奇虎訴騰訊反壟斷案最高院判決的要點

奇虎訴騰訊反壟斷案最高院判決的要點Englishversion作者魏瑛玲合伙人；萬興律師君合律師事務(wù)所發(fā)文日期2014-10-29作者單位2014年10月16日，最高人民法院（以下簡稱'最高院〃）對奇虎訴騰訊濫用市場支配地位案作出終審宣判［1］，駁回奇虎的上訴，維持原判。作為最高院審理的第一例反壟斷案件，本判決對如何界定相關(guān)市場、判斷濫用市場支配地位等一系列問題明確了考量因素和分析方法，將成為對反壟斷訴訟，尤其是濫用支配地位案件起指導(dǎo)性作用的重要案例。本文旨在對該案例的裁判要點和理由進(jìn)行整理歸納和簡要解讀。裁判要點一：并非在任何濫用市場支配地位的案件中均必須明確而清楚地界定相關(guān)市場裁判理由：界定相關(guān)市場有助于明確競爭行為的市場范圍及經(jīng)營者面對的競爭約束。在濫用支配地位案件中，合理地界定相關(guān)市場，對于認(rèn)定經(jīng)營者的市場地位、分析其行為對競爭的影響、判斷其行為是否違法等關(guān)鍵問題具有重要意義。因此，在反壟斷案件中，界定相關(guān)市場通常是重要的分析步驟。但是，是否能夠明確界定相關(guān)市場取決于案件具體情況，尤其是案件證據(jù)、相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù)的可獲得性、競爭的復(fù)雜性等。在濫用支配地位案件中，界定相關(guān)市場是評估被訴經(jīng)營者的市場力量及其行為對競爭影響的工具，而非目的。即使不明確界定，也可通過排除或妨礙競爭的直接證據(jù)對被訴經(jīng)營者的市場地位及其行為可能的競爭影響進(jìn)行評估。君合解讀:根據(jù)本案例，在今后的反壟斷訴訟中，通常仍需界定相關(guān)市場。但是，如果由于難以獲得案件的相關(guān)證據(jù)、數(shù)據(jù)或競爭情況非常復(fù)雜等原因，確實不能明確界定相關(guān)市場的（這種情況非常少），可轉(zhuǎn)而通過排除或妨礙競爭的直接證據(jù)對有關(guān)情況進(jìn)行評估。裁判要點二：如果定性分析足以明確界定相關(guān)市場，不必要進(jìn)行復(fù)雜的定量分析裁判理由：界定相關(guān)市場既可以采取定性分析的方法，又可采取定量分析方法。定性分析通常是進(jìn)行界定的起點。在定性分析足以得出明確結(jié)論時，不必進(jìn)行復(fù)雜的定量分析。君合解讀：定性分析包括基于商品的特征、用途、價格等因素分析需求替代和供給替代的情況。定量分析包括運(yùn)用數(shù)理經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)、計量經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)等方法進(jìn)行的分析。方法只是工具，而非目的。在界定相關(guān)市場時，需先2014年10月23日采取定性分析。如果足以界定，則不必再進(jìn)行定量分析。只有在定性分析不能明確界定相關(guān)市場，同時定量分析可行的情況下（如相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù)可獲得），才需考慮定量分析。裁判要點三：假定壟斷者測試（HMT）可普遍適用于界定相關(guān)市場裁判理由：假定壟斷者測試的基本思路是，在假設(shè)其他條件不變的前提下，通過目標(biāo)商品或者服務(wù)某個變量的變化來測試目標(biāo)商品與其他商品之間的可替代程度。作為界定相關(guān)市場的一種分析思路，該測試具有普遍適用性［2］。既可用于界定相關(guān)商品市場，又可用于界定相關(guān)地域市場。在假定壟斷者測試的框架下，相關(guān)地域市場界定考慮的主要因素是：在價格、質(zhì)量等競爭因素發(fā)生變化的情況下，其他地區(qū)經(jīng)營者對目標(biāo)區(qū)域的假定壟斷者是否會構(gòu)成有效的競爭約束；既可通過定性分析的方法進(jìn)行，又可在條件允許情況下通過定量分析方法進(jìn)行；既可通過數(shù)量不大但有意義且并非短暫的價格上漲(SSNIP)的方法進(jìn)行，又可通過數(shù)量不大但有意義且并非短暫的質(zhì)量下降(SSNDQ)的方法進(jìn)行。君合解讀：本案例明確了假定壟斷者測試的普遍適用性，尤其明確了該測試可以通過定性方法和數(shù)量不大但有意義且并非短暫的質(zhì)量下降(SSNDQ)的方法進(jìn)行，具有相當(dāng)?shù)男乱?。裁判要點四：市場份額只是判斷市場支配地位的一項粗糙且可能具有誤導(dǎo)性的指標(biāo)。判斷市場支配地位還應(yīng)考慮市場進(jìn)入、經(jīng)營者的市場行為、對競爭的影響等綜合因素裁判理由：一般而言，市場份額越高，持續(xù)的時間越長，就越可能預(yù)示市場支配地位的存在。反壟斷法第十九條規(guī)定經(jīng)營者在相關(guān)市場的市場份額達(dá)到二分之一的，可推定其有支配地位，但這一推定可以被推翻。在市場進(jìn)入比較容易，或者高市場份額源于經(jīng)營者更高的市場效率或者提供了更優(yōu)異的產(chǎn)品，或者市場外產(chǎn)品對經(jīng)營者形成較強(qiáng)的競爭約束等情況下，高的市場份額并不能直接推斷出市場支配地位的存在。根據(jù)反壟斷法第十八條的規(guī)定，認(rèn)定市場支配地位需要綜合評估多項因素。君合解讀：《反壟斷法》第19條規(guī)定：因市場份額被推定具有市場支配地位的經(jīng)營者，有證據(jù)證明不具有支配地位的，不應(yīng)當(dāng)認(rèn)定其具有支配地位。