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21March2024
04
08
18
Speedbumpsonthe
Europeanautomakers
ChineseEVstoconquer
roadtoelectrification
arelosingground
theglobalmarket
26
ChallengesandpoliticaluncertaintiesforUSEVs
AllianzResearch
Globalautooutlook:
Steeringthroughturbulence
AllianzResearch
2
Executive
Summary
AnoKuhanathan
HeadofCorporateResearch
ano.kuhanathan@
JasminGr?schl
SeniorEconomistforEuropejasmin.groeschl
@
MariaLatorre
SectorAdvisorB2B
maria.latorre@
MaximeLemerle
LeadAdvisor,InsolvencyResearch
maxime.lemerle@
YaoLu
SectorAdvisor
yao.lu@
?Theautomotivemarketisexpectedtonormalizethisyear.Ontheonehand,weexpectcarregistrationstoslowdownfollowinga
strongreboundin2023.Ontheotherhand,carmanufacturersfacereducedpricingpowerandcontractingmarginsamidintensified
competitionandanuncertainenvironment.Weexpectnew
autosalestogrowby+1.9%thisyearduetosubduedconsumer
spending–especiallyinChinaandEurope–andsub-parglobal
economicgrowth.EVsremaininarelativesweetspotdespitemajorheadwinds.WeforecastthesaleofnewEVpassengercarstoexceed18mn(+32.8%y/y)in2024,withEuropeleadingtheway(+41.2%).
Ontheproductionside,weanticipateadeclineingrossandEBITmarginsto18.7%(-28pps)and5.2%(-164pps),andanacceleratedconsolidation.TheexpecteduptickintheR&Dratio(4.5%,+14pps)
andCapEx-to-salesratios(5.4%,+33pps)showsthatautomakersarelikelytodiversifytheirinvestmentsandstayagile.Theindustryispoisedtoseeariseinintra-regionalcollaborationamong
automakersandstakeholdersacrossthesupplychaintogainanedgeinthereshuffling.
?Moreimportantly,theglobalautoindustryisgoingthrougha
significanttransformationtowardselectricvehicles(EVs)butthepathaheadwillbeturbulent,shapedbygeopoliticaltensions,
slowingdemandandregulatoryuncertainties.Regionally,
thetectonicshifthasalreadystarted.TheChinahasrisenasadisruptiveforce,challengingtraditionalautoleaders.EuropeandtheUS,waryoftheirdependenceonChinesecomponentsand
theimpactonlocalindustries,haverespondedwithincreased
tradebarriersandscrutiny.TherecentdecelerationinEVdemand,
coupledwiththeuncertainregulatoryandeconomicclimate,furthercomplicatestheindustry’snear-termtrajectory.Welookintoregionalspecificitiesbelow.
?First,EuropeanautomakersandespeciallyGermanonesare
losingground.Thecarindustryhasbeenthebackboneofthe
Europeaneconomy(6%ofregionaloutput),servingasaninnovation(32%ofEU’sR&D)andexporthub(2.8%ofEU’sexportvalue)whileemployingavastworkforce(6.5mndirectemployment).However,
havinglongfocusedontheirestablishedstrengths,European
autoincumbentsarrivedlatetotheEVgameandarestruggling
toproduceaffordablemodelsprofitably(EVsstillcost27%more
thangasolinecars).Consequently,Europeanautomakersare
experiencinganotabledeclineinmarketshare.Thetransformationhasalreadyhadvisibleimpactsonthebusinesslandscapeinterms
21March2024
3
ofinsolvencies(+13%in2023)andemployment,putting730,000
jobsatrisk,withGermanybeingespeciallyaffected.Tocatchupinthenewraceandboostmarketuptake,Europeshouldprovidemorecarrotsthansticksandtakeimmediateactionsonbuildingupan
eco-systemaroundtheEVproduction.
