私人股本和戰(zhàn)略資產(chǎn)配置文獻(xiàn)翻譯

私人股本和戰(zhàn)略資產(chǎn)配置文獻(xiàn)翻譯精編PrivateEquityandStrategicAssetAllocationPrivateequityisbothanassetclassandaninvestmentstrategy.Distinguishingbetweentheprivateequityassetclassandtheprivateequityinvestmentstrategycanbeconfusingandcreateschallengesforthetraditionalapproachtoassetallocation.Assetallocationdecisionsshouldbebasedontheriskandreturncharacteristicsoftheassetclass,althoughinreality,mostprivateequitydecisionsarebasedontheperceivedriskandreturncharactersoftheavailableprivateequityvehicles.Publiccompaniescollectivelyformthepublicequityassetclass.Investorscangainexposuretothepublicequityassetclassbypurchasingsharesofpubliclytradedcompaniesorsharesofinvestmentvehicles,suchasmutualfunds,thatpurchasethepublicshares.Private(non-public)companiescollectivelyformtheprivateequityassetclass.Investorscangainexposuretotheprivateequityassetclassbypurchasingsharesofprivatelyheldcompaniesorsharesofinvestmentvehicles,suchasprivateequityfunds,thatpurchasethenon-publicshares.Alargenumberofprivatecorporationsaregenerallyassumedtobepubliccorporations,includingDunkinDonuts,Hertz,Linens-N-Things,Neiman-Marcus,andToys-R-Us.Commonreasonsforbeingprivateincludefamilyownedbusinessesthathavealwaysbeenprivate,leveragebuyouts,andventurestart-upsstillwaitingtogopublic.Fromamodernportfolioperspective,ideally,onecouldinvestinabasketofallprivatecorporationsinwhichtheweightsofthecompaniesinthebasketarebasedontheirtruevalues.Suchabasketwithreal-timepricingwouldincludethousandsofconstituentsandwouldbeatruerepresentationoftheprivateequityassetclass.Insuchaworld,allvalue-weightedbenchmarkswouldleadtoverysimilarconclusionsontheperformanceoftheassetclass.Unfortunately,thisisnotpossibleand,philosophically,nothowmostpeopleconceptualizeaprivateequityinvestment.Wheninvestorsmakeanallocationtoprivateequity,itisnotapassiveinvestmentinthebasketofall(ormost)privatecompaniesthatformtheprivateequityassetclass.Rather,formostinvestors,theallocationtoprivateequityisaninvestmentinaskill-basedstrategy,inwhichthetwoprimarysub-strategiesareleveragedbuyoutsandventurecapital.Onecancarryoutsuchstrategiesdirectlyorthroughaninvestmentvehiclethatcarriesouttheinvestmentsontheirbehalf.Twoprimaryinvestment5vehiclesareengagedinthesestrategies–traditionalprivateequityfundsandpubliclylistedcompanies.Traditionalprivateequityfundsaretypicallypureplaysintheprivateequitystrategies,whilepubliclylistedcompaniesofferaspectrumofprivateequity-likeexposure.Mostprivateequityfundsareorganizedaslimitedpartnershipswithafinitelifeyears).Thelimitedpartnersinvestin(orcommitcapitalto)thefundswhicharethenmanagedbythegeneralpartners.Theindustryappearstobemovingtowardthecreationofmoreperpetualinvestmentvehicles.Ifoneassumesthattraditionalprivateequityfundsandpubliclylistedcompaniesengagedinprivateequitystrategiesownalloftheprivatecompanies