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外層空間遙感法律制度淺析
PrematureLegalFrameworkofRemoteSensingfromOuterSpace
Fromtheintroductionoftechnicaldoctrines,Remotesensingsatellitesmakeitpossibletogatherinformationonmineralresources,weatherandclimaticchanges,aswellasresourcesmanagementanditcanbedrawnaconclusionthatremotesensingisahumanactivitywhichhasalreadybeenpracticeinconnectionwithcommoninterestsallovertheworldforscoresofyears.InitialdiscussionsregardingremotesensingfromouterspacetookplaceattheFirstUNConferenceonPeacefulUsesofOuterSpaceinViennain1968.Intheearly1970s,Argentina,BrazilandotherDevelopingcountriesassertedthateachStatehaspermanentsovereigntyovernaturalresourceswithintheirterritoryandthatanyinformationacquiredregardingthoseresourceswasincludedintheconceptofsovereignty.Thus,developingcountriesarguedthattheconsentofthesensedStatewasaprerequisitetoanyspace-basedremotesensingoftheirsovereignterritory.Moreover,theymaintainedthatifremotesensingdidoccur,theywereentitledtoanydatageneratedandthatthedistributionofsuchdatatothirdpartieswasimpermissiblewithouttheconsentoftheStatesensed.
Actually,followingthelaunchofthefirstcivilianremotesensingsatellitein1972,developedaswellassomedevelopingcountrieshadbeendemandingsomespeciallegalregime,significantlysince1978,whentheWorkingGroupsetupunderUNCOPUOSfinallyfinishedtheirdraftof17principles.“EventsintheWorkingGroupmaywellhavebeenastrawinthewindforatrendthatwassoontobecomeapparentinanotherforum.Thistrendclearlyreflectedthemountinginfluenceofdevelopingcountriesandthepressureoftheircombinedweightininternationalaffairs.ItwasmanifestintheSecondUNConferenceontheExplorationandPeacefulUsesofOuterSpace,whichwasconvenedinViennainAugust1982.”However,ifthemisgivingsentertainedbysomeWesternindustrializedpowersaboutpossiblecontroversyregardingtheinterpretationandapplicationofsomeofthepotentialprinciplestreaty,wereignored,theultimateresultwouldbecompletelydifferent.AfteralengthydebateontheConference,thePrinciplesRelatingtoRemoteSensingoftheEarthfromSpace,whichwasannexedinUNresolution41/65,wasapprovedandadoptedunanimouslyonDecember11th,1986.
Thesefinal15principles,generalspeaking,recognizethegreatbenefitpossiblyderivedfromremotesensingandalsotheopportunitiespotentiallyarisingfromthemisuse.Afterall,itisunderstandableforaUNresolution,inandbyitself,beingnotlegallybindingornotleadingtoseriousconflicts.Rather,it‘sbeenhighlightedintheensuingdiscussionforacoupledecades.Beforefocusingonpossiblecontroversialissues,aglanceatthoseunlikelyfordisputeisnecessary.Apartfromthetechnicaldefinition,basically,thoseprinciples,asreiterationsofalreadyacceptedprinciplesofouterspacelaw,inparticular,supervisedunderorevencopiedverbatimetliteratimfrom1967theTreatyonPrinciplesGoverningtheActivitiesofStatesintheExplorationandUseofOuterSpace,includingtheMoonandOtherCelestialBodies,arecandidatesofdisqualificationforcontroversy.Forexample,PrincipleII,“Remotesensingactivitiesshallbecarriedoutforthebenefitandintheinterestsofallcountries”,III,“shallbeconductedinaccordancewithinternationallaw”,andIV,“irrespectiveoftheirdegreeofeconomicorscientificdevelopmentandstipulatestheprincipleoffreedomofexplorationanduseofouterspaceonthebasisofequality”.TheseparticularUNPrinciplesaremerelyarestatementoftermsfromtheOuterSpaceTreatyorotherwell-establishedcustomaryinternationallaw.Inasense,suchprinciplesmightnotescapethecharacteristicsofobscurityorambiguity,eitherofwhich,however,isnotauniqueissuetothelevelofremotesensingframeworkbuttothelevelofinternationalspacelawanddoesnotrefertotheemergencyofdivergenttextualinterpretationsofsuchresolution.
