Treasurysecuritiessinceitbidsupthepriceof

suchsecurities,therebyloweringtheinterestexpensepaidonTreasurydebt.

Anotherwaytolookatthedollarasastoreofvaluefortheglobalfinancial

systemisthedemandforU.S.dollarbanknotesabroad.Determiningexactlyhowmuchcurrencyisheldabroadischallenging,butresearchsuggeststhatforeigninvestorsholdroughlyhalfofthedollarvalueofU.S.banknotesoutstanding.6Thisshareissimilarto

orabithigherthanforeurobanknotes,whererecentresearchestimatessuggestthat

between30and50percentofeurobanknotesareheldabroad,primarilyincountriesthataregeographicallyclosetotheeuroarea.7“Dollarization”or“partialdollarization”isaglobalphenomenonthatreferstotheuseofdollarsinforeigncountriesasasubstitutefor

thedomesticcurrency.

Typically,thispracticeoccursbecauseofpersistentlyhighdomesticinflation.Whileforeigncitizensarefreetouseanyothercurrencyissuedaroundtheworld,the

dollaristheoverwhelmingchoiceforcitizensinthesecountries.Fulfillingforeign

demandforU.S.currencyallowsustoearnseigniorageonbanknotesheldabroad.

So,bystore-of-valuemeasures,thedollarremainsthemostwidelyusedcurrency,

thoughitsdominancemayhaveedgeddownslightlyoverthepastcoupledecades.

Thedollar’sattractivenesstoprivateinvestorsandbusinessesisespecially

apparentinitsroleasamediumofexchange—thatis,initsuseintradeinvoicing,global

banking,internationaldebtissuance,andforeignexchangetransactions.

5SeeBertaut,vonBeschwitz,andCurcuru(2023).

6SeeBertaut,vonBeschwitz,andCurcuru(2023).

7SeeLalouetteandothers(2021).

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Tostartwithtradeinvoicing,thedollarisbyfarthedominantcurrency.Trade

invoicingindollarsmeansthatthetermsofthecontractarespecifiedinunitsofthedollarandthedollaristhesettlementobjectforthetrade.Dollarinvoicingaccountsforatleastthree-fourthsofexportinvoicinginallregions,exceptinEurope,andover96percentin

theAmericas.Notsurprisingly,theeuroisthedominantinvoicingcurrencyinEurope,

buteventhere,theeuroshareisonlyabout50percentonceintra-euro-areatradeis

excluded.8DollardominanceonthisdimensionhasmajorbenefitsforU.S.firms,asitremovesexchangerateriskandeliminatestheneedforcomplicatedandcostlyhedging

strategieswhentheyengageininternationaltrade.

Invoicingdominanceislinkedtoasimilarlydominantroleininternational

bankinganddebtissuance.About60percentofinternationalbankingloansanddeposits

aredenominatedinU.S.dollars.Forinternationaldebtsecurities,about70percentof

bondsissuedinacurrencyotherthantheissuer’shomecountrycurrencyare

denominatedinU.S.dollars.9Theseshareshavebeenquitestableoverthepast10to15

years.DollardominanceininternationalbankinghasbenefitsforU.S.householdsand

businesses,sinceitmeansthatforeignbankshavestrongconnectionstotheU.S.

financialsystem,increasingtheamountofcreditavailableintheU.S.andloweringthe

costofborrowing.Fordebtsecurities,dollardominancemeansthatwhenU.S.firms

issuedebtinmarketsoutsidetheUnitedStates,theycanissueindollarsanddon’thaveto

bearexchangeraterisk.AndU.S.investorscangetexposuretoforeignfirmswithout

incurringexchangeraterisk.

8SeeBertaut,vonBeschwitz,andCurcuru(2023).

9SeeBertaut,vonBeschwitz,andCurcuru(2023).