?Second,ChineseEVsareoncoursetoconquertheglobalmarketyettheyfaceformidablehurdles.ChineseEVshaverisenat
anastonishingpace,withsalesandproductionjumpingalmost
eightfoldfrom2019to2023.GovernmentsupportplaysacriticalroleinestablishingChina’sundisputeddominanceintheindustrytoday.ChineseEVmakershavestrongcostadvantagesthankstotheir
early-moverposition,lowerlaborcostsandeconomiesofscale,buttheyalsoexcelatquality.However,severalfactorspresentpotentialrisksthatcouldundermineChina’scurrentleadingposition,includinganescalatingpricewar,issuesofovercapacity,risinggeopolitical
tensionsandtheadventofnext-generationbatterytechnologies.
?Third,industrialpolicyispropellingtheshifttoEVsintheUS
autoindustrybutcostchallengesandpoliticaluncertainties
remain.Pragmaticindustrialpolicieshavebeenimplemented
acrossthesupplychain.WhiletheyhaveboostedtheEVtransitionandattractedsignificantinvestment(USD66bnbatteryandEV
investmentpost-IRA),thehighcostofEVsremainsachallenge,
exacerbatedbyincreasinglaborcosts(25%wageincreaseoverthe
nextfouryears)andadomesticpreferenceforlargervehicles(70.5%marketshare).PoliticaldynamicsstandasthelargestvariableinthefutureofUSautoindustry–apotentialsecondTrumppresidency
couldsetthepathonanalternatecoursegiventhedivergenceinthetwoparties’positionsongreentransformation.
4
AllianzResearch
theroadtoelectrification
Theautomotivemarketisexpectedtonormalize
thisyear:Asdemandlosesmomentumfollowinga
strongreboundin2023,weexpectthegrowthofnew
autoregistrationstoslowdownto+1.9%.Newauto
registrationssawasignificantrecoveryin2023asCovid-inducedsupply-chaindisruptionseasedandpent-up
demandreleased.Additionally,resilienteconomicgrowthandstrong,albeitslowing,growthinEVsfuelledcarsales–totalglobalautoregistrationsincreasedby+11.3%to
nearly88mn,thoughisstillbelowpre-pandemiclevels.
Thethreelargestautomarkets–China,theUSand
Europe–allrecordedstronggrowthin2023,at+11.9%,
+12.5%and+17.2%respectively.However,lookingahead,weexpectoverallgrowthtonormalizeto+1.9%thisyear(Figure1)duetosubduedconsumerspending–especiallyinChinaandEurope–andsub-palglobaleconomic
growth.Geopoliticaltensionscouldalsohitoverall
demandwiththeprospectofhighertariffs.ButEVsstill
remaininarelativesweetspotdespitemajorheadwinds(Figure2).WeexpectthesaleofnewEVpassengercarstoexceed18mn(+32.8%y/y)in2024,withEuropeleadingtheway(+41.2%).
Withintensifiedcompetitionandanuncertain
environment,automakersarelikelytofacediminishingpricingpowerandcontractingmarginsin2024across
allregions.Weexpectautocompaniestodiversify
theirinvestmentsacrossICEvehicles,hybridmodels
andfullyelectricmodelsinordertostayagileinthe
evolvingmarket,resultinginincreasedR&DandCapEx
spending.TheR&DratioandCapEx-to-salesratioof
thetop30automakersshouldreach4.5%(+14pps)and
5.4%(+33pps)in2024(Figure3).Ontheotherhand,the
heightenedcompetition,whichisparticularlyintense
intheEVsegmentandinChina,willhurtautomakers’
pricingpower.Weexpectanacceleratedconsolidationasautomakersfaceamarginsqueezeandlaggardsstruggletosurvive.GrossandEBITmarginsarelikelytodeclineto18.7%(-28pps)and5.2%(-164pps)thisyear(Figure4).Wealsoexpectariseinintra-regionalcollaborationamongautomakersandstakeholdersacrossthesupplychaintogainanedgeinthereshuffling.
