未來能源研究所-2024年全球能源展望：高峰還是高原？Global Energy Outlook 2024 Peaks or Plateaus

GlobalEnergyOutlook2024:PeaksorPlateaus?

DanielRaimi,YuqiZhu,RichardG.Newell,andBrianC.Prest

Report24-06

April2024

AbouttheAuthors

DanielRaimiisafellowatResourcesfortheFuture(RFF)andalecturerattheGeraldR.FordSchoolofPublicPolicyattheUniversityofMichigan.Heworksonarangeof

energypolicyissueswithafocusontoolstoenableanequitableenergytransition.HehaspublishedinacademicjournalsincludingScience,ScienceAdvances,EnvironmentalScienceandTechnology,JournalofEconomicPerspectives,ReviewofEnvironmentalEconomicsandPolicy,EnergyResearchandSocialScience,andEnergyPolicy,in

popularoutletsincludingTheNewRepublic,Newsweek,Slate,andFortune,andquotedextensivelyinnationalmediaoutletssuchasCNN,NPR’sAllThingsConsidered,

NewYorkTimes,WallStreetJournal,andmanymore.Hehaspresentedhisresearchforpolicymakers,industry,andotherstakeholdersaroundtheUnitedStatesand

internationally,includingbeforetheUSSenateBudgetCommitteeandtheEnergyandMineralResourcesSubcommitteeoftheUSHouse’sNaturalResourcesCommittee.

In2017,hepublishedTheFrackingDebate(ColumbiaUniversityPress),abookthatcombinesstoriesfromhistravelstodozensofoil-andgas-producingregionswithadetailedexaminationofkeypolicyissues.

YuqiZhujoinedRFFasaseniorresearchassociatein2022afterreceivinghismaster’s

degreeinpublicpolicyfromtheHarvardKennedySchool.Priortograduateschool,he

workedincorporatedevelopmentatLibertyMedia,amediaandcommunicationsholdingcompanyinDenver.

RichardG.NewellisthepresidentandCEOofRFF,anindependentnonprofitresearch

institutionthatimprovesenvironmental,energy,andnaturalresourcedecisionsthroughimpartialeconomicresearchandpolicyengagement.Hehasheldseniorgovernment

appointmentsastheAdministratoroftheUSEnergyInformationAdministrationandastheSeniorEconomistforenergyandenvironmentonthePresident’sCouncilofEconomicAdvisers.Dr.NewellwaspreviouslytheGendellProfessorofEnergyandEnvironmentalEconomicsatDukeandDirectorofitsEnergyInitiativeandisnowadjunctprofessor.Hehaspublishedwidelyontheeconomicsofmarketsandpoliciesforclimatechange,the

cleanenergytransition,andtechnologyinnovation.HeisaboardmemberoradvisorattheNationalAcademyofSciencesClimateSecurityRoundtable,theEuro-MediterraneanCenteronClimateChange,theNationalPetroleumCouncil,andseveralotherinstitutionsandco-chairedaformativeNationalAcademiesstudyonthesocialcostofgreenhousegases.NewellholdsaPhDfromHarvardandanMPAfromPrinceton.

BrianC.PrestisaneconomistandfellowatRFFspecializingintheeconomicsofclimatechange,energyeconomics,andoilandgassupply.Prestuseseconomictheoryand

econometricstoimproveenergyandenvironmentalpoliciesbyassessingtheirimpactsonsociety.Hisrecentworkincludesimprovingthescientificbasisofthesocialcost

ofcarbonandeconomicmodelingofvariouspoliciesaroundoilandgassupply.His

researchhasbeenpublishedinpeer-reviewedjournalssuchasNature,theBrookings

PapersonEconomicActivity,theJournaloftheAssociationofEnvironmentaland

ResourceEconomists,andtheJournalofEnvironmentalEconomicsandManagement.

HisworkhasalsobeenfeaturedinpopularpressoutletsincludingtheWashingtonPost,theWallStreetJournal,theNewYorkTimes,Reuters,theAssociatedPress,andBarron’s.

ResourcesfortheFuturei

Acknowledgements

WethankStuIler,whoinitiallydevelopedtheplatformforharmonizingoutlooks.