,thecollectiveperformanceassociatedwiththeseinvestmentswouldperfectlymatchtheperformanceofabasketofallprivatecompaniesrepresentingtheprivateequityassetclass.Theimplicationisthattheweightedaverageperformanceofprivateequityfundswouldbethesameastheinvestmentintheprivateequityassetclass.Onanassetweighted-basis,halfoftheinvestorswilldobetterandhalfwilldoworsethantheassetclassasa6whole.Thisreturnrelationshipisstraightforward,butnotalwaysrecognized.Unlikethestraightforwardreturnrelationship,theriskrelationshipbetweentheassetclassandtheinvestmentvehicleisnotstraightforward.Thestandarddeviationofprivateequity“assetclass”returnsisnotthesameasthestandarddeviationofprivateequity“fund”returns,asindividualfundshavehighamountsofidiosyncratic(investmentspecific)risk.Forexample,fortheuniverseoflargecapU.S.mutualfunds,theaveragestandarddeviationoftheirreturnsisverysimilartothestandarddeviationoftheS&P500,whichisabyproductofthetendencyofmostmutualfundstocreateportfolioswithcharacteristicsthatmimicthoseofthebenchmark.Fortheuniverseofprivateequityfunds,theaveragestandarddeviationoftheirreturnsshouldbeconsiderablyhigherthanthestandarddeviationoftheprivateequityassetclassduetotheconcentratednatureofprivateequityfunds.ThisphenomenonofawidedispersionofreturnsamongprivateequityfundsisdocumentedinLerner,Schoar,andWongsunwai[2007].Publicequityinvestmentsofteninvolveexposuretomorethan1,000publiccompanies.Whilethousandsofprivatecompaniescollectivelyformtheprivateequityassetclass,privateequityfundsaremoreconcentratedandofteninvolveexposuretofewerthan15privatecompanies.Thefragmentedstructureoftheprivateequitymarketissuchthatprivateequityinvestorscannotfullydiversifyawayprivatecompanyspecificrisk;thus,allprivateequityinvestmentsareamixtureofsystematicriskexposuretotheprivateequityassetclassandprivatecompanyspecificrisk.Assetallocationdecisionsarelargelybasedontheexpectedreturnandstandarddeviationoftheassetclass.Formostassetclasses,itisrelativelyeasytoinvestinapassive–orbeta–representationoftheassetclass.Whenitcomestotheprivateequityassetclass,apassiveinvestmentwithriskandreturncharacteristicsthatmimictheriskandreturncharacteristicsofthetotalprivateequityassetclassdoesnotexist!Thus,asadvocatesofseparatingthebeta(assetallocation)decisionfromthealpha(product)decision,wefacearatherlargedilemma–shouldwebasethebetadecisiononriskandreturncharacteristicsassociatedwiththeaverageprivateequityinvestmentortheprivateequityassetclassWeareforcedtomuddythealpha-betaseparationwatersandusetheriskandreturncharacteristicsthatreflectthebetacharacteristicsthataninvestorcouldobtainthroughaparticularmethodofprivateequityexposure.Fortunatelyforus,thetypeofprivateequityexposureusedinthisstudy–listedprivateequityexposure–providesexposuretothousandsofprivateequitycompaniesandmovingforwardasmoreprivateequityinvestmentsaresecuritizedshouldbemorereflectiveoftheprivateequityassetclass.Asassetallocatorscontemplatingtheroleofprivateequityinastrategicassetallocation,twostrandsofresearchareofparticularinterest:researchonstrategicassetallocationstoprivateequityandresearchontheriskandreturncharacteristicsofprivateequity.Phalippou[2007a]providesanexcellentliteraturereviewandthoughtfulcommentaryonawiderangeofprivateequityinvestingissues.Relativelylittleguidanceexistsintheliteratureaboutanoptimalstrategicassetallocationtoprivateequity.AccordingtothePrivateEquityCouncil,theaverageallocationtoprivateequityfromthe20largestU.S.publicandprivatepensionplanswas%and%respectively.InpreviousIbbotsonresearch,Chen,Baierl,andKaplan[2002]studiestheroleofventurecapitalinastrategicassetallocation.UsingdatafromVentureEconomicsonliquidatedfundsfoundthatventurecapitalfundshadanannualcompoundedreturnof%(comparedtoreturnsof%and%for.LargeandSmallstocksoverthesame1960to1999period),anannualstandarddeviationof%,andacorrelationwithpublicequitiesof.04%,whichleadstoanallocationrangeof2%to9%.Swenson[2000]reportsthehistorical(1982-1997)correlationbetweentheYaleprivateequityportfolioandU.S.equityat.3.Grantier[2007]concludesthatsmallcapstocksareaviablesubstituteforprivateequity.Yambao,Davis,andSebastian[2007]advocatesusingindicesofpubliclytradedsecuritiesasproxiesforilliquidassetclassessuchasprivateequity.UsingCreditSuisseWarburgPincusGlobalPostVentureCapitalIndex,coupledwithaglobalCAPMapproachsimilartooneusedlaterinthispaper,Yambao,David,andSebastianestimatestheexpectedreturnofprivateequityat%,astandarddeviationof%,andacorrelationwithpublicequityof.9–acorrelationthatissubstantiallyhigherthanmostotherestimates,butconsistentwithourviewthat,overlongtimeperiods,returnstothepublicandprivateequityassetclassesshouldbesimilar.AslightlyolderversionoftheYambao,Davis,andSebastian[2007]capitalmarketassumptionswasusedinEnnisandSebastian[2004].Usingmean-varianceoptimization,itfindsthatprivateequityonlybeginstoenterefficientportfolioswhenequityallocationsexceed60%.Furthermore,itconcludes,“Onlymoderate-size,equity-orientedfundswithexceptionalprivateequityinvestmentskill,strongboard-levelsupport,andadequatestaffresourcesshouldconsiderallocationsof10%ormore.”Finally,inanannualupdateonthebenefitsofprivateequity,theCenterforInternationalSecuritiesandDerivativesMarkets(CISDM)ResearchDepartmentwrites,“Resultsshowthattraditionalprivateequityindicesmayprovidediversificationandreturnbenefitswhen7addedtoanexistingstockandbondportfolio,aswellasastock,bond,andhedgefundportfolio.”Thelackofagreementregardingthehistoricalreturnsoftheprivateequityassetclassisthekeyreasonthatrelativelylittleassetallocationguidancearoundprivateequitycanbefoundintheliterature.We,too,cannotescapetheuncertaintysurroundingthehistoricalreturnsofprivateequity.Theperceptionthattheprivateequityassetclasshassignificantlyoutperformedpublicequityisoneofthedriversofthecurrentinterestinprivateequity.TheNationalVentureCapitalAssociation,inconjunctionwithThomson,regularlyreporttheperformanceofThomsonFinancials'USPrivateEquityPerformanceIndex(PEPI),inwhichthereported10-and20-yearannualizedreturnsapproximatelydoublethoseoftheS&P500.Theperceptionthatprivateequityhassuperiorreturnsisalsoduetotheexceptionalperformanceofafewhighprofileprivateequityinvestors,suchasYale,andthestellarreturnsoftopquartileprivateequityfundsthatareoftentrumpetedinthepress.ThePrivateEquityCouncil,anindustrytradeorganization,proclaimsthatfrom1980to2005,top-quartileprivateequityfirmshadannualizednetoffeereturnsof%(seePrivateEquityCouncil[2007]).Unfortunately,theaverageprivateequityinvestorexperiencesaverageprivateequityreturnsandnottopquartilereturns.Overall,theliteratureonprivateequityreturnsvs.publicequityreturnsismixed.Schmidt[2006]comparesthehistoricalperformanceofprivateequityinvestmentsagainstabenchmarkofcomparablestocksfromtheRussell2000smallstockuniverse.From1980to1990,stocksoutperformedprivateequity,whilefrom1990to2002,privateequityoutperformedstocks.Overtheentireperiod,1980to2002,thecompoundedannualreturnwasapproximately%,nearlythreetimesgreaterthanthereturnonthecomparablestockbenchmark,suggestingthatthereturnsontrueprivateequityinvestmentsaresignificantlydifferentthanthecustomstockbenchmark.KaplanandSchoar[2005]findsthatafterfeeperformanceofprivateequityfundsissimilartotheS&P8500.StudiesbyCalPERSandtheYaleEndowmentreachsimilarconclusions:Incontrastwiththeabovefindings,MoskowitzandVissing-Jorgensen[2002]findsthattheriskandreturntrade-offissuperiorforpublicequities.PhalippouandGottschalg[2006]claimsthatKaplanandSchoar[2005]andothersoverstatetheperformanceofprivateequityfunds.Aftercorrectingfor9potentialbiases,itestimatesthatprivateequityfundsunderperformedtheS&P500by383basispoints.Phalippou[2007a]states,“Aninterestingareaforfurtherresearchistounderstandwhyinvestors10allocatelargeamountstothisassetclass,givensuchlowpastperformance.”Aftersurveyingtheliteratureonprivatevs.publicequityreturns,Grantier[2007]concludesthat,onaverage,privateequitiesdonotoutperformpublicequities,althoughtopprivateequityfirmshaveoutperformedpublicequities.Unlikemostotherassetclasseswherepastperformanceisviewedasahistoricalfactandthefocusisonforecastingfuturereturns,furtherresearchisnecessarytoaccuratelydeterminebothhistoricalandfutureexpectedreturnsofprivateequity.Ofparticularinterest,giventhenewprivateequityassetclassproxiesusedinourstudy,Zimmermannetal.studiestherisk,returns,andbiasesoflistedprivateequityportfolios.Between1986and2003,itestimatestheannualreturnandstandarddeviationofthreeportfoliosoflistedequities.Thevalueweightedbuy-and-holdportfoliohadareturnof%andstandarddeviationof%.Theequally-weightedrebalancedportfoliohadareturnof%andstandarddeviationof%.Theequally-weightedbuy-and-holdportfoliohadareturnof%andstandarddeviationof%.Clearly,theweightingandrebalancingschemeshaveasignificanteffectonperformance.Afteradjustingforserialcorrelation,thestandarddeviationsofthetwoequallyweightedportfoliosincreasesubstantially,to%and%,respectively.Forcomparisonpurposes,overthesameperiod,theS&P500hadacompoundedannualreturnof%andastandarddeviationof%.PrivateEquityIndexProxiesRepresentingtheU.S.privateequityassetclass,theListedPrivateEquityIndexisanewindexintroducedonSeptember30,2006,withanavailablebackfilledhistorythatbeginsonSeptember29,1995.TheLPEIndexisacollectionofpubliclytradedcompanieslistedontheNYSE,AMEXand/orNASDAQthataredeemedtobepredominately“PrivateEquityHoldingCompanies.”Asageneralrule,theIndexCommitteelooksforcompaniesfromwhichthemajorityoftherevenuestreamcomesfrominvesting,lending,orprovidingservicestoprivatelyheldbusinesses.TheIndexusesamodifiedmarketcapitalizationapproach.Adesiretodiversifyamongstdifferentprivateequityphases.earlystagefinancing,latestage,etc.),amaximumconstituentweightof10%,andconcentrationissuesdrivetheIndexCommitteetiltsawayfrommarketcapitalizationweights.Thebackfilledhistorieswerecreatedusingtheconstituentweightsatthetimeofinception.Suchanapproachissusceptibletosurvivorshipbias,asallofthecompaniesselectedbytheIndexCommitteeonthetrueindexinceptiondatesobviouslysurvivedtothatpoint.Itisunclearif,hadtheIndexCommitteeexistedin1995,whichcompanieswouldhavebeenintheIndex.The32constituentsasofSeptember30,2007,arelistedinTable1.AninvestmentintheLPEIndexisreportedtorepresentaninvestmentinover1000privatecompanies.Conceptually,eachoftheconstituentsislikeaninvestmentinanevergreenprivateequityfundprovidingexposuretomultipleindividualprivateequitytransactions.Packagingtheconstituentstogetherresultsinaninvestmentthatisconceptuallysimilartoafundofprivateequityfunds.Table1:ListedPrivateEquityIndexConstituentsasofSeptember30,2007CompanyNameLeucadiaNatlCpFortressInvestmentGroupAmericanCapitalStrategiesBlackstoneGroup.AlliedCapCorpCapitalsourceApolloInvestmentsKKRFinancialCorpMacquarieInfrastructureSVBFinancialTickerLUKFIGACASBXALDCSEAINVKFNMICSIVBWeighting%%%%%%%%%%CorpAresCapitalARCCCorpAffiliatedAMGManagersGroupMCGCapitalCorpMCGCBlackRockKelsoCapitalCorp.BKCCCMGIIncCMGICapitalCSWCSouthwestCompassCODIDiversifiHerculesHTGCTechnologyGrowthCapitalInternetCapGrpMVCCapitalIncMVCProspectEnergyCorpPSECEvercoreEVRPPartnersGladstoneCapitalCorpGladstoneInvestmentCorpHarris&HarrisKohlbergCapitalCorpUTEKCorpTINYKCAPGLADGAIN%%UTK%%%Table2:InternationalListedPrivateEquityIndex.ConstituentsasofSeptember30,2007CompanyNameWeightingWendelInvestment%Eurazeo%3iGroup%Jafco%RatosABB%MacquarieGlobal%InfrastructureTotalReturnFundKKRPrivateEquity%MacquarieAirportsBabcock&BrownInfrastructureGroupIntermediateCapitalSVGCapitalGPInvestmentsMacquarieCommunicationsInfrastructureGroupNIFSMBCGIMVRHJIndustrialJapanAsiaElectraCandoverInvestmentsArquesIndustriesAGpGraphiteEnterpriseTrustDeutscheBeteiligungsAGMacquarieCapitalAllianceGroupCDBWebTech/DeACapital.