荷蘭國際關(guān)系研究所-荷蘭半導(dǎo)體在亞洲的利益

DutchsemiconductorinterestsinAsiaionoftheAsiansemiconductorindustryJonasLammertinkterhaitanyaGiriAlexandreFerreiraGomesaikeOkanoHeijmansSenseHofstedeFebruary,20233MapofDutchsemiconductorinterestsinAsia51.Introduction62.TheDutchsemiconductorindustry113.RelevantpoliciesintheUnitedStatesandtheEuropeanUnion144.CountryStudies?China(TychodeFeijterandJonasLammertink)19?India(Dr.ChaitanyaGiri)37?Japan(AlexandreF.GomesandMaaikeOkano-Heijmans)52?Singapore(SenseHofstede)66?SouthKorea(JonasLammertink)81?Taiwan(TychodeFeijter)945.Conclusions(JonasLammertink)108Listofacronymsandabbreviations1124ttheauthorsJonasLammertinkisaresearcherattheLeidenAsiaCentre.TychodeFeijterisaresearcheraffilicatedwiththeLeidenAsiaCentre.Dr.ChaitanyaGiriisanAssociateProfessoratFlameUniversity.AlexandreF.GomesisaResearchFellowattheNetherlandsInstituteforInternationalRelations‘Clingendael’inTheHague,whereheispartofthe‘GeopoliticsofTechnologyandDigitalisation’programme.MaaikeOkano-HeijmansisaSeniorResearchFellowattheNetherlandsInstituteforInternationalRelations‘Clingendael’inTheHague,wheresheleadsthe‘GeopoliticsofTechnologyandDigitalisation’programme.SheisalsoaVisitingLecturerintheMasterofScienceinInternationalRelationsandDiplomacy(MIRD)oftheUniversityofLeiden.SenseHofstedeisaresearcherandUniversityLectureratLeidenUniversity.5conductorinterestsinAsiaForaninteractiveversionofthismap,visit:https://leidenasiacentre.nl/map-of-dutch-semiconductor-erestsinasia6DuringavisittotheWhiteHousein,PrimeMinisteroftheNetherlandsMarkRuttewashandedanintelligencereportbyoneofPresidentTrump’snationalsecurityadvisors.ThesecuritydocumentlaidoutpossibleconsequencesofChinaacquiringthetechnologyofASML,animportantDutchsemiconductorequipmentmanufacturer.TheTrumpadministrationhopedtoconvincetheDutchgovernmenttoblockshipmentofoneofASML’smostadvancedchip-producingmachinestoChina’sSemiconductorManufacturingInternationalCorporation(SMIC).Theygotwhattheywanted:theDutchgovernmentdidnotrenewtheexportlicencethatASMLrequiredfortheshipment.1TheeventisillustrativeofhowtheDutchsemiconductorindustryhasbeendrawnintothetechnologicalrivalrybetweentheUnitedStatesandChina.TheUnitedStates’effortstofrustrateChina’sgoalofbecomingtechnologicallyhighlyadvancedandself-reliantcontinueunderPresidentBiden.NotonlyistheDutchsemiconductorsectordrawnintothisendeavourbutsoaremanyindustriesinAsiaForexample,theBidenadministrationhasproposedcreatinga‘ChipsAlliance’tostrengthentieslinkingtheindustriesofJapan,SouthKorea,TaiwanandtheUnitedStatesinthefaceofChineseambitions.Moreover,inOctober2022PresidenttedsuppliestoChinawhichalsoaffectAsiancompanies.However,theUS–ChinarivalryisnottheonlypoliticalfactorimpactingAsia’ssemiconductorindustries.Soaredomesticpoliticalagendasandregionalrelations.Forexample,tradedisputesbetweenJapanandSouthKoreaareaffectingthesemiconductorindustriesinbothcountries,whileIndiaislookingtobecomeachip-manufacturinghub.TaiwanesesemiconductorgiantTSMCisconsideringbuildingfactoriesinotherAsiancountriesamidpoliticalandmilitarytensionsoverthegncompaniesinthesemiconductorindustrytosettleinthecitystate,whileSouthKoreancompanieshavebuiltuplargeinterestsinChina’ssemiconductorindustry.utchsemiconductorsectorhasmanyconnectionswithcompaniesresearchinstitutesandofficialorganisationsinSouthandEastAsiancountries.Theseconnectionscanbesubjecttoanypoliticisationoftheindustry,creatingbothpoliticalandeconomicrisksandopportunitiesfortheNetherlands.Semiconductordevices(ormicrochips,integratedcircuitsorcomputerchips),towhichtheword‘semiconductor’refersinthisstudy,arecrucialforfuturetechnologicalandeconomictocancelChinachipequipmentsalecleusasmlholdingusachinainsightidUSKBNZHN7developments,aswellasthetransitiontogreentechnologies.Securingasufficientsupplyofchipsisthereforeessential,whiledependenciesinthesectorareusedaspoliticaltools.However,whiletheimpactofUSrestrictionsonDutchcompaniesaspartoftheUS–ChinarivalryhasnSouthandEastAsiaislackingasisanalysisofhowtheseinterestsareaffectedbygeneralpoliticisationofthesector.ThisreportthereforeanalysestheinterestsandconnectionsoftheDutchsemiconductorsectorwithcompanies,researchinstitutesandgovernmentorganisationsinChina,Taiwan,SouthKorea,Japan,SingaporeandIndia.Thereportaimstoanswerthequestion:WhatareheinterestsoftheDutchsemiconductorindustryinSouthandEastAsiainlightofthepoliticisationofthesector?tureInordertostructuretheanalysisinawaythatresultsinaclearanswertotheresearchquestion,thereportisdesignedasfollows.ThefirstchapterprovidesabriefoverviewoftheDutchsemiconductorindustry.ThesecondchapterthenlaysoutthemostimportantEuropeanpoliciesthatshapeDutchinterestsinSouthandEastAsia,aswellasUSpoliciesthataffecttheglobalindustry.ThemainbodyofthereportconsistsofcountrychaptersthatdiscussthecompositionofthesemiconductorindustryineachcountryandtheirconnectionswiththeDutchsector.Thesechaptersarestructuredthus:(1)discussionisheldofthegovernment’spolicyplansforthesectorandtherelevantgovernmentagencies(2)anoverviewisgivenofthesemiconductorindustryinthecountry,itscharacteristics,mostimportantplayersandlinkswithDutchcompanies;(3)therelevantgeopoliticalpositioningandregionaleconomicandpoliticalrelationsofthecountryaremapped;andunderdiscussionareanalysed.Finally,thereport’sconclusionsgatherandcomparethefindingsoftheindividualcountrychapters,andlinkthesebacktotheresearchquestionandwidercontext.TheconclusionswillanalysehowtheNetherlandsandEuropecouldpositionthemselvesregardingthepoliticisationofthesemiconductorsectorinSouthandEastAsia.Analysisfocusesonthosepartsofthesupplychainthataredirectlyrelatedtothemanufacturingprocessofsemiconductors.Thisconsiderstheproductionofadvancedmaterials,theproductionofwafers,theproductionofcomputer-chipequipment,thedesignofsemiconductors,the‘printing’ofthechipsonwafersandfinallythepackagingprocess.Excludedfromthisresearcharethe8carsorphones.Thisreportalsodoesnotfocusonthesourcingofrawmaterials.2tryinthefollowingSouthandEastAsiancountriesareincludedinthisreport:China,Taiwan,SouthKorea,Japan,SingaporeandIndia.ThesecountrieshaveirsignificanceintheglobalsemiconductorindustrytheirconnectionstoentialtobecomeimportantplayerswithimplicationsfortheindustryintheNetherlands.Theinformationthatinformstheanalysiswascollectedinvariouswaysandfromdifferentsources:(1)PolicydocumentsfromgovernmentsinthecountriesunderdiscussionwerestudiedinordertoualisehowthequalitiesandinterestsoftheDutchsectormatchwiththeofficialnationalandernationalpoliciesofeachcountryminedinordertolearnhowsupplychainsarestructuredandwhichconnectionsDutchcompanieshaveineachcountry;(3)Academicliteratureonthedesignofsemiconductorsupplychains,theimpactofgeopoliticsonthesesupplychainsandthedevelopmentoflocalindustrieswasstudiedtodeepengeneralunderstandingofthetopic;(4)Newsreportswereconsideredtogaininsightsintorecentpolicyplansanddecisions,aswellastionalconnectionsbetweenlocalindustries(5)Finally,asmallnumberofinterviewswereconductedwithrepresentativesoftheDutchsemiconductorsectorandwithindustryexpertsfromtheDutchgovernmentinthespecificcountriesinordertogatherinformationthatisnotaccessibleotherwise.hataresemiconductorsTechnicallyspeaking,asemiconductorisamaterialthatallowsforacertainlevelofelectricalconduction,butthetermoftenreferstocomputerchips(alsoknownasintegratedcircuits(IC)orntofmicroscopicallysmall,interlinkedswitches(transistors)thatcanturnelectriccurrentsonoroff,whichcorrespondtothe1sand0sonwhichthefunctionsofelectronicdevicesarebased.LogicoristopicJorisTeerandMattiaBertoliniReachingmatatimeofgreatpowerrivalryOctoberhttpshcssnlwpeofgreatpowerfpdf9systemchipsaredesignedtoprocessinformationtocompletetasks,whilememorychipsstoreinformation.Generallyspeaking,themoretransistorsonecanfitonasmallsliceofsilicium,themoreadvancedthechipwillbe.Thisiswhyinsemiconductormanufacturing,chipsarerankedbasedontheirsize,usingthenanometre(nm)unit.Thelowerthenumberofnm,themoreadvancedthechip,andthemoresuitableitisforcompletingcomplextasks.Today’smostadvancedmass-producedchipsmeasure5nm.Chipmakersaredeveloping3nmand2nmchips.ThemostadvancedchipscansolelybemanufacturedwithASML’scurrentextremeultraviolet(EUV)machines.SuchsemiconductorscanyforartificialintelligenceAIautonomousdrivingandGapplications.However,notallelectronicdevicesrequireextremelyadvancedorsmallchips;thereisalsoalargemarketforlessadvancedchips,forexampleintheautomotive,healthcareormanufacturingindustries.Thesemiconductorsupplychaintakesplaceinadifferentpartoftheworld,atcompaniesthatarespecialisedinthatspecificstage.Infact,accordingtoabriefingreportbytheEuropeanParliament,achipcrossestheborder70timesduringthecompletesupplychain,including50chokepoints(whenoneregionhasmorethan65percentoftheworldwidemarketshare).Alargesemiconductorproducermakesuseofupto16,000suppliersfromallovertheworld.3Beforeachipcanbeproduced,manufacturersneedtherightequipment(suchasASML’smachines),software).Therearetwotypesofmanufacturers:1)foundries,whichproducechipsbasedonthedesignsofcompaniesthatdonothavetheirownfabricationplants(thesedesigncompaniesarebasedontheirownintellectualproperty.Thesemanufacturers‘print’theintegratedcircuitsonslices(wafers)ofsemiconductormaterial,whichiscalledthe‘frontend’oftheproductionprocess.Thesewafersarethenassembled,testedandpackagedintosemiconductorsbyoutsource,assemblyandtest(OSAT)companies,whichiscalledthe‘backend’oftheproductionprocess.ThechipsarethentainstepssuchasRDprocesseswhichtakeplaceatvariousstagesinthevaluechain),componentsuppliersofequipmentmanufacturersandessemiconductorsectorbyequipmentmanufacturersforOSATcompanies,aremissingfromthisoverviewforthepurposeofclarity.Figure:Thesemiconductorvaluechain(source:author’scompilation).semiconductorindustryinparttheresultofthelegacyofPhilips,formerlyoneofthelargestglobalelectroniccompanies.Manyoftoday’sprominentDutchsemiconductorbusinessesderivetheiroriginsfromPhilips.ItisdifficulttoestablishhowmanycompaniesareinvolvedinthesemiconductorindustryintheNetherlands,becausetheindustrydoesnothaveclearboundaries.However,thewebsiteofDutchindustryassociationHollandSemiconductors(formerlyknownasBCSEMINL)lists78members.Accordingtoareportbythisorganisation,theDutchsemiconductorsectoremployedmorethan15,000peoplein2019.4Thisto35,000inthecomingyears.5ThetotalrevenueofthesemiconductorsectorintheNetherlandsisunknown,butthecombinedrevenueofthethreelargestDutchcompaniesisalreadyover30billioneuros.6TogetherwiththeUnitedStatesandJapan,theNetherlandsisoneofonlythreecountriestohaveanductorvaluechainwithinitsbordersHoweverthestrengthoftheDutchindustryliespredominantlyinthemanufacturingofsemiconductorequipment,themachinesthatactuallyproducecomputerchips.ManyofthemostprominentDutchcompaniesareactiveinthissector.uchecosystemsisanotherstrongpointoftheDutchindustry.OtherareasinwhichthesemiconductorindustryintheNetherlandsexcelsareintegratedphotonics(chipsbasedonlightinsteadofelectrons)andradiofrequency(RF,chipsbasedonradiowaves,suchevelofresearchatuniversitiesintheNetherlandsishighandthelinksbetweentheflipside,ananalysiscommissionedbytheDutchgovernmentfoundthatthegovernment’sfinancialsupportforthesectorisrelativelysmall,whileaccesstoventurecapital,technicallytrainedpersonnelandfundsthatallowstartupstoexpandisproblematic.8wpesSemiconEuropapdfnNOSSeptembervanveldhovencomeninvestorsannualreporthighlightsfinancepsasmicorporatereportingcomesSemiconEuropapdfPoliciesbytheDutchgovernmentthattargetthesemiconductorsectorintheNetherlandsareoftenpartof,orinlinewith,EUpolicyplans.SuchEU-levelpoliciesarediscussedinthenextchapter.However,theDutchgovernmenthasalsodevelopednational-levelpoliciesthattargethigh-techreditforResearchandDevelopmentortoattractskilledpersonnelsuchas30PerCentFacilityforKnowledgeWorkers).Furthermore,aspartoftheNationalGrowthFund,theDutchgovernmentinvests471millioneurosintheDutchintegratedphotonicsindustryand450millioneurosinhigh-techmachinesandequipment(includinginthesemiconductorsector).9Thegovernmenthasalsosubmittedaproposaltoinvest230millioneurosinsixsemiconductorprojectsbyDutchcompaniesandknowledgeinstitutionsaspartoftheEU’sImportantProjectofCommonEuropeanInterest(IPCEI)programmeonmicroelectronics.10InordertopreventthecompanySmartPhotonicsfromfallingintoforeignhands,theDutchgovernmentalsoprovidedaloanof20millioneurostothisintegratedphotonicscompanyin2020.11eDutchindustryThemostimportantandmostinternationallyconnected(andthereforemostrelevantforthisstudy)lowThisisonlyaverylimitedoverviewassociation.●ASMInternational(ASMI)isoneofthelargestsemiconductorcompaniesintheNetherlandsndriestoproducechips.themosthightechsemiconductorequipmentforexample,ASMListheonlycompanyinthemostadvancedchips(smallerthan5nm).●BESIisalsoactiveintheequipmentindustryandisamongthelargestDutchsemiconductorcompanies.Itproducesequipmentforthepackagingsegmentofthevaluechain.