WearealsogratefultoLauraCozziandDavideD’AmbrosioattheIEA,AprilRossatExxonMobil,ChristianMollardatEnerdata,AstridN?vikatEquinor,MichaelCohen

andJorgeBlazquezatbp,GeorgiosBoniasatShell,andtheEIAmacroeconomicsandemissionsteamforprovidingdataandrespondingtoquestionsinthepreparationofthisreport.RichardG.Newellconceivedoftheproject;DanielRaimiandYuqiZhuleddatacollectionandharmonization;andDanielRaimileddataanalysisanddraftingofthereport,withtheexceptionsofSections3.1(YuqiZhu)and3.2(BrianC.Prest).Allauthorsreviewedandapprovedofthefinaldraft.

AboutRFF

ResourcesfortheFuture(RFF)isanindependent,nonprofitresearchinstitutionin

Washington,DC.Itsmissionistoimproveenvironmental,energy,andnaturalresourcedecisionsthroughimpartialeconomicresearchandpolicyengagement.RFFis

committedtobeingthemostwidelytrustedsourceofresearchinsightsandpolicysolutionsleadingtoahealthyenvironmentandathrivingeconomy.

TheviewsexpressedherearethoseoftheindividualauthorsandmaydifferfromthoseofotherRFFexperts,itsofficers,oritsdirectors.

SharingOurWork

OurworkisavailableforsharingandadaptationunderanAttribution-

NonCommercial-NoDerivatives4.0International(CCBY-NC-ND4.0)license.Youcancopyandredistributeourmaterialinanymediumorformat;youmustgive

appropriatecredit,providealinktothelicense,andindicateifchangesweremade,andyoumaynotapplyadditionalrestrictions.Youmaydosoinanyreasonable

manner,butnotinanywaythatsuggeststhelicensorendorsesyouoryouruse.Youmaynotusethematerialforcommercialpurposes.Ifyouremix,transform,orbuilduponthematerial,youmaynotdistributethemodifiedmaterial.Formoreinformation,visit

/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

.

GlobalEnergyOutlook2024:PeaksorPlateaus?ii

Highlights

Coal,oil,andnaturalgasconsumptionreachtheirhighestpointsbefore2030butremainhighthrough2050inmanyscenarios.Achievinginternationalclimatetargetswill

requireallthreefossilfuelstodeclinemuchmorequickly,resemblingapeak,notaplateau.

Althoughtheyarecontroversialforavarietyofreasons,carbondioxideremoval(CDR)technologiesaredeployedrapidlyandatscaleineveryscenariothatlimitsglobal

warmingto1.5°Cor2°Cby2100.Thissuggeststheneedforthedevelopmentofrobustmonitoring,reporting,andverificationstandards,alongwithadditionalmeasurestopreventCDRfromcreatingmajornewenvironmentalorsocialchallenges.

Projecteddemandforenergy-relatedmetalsandmineralsgrowsrapidly,particularlyunderAmbitiousClimate

scenarios,risingbyordersofmagnitudeforsomecriticalminerals.Suchgrowthraisesnewquestionsoversupplycosts,geopolitics,localenvironmentalimpacts,andmore.

AtCOP28intheUAE,22nationspledgedtotriplenuclearenergycapacityby2050.Achievingthisgoalatthegloballevelwouldrequireareturntogrowthratesnotseensincethe1980s.Since2010,globalnuclearenergyproductionhasdeclinedbynearly5percent,dueprimarilytoplant

closuresinEurope,Japan,andtheUnitedStates.

ProjectedenergydemandinChinahasbeenrevised

downwardsubstantiallyinrecentyears,reflectinga

decliningpopulationandmajoreconomicheadwinds.Coupledwithnewpoliciesconcerningairqualityandclimatechange,thesetrendsarecontributingtolowerprojectedcoaluseandcarbondioxideemissionsinthedecadesahead.

ResourcesfortheFutureiii

Contents

1.Introduction1

2.KeyFindings3

3.InFocus13

3.1.China’sEvolvingEnergyFutureagainstaForebodingEconomicOutlook13

3.2.EmergingTechnologiesforAchievingNetZero17

3.2.1.Hydrogen17

3.2.2.CarbonCapture,Use,andStorage(CCUS)andDirectAirCapture(DAC)19

3.2.3.BacktotheFuture(ofthePast)20

3.3.ANewEraofMining21

3.3.1.Cobalt22

3.3.2.Copper23

3.3.3.Lithium24

3.3.4.Nickel25

3.3.5.OtherMinerals26

4.DataandMethods27

4.1.Harmonization29

5.Statistics31

References40

GlobalEnergyOutlook2024:PeaksorPlateaus?iv

1.Introduction

Thefutureoftheglobalenergysystemisdeeplyuncertain,andthechoicesthataremadeinthecomingyearswillhaveenormousconsequencesforthefutureoftheclimateand,indeed,humancivilization.Tounderstandhowourenergysystemischanging,eachyearavarietyoforganizationsproducelong-termprojections

thatimagineawiderangeoffuturesbasedondivergentvisionsaboutpolicies,

technologies,prices,andgeopolitics.

