無線網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全英文課件4_第1頁
無線網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全英文課件4_第2頁
無線網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全英文課件4_第3頁
無線網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全英文課件4_第4頁
無線網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全英文課件4_第5頁
已閱讀5頁,還剩31頁未讀, 繼續(xù)免費閱讀

下載本文檔

版權(quán)說明:本文檔由用戶提供并上傳,收益歸屬內(nèi)容提供方,若內(nèi)容存在侵權(quán),請進(jìn)行舉報或認(rèn)領(lǐng)

文檔簡介

1、Wireless Networks and SecurityKey Distribution & User Authentication共三十六頁Symmetric Key Distribution using symmetric encryptionFor symmetric encryption to work, the two parties to an exchange must share the same key, and that key must be protected from access by othersFrequent key changes are usually

2、 desirable to limit the amount of data compromised if an attacker learns the keyKey distribution techniqueThe means of delivering a key to two parties that wish to exchange data, without allowing others to see the key共三十六頁Key DistributionFor two parties A and B, there are the following options:1A ke

3、y can be selected by A and physically delivered to B2A third party can select the key and physically deliver it to A and B3If A and B have previously and recently used a key, one party could transmit the new key to the other, using the old key to encrypt the new key4If A and B each have an encrypted

4、 connection to a third party C, C could deliver a key on the encrypted links to A and B共三十六頁KerberosKey distribution and user authentication service developed at MITProvides a centralized authentication server whose function is to authenticate users to servers and servers to usersRelies exclusively

5、on symmetric encryption, making no use of public-key encryptionTwo versions are in useVersion 4 implementations still exist, although this version is being phased outVersion 5 corrects some of the security deficiencies of version 4 and has been issued as a proposed Internet Standard (RFC 4120)共三十六頁K

6、erberos version 4A basic third-party authentication schemeAuthentication Server (AS) Users initially negotiate with AS to identify self AS provides a non-corruptible authentication credential (ticket granting ticket TGT) Ticket Granting Server (TGS)Users subsequently request access to other services

7、 from TGS on basis of users TGTComplex protocol using DES共三十六頁Table 4.1 Summary of Kerberos Version 4 Message Exchanges 共三十六頁共三十六頁共三十六頁共三十六頁共三十六頁共三十六頁Kerberos RealmsKerberos realmA set of managed nodes that share the same Kerberos databaseThe Kerberos database resides on the Kerberos master computer

8、 system, which should be kept in a physically secure roomA read-only copy of the Kerberos database might also reside on other Kerberos computer systemsAll changes to the database must be made on the master computer systemChanging or accessing the contents of a Kerberos database requires the Kerberos

9、 master passwordA Kerberos environment consists of:A Kerberos serverA number of clientsA number of application servers共三十六頁Kerberos principalA service or user that is known to the Kerberos system Each Kerberos principal is identified by its principal nameA service or user nameAn instance nameA realm

10、 namePrincipal namePrincipal names consist of three parts共三十六頁Differences between versions 4 and 5Environmental shortcomingsEncryption system dependenceInternet protocol dependenceMessage byte orderingTicket lifetimeAuthentication forwardingInterrealm authenticationTechnical deficienciesDouble encry

11、ptionPCBC encryptionSession keysPassword attacks共三十六頁共三十六頁Key distribution using asymmetric encryptionOne of the major roles of public-key encryption is to address the problem of key distributionThere are two distinct aspects to the use of public-key encryption in this regard:The distribution of pub

12、lic keysThe use of public-key encryption to distribute secret keysPublic-key certificateConsists of a public key plus a user ID of the key owner, with the whole block signed by a trusted third partyTypically, the third party is a certificate authority (CA) that is trusted by the user community, such

13、 as a government agency or a financial institutionA user can present his or her public key to the authority in a secure manner and obtain a certificateThe user can then publish the certificateAnyone needing this users public key can obtain the certificate and verify that it is valid by way of the at

14、tached trusted signature共三十六頁共三十六頁X.509 CertificatesITU-T recommendation X.509 is part of the X.500 series of recommendations that define a directory serviceDefines a framework for the provision of authentication services by the X.500 directory to its usersThe directory may serve as a repository of

15、public-key certificatesDefines alternative authentication protocols based on the use of public-key certificatesWas initially issued in 1988Based on the use of public-key cryptography and digital signaturesThe standard does not dictate the use of a specific algorithm but recommends RSA共三十六頁共三十六頁共三十六頁

16、Obtaining a users certificateUser certificates generated by a CA have the following characteristics:Any user with access to the public key of the CA can verify the user public key that was certifiedNo party other than the certification authority can modify the certificate without this being detected

