外文翻譯-企業(yè)社會責(zé)任-股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)和政治干預(yù)-來自中國的證據(jù)

PAGE1中文4490字本科畢業(yè)論文（設(shè)計）外文翻譯外文題目CorporateSocialResponsibility,OwnershipStructure,andPoliticalInterference:EvidencefromChina外文出處《JournalofBusinessEthics》2010（96）：P631-645外文作者WenjingLiRanZhang原文：CorporateSocialResponsibility,OwnershipStructure,andPoliticalInterference:EvidencefromChinaIntroductionInrecentyears,therehasbeengrowingawarenessoftheroleofcorporationsinsocietyinaninternationalsetting.Amongtheunresolvedissuesthatdeserveattention,Aguileraetal.(2007,p.837)postulatethatanimportantquestionincorporatesocialresponsibility(CSR)requiringfurtherattentionis‘‘whatcatalyzesorganizationstoengageinincreasinglyrobustCSRinitiatives.’’Priorresearchstudies(ChappleandMoon,2005;Deniz-DenizandGarcia-Falcon,2002;GravesandWaddock,1994;JohnsonandGreening,1999;MullerandKolk,2010;Roberts,1992;StanwickandStanwick,1998;ZuandSong,2009)documentalinkamongCSRand?rmsize,pro?tability,corporategovernance,leverage,employees,industry,andenvironmentalpressures,e.g.,shareholderdemands,regulation,ormediapressure.Amongthosestudies,GravesandWaddock(1994)andJohnsonandGreening(1999)documentarelationshipbetween?rmownershipstructureandCSR.Keim(1978),Ullmann(1985),andRoberts(1992)alldocumentapositiverelationshipbetweendispersedcorporateownershipandCSRdisclosureinthecontextofdevelopedcountries.Giventhedifferenceinpeople’sethicalreasoninganddecisionsbetweendevelopedandemergingcountries(GeandThomas,2007;LamandShi,2008;Whitcombetal.,1998),doesownershipstructurealsoaffectCSRinemergingmarketssuchasChina?DothefactorsthathavebeenpreviouslydocumentedtodriveCSRinAnglo-Americancountries(theUSAandtheUK)alsodetermineCSRinemergingmarkets?Inordertoanswerthosequestions,ourstudyfocusesonexamininghowa?rm’sownershipstructureandpoliticalinterferenceaffectCSRinthelargestemergingmarket,namely,China.UsingShanghaiNationalAccountingInstitute’s(SNAI)Chinese?rms’socialresponsibilityranking,weshowthatfornon-state-owned?rms,corporateownershipdispersionispositivelyassociatedtoCSR.However,forstate-owned?rms,thisrelationisreversed.WeattributethereversedrelationshiptopoliticalinterferencesandfurthertestthishypothesisbydemonstratingthatregionaleconomicdevelopmentisnegativelyrelatedtoCSRforstate-owned?rmsduetodecreasedpoliticalinterferenceinmoredevelopedareas.Theresultsalsorevealthat?rm’ssize,pro?tability,employeepower,leverage,andgrowthopportunityaffectCSRsinChina.Thisstudycontributestotheliteratureinseveralways.First,thisstudydirectlyexaminedtherelationshipbetweenownershipstructureandCSRinemergingmarkets,andourresultsdepictthatitisimportanttoconsiderownershiptypeinassessingCSRinemergingmarketwherestateownershipisstillprevalent,suchasinChina.Second,thehighextentofretainedgovernmentownershipinChinaallowsustoinvestigatethelinkbetweenCSRandownershiptypeusingauniquedatasetprovidedbySNAIChinese?rms’socialresponsibilityranking.Our?ndingsontherelationshipbetween?rmownershiptypeandCSRhaveimplicationsinothercountrieswherestate-ownershipisstillprevalent,suchasSingapore,Malaysia,Austria,andFinland(Claessensetal.,2000;FaccioandLang,2002).Third,weprovideevidenceofassociationsbetweenCSRand?rm’ssize,pro?tability,corporategovernance,environmentalpressures,andleverage.These?ndingsareconsistentwiththoseofpriorresearch,whicharemostlydocumentedinthedeveloped-countrycontext,suggestingthatCSRactivitiesarelargelydrivenbystrategicmotivationsandareconstrictedbyeconomicconsiderations.Finally,whiletheissueofCSRhasattractedgrowingresearchinterestinrecentyears,mostempiricalresultsarebasedontheUSdataandthisarticleisthe?rstempiricalCSRresearchexaminingdriversofCSRinemergingmarketstousealargeresearchsample.InbothAmatoandAmato(2007)andMullerandWhiteman(2009),thecorrespondingauthorsadvocatenon-US-basedstudiesofCSRtoexaminetheeffectofcultural,economic,legal,andethicaldifferencesincorporatesocialperformance.Thisarticleaddstoagrowingnumberofnon-USstudiesbyinvestigatingthelinkbetween?rm’scharacteristicsandCSRinChina,thelargestemergingmarketintheworld.Theremainderofthisstudyisorganizedasfollows:Thenextsectionshowstherelevantliteratureandidenti?esourresearchquestions.Thethirdsectionprovidesaninstitutionalbackgroundanddevelopshypotheses.Thefourthsectiondiscussesdatagatheringandmethodology.The?fthsectionpresentsresults,andthelastsectionconcludes,suggestingimplicationsofthestudy.LiteraturereviewPriorresearchonCSRmainlyfocusesonconceptualizingaswellasempiricallyassessingitsimpactonbusinessperformance.AnumberofstudieshavebeenconductedinanattempttolinkCSRwith?nancialperformance(i.e.,AbrattandSacks,1988;Aupperleetal.,1985;RussoandFouts,1997;WaddockandGraves,1997).Inadditiontocorporateperformance,recentstudiesalsoexaminedtheimpactofCSRonotherstakeholdersofthecompanies.Forexample,Mohretal.(2001)observetheimpactofCSRonthecustomerbuyingbehavior,whileTurbanandGreening(1997)examinetheimpactofCSRontheorganizationalattractivenesstoemployees.ComparedwiththegrowingbodyofliteratureonthenatureandconsequencesofCSR,however,theissueofhowtoimprovethecompanies’levelofCSR,orwhatfactorsdetermineCSRlevel,hasreceivedrelativelylimitedattention,especiallyintheemergingmarketsetting.Jones(1999)establishesthataninstitutionalframeworkforthedeterminantsofCSR,suggestingthatinstitutionalstructure,suchassociocultural,nationaleconomy,industry,?rm,andindividual,mainlydeterminesCSR.FollowingthelogicofJones(1999),anumbersofstudiesdocumentseveralfactorsaffectingthelevelofCSRbasedonthecontextofdevelopedcountries.Forexample,StanwickandStanwick(1998)?ndevidenceofapositiverelationshipbetweencorporatesocialperformance(CSP)andorganizationsize,?nancialperformance,andenvironmentalperformance.JohnsonandGreening(1999)examinetheeffectsofcorporategovernanceandinstitutionalownershiptypeonCSP,whichindicatesthatownershipstructureiscorrelatedtoCSP.AlthoughseveralstudieshaveshedlightonthedeterminantsofCSRindevelopedcountries,researchonthisareaisstillquitelimitedindevelopingcountries