Becausetheseprojectionsvarywidelyanddependheavilyontheirvariedassumptionsandmethodologies,theyaredifficulttocompareonanapples-to-applesbasis.Inthisreport,weapplyadetailedharmonizationprocesstocompare16scenariosacross

eightenergyoutlookspublishedin2023,aswellastwohistoricaldatasources.Takentogether,thesescenariosofferabroadscopeofpotentialchangestotheenergy

systemasenvisionedbysomeofitsmostknowledgeableorganizations.Table1liststhehistoricaldatasets,outlooks,andscenariosexaminedhere,andadditionaldetailisprovidedinSection4.

Table1.Datasets,Outlooks,andScenariosExaminedinThisReport

Source

Datasetoroutlook

Scenario(s)

Years

Grubler(2008)1

Historical

—

1800–1970

IEA(2022)2

Historical

—

1970–2021

bp(2023)3

EnergyOutlook2023

NewMomentum,AcceleratedTransition,NetZero

To2050

EIA(2023)4

InternationalEnergyOutlook2023

Reference

To2050

Enerdata(2023)5

EnerFuture2023

EnerBase,EnerBlue,EnerGreen

To2050

Equinor(2023)6

2023EnergyPerspectives

Walls,Bridges

To2050

ExxonMobil(2023)7

2023GlobalOutlook

Reference

To2050

IEA(2023)8

WorldEnergyOutlook2023

StatedPolicies(STEPS),AnnouncedPledges(APS),NetZeroEmissionsby2050(NZE)

To2050

OPEC(2023)9

WorldOilOutlook2023

Reference

To2045

Shell(2023)10

EnergySecurityScenarios

Archipelagos,Sky2050

To2100

GlobalEnergyOutlook2024:PeaksorPlateaus?1

AbriefdescriptionofourmethodologyisprovidedinSection4,withselectindicatorsinSection5.Forthefullmethodologyandinteractivegraphingtools,visit

/geo

.

Throughoutthefiguresincludedinthisreport,weuseaconsistentlabelingsystemthatdistinguishesamongthedifferenttypesofscenarios(seeTable2):

?ForReferencescenarios,whichassumelimitedornonewpolicies,weuse

long-dashedlines;thissetcomprisesReferencescenariosfromtheUSEnergyInformationAdministration(EIA),Enerdata’sEnerBase,ExxonMobil,andOPEC.

?ForEvolvingPoliciesscenarios,whichassumethatpoliciesandtechnologies

developaccordingtorecenttrendsortheexpertviewsoftheteamproducingtheoutlook,weusesolidlines;thissetcomprisesbpNewMomentumandIEASTEPS.Althoughtheydonotfollowthesamesetsofassumptions,wealsoincludeEquinorWallsandShellArchipelagosbecausetheirCO2emissionstrajectoriesaresimilartothoseinotherEvolvingPoliciesscenarios.Inaddition,weincludeEnerdata’s

EnerBlueandIEA’sAPS,whichassumegovernmentsimplementtheirnationallydeterminedcontributions(NDCs)undertheParisAgreement;forthese,weusedot-dashlines.

?AmbitiousClimatescenariosarenotdesignedaroundpoliciesbutinsteadare

structuredtoachievespecificclimatetargets.Forthosethatlimitglobalmean

temperaturerisetobelow2°Cby2100(bp’sAcceleratedTransitionandEnerdata’sEnerGreen),weuseshort-dashedlines.Forscenariosdesignedtolimitglobal

meantemperatureriseto1.5°Cby2100ornet-zeroemissionsby2050(bpNetZero,EquinorBridges,IEANZE,andShell’sSky2050),weusedottedlines.