21March2024
5
Figure1:Newautoregistrationsbyregion(mnunits)
100
80
60
40
20
0
Asia
SouthAmerica
NorthAmericaEurope
OtherregionsGrowthrate(rhs)
131415161718192021222324e
15%
10%
5%
0%
-5%
-10%
-15%
Sources:nationalassociations,OICA,Wards,ACEA,AllianzResearch
Figure2:EVsalesandgrowth
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
EV(mnunits)EVsalesgrowth(rhs)
1314151617181920212223e24e
140%
120%
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
Sources:IEA,AllianzResearch
Notes:thedataonlyincludespassengervehicles
AllianzResearch
6
Figure3&4:Investmentandmarginsoftop30autocompaniesbysales
6%
5%
4%
R&D%CapEx-to-sales
21%
20%
19%
18%
17%
161718192021222324e
GrossmarginEBITmargin(rhs)
161718192021222324e
8%7%6%5%4%3%2%1%0%
Sources:Bloomberg,AllianzResearch
Moreimportantly,theglobalautoindustryisundergoingitsmostsignificantparadigmshiftsincetheadventof
vehiclespoweredbyinternalcombustionengines(ICEs).
Toreachtheirambitiousclimatetargetsandachieve
carbonneutrality,governmentsaroundtheworldare
activelypromotinggreenenergyoverfossilfuels.The
autoindustrywillplayapivotalroleinthistransition,
whichwilldependondrivingupthenumberofelectric
vehicles(EVs)inuse.Inthiscontext,thedefiningattributeofacarisgraduallyshiftingfromenginecapacity—a
domainwhereEuropean,US,JapaneseandSouthKoreanautomakersexcelledduringtheICEera—tobatteryandsoftwarecapabilities.Amidstthisstructuralshift,Chinahasrisenasadisruptiveforce,havinginvestedinbatteryandsoftwarecapabilitiesformorethanadecadeandsecuredaleadingposition.Asaresult,itisreshapingtheglobal
autolandscapewithitsrapiddevelopmentinEVsanddominanceovertheentiresupplychain(Figure5).
Butthedeterioratingpoliticallandscapehaspavedaturbulentpathforthispivot.Amidelevatedgeopoliticaltensions,EuropeandtheUSaregrowingincreasingly
waryoftheirdependenceonChinesesupplies,aswell
astheimpactofthegrowingpopularityofChineseEVs
ontheirlocalindustries.Forinstance,batteriesrepresentthesinglelargestexpenseintheproductionofanEV,
typicallyaccountingforaround40%ofthetotalcost.Sixofthetop10globalmanufacturersofbatteriesarebasedinChina,withtheremainingfouralsoinAsia,together
accountingfor92.1%oftheworld’stotalbatterycapacityinstallationin2023(Figure6).Inresponse,governments
havebeentighteningrestrictionsandscrutinyoverChineseautoimports.Tradebarriersonautoandauto-related
productshavebeenincreasingabovetheirhistoriclevelssince2019(Figure7).Biden’sInflationReactionAct(IRA),forexample,offersuptoUSD7,500intaxcreditsforthe
purchaseofnewEVsbutexcludesthosewithChinesecomponents.AndtheEUlaunchedananti-subsidy
investigationintoChinesecarmakerslastyear,which
couldpotentiallyleadtoafurtherincreaseintariffs.
Thesegeopoliticaltensionsareaddingtotheuncertaintyofthepathtoelectrification.SinceChinesecompanies
canproduceEVsatmuchlowercost,thankstothewell-
establishedlocalsupplychain,cheaperlaborcostsand
scaleeconomies,theinfluxofcheaperChineseEVscouldbridgethegapinthelackofmass-marketmodelsinthe
West,thusacceleratingtheEVtransition.Butpolicymakersfaceadilemmabetweengoinggreencheaperand
quickerandtherisksthisposestolocalindustriesandemployment,addingtotheuncertainty.