%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%MacquarieMacquarieMediaGroupBureEquityBraitS.A.DinamiaHgCapitalTrustplcJZEquityCapManOyjGrowthValueOpportunities.AdCapitalAGDunedinEnterpriseInvestmentTrustplcTractionSource:TomIdzorek,2007“PrivateEquityandStrategicAssetAllocation”.JournalofPoliticalEconomy,October,.私人股本和戰(zhàn)略資產(chǎn)配置私人股本既是一種資產(chǎn)類(lèi)別又是一種投資策略。私人股本資產(chǎn)類(lèi)別和私人股票投資策略之間的可辨性是混亂的，它創(chuàng)造了傳統(tǒng)的方法進(jìn)行資產(chǎn)配置的挑戰(zhàn)。資產(chǎn)配置的決策應(yīng)該基于資產(chǎn)類(lèi)別的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和收益特征，雖然在現(xiàn)實(shí)中，大多數(shù)私人股本決定是對(duì)知覺(jué)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)以及對(duì)所提供的投資機(jī)會(huì)返回私人股本基礎(chǔ)。公眾公司共同組成的公眾股權(quán)類(lèi)資產(chǎn)。投資者可以通過(guò)購(gòu)買(mǎi)獲得上市公司的股份或投資工具，如共同基金，即社會(huì)公眾股股份購(gòu)買(mǎi)暴露在公眾股權(quán)類(lèi)資產(chǎn)。私人(非公開(kāi))公司共同組成的私人股本資產(chǎn)類(lèi)別。投資者可以通過(guò)購(gòu)買(mǎi)獲得，如私募基金，即購(gòu)買(mǎi)非公有制私人持有的公司股份或投資工具，股票股份暴露于私人股一個(gè)私營(yíng)公司一般不被認(rèn)為是公共機(jī)構(gòu)，包括鄧肯，，尼曼和馬庫(kù)斯的。對(duì)于常見(jiàn)的原因包括被來(lái)說(shuō)一直是私人的，杠桿收購(gòu)，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)創(chuàng)業(yè)公司仍然在等待著上市。從現(xiàn)代投資組合的角度來(lái)看，最理想的情況是，在一個(gè)籃子中公司的重量是根據(jù)它們投資的所有私立公司的價(jià)值。與實(shí)時(shí)定價(jià)的包括數(shù)以萬(wàn)計(jì)組成部分的這樣一個(gè)籃子，并且是私有產(chǎn)權(quán)財(cái)產(chǎn)類(lèi)的一個(gè)真實(shí)的表示法。在這樣一個(gè)世界里，所有衡量?jī)r(jià)值的基準(zhǔn)將導(dǎo)致人們會(huì)非常關(guān)注私有財(cái)權(quán)財(cái)產(chǎn)類(lèi)的表現(xiàn)形式。不幸的是，這是不可能的，在哲學(xué)中，不是大多數(shù)人如何概念化的私人股權(quán)投資。當(dāng)投資者作出私人股權(quán)分配，私募股本公司,它并不是一種被動(dòng)投資里的所有(或大部分)私人公司所構(gòu)成的私人股本資產(chǎn)階級(jí)。相反，對(duì)于大多數(shù)投資者而言，就是投資于以提高技能為主的策略,兩種主要的副策略是杠桿收購(gòu)和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本。私人股權(quán)分配是一項(xiàng)以技術(shù)為基礎(chǔ)的戰(zhàn)略，其中兩個(gè)主要的子戰(zhàn)略杠桿收購(gòu)和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本投資。你可以代表他們直接或通過(guò)一種投資工具實(shí)施策略來(lái)進(jìn)行投資?；顿Y了5個(gè)公司——傳統(tǒng)的私募股權(quán)投資基金,并且已公開(kāi)上市公司。粹的投資戰(zhàn)略，而上市公司的私人股權(quán)是被公開(kāi)列出的。大多數(shù)私人股權(quán)基金的組織被作為有限的生命的(例如10年)有限合伙企業(yè)。有限合伙投資(或承諾的資金)的，然后由普通合伙人管理的基金。業(yè)界似乎是朝著更永久的投資工具創(chuàng)造。如果假設(shè)傳統(tǒng)的私人股權(quán)基金公司和上市投資的投資策略為私人公司所有，集體的表現(xiàn)將與這些與投資相關(guān)的完全分配給的代表私營(yíng)股權(quán)類(lèi)資產(chǎn)所有私人公司。其含義是，私募基金的加權(quán)平均權(quán)重將作為私人股權(quán)類(lèi)資產(chǎn)來(lái)投資的。在資產(chǎn)加權(quán)的基礎(chǔ)上，一半的投資者會(huì)做的更好，另一半會(huì)比作為一個(gè)資產(chǎn)類(lèi)別的整體更糟。這種回歸關(guān)系式直接的，但總是被人忽不同于直接的回歸關(guān)系，財(cái)產(chǎn)類(lèi)和投資工具之間的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)關(guān)系不是直接的。私募基金“資產(chǎn)類(lèi)”回報(bào)的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)偏差是不作為私人股權(quán)“基金”的回報(bào)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)偏差的，兩者并不相同的，作為各自的資金有金額上限的限制(投資具體)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。