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1、本科畢業(yè)論文(設(shè)計(jì))外 文 翻 譯原文:corporate social responsibility and nancialperformance: the virtuous circle revisitedwe examine the causal relation between corporate social responsibility (csr) and nancial performance. consistent with past studies, we nd that the two variables appear to be related when we use t

2、raditional statistical techniques. however, using a time series xed effects approach, we nd that the relation between csr and nancial performance is much weaker than previously thought. we also nd little evidence of causality between nancial performance and narrower measures of social performance th

3、at focus on stakeholder management. our results suggest that strong stock market performance leads to greater rm investment in aspects of csr devoted to employee relations, but that csr activities do not affect nancial performance. we conclude that csr is driven more by unobservable rm characteristi

4、cs than by nancial performance.the area of corporate social responsibility (csr) has become a notable topic both in the business and academic press. mcwilliams and siegel (2001) dene csr as actions that appear to further some social good, beyond the interests of the rm and that which is required by

5、law,. examples of csr include support of local businesses or charities, developing recycling programs, and promoting minority employment. though these activities certainly result in societal benets, opinions differ as to whether a rms csr activity enhances nancial performance. for instance, csr has

6、been described as beinglittle more than a cosmetic treatment, while an earlier article in the nancial press touted the economic advantages for companies practicing csr.csr has attracted the attention of mutual fund investors, including tiaa cref, and a number of funds use csr as a screening device f

7、or investment selection. however, any benets investors derive from including socially responsible rms in their portfolios do not appear to be in form of superior returns. bello (2005) matches socially responsible mutual funds to conventional funds in the late 1990s and nds no signicant difference in

8、 long-run investment performance or portfolio diversication between the two groups. according to statman (2000), the domini social index (dsi) did as well as the s&p 500 between 1990 and 1998. he nds that some socially responsible funds performed worse than the s&p 500 and the dsi, but fared no wors

9、e than conventional mutual funds during the time period.academic research has examined the causal relation between csr and nancial performancewhat is sometimes referred to as the virtuous circleto determine ifdoing good socially leads to doing well nancially, and whether rms exhibiting superior nanc

10、ial performance devote more resources to social activities. why should avirtuous circle exist? waddock and graves (1997) suggest that positive stakeholder relationships can reduce the likelihood of difculty when dealing with groups such as employees, customers, and the community. in addition, good s

11、ocial performance and good managerial practice may be related, so this in turn may lead to strong nancial performance. for instance, cheng et al. (2006) nd that rms with strong shareholder rights tend to have a lower cost of equity capital than competing rms, which supports the idea that reducing ag

12、ency problems between stakeholders and management improves nancial performance. ferreira et al. (2008) nd that large rms benet in the form of positive long-run stock performance following certication of quality management. this suggests that in the case of large companies, good managerial practice d

13、oes indeed improve the bottom line.the empirical evidence suggests that a virtuous circle exists. waddock and graves (1997) and hillman and keim (2001) nd that increased csr leads to enhanced nancial performance and vice versa. mcguire et al. (1988) nd that prior years stock returns and accounting-b

14、ased performance measures are related to current measures of csr, but that a past record of good social performance does not affect the current nancial performance of a rm.despite the extensive body of research on csr and nancial performance, we believe that additional analysis is warranted. in this

15、 study, we use alternative statistical techniques to provide new insights on the causal relationship between rm performance and csr. the studies cited above and others on the topic have typically employed ordinary least squares (ols) regressions with 1-year lagged values of one variable (e.g., csr)

16、used as determinants of the other (e.g., roa). indeed, we also nd that csr and performance are related when we use standard ols regression models. however, in a time series xed effects approach with over 2,800 rm-year observations, we nd that the relation between csr and nancial performance is much

17、weaker than that documented in past studies. we also nd little evidence of causality between nancial performance and narrower measures of social performance. overall, we nd weak evidence that strong stock market performance leads to greater levels of csr that focus specically on employee relations.

18、however, csr activity does not lead to changes in a rms nancial performance.this study contributes to the literature on csr in several ways. we use a more comprehensive time-series of csr data relative to past studies. also, previous research analyzing the link between csr and nancial performance do

19、es not account for possible persistence or unobservable characteristics that may play a role in the level of csr activity undertaken by a rm. we examine these important considerations by using granger causality and controlling for rm xed-effects in our time series. we also use a tobit specication fo

20、r models of csr causality to account for the censored nature of the data. finally, our specications also include analysis of narrow measures of social performance such as how the company treats employees, the environment, the community, and diversity issues. the use of appropriate statistical method

21、s and examination of the components of csr yield added insights regarding the relation between csr and nancial performance.to measure csr, we use the kld socrates database. this database rates companies on the various degrees of social responsibility including community participation, diversity, emp

22、loyee interests, environmental considerations, and shareholder interests. this index is superior to alternative measures of csr because it is compiled by an independent rating service that focuses on a wide range of rms over a broad spectrum of csr screens, whereas alternative measures of csr focus

23、on a small sample of rms or use a narrow csr screen. each screen in the kld database is summarized in terms of strengths (positive values) and concerns (negative values). for instance, the community screen is calculated on the basis of strengths, such as generous giving or support for education in t

24、he area, and concerns, such as investment controversies or negative economic impact on the community.we calculate a weighted average of the overall index to represent each rms aggregate level of csr, using the weights developed by waddock and graves (1997). we use these weights to facilitate compari

25、son of results, and to highlight the effect of a different estimation methodology on statistical inferences. waddock and graves calculate weights using expert panel evaluations on the relative importance of each csr attribute. weightings are as follows: employee relations: 0.168; product: 0.154; com

26、munity relations: 0.148; environment: 0.142; treatment of women and minorities: 0.136; nuclear power: 0.089; military contracts: 0.086; south africa: 0.076. our sample extends from 1993 to 2000 and includes data on more than 600 u.s. rms. we assess nancial performance using both accounting (return o

27、n assets, or roa) and market-based (common stock returns) measures from compustat.previous studies of the relationship between nancial performance and social responsibility have failed to control for unobservable characteristics in panel data that differ between rms but are constant over time. for e

28、xample, variables such as corporate culture or managerial inuence may be signicant determinants of csr activity. using a xed effects regression model allows us to estimate the effects of the independent variables on the dependent variable while controlling for the effect of unobserved variables.the

29、regression results suggest a link between csr and nancial performance. an interesting question arises as to the nature of causality, if any, between doing good through greater csr activity and doing well nancially. does good nancial performance cause a rm to become more socially responsible, or does

30、 a high level of csr lead to subsequent superior nancial performance? good nancial performance may result in more resources being available for the pursuit of csr goals. a high level of csr may attract the attention of investors or customers or motivate employees to perform better and reduce costs,

31、boosting nancial performance. another possibility is that a virtuous circle exists, and the causality runs in both directions.before discussing our results, a comment on model specication is in order. the typical problem that arises in ols regression when lagged dependent variables are included as r

32、egressors is serial correlation in the error term, rendering the parameter estimates biased and inconsistent. we test for this using the method of maddala (1971) and nd that serial correlation is not a problem in our model.harrison and freeman (1999) note that research on csr has over time focused m

33、ore on specic measures of social responsibility, and less on the aggregate social performance measure. for instance, hillman and keim (2001) separate social performance into two components: stakeholder management and social issue participation. primary stakeholders include shareholders, employees, a

34、nd customers, and they nd that this measure is directly related to shareholder value creation. however, social issue participation, which refers to the use of corporate resources for social issues outside rm strategy such as avoidance of nuclear energy, refraining from alcohol, tobacco, and gambling

35、 industries, etc., is negatively related to changes in shareholder wealth. fisman et al. (2005) focus specically on csr that is targeted towards the community in a study on industry variability in csr. they justify the use of this measure as it is the most prominent element of csr, and suggest that

36、activities directed towards the community can be used as a means of differentiation by rms in competitive industries. they nd that the community csr measure is positively related to protability in advertising intensive industries.we test the relationship between nancial performance and specic aspect

37、s of csr using individual factors in the kld database rather than the weighted average csr score. the kld database rates companies on eight different screens of social responsibility. each screen focuses on strengths and concerns of a particular social indicator. we create separate stakeholder manag

38、ement scores for community, diversity, employee relations, and environment by adding up the number of strengths listed in each category and subtracting out the total number of weaknesses. by doing this, we can analyze the causal relationship between nancial performance and specic indicators of csr r

39、ather than the overall csr score.a number of studies have examined the relationship between csr and nancial performance, and most have found that the two characteristics are directly related. in this paper, we analyze the existence and direction of causality between csr and nancial performance by us

40、ing a more comprehensive data set and an improved statistical methodology.we use the kld index as the measure of csr, and both return on assets and stock returns to assess nancial performance. first, we analyze causality using standard ols regression analysis, similar to past research. our results a

41、re consistent with the existing literature in that past nancial performance is signicant in explaining variability in csr, and that csr is signicant in explaining variability in nancial performance.however, when we introduce panel xed effects into the model, the results no longer suggest a strong re

42、lationship between csr and nancial performance. we further examine the link between csr and nancial performance using granger causality models. results here again demonstrate the weakened evidence of a relationship between csr and nancial performance. however, there is some evidence that stock retur

43、ns cause csr performance. we then introduce both panel xed effects and tobit models in the causality model specication. we nd no causality from csr to nancial performance, and only weak evidence of causality running from stock returns to a rms csr score. finally, we examine the relation between nanc

44、ial performance and stakeholder-specic measures of csr. we nd that higher stock returns lead to higher employee relations scores, but nd no evidence of causality between stock returns and aspects of csr related to the community, diversity, or environment.in summary, csr and nancial performance appea

45、r to be related when using traditional ols regression models. however, this virtuous circle is found to be much weaker when examined using a xed effects granger causality approach. there is no evidence that csr affects a rms nancial performance, and the only aspect of csr driven by stock market perf

46、ormance is employee relations. if socially responsible activities provide benets to the rm, they appear to manifest themselves in forms unrelated to nancial performance.source: edward nelling,elizabeth webb,2009.“corporate social responsibility and nancial performance: the virtuous circle revisited”

47、. review of quantitative finance and accounting,vol.32,no.2,pp.197209.譯文:企業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任與財(cái)務(wù)業(yè)績(jī):重新建立的“良性循環(huán)”通過(guò)研究企業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任與財(cái)務(wù)業(yè)績(jī)之間的因果關(guān)系,我們發(fā)現(xiàn),當(dāng)運(yùn)用傳統(tǒng)的統(tǒng)計(jì)技術(shù)時(shí)這兩個(gè)變量是相關(guān)的,并且與過(guò)去的研究結(jié)論一致。然而通過(guò)使用時(shí)間序列固定效應(yīng)的方法,我們發(fā)現(xiàn)企業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任與財(cái)務(wù)業(yè)績(jī)之間的關(guān)系比之前預(yù)想的更虛弱。我們也發(fā)現(xiàn)沒(méi)有跡象顯示財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效與重點(diǎn)在利益相關(guān)者管理上的采用狹隘措施的社會(huì)績(jī)效評(píng)價(jià)之間存在因果關(guān)系。結(jié)果表明,強(qiáng)大的股票市場(chǎng)表現(xiàn)導(dǎo)致投資于企業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任方面的公司更多地致力于員工關(guān)系,但是企

48、業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任活動(dòng)并沒(méi)有影響財(cái)務(wù)業(yè)績(jī)。我們可以得出結(jié)論:企業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任比財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效更能夠體現(xiàn)公司隱藏的特征。無(wú)論是在商業(yè)還是學(xué)術(shù)出版物上,企業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任已成為一個(gè)值得關(guān)注的話題。麥克威廉姆斯和席格(2001)定義企業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任為“那些對(duì)社會(huì)長(zhǎng)期有利,超越企業(yè)利潤(rùn)的行為,這也正是法律所要求的”。企業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任的例子包括支持當(dāng)?shù)禺a(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)和慈善機(jī)構(gòu),發(fā)展循環(huán)項(xiàng)目,和促進(jìn)少數(shù)名族人口就業(yè)問(wèn)題。雖然這些活動(dòng)的結(jié)果肯定存在社會(huì)效益的,但是對(duì)于一個(gè)公司的企業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任是否能提高財(cái)務(wù)業(yè)績(jī)是見(jiàn)仁見(jiàn)智的。例如,企業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任被認(rèn)為是“類似于化妝品治療”,而在財(cái)經(jīng)出版物上的一篇早期的文章則指出對(duì)于公司實(shí)踐企業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任是具有經(jīng)濟(jì)優(yōu)勢(shì)的