Additionally,thesameasforegoingcases,toprovideanaddedprotectionforthesensedstate,PrincipleIVaddsthatremotesensingactivitiesmustbeconductedwithrespecttoallStates‘permanentsovereigntyoveritswealthandnaturalresources,andmaynotbeconductedinsuchamannerdetrimentaltothelegitimaterightsofthesensedState,eventhoughtheissueofsovereigntyofsatesovertheirownnaturalresources,includinginformationderivedfromremotesensingregardingsuchresourceshadbeenoneofthemostbothersomeissuesformanyyearsduringthedraftingprocessandhasservedasastumblingblocktoachievingconsensus,whichwillbediscussedhereinafter.Besides,“[A]nassociatedprinciple,lackingexpectationsoffuturecontroversiality,istheprinciplethataStatecarryingoutremotesensingprogramsistoinformtheSecretary-GeneralinaccordancewithArticleIVoftheRegistrationConventionandArticleXIoftheOuterSpaceTreaty”;“Also,theprinciplerelatingtothepromotionoftheprotectionoftheEarth’senvironmentanddisclosureofinformationthatiscapableofavertinganyphenomenonharmfultosuchenvironmentaswellastheprincipleapplicabletothepromotionoftheprotectionofmankindfromnaturaldisastersandthetransmittalofrelevantinformationtoaffectedStates.”Hence,theUNPrinciplesalsomakeitclearthattheprotectionoftheearth‘senvironmentandtheprotectionofmankindfromnaturaldisastersareofextremeimportance.
Incontrasttothoseforegoingprinciples,thereareplentyofpossibleareaswheredifferencesofinterpretationmayarise.Firstofall,theUNPrinciplesapplyonlyto“naturalresourcesmanagement,landuse,andtheprotectionoftheenvironment,”media,meteorologicalandmilitaryapplicationsaresupposednotincluded.ThusitisconceivablethatnewsorganizationsmaydisregardtheentirePrinciplesifstrictlyinterpretedfromaliteralstandpoint.Andalso,thePrinciplesdonotapplytomilitaryreconnaissanceorsurveillance.SuchkindofidentificationinnarrowsensewascontributedtothosesufficientlybroadtermsinthecontextofthePrinciples,inavoidanceoffailuretoachieveunanimityonasetofothercivilianactivities.Infact,inutmostcircumstances,unanimityplaysarolenomorethanadoptionbynegativeconsensuswithoutmajorityvotes.ThisisjustthebeautyofaUNresolutionwithtolerationondeliberationspermeatedthrough,ratherthananinternationalconvention,whichmaynotbetracedtoopposedpositions.Asmentionedhereinbefore,despitethegreatinfluencebydevelopingcountriesandtheircombinationssuchas“Group77”,thedevelopedcountriesespeciallytheWesternpowers‘endeavoroftryingnottoconcludeatreatywasevenmoresignificant.“OnechampionedbytheUnitedStatesandmanywesternnationsregardedthefreedomofacquiringandimpartinginformationasafundamentalhumanrightwhereasdevelopingnationsandtheSoviet-ledsocialistcountriespredictedtheircaseastheirinalienablerighttodisposeoftheirnaturalresourcesandofinformationconcerningsuchresources.”
Hence,thecontroversialissuesarecenteringonthoseprinciplesnewlyintroducedunderinternationalcooperation,whichcanbutbeledbytechnicallydevelopedcountriesandseeminglybenefitthedevelopingnations,payingattentionto“andtakingintoparticularconsiderationtheneedsofthedevelopingcountries”.Simplyspeaking,theUnitedSateshadlongbeenaproponentoftheinternationalavailabilityofremotelysenseddataonanondiscriminatorybasis,commonlyreferredtoasthe“OpenSkies”policy.TheUNPrincipleslargelyembodiedthispolicyinthewayoftripleconceptions,whichareequitableparticipation,technicalassistanceandaccesstodata.Althoughnon-binding,mercialremotesensingregulatoryregimerecognizesthem,forthemostpart,asinternationalobligationsandrequiresthoselicensedinthetocomplywiththedataaccessibilityprinciple.ThereasonisthatthePrinciplesgivenbirthtoinmultilateralmovesweresubstantiallyinvirtueoftheAmericanpreviouspracticesinbilateralapproach.