.Onlyafewrecentarticleshaveaddressedthisarea,andnoneofthemexaminestheownershipstructure–CSRrelationshipdirectlyindevelopingcountries.Analyzingwebsitereportingof50companiesinsevenAsiancountries,ChappleandMoon(2005)concludethatvariationofCSRisexplainedbyfactorsintherespectivenationalbusinesssystems.MullerandKolk(2010),usingsurveydatafrom121autopartssuppliersinMexico,?ndthatmanagement’scommitmenttoethicsisadominantdriverofCSP,andmanagement’scommitmenttoethicsinteractspositivelywithtrade-relatedpressurestoraiseCSPlevels.Basedonasurveymethodandasmallsample,ZuandSong(2009)documentthat?rmssmallerinsize,state-owned,producingtraditionalgoods,andlocatedinpoorerregionsaremorelikelytohavemanagerswhooptforahigherCSRratinginChina.Thestudiesrelatedwithemergingmarketsmaybeinconclusivegiventhesmallsamplesize.Consideringthevalidityandreliabilityoftheconclusion,themultivariateanalysisofalargesamplemaydescribeaclearpictureofdeterminantsofCSRinemergingmarkets.AccordingtotheargumentofJones(1999)andthegeneralframeworkforenvironmentalconstraintdriversofCSRprovidedbySee(2009),thepreviousstudiesonlyexamineoneorseveralaspectsofthedrivingfactorsofCSR,andarewithhighchancesofmissingimportantcontrolvariablesaffectinglevelsofCSR.Therefore,themultivariateregressioninourstudyperceivestheinclusionofacomprehensivesetofcontrolvariablesfromnotonlyexistingevidencesinpriorstudies,butalsotheoreticalanalysisonthedeterminantsofCSR(Jones,1999;See,2009).Usingthesampleofmanufacturing?rmsinChina,weextendtheexistingresearchbyexaminingtheeffectofownershipstructureandeconomicdevelopment,aswellaspoliticalinterference,onthelevelofCSRaccordingtothetheoreticalframeworkonharmonioussocietyandChineseCSR(See,2009)aftercontrollingforavarietyofvariableswhichhavebeendocumentedasin?uencingfactorsofCSR.BackgroundandhypothesesdevelopmentInstitutionalbackgroundChinesepubliclistedcompanies(PLCs)differfromtheircounterpartsinothercountriesintherelativelylargegovernmentstakeandtheassociated,generallymoreconcentrated,shareholdingstructure(TianandEstrin,2008).Table1comparesthepercentageof?rmswiththestateasultimatecontrollerinChinaversusothercountries.Consistentwithpriorresearch(Bennettetal.,2005),weobservethatthegovernmentasownerplaysaroleinChineselisted?rmsquiteoutoflinewiththatobservedinothermarketsortransitioneconomies.In1481Chinesepubliclistedcompanieswithavailable?nancialandownershipdata,63.15%havethestateasultimatecontroller,comparingwiththehighest23.50%inSingaporeandthelowest0.08%intheU.S.,amongstallothercountries.TheveryhighextentofretainedgovernmentownershipofChineselisted?rmssuggeststhatpoliticalinterferencebecomesanimportantinstitutionalcharacteristicofChina’scapitalmarketwhichoffersusagreatopportunitytoinvestigatetherelationshipbetween?rmownershiptype,ownershipstructure,andCSR.Comparedwithwesterncompanies,Chineseenterprisesfacemoresevereagencyproblemsthatarisebetweencontrollingandnon-controllingshareholders(TypeIIagencyproblem)becauseofcontrollingshareholders’signi