central local government relations and policy cution a foreignfunded industrial policy as an example_5812

1、Central - local government relations and policy execution: A foreign-funded industrial policy as an example      Abstract: Policy execution has been the political and academic priority issues of common concern. In this paper, the central - local government relations perspect

2、ive, taking into account the policy characteristics (conflictual, clarity), put forward a policy framework for implementation of local government, we believe that the different characteristics of intergovernmental relations and policy conditions, local governments will be take a completely different

3、 strategic behavior of policy implementation. Furthermore, we also believe, as the central - local government relations is essentially a multi-stage bargaining process, therefore, policy-making itself and the local government policy implementation strategy would be a dynamic equilibrium. In this pap

4、er, China's industrial policy, foreign investment in Jiangsu Province, the implementation of the policy implementation framework of the case are described, case analysis results confirmed the above-mentioned dynamic equilibrium point of view.      Key words: central governmen

5、t, local government, bargaining, policy execution, foreign industrial policies      Since reform and opening, with the central government's decentralization process and the gradual establishment of a market economy, the central - local government relations and complex changes

6、 have taken place in domestic and international academic circles have given special attention, but also produced a number of arguments. However, there is little to achieve a basic consensus: With the changes in intergovernmental relations is the result of the diversification of policy implementation

7、, local governments do not always follow the implementation of central government policy, sometimes even contrary to the implementation of the central government's policy decisions.      Clearly, policy formulation and policy implementation are not the same thing, although ou

8、r policy is mainly responsible for the formulation by the central government, but to a large extent is the concrete implementation by local governments. Then, the local government in the policy implementation process and whether there will be deviations? What has caused the local government implemen

9、tation of the deviation? Also the central government can control these errors? These are important practical significance. This paper attempts from the central - local government relations point of view, taking into account the policy characteristics (conflictual, clarity), analysis of the implement

10、ation of policies of local government behavior, and to China's industrial policy, foreign investment in Jiangsu province, the implementation of case-specific interpretation of them.      This paper is structured as follows: First, a theoretical construct to explore the differ

11、ent characteristics of intergovernmental relations and policy, under the conditions of local government policy implementation framework; then analyzed the evolution of China's foreign investment industrial policies and in accordance with local government policy implementation framework for the c

12、orresponding hypothesis put forward ; The third part is research and design, respectively, variables and metrics, models and methods; followed by empirical analysis and results; finally concluded the article.      A theoretical construct      (A) Review of the

13、 Literature      In the reform and opening up the former planned economy system, the central government has the absolute right of local government political and economic authority, therefore, the central government and local governments the power comparison between the result is

14、always biased in favor of the central government. In this case, the relationship between the two maintained a relatively simple "order the implementation of a" model, just as economic organizations like the U-functional structure, the local government is only the central government under t

15、he administrative body responsible for compliance with the implementation of the Central government policies (Peng, 1996).      After the reform and opening up, in order to fully mobilize the initiative of local governments, the central government to begin the process of decentra

16、lization (Yusuf, 1994). There is no doubt that, along with the inevitable process of decentralization of local government interests are the formation of (Shirk, 1993), Moreover, the interests of local governments will not necessarily be consistent with the Central Government interests (Chung, 1995).

17、 In this case, the central - local government relationship into a complex "negotiations a bargaining" model, such as economic organizations like the M-type multi-sectoral structure, the local government has a certain amount of autonomy and arbitrary right of disposal, and has a a potential

18、 deviation from the central government policy, the motivation (Li, 1997; Peng, 1996,2000).      Academia for the reform and opening up of central - local government relations, and the resulting diversity of the results of policy implementation, there are two competing theoretical

19、 perspectives (Su and Yang, 2000; Manion, 1991). One view stresses the leading role of local government that local government has sufficient any right of disposition. This is because, with the decentralization reforms, the central government no longer has sufficient administrative and economic resou

20、rces to conduct adequate control of local government (Feinerman, 1998; Oi, 1992). Moreover, although the central government through various means to monitor the local government behavior, but our government agencies arising from the complex issue of control would make the regulation is not perfect (

21、Huang, 2002). Furthermore, the structure of our government based on multi-agency relationship, in full compliance with the implementation of central government policy is also difficult to achieve (Wedeman, 2001). Resulted from failure of central government control, will inevitably lead to local gove

22、rnments in the policy implementation process deviated from the central government interests in favor of pursuing their own interests.      Another approach emphasized the leading role of the central government that the central government can be effectively bound by the local gove

23、rnment self-interest. This is because the cadre management system of evolution and improvement (including the cadre appointment and assessment system, the tenure system, dual working, job rotation, etc.), allowing the central government to control the behavior of local government officials to make i

24、t consistent with the interests and the central government ( Huang, 1995,1996 a, 1996b, 2002). Moreover, the target responsibility system established by the leading cadres of the performance assessment and evaluation mechanisms, and can lead the interests of local government officials in accordance

25、with the requirements of the central government allocation of resources (Tsui and Wang, 2004). Therefore, even if local governments have dominated more and more economic resources, the central government's political control can also ensure that local governments in the policy implementation proc

26、ess subject to the interests of the central government.      Clearly, the central - local government relations, uncertainty, decided to separate a theoretical point of view on any of the above can not adequately explain the practice of local government policy implementation, whil

27、e the diversification of China's local government policy implementation is also reflected in this. Therefore, in order to more fully illustrate the implementation of policies of local governments need to these two competing theoretical perspectives integrated.      From anoth

28、er point of view, the local government policy implementation or policy characteristics (conflictual, clarity) of the function, which refers to the policy conflicting policy objectives of different actors or policy in the manner of implementation there is disagreement on the extent of the policy clar

29、ity refers to the implementation of policies in the policy objectives or the way the extent there is ambiguity (Matland, 1995). Derived from the policy properties, Matland (1995) established a policy analysis of the implementation of the conflict - matrix model of clarity and to make four kinds of p

30、olicy implementation strategies: administrative implementation of the (low conflict, high clarity), political implementation of the (high conflict, high clarity), a pilot implementation of the (low conflict, low clarity), and a symbolic implementation of the (high conflict, low clarity). Matland (19

31、95) that, in different policy implementation strategy, the central and local governments should be the role of contingency, for example, in the administrative policy implementation strategy (low conflict, high clarity), the central government will play a to a leading role in policy implementation in

32、 the experimental strategy (low conflict, low clarity), the local government will play a dominant role.      There is no doubt, Matland (1995) a comprehensive framework provides us with a useful analytical perspective, however, only consider policy features caused by excessive si

33、mplicity, but also to conflicting - matrix model brings clarity defects. First, the conflictual - clarity in the policy matrix model did not provide sufficient analysis of the dynamic nature of space. In reality, the policy can be derived from the dynamic nature of the policy characteristics (confli

34、ctual, clarity) of the changes, but the most important change is not limited to this. Thus, when the inter-governmental relations between the situation of uncertainty, or when the policy was quickly modified and re-enacted and conflict - matrix model of clarity would lose much of its explanatory pow

35、er (Schofield, 2004). Second, and conflict - more clarity matrix model considered in the policy implementation process, but no results of the implementation of policies to provide adequate forecasts (deLeon, 1999). Therefore, four kinds of policy implementation strategies and policy implementation,

36、and there is no established between the results of a clear relationship, will be difficult to sum up the hypothesis to be tested.      More importantly, although Matland (1995) pointed out that the central government and local governments in the four kinds of policy implementatio

37、n strategy, contingency plays a role, but it is essentially four kinds of policy implementation strategy and in the central - local government relationship is irrelevant. In other words, the central - local government relations in post-conflict nature - clarity matrix model is fixed. In reality, how

38、ever, the central - local government relations provides the central - local government rules of the game, which determines the extent of authority to local governments, reward and punishment methods, allocation of resources, restrictions on movement and supervision. Therefore, the central - local go

39、vernment relations determine the extent of local government any right of disposal, also bound to affect the strategic choices of local government policy implementation. It is based on this understanding, we believe that local government policy implementation choice is a two-stage. The first stage is

40、 the central - local government relations option, which is decided in the end the central government or local government-led policy implementation, this time the local government is a passive, because the policy is mainly responsible for the formulation by the central government. Should be pointed o

41、ut that, although the central government always want to be able to achieve the central government-led situation, but because of the lack of experience in policy design or do not have enough information and other reasons, led in some cases, the presence of the local leading situation. The second stag

42、e is the policy implementation strategy selection, that is, the central - local government relations, constraints, local governments according to the policy characteristics (conflictual, clarity), to select the best action strategies. At this point the local government in charge of policy implementa

43、tion, so it is active. When we proceed in two stages from the implementation of policies, through the inter-governmental relations and policy characteristics (conflictual, clarity) to study the policy execution, we found that not only more in-depth detailed analysis of local government policy implem

44、entation strategies, but also to broaden the policy analysis of the dynamic nature of space, but also be able to policy implementation strategies and policy implementation, to establish a clear link between the results by which policies can be developed for specific testable hypothesis.   

45、   (B) Central - local government relations      The system of interest as an independent entity, the local government in the policy implementation process will be through a cost-benefit analysis to determine their best course of action, so we also can be done through l

46、ocal government cost-benefit analysis to illustrate the central - local government relations. If the central government's policy design allows local governments to implement policies contrary to the costs or benefits in accordance with the implementation of policies is high enough, then the inte

47、r-governmental relations between the result of choice will be biased in favor of the central government-led. On the contrary, if the central government's policy design allows local governments to implement policies contrary to the benefits is large enough, then the inter-governmental relations b

48、etween the result of choice will be biased in favor of local government-led. A specific policy for a particular case, we believe that local government policy of cost-benefit should depend on the importance of the degree of information asymmetry and the central government to local government incentiv

49、es and so on.      Importance of a policy decision of the central government's degree of concern on the policy, as well as the implementation of the policy process in the level of resources invested, the local government thus can feel the pressure from the central government

50、level. Thus, a policy more important, the local government deviated from the cost of implementing policies, the greater the possibility of strict compliance with the interests of the greater central government, whereas local governments in the policy implementation process more likely to pursue thei

51、r own interests. The importance of the policy objectives of assessing the responsibility of leading cadres to some extent the book is all about. The book contains a set of objective responsibility of local government officials need to complete the task system, these tasks system, issued in the gover

52、nment structure at every level, within the specified time required to achieve the set goals. At the same time, these tasks system, there will be a set of scores - the weight system, and incentive measures corresponding to (Tsui and Wang, 2004). From these scores - the weight system and incentive mea

53、sures, local government officials can judge the importance of a policy, and, in some extreme cases, has a "one-vote veto" policy must be in full compliance with the central government decided executed. Although not all of the central policy objective in assessing the responsibility of lead

54、ing cadres to be a direct embodiment of the book, but the local governments also issued a document from the policy of the powers of the hierarchy to see the importance of a policy. The central party and government agencies (State Council, the Central Organization Department, etc.) has the right of a

55、ppointment and removal of local government officials, so local governments will generally value the policies promulgated by these bodies. In contrast, central government ministries and local government officials do not have the right personnel power, but from a control perspective, the various minis

56、tries and local governments in fact belong to the same power levels (Huang, 2002), therefore, by these ministries alone the importance of policies enacted to be lower. However, multiple ministries jointly issued a policy would cause the local government's attention, because the multi-ministries

57、jointly issued a document stating that the policy covers a broader, aroused great concern, and, once the policy implementation problems, it will enable local governments face a wide range of pressure.      Policy in the implementation process arising from the central - local gove

58、rnment information asymmetry between the degree, it will directly affect the cost-benefit analysis of local government. If a higher degree of information asymmetry, the local government to implement policies contrary to the likelihood of being found in relatively low, so when accompanied by informat

59、ion asymmetries and conflicting interests at any time, local governments are most likely to adopt opportunistic behavior, damage to the central government in the interests of circumstances to maximize self-interest (Huang, 2002). Therefore, if you want to regulate self-interested behavior of local g

60、overnments, the central government must have enough information. However, any implementation of the policy, the local government must be more than the central government has adequate information, it is because local governments on the implementation of policies specific environment (jurisdiction) is

61、 more familiar with, and that specific operations of local government policies implementation, more detailed understanding of its processes. Therefore, the central government will inevitably be the presence of information imperfections. However, existing research also shows that after the reform and opening up, the central government through continuous r