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ThemanysourcesofdemandforU.S.dollarsshowthroughtoitsveryhighshare

offoreignexchangetransactions,where,accordingtothelateststatisticsfromtheBank

forInternationalSettlements,thedollarremainsbyfarthemostcommonlytraded

currency.10Thesizeanddepthofdollarforeignexchangemarketsmeanthedollaris

frequentlyusedasa“vehicle”currency:Evenwhenfirmsandinvestorsaroundtheglobewanttotransactintwocurrenciesthatdon’tincludethedollar,theytypicallyfindthatit

iseasierandlessexpensivetofirstconductatradebetweentheinitialcurrencyandthe

dollarandthenconductasecondtradetoexchangethedollarsforthesecondcurrency.11

Thefinalroleforaninternationalcurrencyisasaunitofaccount,andan

importantmeasureonthisdimensionisitsuseasan“anchorcurrency”againstwhich

othercountriesmayattempttolimittheirexchangeratemovements.Here,theresearchfindsthatthedollar’susageasananchorcurrencyhasincreasedsomewhatoverthepast

twodecades.NotincludingtheU.S.,economiesanchoredtothedollaraccountedfor

roughly50percentofworldgrossdomesticproduct(GDP)by2015.Bycontrast,the

shareofworldGDPanchoredtotheeurowasonly5percent(notcountingtheeuroarea

itself).12

Torecap,bystandardmeasuresofaninternationalcurrency’suse,therehasnot

beenanynotableerosioninthedollar’sdominanceoverthepastcoupleofdecades.

Goingforward,however,therearepotentialchallengestothedollar’sinternationalstatus,

andsomerecentdevelopmentshavethepotentialtoboosttheinternationaluseofother

currencies.

10SeeBankforInternationalSettlements(2022).

11SeeDevereuxandShi(2013).

12SeeIlzetzkietal.(2019).

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Ashiftingpaymentslandscape—forexample,therapidgrowthofdigital

currencies—couldreducerelianceontheU.S.dollar.Peopleoftenconjecturethat

cryptocurrencieslikeBitcoinmayreplacetheU.S.dollarastheworld’sreservecurrency.Butmosttradingindecentralizedfinance(DeFi)involvetradesusingstablecoins,which

linktheirvalueone-for-onetotheU.S.dollar.About99percentofstablecoinmarket

capitalizationislinkedtotheU.S.dollar,meaningthatcrypto-assetsaredefactotraded

inU.S.dollars.SoitislikelythatanyexpansionoftradingintheDeFiworldwillsimply

strengthenthedominantroleofthedollar.

Asecondpotentialchallengetothedollarcouldbeincreasedprominenceoftheeuro,thesecondmostwidelyusedinternationalcurrency.LiketheU.S.,theEuropeanUnion(EU)isalargeeconomywithfairlydeepfinancialmarkets,generallyfreetrade,androbustandstableinstitutions.Wideruseoftheeuroasareservecurrencymayhave

beenheldbackbythelackofadeepandliquidmarketforEUdebt,thoughtherehave

beensomenotablerecentdevelopments.DuringtheCOVID-19crisis,theEUissuedanunprecedentedamountofjointlybackeddebt,reachingaboutEUR400billionbyMay2023.WhilethisisanoteworthydevelopmentfortheEU,thisamountistinycompared

withthe$24trillionoutstandinginU.S.Treasurysecurities.13

ThecontinuedrapidgrowthofChinaandChineseeffortstoboosttheuseoftheircurrencycouldmaketheChineserenminbiamoreattractivecompetitortothedollarandincreaseitsinternationaluse.Severalfactorscurrentlyweighagainsttherenminbiasan

attractiveassetforinternationalinvestors:Itisnotfreelyexchangeable,theChinese

capitalaccountisnotopen,andinvestorconfidenceinChineseinstitutionsisrelatively

13SeeBertaut,vonBeschwitz,andCurcuru(2023).