Toillustrate,thoseLandsatagreementsbeforethePrinciplesmaybestbetakenasanexample,whichareagreementsconcludedbetweentheNationalAeronauticsandSpaceAdministrationofandanumberofcountriesspreadovertheworld:Argentina,Australia,Brazil,Canada,India,Italy,Japan,Swedenetc.“TheauthorityforNASAtoenterintosuchagreementsderivesfromtheNASAActof195,whichprovides‘thatactivitiesinspaceshouldbedevotedtopeacefulpurposesforthebenefitofallmankind’,whileSection205ofthatActempowersNASAto‘engageinaprogramofinternationalcooperationinworkdonepursuanttothisAct,andinthepeacefulapplicationoftheresultsthereof’?!盕orthosecountries,theLandsatagreementsinvolvedthebuildingofgroundstationsforacquisitionandprocessingofremotesensingsatellitedata,attheirownexpense.Inadditiontoeachcountrypayingforitsownshareintheproject,itwasalsoagreedunderLandsatarrangementsthatdataobtainedfromexperimentswouldbemadeavailabletotheinternationalscientificcommunity.Besides,countrieswithoutLandsatfacilitiesbutwithintheovercastrangeofthegroundstationswouldbeservedwithinformationbonafide,prevailingtheprincipleofpactatertiisnecnocentnecprosunt.Suchpracticewasbornetheacquiescenceinmeetingofmindsthatasensorstatemightconductwithoutconsentinadvancefromsensedstate.Besides,advancedtechnologywasnotinmonopolybymutualagreementsandthedatawouldbeinpublicityfortheworld.
Hence,imitationallyandcorrespondingly,PrincipleVsays,“Statescarryingoutremotesensingactivitiesshallpromoteinternationalcooperationintheseactivities.Tothisend,theyshallmakeavailabletootherStatesopportunitiesforparticipationtherein.Suchparticipationshallbebasedineachcaseonequitableandmutuallyacceptableterms”;andPrincipleVI,“Inordertomaximizetheavailabilityofbenefitsfromremotesensingactivities,Statesareencouraged,throughagreementsorotherarrangements,toprovidefortheestablishmentandoperationofdatacollectingandstoragestationsandprocessingandinterpretationfacilities,inparticularwithintheframeworkofregionalagreementsorarrangementswhereverfeasible.”Themutualagreementsareherebyhighlightedasaguaranteeforfeasibilityofparticipation,becausewithoutcontractualtransactions,theterm“equitable”mayfallintoinconsequentialextensionofitssubjectsaswellasobjects,whereofthe“opportunities”seemsurprisingchanceratherthanrationalexpectation.Inanutshell,theUNPrinciplesareconsideredtopermitStatestofreelysenseandpubliclydistributedatafromouterspacewithouttheconsentofthesensedState.Moreover,itisnowregardedaswell-establishedcustomaryinternationallawthatremotesensingmaybeconductedwithoutpriorconsent.Fordissemination,suchkindsofconclusionsareatleastdrawndirectlybysomescholarsongroundoftheabsenceofspecificprovisionsinthePrinciplesconcerningdisseminationofdata.
Asforsensing,“[A]lthoughithasbeenarguedbysomenationsthatpriorconsentforremotesensingofaStateshouldbesought,suchprotestationshaveneveradverselyaffectedoperationalprogress.PrincipleXIIIoftheResolutionmentionsprior‘consultation’andnot‘priorconsent’。Itisformulatedasfollows:topromoteandintensifyinternationalcooperation,especiallywithregardtotheneeds,ofdevelopingcountries,aStatecarryingoutremotesensingoftheearthfromspaceshall,uponrequest,enterintoconsultationwithaStatewhoseterritoryissensedinordertomakeavailableopportunitiesforparticipationandenhancethemutualbenefitstobederivedtherefrom.Consensuscouldnotbereachedregardingpriorconsultation,butitisclear,nonetheless,thatastateconsideringthatitislikelytobesubjectedtoforeignremotesensinghasaright,andwithoutrestriction,torequestthatconsultationstakeplaceandthattherequestedState‘shall’enterintoconsultationswithaStatewhoseterritoryissensed.”Suchinferencerepresentssomeoptimisticviewpointsbutdoesn‘tstandadequatereasonsforitsfeasibility.AsMyerspointedout,“[T]heThirdWorldStatesarefacedwithseriousproblems,primarilybecausetheydonotpossessthetechnologyandmeanstoconductremotesensing.TheymustrelyonthedevelopedStatestoprovidethedataandtoassistintheanalysis”.