Theuncertainregulatoryclimatefurthercomplicates
theindustry’snear-termtrajectory.TheEUhascarved
outanexemptionfore-fuelsinits2035banonthesale
ofnewfossil-fueledvehicles,whiletheUKhaspushed
backitssimilarbanfrom2030to2035.LookingacrosstheAtlantic,thepotentialreturnofTrumptotheWhiteHousecouldalsohaveimplicationsfortheEVtransitioninthe
world’ssecond-largestautomarket.Thesedevelopmentsunderscoretheintricateinterplaybetweenregulatory
decisions,marketdynamicsandgeopoliticalfactorsthatwillshapetheglobalautoindustry’sgreentransformation.
21March2024
Figure5:RegionaldistributionoftheEVbatterysupplychain
ChinaEuropeUnitedStatesOther
100%
75%
50%
25%
0%
Sources:IEA,AllianzResearch
Figure6:Installedcapacityofmajorbatterymakers(MWh)
20232022
250000
200000
150000
100000
50000
0
Sources:CleanTechnic,AllianzResearch
Notes:*referstoChinesecompanies,**referstoSouthKoreancompanies,***referstoJapanesecompanies
Figure7:Tradebarriersoncarsandrelatedproducts
500
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
20162017201820192020202120222023
ImporttariffsNon-tariffbarriers
Sources:GTA,AllianzResearch
7
AllianzResearch
8
Europeanautomakers
arelosinggroundfast
Theautoindustryhasbeenthebackboneofthe
Europeaneconomy,notonlydrivingindustrial
innovationandtechnologicaladvancementsbutalso
creatingsubstantialemploymentopportunities.The
EUautosectorcontributestoaround6%oftheregion’s
output,accountsforcloseto950,000firmsandemploys6.5mnpeople.Someestimatesthatincludeindirectjobscountasmuchas13mnpeople,whichwouldrepresent7%oftotalemploymentintheEU.Thesectoralsoservesas
aninnovationhubastheEU’slargestinvestorinresearchanddevelopment,contributing32%totheregion’sannualR&Dinvestment(nearlyEUR73bnin2022,Figure8).
Additionally,theautosectoralsoplaysacrucialroleintheregion’sexportmarketasEuropean,especiallyGerman,
carmakershavebeenrenownedfortheirengineering
prowess,designandperformance.In2022,theEU
exportedEUR158bnworthofcars,whichaccountedfor2.8%ofthebloc’stotalexportvalue.Germanyclearly
dominatesthesectorintheEU,accountingfor12%ofthenumberoffirmsintheEU,28%ofthepersonsemployedand34%oftheturnover.ItisalsoworthnotingthattheautoindustryinGermanyisconcentratedinthewesternpartofthecountry,whichhasbeenhistoricallyhometosomeofthelargestmanufacturers(Figure9).
Figure8:R&DspendinginEurope(EURmn)
70000
60000
50000
40000
30000
20000
10000
0
GermanyFranceSpainItaly
ManufacturingAutomotive
Sources:Eurostat,AllianzResearch
21March2024
9
Figure9:AutoplantsinEurope
Sources:KlierandRubenstein(2016)
However,havinglongfocusedontheirestablished
strengths,Europeanautoincumbentsarrivedlateto
theEVgameandarestrugglingtoproduceaffordablemodelsprofitably.Affordabilityremainsthebiggest
factorholdingconsumersbackfromanEVpurchase,
accordingtoasurveybyS&PGlobalMobility,with
nearlyhalfofrespondentsconsideringEVstobetoo
expensive.Thoughcarmakersareracingtocuttheir
costs,elevatedenergyandlaborcostshavemadeit
difficulttomaintainprofitabilitywhilesellingataffordableprices.Consequently,Europeancarmakershavefocusedpredominantlyonthepremiumsegment,leadingtoa
lackofaffordablemodelsinthemarket.TheaveragepriceofEVsinEuropewasEUR55,821in2022–27%higherthanthatofgasolinecars–andalmostallEV
offeringswerepricedaboveEUR20,000.Incomparison,
EVscostEUR31,829onaverageinChina,athirdlower
thanthepriceofgasolinecarsin2022.Whilegrappling
withthehighcostsandlowprofitabilityofEVs,EuropeanautomakersarealsofacingpotentialprofitabilitysqueezesonICEvehicles.Lastyear,theEUreachedaprovisional
agreementonEuro7,anupdatedregulationtoincludeadditionalrulesforvehicleemissionsandimposestricterrequirementsforvehiclelifetimes.ThenewlegislationisestimatedtoincreasethedirectcostbyEUR2,000perICEcar/van(Figure10).