17、Because certificates are unforgeable, they can be placed in a directory without the need for the directory to make special efforts to protect them共三十六頁共三十六頁Revocation of certificatesEach certificate includes a period of validityTypically a new certificate is issued just before the expiration of the

18、old oneIt may be desirable on occasion to revoke a certificate before it expires for one of the following reasons:The users private key is assumed to be compromisedThe user is no longer certified by this CA; reasons for this include subjects name has changed, the certificate is superseded, or the ce

19、rtificate was not issued in conformance with the CAs policiesThe CAs certificate is assumed to be compromised共三十六頁X.509 Version 3Includes a number of optional extensions that may be added to the version 2 formatEach extension consists of:An extension identifierA criticality indicatorAn extension val

20、ueThe certificate extensions fall into three main categories:Key and policy informationSubject and issuer attributesCertification path constraints共三十六頁Key and policy informationThese extensions convey additional information about the subject and issuer keys, plus indicators of certificate policyA ce

21、rtificate policy is a named set of rules that indicates the applicability of a certificate to a particular community and/or class of application with common security requirementsIncludes:Authority key identifierSubject key identifierKey usagePrivate-key usage periodCertificate policiesPolicy mapping

22、s共三十六頁Certificate subject and issuer attributesThese extensions support alternative names, in alternative formats, for a certificate subject or certificate issuer and can convey additional information about the certificate subject to increase a certificate users confidence that the certificate subje

23、ct is a particular person or entityIncludes:Subject alternative name Issuer alternative name Subject directory attributes共三十六頁Certification path constraintsThese extensions allow constraint specifications to be included in certificates issued for CAs by other CAsThe constraints may restrict the type

24、s of certificates that can be issued by the subject CA or that may occur subsequently in a certification chainIncludes:Basic constraintsName constraintsPolicy constraints共三十六頁共三十六頁PKIX Management functionsFunctions that potentially need to be supported by management protocols:RegistrationInitializat

25、ionCertificationKey pair recoveryKey pair updateRevocation requestCross certificationAlternative management protocols:Certificate management protocols (CMP)Designed to be a flexible protocol able to accommodate a variety of technical, operational, and business modelsCertificate management messages o

26、ver CMS (CMC)Is built on earlier work and is intended to leverage existing implementations共三十六頁Identity ManagementA centralized, automated approach to provide enterprise wide access to resources by employees and other authorized individualsFocus is defining an identity for each user (human or proces

27、s), associating attributes with the identity, and enforcing a means by which a user can verify identityCentral concept is the use of single sign-on (SSO) which enables a user to access all network resources after a single authenticationPrincipal elements of an identity management system:Authenticati

28、onAuthorizationAccountingProvisioningWorkflow automationDelegated administrationPassword synchronizationSelf-service password resetFederation 共三十六頁共三十六頁共三十六頁StandardsThe Extensible Markup Language (XML)Appear similar to HTML documents that are visible as Web pages, but provide greater functionalityI

29、ncludes strict definitions of the data type of each fieldProvides encoding rules for commands that are used to transfer and update data objectsThe Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP)Minimal set of conventions for invoking code using XML over HTTPEnables applications to request services from one another with XML-based requests and receive responses as

溫馨提示

  • 1. 本站所有資源如無特殊說明,都需要本地電腦安裝OFFICE2007和PDF閱讀器。圖紙軟件為CAD,CAXA,PROE,UG,SolidWorks等.壓縮文件請下載最新的WinRAR軟件解壓。
  • 2. 本站的文檔不包含任何第三方提供的附件圖紙等,如果需要附件,請聯(lián)系上傳者。文件的所有權(quán)益歸上傳用戶所有。
  • 3. 本站RAR壓縮包中若帶圖紙,網(wǎng)頁內(nèi)容里面會有圖紙預(yù)覽,若沒有圖紙預(yù)覽就沒有圖紙。
  • 4. 未經(jīng)權(quán)益所有人同意不得將文件中的內(nèi)容挪作商業(yè)或盈利用途。
  • 5. 人人文庫網(wǎng)僅提供信息存儲空間,僅對用戶上傳內(nèi)容的表現(xiàn)方式做保護(hù)處理,對用戶上傳分享的文檔內(nèi)容本身不做任何修改或編輯,并不能對任何下載內(nèi)容負(fù)責(zé)。
  • 6. 下載文件中如有侵權(quán)或不適當(dāng)內(nèi)容,請與我們聯(lián)系,我們立即糾正。
  • 7. 本站不保證下載資源的準(zhǔn)確性、安全性和完整性, 同時也不承擔(dān)用戶因使用這些下載資源對自己和他人造成任何形式的傷害或損失。

評論

0/150

提交評論