本案例列舉了對支配地位的推定可能起推翻作用的證據(jù)，即：市場進(jìn)入比較容易，或者高市場份額源于經(jīng)營者更高的市場效率或者提供了更優(yōu)異的產(chǎn)品，或者市場外產(chǎn)品對經(jīng)營者形成較強(qiáng)的競爭約束等情況。同時，根據(jù)本案例，如果具有相當(dāng)?shù)氖袌龇蓊~(如40%)，即使未達(dá)到《反壟斷法》第19條的推定標(biāo)準(zhǔn)(如二分之一），但市場進(jìn)入很難，或者市場外產(chǎn)品對經(jīng)營者形成的競爭約束很弱，亦有可能被認(rèn)定為具有支配地位。裁判要點五：在認(rèn)定經(jīng)營者具有市場支配地位后，判斷其是否構(gòu)成濫用支配地位行為，需要綜合評估對消費(fèi)者和競爭造成的消極效果和可能的積極效果裁判理由：即使被訴經(jīng)營者具有市場支配地位，判斷其是否構(gòu)成濫用支配地位，也需要綜合評估其行為對消費(fèi)者和競爭造成的消極效果和可能具有的積極效果，進(jìn)而對行為的合法性與否作出判斷。君合解讀：在今后的濫用市場支配地位案件中，法院將不會因經(jīng)營者具有支配地位且實施了有關(guān)行為即判定其違法，需要評估行為對消費(fèi)者和競爭造成的消極效果和可能具有的積極效果，即采取'合理〃原則（ruleofreason）。如果有關(guān)行為并未導(dǎo)致排除或限制競爭的明顯效果（如本案例中法院對騰訊'產(chǎn)品不兼容〃行為的認(rèn)定），或?qū)οM(fèi)者和競爭產(chǎn)生的積極效果遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)大于其消極效果，則可能不構(gòu)成違反反壟斷法的濫用支配地位行為。反之，則可能構(gòu)成違法。裁判要點六：搭售對競爭既可能有積極效果，又可能有消極效果。只有對競爭具有消極效果，才可能構(gòu)成反壟斷法禁止的搭售行為裁判理由：構(gòu)成反壟斷法禁止的搭售行為，應(yīng)當(dāng)符合如下條件：搭售產(chǎn)品和被搭售產(chǎn)品是各自獨(dú)立的產(chǎn)品；搭售者在搭售產(chǎn)品市場上具有支配地位；搭售者對購買者實施了某種強(qiáng)制，使其不得不接受被搭售產(chǎn)品；搭售不具有正當(dāng)性，不符合交易慣例、消費(fèi)習(xí)慣等或者無視商品的功能；搭售對競爭具有消極效果。搭售行為本身既可能產(chǎn)生積極效果，也可能造成消極效果。搭售的積極效果是在特定情況下可以提高產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量、降低成本、促進(jìn)銷售、確保安全，從而提高效率，其消極效果是可能使得在搭售產(chǎn)品上市場具有支配地位的經(jīng)營者將其競爭優(yōu)勢延伸到被搭售產(chǎn)品市場上。君合解讀:本案例明確了搭售可能對競爭產(chǎn)生的具體的積極效果和消極效果。如果搭售未產(chǎn)生消極效果，或者消極效果非常有限、短暫但同時具有顯著的積極效果，則可能不構(gòu)成反壟斷法禁止的搭售行為。反之，則可能構(gòu)成違法。結(jié)語雖然本案例的被訴行為發(fā)生在互聯(lián)網(wǎng)領(lǐng)域，最高院的判決對反壟斷案件，尤其是濫用市場支配地位案件的若干普遍性問題明確了考量因素和分析方法，包括并非在任何反壟斷案件中都必須明確而清楚地界定相關(guān)市場、判斷是否構(gòu)成濫用支配地位行為需要綜合評估對消費(fèi)者和競爭的消極效果和可能具有的積極效果等。本案例對今后的反壟斷訴訟將具有重要的指導(dǎo)作用，并可能對反壟斷行政執(zhí)法產(chǎn)生重大影響。最高人民法院民事判決書(2013)民三終字第4號參見《國務(wù)院反壟斷委員會關(guān)于相關(guān)市場界定的指南》第10條第一款。KeyRulesoftheQihoov.TencentJudgmentofChina'sSupremeCourtChineseversionAuthorWei,YinglingPartner,StanleyWanAssociateJunHeLawOfficesPromulgationdate2014-10-29AuthorCompanyOnOctober16,2014,theSupremePeople'sCourt(hereafter"SPC")announcedthefinaljudgment[1]onthecaseofabuseofdominantmarketpositionfiledbyQihooagainstTencent,whichdismissedQihoo'sappealandsustainedthetrialcourtjudgment.Asthefirstantitrustcaseheardbyit,theSPCsetsforthelementsofanalysisandanalyticalapproachestoaseriesofissuessuchasmarketdefinitionanddeterminationofabuseofdominantmarketposition,amongothers.Thefinaljudgmentwillbeanimportantcasetoprovideguidanceforantitrustlitigation,especiallyforcasesofabuseofdominantmarketposition.Thisarticleaimstoidentifyandsummarizethekeyrulesandreasoningofthisfinaljudgmentandtoprovideourbriefcomments.KeyRuleI:Itisnotnecessarytoexplicitlyandclearlydefinearelevantmarketinanycaseofabuseofdominantmarketposition.Reasoning:Marketdefinitionishelpfultomakeclearthemarketscopeofcompetitivebehaviorsandthecompetitiveconstraintsfacedbybusinessoperators.Inacaseofabuseofdominant1CivilJudgment(2013)MinSanZhongZiNo.4oftheSupremePeople'sCourt.position,areasonablydefinedmarketisveryimportantforassessingthemarketpositionofabusinessoperator,analyzingthecompetitiveeffectsofitsconduct,anddeterminingthelegalityofitsconductandotherkeyissues.Therefore,marketdefinitionisusuallyanimportantanalyticalstepinantitrustcases.However,itwoulddependonspecificsituationsofacasewhetherarelevantmarketcouldbeclearlydefined,especiallyavailabilityofrelevantevidenceanddataandcomplexityofcompetition.Inacaseofabuseofdominantposition,marketdefinitionisnotthepurposebutatoolforevaluatingthemarketpowerofthebusinessoperatorbeingsuedandthecompetitiveeffectsofitsconduct.Evenifamarketisnotclearlydefined,themarketpositionofthebusinessoperatorbeingsuedandthepotentialcompetitiveeffectsofitsconductcouldalsobeevaluatedthroughthedirectevidenceofexclusionorrestrainttocompetition.JunHe'scomments:Accordingtothiscase,marketdefinitionisusuallystillnecessaryinantitrustlawsuitsinthefuture.However,ifcleardefinitionofarelevantmarketisreallynotfeasible(inveryrarecases)duetounavailabilityofrelevantevidenceordataorcomplexityofcompetition,therelatedissuesOctober23,2014couldbeevaluatedthroughthedirectevidenceofexclusionorrestrainttocompetition.KeyRuleII:Ifqualitativeanalysisissufficienttoclearlydefinearelevantmarket,complicatedquantitativeanalysisisnotnecessary.Reasoning:Marketdefinitioncouldbeconductedineitheraqualitativewayoraquantitativeway.Qualitativeanalysisisusuallythestartingpointtodefinearelevantmarket.Whenqualitativeanalysisissufficientforreachingadefiniteconclusion,itisnotnecessarytocarryoutcomplicatedquantitativeanalysis.JunHe'scomments:Qualitativeanalysisincludesanalysisofdemandsubstitutionandsupplysubstitutionbasedonfactorssuchasproductcharacteristics,useandprice.Quantitativeanalysisinvolvesapplyingthemethodsofmathematicaleconomicsoreconometrics.Methodisnotapurposebutatool.Formarketdefinition,qualitativeanalysisshouldbeadoptedfirst.Ifitissufficientfordefinition,quantitativeanalysisisnotnecessary.Onlyifarelevantmarketcouldnotbeclearlydefinedqualitativelyandquantitativeanalysisisfeasible(e.g.relevantdataisavailable),itisthennecessarytoconsiderquantitativeanalysis.KeyRuleIII:Thehypotheticalmonopolisttest