Table2.LegendforDifferentScenarioTypes

Reference

Evolvingpolicies

Ambitiousclimate

EIA

bpNewMomentum

bpAccel.Transition(2°C)

EnerdataEnerbase

IEASteps

EnerdataEnerGreen(2°C)

ExxonMobil

EquinorWalls

bpNetZero(1.5°C)

OPEC

ShellArchipelagos

EquinorBridges(1.5°C)

EnerdataEnerBlue

IEANZE(1.5°C)

IEAAPS

ShellSky2050(1.5°C)

FiguresandtablesinthisreportsometimesrefertoregionalgroupingsofEastandWest.Table3definesthoseregionalgroupings.

Table3.RegionalDefinitionsfor“East”and“West”

“East”

Africa,Asia-Pacific,MiddleEast

“West”

Americas,Europe,Eurasia

ResourcesfortheFuture2

2.KeyFindings

Atthe28thConferenceoftheParties(COP28)totheUnitedNationsFramework

ConventiononClimateChangeheldinDubai,worldleadersagreedto“transitioningawayfromfossilfuelsintheenergysystem.”11Someadvocates,governments,and

civilsocietyfigureshavecritiquedthisagreementandarguedinsteadforthetotal

phaseoutoffossilfuelstoachievelong-termclimategoals.However,allscenarios

examinedhere,includingthoseconsistentwithlimitingwarmingto1.5°Cby2100,showsubstantialglobalfossilfuelconsumptionthroughatleast2050,suggestingthata

phaseoutisnotaprerequisitetoachievinginternationalclimategoals.

Figure1.GlobalFossilFuelDemandPeaksandDeclinesRapidlyinAmbitiousClimateScenarios

Note:Includesprimaryenergydemandforcoal,oil,andnaturalgas.HistoricaldatafromShell.

AswehavenotedinpreviousGlobalEnergyOutlooks,12worldprimaryenergydemandhasexperiencedaseriesofenergyadditions,notenergytransitions,withnewer

technologiessuchasnuclear,wind,andsolarbuildingontopofincumbentsourcessuchasbiomass,coal,oil,andnaturalgas.Toachieveinternationalclimategoalsandlimitwarmingto1.5°Cor2°Cby2100,atrueenergytransitionisneeded.Butdoes

achievingsuchgoalsrequirephasingoutfossilfuelsentirely?

Thescenariosweanalyzeinthisreportsuggestthattheanswerisno.Likemost

scenariospublishedinrecentyearsbytheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange(IPCC),13,14fossilfuelusedeclinesbutremainssubstantialthroughmidcenturyand

beyond,evenunderscenariosthatlimitwarmingto1.5°C.SeveralAmbitiousClimate

scenariosshowglobalfossilfueluseofroughly100quadrillionBritishthermalunits

(QBtu)in2050,slightlyhigherthantotalUSprimaryenergydemand.Thewiderangeofprojectedfossilfueldemandalsohighlightsthedeepuncertaintyofthefutureoftheworldenergysystem,with2050scenariosspanning487QBtu,roughlyequivalentto

globalconsumptionoffossilfuelsin2022.

GlobalEnergyOutlook2024:PeaksorPlateaus?3

Iffossilfuelsarenotphasedoutoftheenergysystem,limitingwarmingtointernational

climatetargetsimpliesasubstantialscale-upofcarbonremovaltechnologies,including

directaircapture(DAC),bioenergywithcarboncaptureandstorage(CCS),andnature-

basedsolutions,allofwhichwillrequirerobustmonitoring,reporting,andverification.

Althoughthesetechnologiesarecontroversialforavarietyofreasons,theirapplicationatscaleisanessentialtoolinreachingnet-zeroemissionsineveryAmbitiousClimatescenarioexaminedhere.

Figure2.WorldCarbonCapture,Use,andStorageRisesSharplyinAmbitiousClimateScenarios

Note:HistoricaldatafromIEA.AllscenariosexceptthosefromEquinorexcludenature-basedsolutionssuchasafforestationandreforestation.

In2022,roughly42millionmetrictonsofCO2werecapturedbyCCUSinfrastructurearoundtheworld.Althoughthisaccountsforjust0.1percentofannualglobalCO2emissions,italsorepresentsaneartriplingofCCUSsince2010,acompoundaverageannualgrowthrate

(CAAGR)of8.7percent.UnderEvolvingPoliciesscenarios,comparableCAAGRsemerge

through2050,rangingfrom8.2percent(IEASTEPS)to12.5percent(bpNewMomentum).UnderAmbitiousClimatescenarios,however,CCUSdeploymentincreasesbymorethan

twoordersofmagnitudeby2050,growingby14-to16-fold,oraCAAGRof19to20percent.