●NXPisthelargestDutchcompanythatdesignsandproducessemiconductors.Thecompanydoesnotfocusonproducingthesmallest/mostadvancedchips,butspecialisesinchipswithRFfunctionality.ronicaAprilmicroelektronicaonldeadringvanhetbedrijfsmartphotonicspdfconductorcompaniesthatarebasedintheNetherlandsareinforeignhandsNoteworthyexamplesareNexperiaandAmpleon,whichbothproduceRFchipsandareChineseowned.SmartPhotonicsisanimportantplayerintheintegratedphotonicssectorandproducesphotonicchips.yAssociationsemiconductorspresentsitselfasanationalnetworkofsemiconductorplayersintheionrepresentsthecollectiveinterestsofthesectorandfocusesonsupportinglong-terminnovationandinternationalcollaboration.ctionsasacoordinatorspokesmanandinvestorfortheintegratedphotonicssector.TheassociationissupportedbytheDutchgovernment,forexamplethroughinvestments.edgeandRD●TheNetherlandshasthreetechnicaluniversitieswithsemiconductorresearchgroupsthathavemanyconnectionswiththebusinesssector.TheseareEindhovenUniversityofTechnology,theUniversityofTwenteandDelftUniversityofTechnology.●OthernoteworthyresearchandtechnologycentresareTNO,theHolstCentre,theChipIntegrationTechnologyCentre(CITC)andOnePlanet.TheseorganisationsprovideappliedsforthesectorManyDutchplayersalsocooperatewithIMECaresearchcentrelocatedinBelgium.nt●RegionaldevelopmentagenciessupportthedevelopmentofDutchcompanies,aswellasforeigncompaniesthatarelookingtocollaboratewithplayersfromtheNetherlands,includinginthesemiconductorsector.NoteworthyexamplesareOostNL,BrainportDevelopmentandtheBrabantseOntwikkelingsMaatschappij(BOM).TheNetherlandsEnterpriseAgencyRVOsupportsinnovativecompaniesintheNetherlands.●TheNetherlandsForeignInvestmentAgency(NFIA)supportsforeigncompaniesinvestingintheNetherlandstolinkupwithDutchcompanies.evantpoliciesintheUnitedStatesandtheEuropeanUnionSomeofthemostimportantpoliticaldevelopmentsthatshapetheworldwideinterestsofDutchustrybutalsotopreventChinafromacquiringadvancedchipsandsemiconductorequipment.Meanwhile,Brusselsfeelscompelled,asachaindependenciestoinvestinhepotentialtoaffectDutchsemiconductorinterestsintheAsiancountriesunderdiscussion.Whetherandhowtheyactuallydoaffecttheseinterestsisdiscussedinthecountrychaptersthemselves.TheEUcontextCurrently,theEUaccountsforabout9percentofglobalsemiconductorproduction.12Thismanufacturingcapacitycanmainlybefoundintheareaoflessadvancedchips(themostadvancedchipsmadeinEuropearefrom22nmandabove).Non-DutchexamplesofcompaniesinthisareaarecroelectronicsInfineonASMSFabMelexisandBoschSemiconductorswhichoftenspecialisetheautomotiveindustry,theEUholdsastrongposition,withaglobalmarketshareof37percent.Outsideofchipmanufacturing,Europeanstrengthslieinitsequipmentmanufacturing(suchasZEISSSMT)andadvancedresearch(forexample,Imec,CEA-LetiandFraunhofer).TherearealsolargeEuropeancompaniesinthematerialssectionofthevaluechain(includingSiltronic,BASFandMerckKGaV).13However,manyEuropeanchipmanufacturersoutsourcetheirtesting,assemblyandpackagingprocessestoAsiancompanies.Foradvancedchipmanufacturing,theEUisalsohighlydependentonEastAsia,whileEuropeancompaniesdependonintellectualpropertyfromtheUnitedStatesregardingchipdesigntools.14Importantly,theEUconsumestwiceasmanysemiconductorsasitproduces,anddemandisexpectedtodoubleby2030.15ThedownsidesofsuchrelianceonexternalsupplierscametotheforeduringtherecentchipshortageamidtheglobalCOVID-19pandemicandgyandpolicyprioritieseuropefitdigitalnchipsfficientNovembergoalsfordigitalisationandsustainability.Forthisreason,theEuropeanCommissionproposedtheEuropeanChipsActinFebruary2022.ThetheactintendstomaketheEUanindustrialleaderinsemiconductorsbystrengtheningEuropeanresearchandtechnology,reinforcinginnovationcapacity,addressingtheshortageoftalentanddeepeningunderstandingofglobalsupplychains.Mostconcretely,thegoalistodoubletheEU’smarketshareofglobalchipproduction,from9percentin2020to20percentin2030.Thismeansoubleinthesametimeperiod.16Inordertorealisethesegoals,theEuropeanCommissionhopestomobilise43billioneurosinpublicandprivateinvestmentsby2030.Manyoftheseinvestments(about30billioneuros)wereactuallyalreadyplannedaspartofnationalbudgetsandotherEUfundingschemes,suchasforscientificresearch(HorizonEurope),theCOVID-19economicrecoverypackage(NextGenerationEU)andpossiblytheIPCEIonmicroelectronicsmentionedinchapter2above.17Thefundswillbeinvestedbasedonthreepillars.First,the‘ChipsforEuropeInitiative’targetsresearch,developmentandinnovation.Thesecondpillarfocusesonensuringthesecurityofsupply,bysupportingstart-upsandthedevelopmentofchip-manufacturingfacilities(bothfoundriesandIDMs)atalevelofinnovationanEUwidecoordinationmechanismthatmonitorsthesupplychain.18Atthesametime,theEuropeanCommissionemphasisesthatbuildinginternationalpartnershipswith‘like-mindedcountries’thatsharecorevaluesisrequiredforsecuresupplychainsandtofindmarketsforEuropeanchips.19TheUScontextRelevantUSpoliciesthattargetthesemiconductorindustryareaimedatbothstrengtheningtheUSdomesticsectorandatslowingdownChina’stechnologicalprogress.TheUSholdsastrongpositionintheglobalsemiconductorindustry:in2021,US-basedfirmshad46percentoftheglobalsemiconductormarketshare.20TheUnitedStatesisespeciallystronginthefollowingsectionsoftheActFebruarylingdocumentningEUchipmentngEUchipcapabilitiespctbookhttpswwwsemiconductorsorgwpcontentuploadsSIAvaluechain:equipment(forexample,AppliedMaterials,LamResearchandKLA),EDA(SynopsysandCadence),design(Broadcom,Qualcomm,AMDandIBM)andIDM(Intel,Micron,TexasInstrumentsandNvidia).TheUSalsohasanoteworthyfoundrycompany(GlobalFoundries).Italsohasseveralsignificantacademic/researchcentres,isgenerallystronginactivitiesthatrequireahighrateofR&Danditcontrolsmuchofchip-designintellectualproperty(IP).21However,thesemiconductorindustryintheUnitedStateshasrecentlylostgroundtootherregions.Forexample,USchip-manufacturingcapacityhasdroppedfrom37percentofglobalproductioninthe1990sto12percenttoday.22AndwhiletheUnitedStatescontinuestoholdaleadingpositioninchipdesign,itdependsonAsiafortheactualmanufacturingofhighlyadvancedchips.23Inresponsetothesedevelopments,theUSgovernmentsignedtheCHIPSandScienceActintolawinAugust2022.Thisactallocates52.7billionUSDinfederalsubsidiestosupporttheUSchipindustry.Thelargemajorityofthesefunds(39billionUSD)supportstheconstructionofdomesticchip-manufacturingplantstoincreaseproductioncapacity.Theother11billionUSDistargetedatR&D.Moreover,theactestablishesataxcreditfortheconstructionofadvancedsemiconductormanufacturingfacilities.However,counteringChinaisalsopartoftheact’sgoal:fundingrecipientsarenotallowedtoexpandadvancedsemiconductormanufacturingincertaincountries,includingChina,fortenyears.24Furthermore,theUnitedStatesispursuingaforumforgovernmentsandcompaniesfromfour‘like-minded’countriestocoordinatetheirpoliciesinthesemic