AllianzResearch
10
Figure10:AverageincrementalcostsofEuro7forcars/vans(EUR/vehicle)
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
0
500
IndustryECdirect
directcostscostsPI(Gasoline)
Industrydirectcosts
ECdirect
costs
CI(Diesel)
Industryindirectcosts
Sources:FrontierEconomics,ACEAmemberdata,AllianzResearch
Inaddition,Europe,particularlyGermany,isfacing
significantchallengesinretaininginvestmentwithintheregionamidgrowingprotectionism.TheUSisemergingasahighlyattractiveinvestmentdestinationforEuropeancompanies,drivenbygenerousfederaltaxcreditsand
statesubsidies.Thisimpactisespeciallypronounced
amongGermancompanies,whichcommittedarecord
USD15.7bntoUSprojectsin2023,nearlydoublethe
amountfrom2022.Meanwhile,thegapbetweeninboundandoutboundinvestmenthaswidened,reachinga
recordhighin2022,withmorethanUSD135bninforeigndirectinvestmentleavingGermanyandonlyUSD10.5bn
entering.Theautosectorisemblematicofthistrendas
Volkswagen,Mercedes-BenzandZFFriedrichshafen
spearheadedthethreelargestUSprojectsbyGerman
companiesin2023.Theircombinedinvestmenttotals
USD4.4bnandisexpectedtocreate6,300jobs.Notably,
VolkswagenearlierdecidedtoprioritizeabatteryplantinNorthAmericaoverapreviouslyplannedfacilityinEasternEurope,enticedbytheprospectofreceivinguptoUSD10bninUSincentives.Thistrendislikelytocontinuegiven
thehighproductioncosts,shortageofskilledlaborandlackofcomparableincentivesintheEU.Accordingtoa
surveybytheGermanAmericanChambersofCommerce,96%ofGermancompaniesintheUSplantoexpandtheirinvestmentsby2026.
Consequently,Europeanautomakersareexperiencing
anotabledeclineinmarketshareintheirhometurf,a
trendlargelyattributedtoChina’sevolvingrolefromamajorimportertoaformidablecompetitor.Thisshiftis
particularlyimpactfulforsomeofEurope’smostrenownedautomakersthathavetraditionallydependedonthe
Chinesemarketforasignificantportionoftheirsalesandprofits.Asaresult,EuropeanbrandsarelosinggroundinboththeEUandChina,withtheirmarketsharedecreasingby3.6ppsand4.5pps,respectively,between2019and
2022(Figures11&12).ThesedecreasescorrespondwiththeriseofChineseautomakers,whichhavenotonly
solidifiedtheirpositioninthedomesticmarket–wherethereisagrowingpreferenceforlocalbrands–buthavealsomadesignificantinroadsintoEurope,bolsteredbytheirEVofferings.Consequently,Europeanautomakersarebecomingincreasinglypessimisticabouttheir
competitiveness,asevidencedbythedownwardtrendintheperceivedcompetitivenessofautomotivecompaniesinGermanyandFrance,whichhavelongbeenconsideredpowerhousesintheEuropeanautoindustry(Figure13).