49、。企業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任業(yè)績(jī)吸引了共同基金投資者們的注意,包括美國(guó)全美教師保險(xiǎn)及年金協(xié)會(huì)以及一些使用社會(huì)責(zé)任作為投資選擇的一個(gè)篩選工具的基金。然而,來(lái)自包括對(duì)社會(huì)負(fù)責(zé)任公司的投資組合中的任何利益都沒(méi)有表現(xiàn)出超額的投資回報(bào)的形式。貝洛(2005)測(cè)試了社會(huì)責(zé)任基金和上世紀(jì)90年代末期的傳統(tǒng)基金,發(fā)現(xiàn)在長(zhǎng)期投資業(yè)績(jī)上無(wú)顯著差異或者投資組合的多樣性。根據(jù)斯塔特曼(2000)的觀點(diǎn),多米尼社會(huì)指數(shù)做到了標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾500指數(shù)在1990至1998年間的數(shù)據(jù),并發(fā)現(xiàn)一些社會(huì)責(zé)任基金表現(xiàn)得比標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾500指數(shù)和多米尼社會(huì)指數(shù)差,但是在同期內(nèi)表現(xiàn)并不遜于傳統(tǒng)的共同基金。學(xué)術(shù)研究已經(jīng)檢驗(yàn)了企業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任與財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效之間的因果關(guān)系

50、它有時(shí)以“良性的循環(huán)”被提及決定是否在社會(huì)責(zé)任方面做得好就會(huì)導(dǎo)致在財(cái)務(wù)業(yè)績(jī)上表現(xiàn)得好,以及公司表現(xiàn)出卓越的財(cái)務(wù)業(yè)績(jī)后是否會(huì)增加在社會(huì)活動(dòng)上的投入。“良性循環(huán)”為什么會(huì)存在呢?華道克和格雷烏斯(1997)認(rèn)為積極的利益相關(guān)者的關(guān)系可以減少處理與員工、客戶和社會(huì)各界打交道的問(wèn)題的可能性。此外,良好的社會(huì)業(yè)績(jī)與良好的管理實(shí)踐有一定的相關(guān)性,所以可能導(dǎo)致帶來(lái)強(qiáng)大的財(cái)務(wù)業(yè)績(jī)。例如,程孫儷等(2006)發(fā)現(xiàn)股東權(quán)利高度集中的公司比其他競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者更傾向于擁有一個(gè)較低的權(quán)益資本成本,這就支持了通過(guò)減少股東與管理層之間的代理問(wèn)題來(lái)提高財(cái)務(wù)業(yè)績(jī)的觀點(diǎn)。費(fèi)雷拉等(2008)發(fā)現(xiàn)大公司利益在長(zhǎng)期股票業(yè)績(jī)上伴隨著質(zhì)量管理的

51、認(rèn)證。這表明在大公司中良好的管理實(shí)踐確實(shí)能提高公司的底線。經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)表明,確實(shí)存在一個(gè)良性循環(huán)。華道克和格雷烏斯(1997)以及希爾曼和凱姆(2001)發(fā)現(xiàn)社會(huì)責(zé)任的加強(qiáng)能帶動(dòng)財(cái)務(wù)業(yè)績(jī)的增長(zhǎng),反之亦然。麥奎爾等(1988)發(fā)現(xiàn),前一年的股票回報(bào)率和會(huì)計(jì)為基礎(chǔ)的績(jī)效措施是關(guān)系到現(xiàn)行的社會(huì)責(zé)任措施的,但那是過(guò)去的良好社會(huì)表現(xiàn)的記錄,并不影響公司目前的財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效。盡管存在廣泛而大量的有關(guān)企業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任和財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效之間的研究,但我們?nèi)匀幌嘈蓬~外的分析是需要被保證的。在本研究中,我們使用替代統(tǒng)計(jì)方法應(yīng)用于提供新的關(guān)注點(diǎn)在公司的業(yè)績(jī)和社會(huì)責(zé)任兩者的因果聯(lián)系上。以上所提到的研究以及其他的話題已經(jīng)使用了具有代表性的普

52、通最小二乘法,它根據(jù)一年內(nèi)回歸滯后測(cè)試值作為一個(gè)變量(如企業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任),以用作其他變量(如資產(chǎn)收益率)的決定因素。事實(shí)上,我們還發(fā)現(xiàn),當(dāng)使用標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的最小二乘法模型時(shí),企業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任和財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效之間是有關(guān)聯(lián)的。然而,在時(shí)間序列固定效應(yīng)方法上以超過(guò)2800家公司的年度觀察來(lái)看,我們發(fā)現(xiàn)兩者的關(guān)系比記錄在過(guò)去的研究上的要微弱些。我們也發(fā)現(xiàn)沒(méi)有跡象表明財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效和社會(huì)績(jī)效的狹隘措施之間存在因果聯(lián)系??偟膩?lái)說(shuō),我們發(fā)現(xiàn)有微弱的證據(jù)表明,強(qiáng)烈的股票市場(chǎng)表現(xiàn)導(dǎo)致高水平的企業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任,特別是在員工關(guān)系上。然而,企業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任活動(dòng)一般不會(huì)導(dǎo)致公司財(cái)務(wù)業(yè)績(jī)的改變。本研究從多方面對(duì)企業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任作出貢獻(xiàn),相對(duì)于過(guò)去的研究,我們