?cantstockownershipandcontroloverthe?rms’boardofdirectors(Jiangetal.,2010;Johnsonetal.,2000).ShleiferandVishny(1997)pointout,‘‘largeinvestorsmayrepresenttheirowninterests,whichneednotcoincidewiththeinterestsofotherinvestorsinthe?rm,orwiththeinterestsofemployeesandmanagers.’’Inordertoexploittheirowninterests,controllingshareholdershaveclearincentivestodivertcorporatewealthbytunnelingthroughinter-corporateloans(Jiangetal.,2010).TypeIIagencyproblemdivertscorporatewealthfromrelated?rms,andithasanegativeeffectoncorporatebusinessbehavior,especiallyperformance.Theliteraturealsodocumentssuchempiricalevidences.Someeconomistsusuallyviewthatpoliticalinterference,thetypeIIagencyproblemforstate-ownedenterprises(SOEs),isusuallyattheexpenseofcorporatepro?tability(Boyckoetal.,1996).FryeandShleifer(1997)showthatprivateownershipispreferabletostateownershipbecausethegovernmenthasa‘‘grabbinghand’’thatextorts?rmsforthebene?tofpoliticiansandbureaucrats.AcemogluandJohnson(2005)providecross-countryevidencethatcountrieswithweakerpropertyrightsandlimitedprotectionagainstexpropriationbypoliticiansandthecountry’selitehavesubstantiallylowerincomepercapitaandinvestmentrates,andless-developedstockmarkets.SimilarconclusionsaredrawninChina.Fanetal.(2007)documentthattheaccountingandstockreturnperformanceofthe?rmsrunbypoliticallyconnectedCEOsispoorrelativetotheirpoliticallyunconnectedcounterparts.DoughertyandMcGuckin(2008)proposethatdecentralizedadministrationhasbeenakeyfactorindeterminingbusinessproductivityinChina.Ingeneral,governmentinterventionisshowntobedetrimentaltocorporateperformanceasaresultofdivertingcorporatewealthforpoliticalpurposes.HypothesesdevelopmentPreviousliteratureindirectlysupportstheargumentthatwhen?rm’sownershipgetsmoredispersed,theCSRlevelgetshigher(Keim,1978;Ullmann,1985).Keim(1978)statedthatasthedistributionofownershipofacorporationbecomeslessconcentrated,thedemandsplacedonthecorporationbyshareownersbecomebroader.Dispersedcorporateownership,especiallybyinvestorsconcernedwithcorporatesocialactivities(e.g.,socialresponsibilitymutualfunds,church,andcivicpensionplans,andethicalinvestors),heightenspressureformanagementtodisclosesocialresponsibilityactivities(Ullmann,1985).SomestudiesshowCSPispositivelyrelatedtothenumberofinstitutionsholdingthesharesofacompany(GravesandWaddock,1994)andpensionfundequity(JohnsonandGreening,1999).Consistentwiththewesterncounterparts,theshareholdersofChinesenon-state-owned?rmsshouldhavethesamerelationshipbetweenownershipdispersionandCSR.AccordingtothetheoryoftypeIIagencyproblem,thelargestshareholderofnon-state-owned?rmsexpropriatesminorityshareholderstoachieveitsowninterest,whichimpairsotherstakeholders’interestanddeclinesCSR.Therefore,well-protectedminorityshareholdersareassociatedwithhigherlevelsofCSRengagement(JohnsonandGreening,1999;See,2009).CorporateownershipdispersionlessenstheextentoftypeIIagencyproblem.Thelesstheownershipdispersion,themorethecontroloflargestshareholderovercompanytodivertcorporatewealth.Takentogether,corporateownershipdispersionisnegativelyrelatedtolevelsofCSRforChinesenon-state-owned?rms.Withmuchhigherimpactofpoliticalinterferenceoncompanybehaviors,weexpecttherelationshipbetweenownershipdispersionandCSRtobenegativeforstate-owned?rms.Higherlevelsofperceivedgovernmentalin?uenceoncorporateactivitywouldbeexpectedtoleadtoagreatereffortbymanagementtomeetexpectationsofgovernment.Thegovernment,largestshareholderofSOEs,hasincentivestodivertwealthtoobtainsocialstability(Baietal.,2006),whichhelpstoimproveCSR.HighlevelsofgovernmentownershipcreateincentivesforCEOstoachievenon-?nancialobjectivesrelatedtogovernmentpolicy,suchasinfrastructuredevelopmentandresolutionoftheregion’s?scalandunemploymentchallenges,andhence,thesesocialorpoliticalobjectivesexertpressureon?rmstopursueCSR(See,2009).Roberts(1992)documentsthatpoliticalinterferencepositivelyimpactsocialresponsibilitydisclosures.IntheexampleprovidedbyTianandEstrin(2008),theSinopecShanghaiPetrochemicalCompanyLimited,whichhasthegovernmentasmajorityshareholder,employed38,000peopleforitscoreoperationin1998.Whenittriedtolayoff17,000employees,itsgovernmentshareholderpreventedit,insteadforcingitto?ndalternativeemployment.Althoughthiskindofbehaviormayharmcorporatewealth,itsatis?esthegovernmentshareholder’spoliticalinterestsandcommittedahighlevelofCSR.Accordingly,weproposeour?rsthypothesisasfollows:H1a:ForSOEs,asthestateisthelargestshareholder,thecorporateownershipdispersionispositivelyrelatedtothelevelofCSR.H1b:Fornon-state-owned?rms,corporateownershipdispersionisnegativelyrelatedtothelevelofCSR.Source:WenjingLi，RanZhang.CorporateSocialResponsibility，OwnershipStructure，andPoliticalInterference：EvidencefromChina[J].《JournalofBusinessEthics》.2010（96）：P631-645.譯文：企業(yè)社會責(zé)任，股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)和政治干預(yù)：來自中國的證據(jù)引言近年來在國際環(huán)境中，企業(yè)在社會中所扮演的角色得到了人們越來越多的認知。在各種值得關(guān)注的懸而未決的問題中，阿奎萊拉等（2007，第837頁）認為在企業(yè)社會責(zé)任（CSR）方面的一個問題“是什么促進了各組織參與企業(yè)社會責(zé)任研究的積極性的日益增長”最值得關(guān)注。此前的調(diào)查研究（查普爾和穆恩，2005年；丹尼斯-丹尼斯和加西亞-法爾肯，2002;；格拉芙和伍德科，1994；約翰遜和格林，1999；穆勒和科爾克，2010；羅伯茨，1992年；斯坦威克和斯坦威克，1998年；祖和宋，2009））證明了企業(yè)社會責(zé)任和公司規(guī)模、盈利能力、公司治理、影響力、員工和環(huán)境壓力如股東的要求、法規(guī)或輿論壓力之間的一種關(guān)系。在這些研究中，格拉芙和伍德科（1994）以及約翰遜和格林（1999）證明了公司所有制結(jié)構(gòu)和企業(yè)社會責(zé)任之間的一種關(guān)系。凱姆（1978），烏爾曼（1985），和羅伯茨（1992）都證明了在發(fā)達國家中企業(yè)所有權(quán)分散和企業(yè)社會責(zé)任信息披露方面的一種積極關(guān)系?？紤]到在發(fā)達國家和新興國家之間人們基于道德的推論和決定不同，（葛和托馬斯，2007；林和石，2008；惠特科姆等，1998），在新興國家如中國的所有制結(jié)構(gòu)是否也會影響企業(yè)社會責(zé)任？之前已經(jīng)證明的在英美國家（英國和美國）推動企業(yè)社會責(zé)任的因素是否也決定了企業(yè)社會責(zé)任在新興市場的發(fā)展？為了解答這些問題，我們的研究焦點主要是在一個公司的所有制結(jié)構(gòu)和政治干預(yù)是如何在中國這個最大的新興市場上影響企業(yè)社會責(zé)任的。通過上海國家會計學(xué)院的中國企業(yè)社會責(zé)任排行，我們可以發(fā)現(xiàn)對于非國有企業(yè)，企業(yè)所有制分散和企業(yè)社會責(zé)任呈正相關(guān)。但是，對于國有企業(yè)，這種關(guān)系是相反的。我們把這種相反的關(guān)系歸因于政治的干預(yù)并通過演示由于國有企業(yè)在發(fā)達地區(qū)較少的政治干預(yù)而導(dǎo)致區(qū)域經(jīng)濟發(fā)展和企業(yè)社會責(zé)任的負相關(guān)來進一步證明這種假說。