11
21March2024
Figure11&12:Europeancarmakersarelosingmarketshare
MarketshareofautointheEUbyregionMarketshareofautoinChinabyregion
76%75%74%73%72%71%70%69%68%67%
MarketshareofEuropeanbrandsintheEU
50%
1.4%
1.2%
1.0%
0.8%
0.6%
0.4%
0.2%
0.0%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
MarketshareofChinesebrandsintheEU(rhs)
2019202020212022
MarketshareofEuropeanbrandsinChinaMarketshareofChinesebrandsinChina
2019202020212022
Sources:ACEA,AllianzResearch
Figure13:Perceivedcompetitivenessonforeignmarketsbyfirmsintheautoindustry
80
60
40
20
0
-20
-40
-60
-80
Germany-extra-EU---Germany-intra-EUFrance-intra-EUFrance-extra-EU
Sources:EuropeanCommission,AllianzResearch
AllianzResearch
12
Thetransformationofthesectorisalreadypushingup
insolvenciesandthreateningemployment,with730,000jobsatrisk,especiallyinGermany.InGermany,the
ongoingtransitionisleadingtofewerfirms,withdivergingtrendsamongsub-sectors:anincreaseinthenumber
offirmsinmanufacturing(indicatingthatthestructural
changesinthesectorarealsofosteringnewbusinesses)
thathasbeenmorethancompensatedbythedecrease
inthetrade/maintenancesegment.Thenumberofauto
sectorinsolvenciesinGermanyhasremainedrelatively
moderatesofar,comparedtoothercountriessuchas
FranceandtheUK,aswellascomparedtoothersectors
withinthecountry.However,theupwardtrend(+13%y/y
in2023)confirmsthatmorefirmsarestrugglingtoadapttothechangesinthesector.Withregardtoemployment,sinceanEVismadeupoffewerparts,weestimatethat
companiesinthemanufacturingsegmentscouldoperatewith30%fewerpeople.Thiswouldmean730,000jobs
atriskintheEU,includingatleast260,000inGermany.
Thesenumberscouldevenbehigher,especiallyifEU
automakerslosefurthermarketsharesand/ordecideto
offshoreproduction.Germanyisparticularlyexposed
asthesectoris(i)bothhighlyexport-oriented,and
thereforemoreexposedtocompetitionfromforeign
brands,notablyChineseones,and(ii)muchmorelabor-
intensive,andthereforeexposedtotheriskofoutsourcing/subcontractingtolow-wagecountries,notablyEastern
Europeancountrieswhereunitwagecostsaresignificantlylower(between60-70%).
by2035.However,incomparisontotheUSandChina,
theEU’sapproachlackscoordinatedsupportanda
comprehensivestrategy.Bymid-2023,20EUcountriesdidnotprovideanyinfrastructureincentivesandsevenofferednosubsidiesforEVpurchases.Incentivesarescaling
backevenfurtherenteringinto2024,withGermany
terminatingthehandoutsearlierthanoriginallyplannedandFrancecurbingsubsidiesduetobudgetconstraints.Theavailabilityofchargingstations,whichiscrucialto
addressEVbuyers’rangeanxiety,isunevenwithinthe
region,with60%ofallchargingstationsconcentrated
intheNetherlands(149,025),Germany(125,997)and
France(124,526,Figure15).Policymakersshouldstep
uptheirsupportfortheexpansionofchargingnetworksandprovidemoreincentivestoencouragetheswitchtoEVs.Furthermore,keepinganedgeintheEVcompetitionismorethanjustexpertiseincarmanufacturing.Italsorequiresarobustsupplychainaswellasadvancementsinbatteryandsoftwaretechnology,whicharecrucial
formanagingcostsandenhancingdrivingperformanceandexperience.Hencepolicymakersshouldtakeactionstoattractinvestmentsacrosstheentiresupplychain,
ensuringaccesstoessentialrawmaterials,improving
refineryinfrastructureandadvancingbatterytechnologytonavigatethecrossroads.
Tocatchupinthenewraceandboostmarketuptake,Europeshouldprovidemorecarrotsthansticks.