53、使用更全面的時(shí)間序列的企業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任數(shù)據(jù)。同時(shí),以前的研究分析了企業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任與財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效之間的聯(lián)系,卻沒(méi)有對(duì)可能的持續(xù)性和未被發(fā)現(xiàn)的特征作出解釋,而這些有可能在公司正在進(jìn)行的社會(huì)責(zé)任活動(dòng)中起著重要的作用。我們通過(guò)使用格蘭杰因果關(guān)系和在時(shí)間序列里控制公司的固定影響來(lái)檢測(cè)這些重要的考慮因素。我們也使用托賓規(guī)格因果關(guān)系的企業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任模型區(qū)計(jì)算審查數(shù)據(jù)的性質(zhì)。最后,我們的技術(shù)參數(shù)也包括分析社會(huì)績(jī)效的狹隘措施,諸如公司如何對(duì)待員工,環(huán)境,社會(huì)等多樣性的問(wèn)題。合適的統(tǒng)計(jì)方法的使用和對(duì)企業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任收益部分的檢查開(kāi)闊了關(guān)于社會(huì)責(zé)任和財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效之間關(guān)系的視野。衡量企業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任,我們使用kld蘇格拉底的數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)。這個(gè)數(shù)據(jù)

54、庫(kù)認(rèn)為不同程度的企業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任包括社區(qū)參與、多樣性、員工利益,環(huán)境問(wèn)題和股東利益。這個(gè)指標(biāo)優(yōu)于替代措施的企業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任,因?yàn)樗怯瑟?dú)立的等級(jí)服務(wù)編制,聚焦于廣泛的社會(huì)責(zé)任屏幕下的大量的公司,而選擇方案的社會(huì)責(zé)任則聚焦于一個(gè)小樣本的公司或使用窄的企業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任的屏幕。在每個(gè)kld數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)的屏幕上都對(duì)優(yōu)勢(shì)(正面價(jià)值觀)和關(guān)注點(diǎn)(負(fù)面值)進(jìn)行了總結(jié)。例如,社會(huì)屏幕是在優(yōu)勢(shì)和關(guān)注點(diǎn)的基礎(chǔ)上計(jì)算的,優(yōu)勢(shì)如慷慨捐贈(zèng)或支持在這個(gè)地區(qū)的教育,而關(guān)注點(diǎn)如投資爭(zhēng)議或者對(duì)社會(huì)消極的經(jīng)濟(jì)影響。我們計(jì)算加權(quán)平均整體指數(shù)代表各公司企業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任的總體水平,利用維杜卡和格雷烏斯(1997)在權(quán)數(shù)上的研究發(fā)現(xiàn)。我們利用這些權(quán)值便于結(jié)果的對(duì)比,以突出不同的估計(jì)方法在統(tǒng)計(jì)推論上的效果不用。維杜卡和格雷烏斯利用專家小組使用的相對(duì)重要性評(píng)價(jià)各企業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任的屬性來(lái)計(jì)算權(quán)數(shù)。權(quán)重如下:?jiǎn)T工關(guān)系:0.168;產(chǎn)品:0.154;社區(qū)關(guān)系:0.148;環(huán)境:0.142;婦女和少數(shù)民族的對(duì)待:0.136;核能:0.089;軍事合同:0.086;南非:0.076。我們樣本的延伸從1993年到2000年,包括超過(guò)600家美國(guó)公司的數(shù)據(jù)。我們?cè)u(píng)估財(cái)務(wù)業(yè)績(jī)使用從數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)中的兩類數(shù)據(jù):會(huì)計(jì)(資產(chǎn)收益率)和市場(chǎng)化(普通股票收益)。先前的關(guān)于財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效和社會(huì)責(zé)任之間的關(guān)系未能控制面板數(shù)據(jù)的特點(diǎn),固定樣本數(shù)據(jù)在不同公司間

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