調(diào)查結(jié)果還顯示，在中國，公司的規(guī)模、盈利能力、員工能力、影響力和成長機會對企業(yè)社會責(zé)任的影響。這項研究對本文的貢獻表現(xiàn)在以下幾方面。首先，這項研究直接檢驗了所有制關(guān)系和企業(yè)社會責(zé)任在新興市場的關(guān)系，我們的結(jié)果顯示在如中國這種國有制仍然普遍存在的新興市場中，評估企業(yè)社會責(zé)任時考慮所有制的形式是很重要的。第二，中國大范圍的保留國有制使我們在調(diào)查企業(yè)社會責(zé)任和所有制類型時可以使用由上海國家會計學(xué)院提供的中國企業(yè)社會責(zé)任排名這項獨特數(shù)據(jù)。我們在企業(yè)所有制類型和企業(yè)社會責(zé)任的關(guān)系方面的發(fā)現(xiàn)可以推及到一些國有制仍然普遍存在的國家，如新加坡，馬來西亞，澳大利亞和芬蘭（克萊森等，2000；發(fā)科爾和郎，2002）。第三，我們可以為企業(yè)社會責(zé)任和企業(yè)的規(guī)模、盈利能力，公司治理，環(huán)境壓力和影響力之間的關(guān)系提供證據(jù)。這些發(fā)現(xiàn)和之前在大部分發(fā)達國家發(fā)現(xiàn)的企業(yè)社會責(zé)任活動主要受到戰(zhàn)略動因和經(jīng)濟因素的影響的研究是一致的。最后，雖然近年來企業(yè)社會責(zé)任已經(jīng)引起了人們越來越大的研究興趣，但大多數(shù)實證結(jié)果是根據(jù)美國的數(shù)據(jù)得出的，本文是第一個在對企業(yè)社會責(zé)任進行實證研究時大量使用新興市場的企業(yè)社會責(zé)任樣本。阿瑪托和阿瑪托（2007），穆勒以及懷特曼（2009）等作者都提倡用非美國的企業(yè)社會責(zé)任研究去驗證在文化，經(jīng)濟，規(guī)模和道德不同時企業(yè)的社會表現(xiàn)所受到的影響。本文通過在世界上最大的新興市場——中國的對企業(yè)特征和企業(yè)社會責(zé)任的關(guān)系的研究增加了大量的非美國的研究。本研究的其余部分結(jié)構(gòu)如下：下一節(jié)介紹相關(guān)文獻以及我們的研究問題。第三節(jié)提供了一個體制背景和發(fā)展假說。第四節(jié)討論數(shù)據(jù)收集和研究方法。第五節(jié)介紹研究成果，最后一節(jié)是總結(jié)以及說明研究的意義。文獻綜述在此之前對企業(yè)社會責(zé)任的研究主要集中于概念化以及經(jīng)驗評估它對企業(yè)績效的影響。許多研究已經(jīng)試圖分析企業(yè)社會責(zé)任和財務(wù)績效之間的聯(lián)系（如阿伯特和薩克斯，1998；奧普勒等，1995；羅索和福茨，1997；伍德科和格拉芙，1997）。除了企業(yè)績效，最近的研究還調(diào)查了企業(yè)社會責(zé)任對公司其它利益相關(guān)者的影響。例如，摩爾等（2001）觀察了企業(yè)社會責(zé)任對客戶購買行為的影響，特伯恩和格林（1997）調(diào)查了企業(yè)社會責(zé)任對企業(yè)對員工吸引力的影響。然而相較于越來越多的文獻對企業(yè)社會責(zé)任的性質(zhì)和后果的研究，如何提高企業(yè)的企業(yè)社會責(zé)任水平或者企業(yè)社會責(zé)任水平由什么因素決定等問題的研究尤其實在新興市場環(huán)境下的研究獲得的關(guān)注相當(dāng)有限。瓊斯（1999）設(shè)立了一個體制框架作為企業(yè)社會責(zé)任的決定因素，表明如社會文化，國家經(jīng)濟，產(chǎn)業(yè)，企業(yè)，個體等的體制結(jié)構(gòu)主要決定了企業(yè)社會責(zé)任的水平。繼瓊斯（1999）的邏輯后，數(shù)個在以發(fā)達國家為基礎(chǔ)的研究又證明了對企業(yè)社會責(zé)任水平有影響的幾個因素。例如，斯坦威克和斯坦威克（1998）發(fā)現(xiàn)了企業(yè)社會績效（CSP）和組織規(guī)模，財務(wù)表現(xiàn)以及環(huán)境績效之間的有一種積極關(guān)系的證據(jù)。約翰遜和格林（1999）驗證了公司治理和所有制類型對企業(yè)社會績效的影響，這表明所有制結(jié)構(gòu)與企業(yè)社會責(zé)任之間是有聯(lián)系的。雖然一些研究揭示了發(fā)達國家中企業(yè)社會責(zé)任的決定因素，但在發(fā)展中國家這方面的研究還是相當(dāng)有限的。只有最近少數(shù)幾篇文章涉及到了這個領(lǐng)域，然而其中任何一個都沒有驗證在發(fā)展中國家中所有制結(jié)構(gòu)和企業(yè)社會責(zé)任之間的關(guān)系。通過對網(wǎng)站報告的七個亞洲國家的50個企業(yè)的分析，查普和穆爾（2005）推斷企業(yè)社會責(zé)任的差異是由各個國家的商業(yè)系統(tǒng)因素造成的。穆勒和科爾克（2010）利用121個墨西哥汽車零部件供應(yīng)商的調(diào)查數(shù)據(jù)，研究發(fā)現(xiàn)管理層的道德承諾是企業(yè)社會責(zé)任的主導(dǎo)動力，管理層道德承諾和與貿(mào)易相關(guān)的壓力的積極互動提升了企業(yè)社會責(zé)任的水平。根據(jù)一項調(diào)查方法和小樣本，祖和宋（2009）證明，在中國，企業(yè)規(guī)模較小，國有的，生產(chǎn)傳統(tǒng)商品以及在貧困地區(qū)的企業(yè)的管理人更可能選擇高標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的企業(yè)社會責(zé)任等級。小樣本的規(guī)?？赡懿荒茏C明與新興市場相關(guān)的研究?？紤]到結(jié)論的有效性和可靠性，一個大樣本的多變量分析可能更能描述企業(yè)社會責(zé)任的決定因素在新興市場的清晰畫面。根據(jù)瓊斯（1999）的論據(jù)和瑟（2009）提供的環(huán)境對企業(yè)社會責(zé)任動力的約束的總體框架，以往的研究只驗證了企業(yè)社會責(zé)任的一個或幾個方面的驅(qū)動因素，并很有可能遺漏了可以影響企業(yè)社會責(zé)任水平的重要控制參數(shù)。因此，在我們研究的多元回歸中應(yīng)認識到包含的一整套控制變量不僅存在于之前研究的證據(jù)中，也存在于對企業(yè)社會責(zé)任的決定因素的理論分析（瓊斯，1999；瑟，2009）。以中國的制造業(yè)公司為樣本，我們通過驗證所有制結(jié)構(gòu)和經(jīng)濟發(fā)展以及政治干預(yù)對根據(jù)和諧社會的理論框架以及在控制多種企業(yè)社會責(zé)任影響因素的變量后的中國的企業(yè)社會責(zé)任（瑟