Amongthethreelargestautomarkets,theEUhas
setthemostambitiousemissions-reductiongoalbyeffectivelybanningthesaleofnewfossil-fuelvehicles
Figure14:Insolvenciesinthemanufacturing(left)andtrade/maintenance(right),numberofcases,annually
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
-
nGermanyFrancewUK
08091011121314151617181920212223
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
-
GermanyFranceUK
08091011121314151617181920212223
Sources:DeStatis,ONS,AllianzResearch
21March2024
Figure15:DistributionofchargingstationsintheEU
160000
140000
120000
100000
80000
60000
40000
20000
0
Sources:EuropeanCommission,AllianzResearch
13
AllianzResearch
14
Box1:ShiftinginternationalvaluecreationstructuresintheGermanautomotiveindustry
TheautomotivesectorplaysapivotalroleinGermany,theleadingmarketandproducerinEurope.Theindustryservesasaglobalexportpowerhouseanddriverofinnovationinmobility.Companiesactiveinthesectorrangefromlargeautomanufacturerstoanetworkofsmall-andmedium-sizedsuppliers.Notably,around85%ofautoindustrysuppliersfallwithinthemedium-sizedcategory.In2020,theindustry’sproductionreachedUSD433bn,overathird
ofthisamountrepresentingthevalueadded(VA)generatedbytheGermanautomotiveindustry.Outofthegoodsmanufactured,USD96bnwereconsumeddomesticallyinGermany,whileanadditionalUSD156bnwereexportedtoforeignmarkets.TheremainingnearlyUSD286bnwasutilizedasintermediateconsumptionbysectorsbothathomeandabroad.
Theautomotiveindustryhastraditionallyreliedheavilyondomesticvaluecreation–butthelandscapeischanging.
From1995to2020,therehasbeenanotableincreaseofone-quarterinGermandomesticVAwithintheautomotive
sector,whileforeignVAhassurgedbymorethanthree-quarters.Concurrently,intermediateimportshavenearly
quadrupled.However,despitethesteadyriseinforeignVAandintermediateimports,thegrowthindomesticVAhas
shownsignsofstagnationsince2018.Whencomparingthesetrendstogrossoutput,adifferentpictureemerges.TheshareofdomesticVAasaproportionofgrossoutputhasdeclinedby11.7pps,droppingfrom38.1%in1995to26.4%
in2020,whiletheproportionofforeignVAhasremainedconstant(Figure16).Meanwhile,theshareofintermediate
importshasincreasedfrom7.4%to11.4%.Thisindicatesthatthehigherlevelofinternationalinterconnectednesswithinvaluecreationstructureshasenabledincreasedoutputwithintheindustry.
Figure16:Grossoutput(inUSDbn,left),domesticandforeignVAandintermediateimports(in%ofgrossoutput,right)intheGermanautomotiveindustry,1995-2020
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
Grossoutput---VAdomesticVAforeign---Intermediateimports
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
Source:OECDTiVA,AllianzResearch
Thedomesticmarketcontinuestostandoutastheprimarybuyer.In2020,,two-thirdsoffinaldemandproductioninthesectorwasdirectedtowardsthedomesticmarket.Notably,Chinawasthemostimportantforeignmarketfor
Germanautomotiveproducts,holdingashareof3.2%,followedbytheUSat3.1%andFranceat2.3%(Table1).
Despitethisstrongfocusondomesticsales,theGermanautomotiveindustryboastsarobustinternationalnetwork.
WhileitimportedatotalofUSD304bninintermediategoodsandservices,italsoexportednearlyUSD500bnworthofintermediategoodsandservicestomarketsabroad.
21March2024
Table1:Top10countriesoffinaldemandforproductsfromtheGermanautomotiveindustry,2020
Sharein%
GermanyChina
USA
FrancePoland
NetherlandsItaly
Austria
SwitzerlandSpain
UK
RestoftheWorld
VolumeinUSDmn
702.5
65.1
34.9
3.2
33.1
3.1
25.3
2.3
24.1
2.2
22.7
2.1
19.3
1.8
15.5
1.4
15.4
1.4
14.3
1.3
13.4
1.2
158.8
14.7
Sources:OECDTiVA,AllianzResearch
ChinaisnotonlyakeymarketforGermancarsbutalsostandsoutasthetopcontributorofforeignvalueadded
intheautomotivesector.Thesector’sglobalinterconnectednessisfurtherhighlightedbythesignificantincreasein
foreignVAcontributionstofinaldemand,whichsurgedby77%between1995
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