例如，在美國(guó)于大市值共同基金的宇宙中，他們的回歸的平均標(biāo)準(zhǔn)偏差與標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾系數(shù)500的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)偏差非常類(lèi)似，這是大多數(shù)共同基金趨勢(shì)的副產(chǎn)品，創(chuàng)造具有特色的組合，模仿標(biāo)準(zhǔn)偏差這些基準(zhǔn)。他們的回歸的平均標(biāo)準(zhǔn)偏差高于私有產(chǎn)權(quán)財(cái)產(chǎn)類(lèi)的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)偏差，應(yīng)該適當(dāng)?shù)赜伤接袃糁蒂Y本集中。據(jù)此，勒納，斯佳羅和旺瑟威(2007)提出回歸具有一種廣泛的分散作用。而數(shù)以萬(wàn)計(jì)私人公司共同形成私有產(chǎn)權(quán)財(cái)產(chǎn)類(lèi)時(shí)，私有凈值資本是被集中的并且涉及較少的私人公司，15家。私人股權(quán)市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)分散是私人股權(quán)投資者不能充分分散的具體的私人股本投資是一種系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的私募股權(quán)類(lèi)資產(chǎn)和私人公司的特定風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的混合物。資產(chǎn)配置的決策都是根據(jù)預(yù)期收益和資產(chǎn)類(lèi)別的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)偏差。對(duì)于大多數(shù)資產(chǎn)類(lèi)別，它是相對(duì)容易處于被動(dòng)的投資或β資產(chǎn)類(lèi)的。當(dāng)涉及到私人股權(quán)類(lèi)資產(chǎn)，一種有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的被動(dòng)投資和仿造的回歸特征的私有產(chǎn)權(quán)類(lèi)財(cái)產(chǎn)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)是不存在的！因此，作為分離β(資產(chǎn)配置)從α(產(chǎn)品)的決定決定論者，我們面臨著相當(dāng)大的難題—我們應(yīng)該與相應(yīng)的平均私人股權(quán)投資相關(guān)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和收益特征或私人股β來(lái)決定資產(chǎn)類(lèi)別我們被迫對(duì)α-β分離并且使用β特征的投資者可能通過(guò)私有產(chǎn)權(quán)曝光這一個(gè)特殊方法來(lái)獲得回資――提供涉及數(shù)以千計(jì)的私人股本司來(lái)暴露私有產(chǎn)權(quán)的投資狀況。作為在戰(zhàn)略性資產(chǎn)分配中凝視私人公平的作用的資產(chǎn)分配程序，兩年調(diào)查的擱淺有人們對(duì)這研究又有了特別的人公平的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和回歸特征的私人股權(quán)以及研究戰(zhàn)略性資產(chǎn)分配額上的調(diào)查。費(fèi)立頗(2007)提供了極好的文學(xué)審核和各種有關(guān)私人股權(quán)投資的言論。目前的理論中有關(guān)優(yōu)選的戰(zhàn)略資產(chǎn)分配的教學(xué)指導(dǎo)還是較少的。根據(jù)私人股本委員會(huì)，將私人股權(quán)平均分配給20個(gè)美國(guó)的公眾和私人養(yǎng)老金計(jì)劃分別為％和％。在早先的伊博森、貝阿柔和卡普蘭(2002)的研究中提倡發(fā)揮風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本在戰(zhàn)略資產(chǎn)配置中的作用。使用從經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的違約風(fēng)險(xiǎn)基金的數(shù)據(jù)發(fā)現(xiàn)，創(chuàng)業(yè)資本基金的年度復(fù)合回報(bào)率％ 間美國(guó)大型股和小型股)，一個(gè)年度標(biāo)準(zhǔn)偏差％和與公共文森(2000)報(bào)告指出耶魯大學(xué)和美國(guó)私人股權(quán)投資權(quán)益之間的相關(guān)的歷史(1982-1997)。格朗迪(2007)的結(jié)論是，小額股本是私有產(chǎn)權(quán)的一個(gè)可實(shí)行的替補(bǔ)。亞米巴奧，戴維斯和塞巴斯蒂安(2007)提倡使用非流動(dòng)性資產(chǎn)類(lèi)別作為基準(zhǔn)，如私人股權(quán)公開(kāi)交易的證券指數(shù)。使用瑞士信貸全球華平創(chuàng)業(yè)投資指數(shù)后，與全球資本文亞米巴奧·大衛(wèi)以后使用的一個(gè)私人股本期望值為％，標(biāo)準(zhǔn)偏差為％，公眾權(quán)益對(duì)比的方法，相對(duì)于其他具有相當(dāng)高的相關(guān)性。但我們認(rèn)為，在長(zhǎng)期的時(shí)間段，向公眾和私人股本資產(chǎn)類(lèi)別的回報(bào)應(yīng)該是相似的。作者亞米巴奧，戴維斯和塞巴斯蒂安(2007)假設(shè)資本市場(chǎng)中有一個(gè)更舊的版本被用在恩尼斯和塞巴斯蒂安(2004)。利用均值方差優(yōu)化，它認(rèn)為，只有私人股本投資能力，較強(qiáng)的板級(jí)支持，以及充足的人力資源股票型私人股本權(quán)