Arethesegrowthratesachievable?Technicallyspeaking,theanswerisyes.CCUS

infrastructureandundergroundstoragereservoirsaremorethanadequatetohandlethesevolumesofCO215However,thefuturecostsofdeployingthesetechnologies,includingtorelativelynovelsectorssuchaselectricpowergeneration(mostCCUStodayisusedintheindustrialsector),16arenotwellunderstood.

Inaddition,CCUStechnologiesarecontroversialandmaybeunwelcomeinsomeregions,inlargepartbecausetheymaynotreduce,andinsomecasesmayexacerbate,emissionsofotherairpollutantsfrompointsources17Theyalsodonotreducewaterpollutionorotherconsequencesoffossilfuelextraction,transportation,refining,andcombustion.

ResourcesfortheFuture4

Astheglobaleconomybecomesmoreenergyefficient,worldprimaryenergydemand

growsslowlyordeclinesunderalmostallscenariosexaminedhere.Thistrendisseen

mostclearlyinAmbitiousClimatescenarios,whereaggregateenergydemanddeclines

byasmuchas33percent(EquinorBridges).Fallingenergydemandoccursprimarilyin

high-incomecountries,withcontinuedgrowthinenergyconsumptioninmanylow-incomenations.Somescenarios,suchastheIEA’sNZE,highlighthowexpandingaccesstomodernenergyservicesinlow-incomeregionscanbeconsistentwithdecliningglobalenergy

demandandachievinglong-termsustainabilitygoals.

Figure3.WorldPrimaryEnergyDemandGrowsModestlyorDeclinesUnderMostScenarios

Note:Projectionsareorderedfromhighesttolowestdemandforfossilfuels.HistoricaldatafromIEA.“Liquids”includesoilonlyforEnerdatascenarios.“Biomass”excludesbiofuels,whichareincludedin“Liquids.”O(jiān)PECprojectionsarefor2045.“Other”includeswindandsolarforEquinorandOPEC.

Coaldemanddeclinesrelativeto2022ineveryscenarioexaminedhere,rangingfrom2

percent(EIA)to93percent(EquinorBridges)lowerby2050.Similarly,oildemandislowerattheendoftheprojectionperiodforallbutfourscenarios,whereitgrowsslowly.Liquidsdemand,whichincorporatesbiofuels,increasesby2050insixscenarios(EIA,EnerBase,

ExxonMobil,IEASTEPS,OPEC,andShellArchipelagos).Projectionsfornaturalgasdemandaremoremixed,withroughlyhalfshowinggrowthandhalfshowingreductions.Underall

AmbitiousClimatescenarios,globalgasdemandfallsconsiderably,rangingfromadropof59percent(bpNetZero)to78percent(EnerGreenandIEANZE)relativeto2022levels.

Windandsolargrowfasterthananyothersourcesinpercentagetermsunderallscenarios,butwithawiderange.Forexample,EIAprojectsglobalwindenergytoroughlytripleovertheprojectionperiod,themostbearishscenario.EvolvingPoliciesscenariossuchasIEA

STEPSshowwindgrowing5-fold,whilesolargrowsmorethan10-fold.UnderAmbitious

Climatescenarios,solarandwindtogetherrisefrom2percentoftheenergymixin2022toroughlyone-thirdormoreby2050.

GlobalEnergyOutlook2024:PeaksorPlateaus?5

Overthelast40years,thecarbonintensityoftheworld’sprimaryenergymixhas

remainedroughlyflat,decliningmodestlyfrom2010throughtoday.Inthedecades

ahead,carbonintensityisprojectedtocontinuethismodestdeclineunderReferenceandmostEvolvingPoliciesscenarios.Achievingambitiousclimategoals,however,willrequireanunprecedentedreductioninthecarbonintensityofenergy.

Figure4.AmbitiousClimateScenariosEnvisionUnprecedentedImprovementinCarbonIntensity

Note:HistoricaldatafromShell.NetCO2emissions(i.e.,inclusiveofnegativeemissions)perunitofprimaryenergydemandareshownhere.

From2010through2021,globalcarbonintensityofprimaryenergyfellbyaCAAGRof0.4percent.Thisdeclineacceleratesunderallscenarios,rangingfromalowof0.6percentonaverageannually(EIA)toahighof12.8percentormoreonaverageannuallyfrom2022to2050(EquinorBridgesandIEANZE).