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low.RecentendeavorsbyChinatoovercometheseshortcomingsincludeincreased

effortstopromoterenminbiinvoicing.Forexample,itreachedanagreementwithBraziltoallowChineseandBraziliancompaniestosettletradeintheirdomesticcurrenciesand

hasbeenindiscussionwithSaudiArabiatopotentiallypriceoiltradeinrenminbi.

However,outsideanalystsgenerallyviewtheseagreementsassymbolicandatmost

layingthegroundworkforpotentialfutureuseoftheChineserenminbiinveryisolated

instances.

SomecommentatorshavealsoarguedthatsanctionsimposedbytheUnitedStates

anditsalliesonRussiafollowingtheinvasionofUkrainecouldmakethedollarless

attractiveasareservecurrencyfortheUnitedStates’sgeopoliticaladversaries.In

practice,however,U.S.adversarieshavefewpracticalalternativestothedollar,asotherprominentreservecurrencies—suchastheeuro,Japaneseyen,andBritishpound—areall

issuedbycloseU.S.allies,whoalsoparticipatedinsanctionsonRussia.

Moregenerally,someworrythatthedollar’srolecouldbethreatenedbyamovetowardso-calledgeoeconomicfragmentation,inwhichtradeandfinancialflowsrealign

andbecomerestrictedwithinblocsofalliedcountries.Theformationofablocthat

excludestheU.S.—orevenexplicitlyseekstocountertheUnitedStates’roleintheglobaleconomy—couldmakesomecountrieslesslikelytodenominateinternational

transactionsindollars.

Thisscenariosoundsalarming,butthusfar,trendsthatappearconsistentwith

fragmentationlargelycanbeexplainedbyspecificpolicyactions.Oneexampleisthe

dramaticreallocationofU.S.–Chinatradeinrecentyears,asfirmsineachcountry

decreaserelianceonimportssourcedfromtheother.Whilethisshifthascoincidedwith

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aperiodofheightenedgeopoliticaltensions,theevidencesuggestsasimplerexplanation:

firmsrespondingtochangesinrelativeprices,inthiscasecausedbytheimpositionof

reciprocaltariffsbythetwocountriessince2018.Forexample,whileU.S.importsoftariff-affectedgoodsfromChinahaveplunged,importsofgoodsnotsubjecttotariffshavecontinuedtorise.14Despitethereallocationoftradeflowsacrosscountries,atthe

endoftheday,thosetradeflowscontinuetobeinvoicedmainlyindollars.

Afinalconsiderationregardingtheinternationaluseofthedollarrelatesto

financialstabilityconcerns.Intimesofglobalfinancialstress,investorsand

governmentsseekasafehaventoprotectthevalueoftheirassetsandstabilizetheirownfinancialmarkets.Whenthishappens,thereisalmostalwaysa“flighttothedollar”andheighteneddemandforU.S.dollarassets.Wesawthisin2008andagainin2020.ThisistheultimatevindicationthattheU.S.dollaristheworld’sreservecurrencyandislikely

toremainso—intimesofglobalstress,theworldrunstothedollar,notawayfromit.

Toconclude,forthereasonsIhavelaidouthere,IdonotexpecttoseetheU.S.

dollarloseitsstatusastheworld’sreservecurrencyanytimesoon,norevenseea

significantdeclineinitsprimacyintradeandfinance.Recentdevelopmentsthatsome

havewarnedcouldthreatenthatstatushave,ifanything,strengthenedit,atleastsofar.

14SeeBown(2022).

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References

Alfaro,Laura,andDavinChor(2023).“GlobalSupplyChains:TheLooming‘GreatReallocation,’”NBERWorkingPaperSeries31661.Cambridge,Mass.:

NationalBureauofEconomicResearch,September,

/papers/w31661.

BankforInternationalSettlements(2022).TriennialCentralBankSurveyofForeign

ExchangeandOver-the-CounterDerivativesMarkets.Basel,Switzerland:BIS,October,

/statistics/rpfx22.htm.

Bertaut,Carol,Bastia