("HMT")isgenerallyapplicabletodefinearelevantmarket.Reasoning:ThebasicapproachoftheHMTistotestthedegreeofsubstitutabilityamongthetargetproductandotherproductsthroughachangeofcertainvariableofthetargetproductorservice,assumingotherconditionsremainunchanged.Asananalyticalapproachtomarketdefinition,thetestcanbegenerallyapplied[2].Itcanbeusedtodefinebotharelevantproductmarketandarelevantgeographicmarket.UndertheHMTframework,themainconsiderationfordefiningarelevantgeographicmarketis:whetherthebusinessoperatorsinothergeographieswillconstituteeffectivecompetitiveconstrainttothehypotheticalmonopolistinthetargetgeographyincaseofanychangetosuchcompetitiveelementslikepriceandquality;Itcanbecarriedoutnotonlythroughqualitativeanalysis,butalsothroughquantitativeanalysisifconditionspermit;ItcanbecarriedouteitherthroughthemethodofSSNIPwhichinvolvesimposingasmallbutsignificantandnon-transitoryincreaseinprice,orthroughthemethodofSSNDQwhichinvolvesimposingasmallbutsignificantandnon-transitorydecreaseinquality.JunHe'scomments:ThiscasemakescleartheHMT'sgeneralapplicability,especiallystatingthatthetestcouldbecarriedoutqualitativelyandthroughthemethodofSSNDQthatinvolvesimposingasmallbutsignificantandnon-transitorydecreaseinquality,whichisquiteaninnovativeidea.KeyRuleIV:Marketshareisonlyaroughandpotentiallymisleadingindicatorforassessingexistenceofadominantmarketposition.Forsuchassessment,multiplefactorsshouldbeconsideredinacomprehensiveway,includingentry,abusinessoperator'smarketbehavior,andcompetitiveeffects,etc.Reasoning:Ingeneral,thehigheramarketshareisandthelongeritcontinues,themorelikelyadominantmarketpositionmayexist.Article19oftheAnti-MonopolyLaw("AML")statesthatifthemarketshareofabusinessoperatorreaches1/2intherelevantmarket,itmaybepresumedtohaveadominantposition.Butthispresumptionmaybeoverturned.Whereentryisrelativelyeasy,orthehighmarketshareisduetothatthebusinessoperatorismoreefficientorprovidesabetterproduct,ortheproductsoutsidethemarketconstituterelativelystrongcompetitiveconstrainttothebusinessoperator,adominantmarketpositioncannotbeinferreddirectlyfromahighmarketshare.AccordingtoArticle18oftheAML,multiplefactorsneedtobeevaluatedindeterminationofadominantmarketposition.JunHe'scomments:Article19oftheAMLstatesthatwhereabusinessoperatorwithapresumeddominantpositionduetoitsmarketsharecanotherwiseprovebyevidencethatithasnodominance,itshallnotbedeterminedashavingadominantposition.Thiscaseliststheevidencethatmayoverturnthepresumptionofadominantposition,includingthatentryisrelativelyeasy,thehighmarketshareisduetothatthebusinessoperatorismoreefficientorprovidesabetterproduct,ortheproductsoutsidethemarketconstituterelativelystrongcompetitiveconstrainttothebusinessoperator,etc.Meanwhile,accordingtothiscase,wherethereisaconsiderablemarketshare(e.g.,40%),evenifitfailstomeetastandardofpresumptioninArticle19oftheAML(e.g.,1/2),butentryisverydifficult,ortheproductsoutsidethemarketconstituteveryweakcompetitiveconstrainttothebusinessoperator,itmayalsobedeemedashavingadominantposition.KeyRuleV:Afterabusinessoperatorisdeterminedtohaveadominantmarketposition,acomprehensiveassessmentofitsadverseeffectsandpotentialfavorableeffectstoconsumersandcompetitionisnecessarytodeterminewhetheritconstitutesabuseofdominantposition.Reasoning:Evenifabusinessoperatorbeingsuedhasadominantmarketposition,acomprehensiveassessmentofitsconduct'sadverseeffectsandpotentialfavorableeffectstoconsumersandcompetitionisnecessarytodeterminewhetheritconstitutesabuseofadominantpositionandtofurtherdeterminetheconduct'slegitimacy.JunHe'scomments:Foracaseofabuseofdominantmarketpositioninthefuture,acourtwillnotdeclareabusinessoperatorwithadominantpositioninviolationoflawsimplyforcarryingouttherelevantconduct.Itisnecessarytoassesstheconduct'sadverseeffectsandpotentialfavorableeffectstoconsumersandcompetition,whichmeanscourtswilladopta"ruleofreason"approach.Iftherelevantbehaviordoesnotresultinanobviouseffectofexclusionorrestrictiontocompetition(forexample,thecourt'sfindingofTencent'sconductof"incompatibilityofproducts"inthiscase),orthefavorableeffectstoconsumersandcompetitionarefarbeyonditsadverseeffects,itmaynotconstituteabuseofdominantpositioninviolationoftheAML.Otherwise,itmaybedeemedinviolationoflaw.KeyRuleVI:Tyingcouldhavepro-competitiveeffectsoranticompetitiveeffects.Onlywhenithasanticompetitiveeffects,itmayconstituteatyingconductprohibitedbytheAML.Reasoning:ForaconducttobedeemedasinviolationoftheAML,thefollowingconditionsshallbemet:thetyingandtiedproductsareseparate,thesellerhasadominantpositioninthemarketofthetyingproduct,thesellerimposescertainrestrictionuponthepurchaserswhowouldhavetotakethetiedproduct,tyingisnotjustifiableanddoesnotcomplywithtradeorconsumptioncustomsordisregardstheproductfunctions,andtyinghasanticompetitiveeffects.Tyingitselfmayhavefavorableeffectsoradverseeffects.Thefavorableeffectsoftyingincludeimprovedproductquality,loweredcost,increasedsales,enhancedsecurityandimprovedefficiency,undercertaincircumstances.Itsadverseeffectisthattyingmightenableabusinessoperatortolever