Isthererecentprecedentforsuchrapidreductionsincarbonintensityatanationalorregionalscale?Unfortunately,theanswerisno.TheUnitedStates,SouthKorea,and

theUKrespectivelyreducedtheircarbonintensitiesbyanaverageof1.1,1.2,and1.3

percentannuallyfrom2010through2022.AndinSweden,carbonintensitydeclinedby1.9percentonaverageduringthisperiod.

Otheraffluentnationsexperiencedlessprogress,particularlyduetotheclosureof

nuclearpowerfacilities.Forexample,Germany’scarbonintensitydeclinedbyonly

0.2percentonaverageperyearfrom2010through2022,whileJapan’sincreasedby0.9percentannuallyonaverage.Thesefigureshighlightthescaleofthechallenge

facingglobalpolicymakersandpointtotheimportanceofretaininglow-carbonenergysourceswheretheycancontinueoperatingsafely.

ResourcesfortheFuture6

WorldleadersatCOP28agreedto“triplingrenewableenergycapacityglobally”to11,000gigawatts(GW)by203011,18Achievingthisgoalwouldrequireunprecedentedgrowthacrossmultipletechnologies,particularlywindandsolar.ThreeAmbitious

Climatescenarios(IEANZE,EnerGreen,andShellSky2050)achievethe2030goal,butthesescenariosarenotbasedonexistingorannouncedpolicies,highlightingtheneedforenhancedpolicyambitionifnationsaretoachievetheirCOP28renewableenergygoals.

Figure5.RenewableElectricityCapacityTriplesby2030UnderThreeScenarios

Note:HistoricaldatafromEIA.“Renewables”includeshydro,biomass,wind,solar,geothermal,andtidalenergy.ProjectionsaretakendirectlyfromEIAandIEA.Projectionsforother

organizationsareestimatedbasedonrenewableelectricitygenerationprojectionsfromeachorganization,convertedtocapacityassumingcapacityfactorsimputedfromtheIEAAPS.

In2010,renewableelectricitywasdominatedbyhydropower,whichaccounted

formorethan75percentofinstalledcapacityworldwide.Overthenext10years,

renewablecapacitymorethandoubled,growingby125percent,overwhelminglyledbywindandsolarphotovoltaic(PV),whichaccountedformorethan75percentofcapacityadditions,followedbyhydroat18percent.

From2020to2022,solarledafurtheraccelerationofrenewablesgrowth,which

increasedatanannualrateofmorethan10percent,or320GWperyear.Toreach11,000GWofrenewablecapacityby2030,annualcapacityadditionswouldneedtoaverageroughly800GWperyearfrom2022.Forperspective,in2022,globalwindcapacitywas832GWandsolarwas892GW,highlightingtheunprecedentedrateofgrowthneededtoachievetherenewableenergygoalagreeduponatCOP28.

GlobalEnergyOutlook2024:PeaksorPlateaus?7

AtCOP28,22nationscommittedtotriplingtheirnuclearenergycapacityby2050.Achieving

thisgoalwouldrequireafundamentalchangeinthetrajectoryofnuclearenergyfor

developednations,as12ofthe22experienceddecliningnuclearenergyproductionfrom2012through2022,while5currentlyproducenonuclearpower19Inrecentyears,nuclearenergy

growthhasbeenledbyChinaandIndia.AlthoughneitherofthesecountrieswaspartoftheannouncementatCOP28,theywerethetoptwonationsfornuclearpowerplantconstructionasofDecember2023.20Globally,nuclearcapacityisprojectedtogrowmodestlyundermostscenarios,and2022levelstripleby2050injusttwoscenarios,bothfromEnerdata.

Figure6.WorldNuclearPowerCapacityTriplesby2050UnderJustTwoScenarios

Note:HistoricaldatafromShell.CapacitydataaretakenfromoriginalinEIA,IEA,andShellandestimatedbasedonnuclearelectricitygenerationfrombp,Enerdata,Equinor,andExxonMobil,assumingplantsoperatedattheaverageglobalcapacityfactorin2020–22.

Projectionsforthegrowthofnuclearcapacityspanroughly800GW,nearlytwicethe

installedcapacityin2022.EvenacrossscenarioswithsimilarCO2emissionstrajectories,

projectionsvarywidely.F