Inlightofthenegotiatingpositions,suchprinciplesprovidedformaymakenomoresensebutforanyStateinpossessionofripetechnology,whetherit‘sadevelopedcountryoradevelopingcountry.Asexemplified,therehasbeenabrightnovaintheouterspaceundertakinginrecentthreedecades,People’sRepublicofChina,sincetheChinesefirstrecoverableremotesensingwassuccessfullylaunchedandrecoveredin1975andChinaRemoteSensingSatelliteGroundStationbeganoperatedfunctioningin1986.Chinahasmadesufficientlyrapidprogressinspatialundertakingandbecomeoneoftheleadingcountriesinremotesensingtechnology,onthebasisofwhich,Chinaissubstantiallycapabletoparticipateininternationalcooperationwithotherforeignsatellitemanagementauthorities,forexample,in1999,theChina-BrazilEarthResourcesSatellite01collectivelyexploredanddevelopedbybothcountrieswassuccessfullylaunchedasthebeginningofasatelliteseries;in2003,ChinaRSGShadconcludedorcontinuedimplementingaseriesofinternationalorregionalagreements,includingLandsat-5/7withAmericaUSGS,Spot-1/2/4/5andEnvisatwithFranceCNESandSpotImage,Radarsat-1withCanadaCSAandRSI,ERS-2withESRINsubsidiarytoESA,EnvisatDataReceptionwithNorwaysKongsbergSpacetec,attendanceonIndiaIRSConf.etc.ConsideringthepreviousexamplesofandChina,it‘sobviousthatavailableopportunitiesforequitableparticipationmustnotbelackofthereciprocaltechnicalabilityandnegotiations.
Insummary,PrincipleVandVIaredeemedtoconfirmtheunrestrictedrighttoremotesensingwithoutpriorconsentornotification.Additionally,remote-sensingStatesarerequiredtoenterintoconsultationswithsensedStatesuponrequest.Inthissense,PrincipleXIIIisattributedmuchmoreinreturnfortechnicaldiscrepancysituations.Furthermore,Statesconductingremotesensingarerequiredtoprovidetechnicalassistanceonmutuallyagreedtermsandareencouraged,preferablythroughregionalagreements,toestablishdatacollection,storage,processingandinterpretationfacilities,byPrincipleVII.Thereasonfortheseprovisionsisevidentinasmuchastheapplicationoftherelevantprinciplesinsuchcaseismadedependenton“mutuallyacceptableterms”。Concretely,suchmadeavailable“technicalassistance”shouldalsoapplytheprevioustwoprinciples,asstipulatingtheneedsofdevelopingcountriesand“wheneverfeasible”isathands.Moreover,inreturn,thestatesubjecttoremotesensinghasaccesstothedataonanon-discriminatorybasisandatareasonableprice.ThosestatesconductingremotesensingactivitiesmustmakeavailabletoallStates,attheirrequestandtothegreatestextentfeasibleandpracticable,anyrelevantnon-discriminatoryaccessanditwaspartofthe“OpenSkies”policytobeginwithandcodifiedbyPrincipleXII.ThisincludesaccesstoavailableanalyzedinformationinthepossessionofanyStateparticipatinginremotesensingonthesamebasisandterms,andmostsignificantly,sensedStatesshallhaveaccesstoprimaryandprocesseddataconcerningtheterritoryundertheirjurisdictionassoonasitisproducedonanondiscriminatorybasisandonreasonablecostterms.Nevertheless,thiscouldnotbeviewedasavictorywhenitcomestofurtheringthedevelopmentoflesserdevelopedcountriesinthattheyshouldhaveimmediateaccesstostateoftheartdataandinformationonreasonableterms,providedtheguaranteethattheyhavethemeanstopayforit.
Problemsremain,certainly.HowwillthesensedStateknowthedataorinformationhasbeenproduced?Whatistherealmeaningofinformationregardingsuchactivities?Furthermore,apartfromthecontractualtransmission,isthereisocracyinremotesensinglegalframework,especiallyinthecaseoftechnicalassistance,whereasitisnotpureassistancebuttheassistedstatesconductpartialarm‘slengthdeals,interalia,bindingthedemandedaccesstodata?Lastbutnottheleast,apartfromthemethodofcovenantencouraged,evenalittlebitbroadlyinterpreting,fromtheangleofathirdpartystate,aretheacquirementandthedisseminationofremotesensingdataneedingthepriorapprovalofoperatorstateorsensedstate,orisitadlibitumonsovereignty?SuchproblemshavekeptGordianknotsinthecircumstancesofgreattechnical,economicandpoliticaldiscrepancyamongstthecountries.Notonlythesensedstatesemphasizedsovereigntyinremotesensingactivities,butalsothesensorstateshighlighteditonverificationissue.Dataistreasure,andbeforeideallycontributedtoandsharedbytheworld,mustbeproprietarybysomesubjects,whetherthereisanyagreementornot.Toresolvesuchcommunicativeproblem,in1978,aproposaltocreateanInternationalSatelliteControlAgencywastabledbyFranceduringthefirstsessionoftheDisarmamentConferenceoftheUnitedNationsheldinNewYork.ThisproposalagaincameupfordebateattheSecondDisarmamentConferencein1982.Themainmotivationbehindtheproposalwasinspiredbymilitaryconsiderations.
“AmongthemostimportanttaskstobeentrustedtotheAgencyundertheFrenchproposalwouldbetheacquisition,processinganddisseminationofdataand/orinformation.‘Data’inthiscontextwouldincluderoughimagesandelectromagneticsignalsobtainedbytheAgency‘ssatellites,orputatitsdisposalbysatellite-operatingStates.’Information‘wouldincludetheanalysedresultsofthedataaswellasallotherinformationonarmssystems,geographicalconditions,militaryinstallationsetc.,whichwouldbeusefultotheAgencyinaccomplishingitsduties.SuchauxiliaryinformationwouldbecomeavailableeitherfromfreelyaccessiblesourcesorbesuppliedbyindividualmemberStates.”Regretfully,suchproposaldidnotseekforsupportivecommentsfromorUSSRatthattime,andwasnullifiedwithregardstoexcessiveexpenditureinvolved.Albeit;intheUNPrinciples,suchdirectivespiritwasincorporatedinPrincipleVIII,“TheUnitedNationsandtherelevantagencieswithintheUnitedNationssystemshallpromoteinternationalcooperation,includingtechnicalassistanceandcoordinationintheareaofremotesensing”。However,withoutrealisticattractiontotechnicallydevelopedcountries,howcomeitseemsmuchchanceofthisstrategyrealizedintheforeseeablefuture?So,suchproblemsarestayingahostofdiscussioninthescholarlyliteratures.
Finally,turningbackwardstoPrincipleIV,thedeclarationofsensedstate‘slegitimaterightsonsovereignty,deemedasnotincentiveforcontroversyasaforementioned,hadstrictlyinterpretedasonlyreferringtotheconductofremotesensingactivitiesbutnotincludingthedetrimentalresultscausedbydisseminationofdata,especiallytothenon-participantstates.Whiletheacceptedinternationalresponsibilityfortheouterspaceactivitiesofitsgovernmentalornon-governmentalentities,itcouldneveraccepttheextensionofsuchresponsibilitytoterrestrialactivities,aschampionedbytheSoviet-ledsocialistcountries,exceptinaccordancewithgenerallyrecognizedprincipleofinternationallaw.Reachingcompromisesincorrespondencewithsuchattitudes,thePrinciplesstateslogicallycircularrecommendationsinPrincipleXIV,andanon-envisageddisputesettlementprocedureinPrincipleXV.Insum,theenforcementofinternationalliabilityisalsocontroversialbutbeyondthisarticle.
「注釋」
1See,Prof.Dr.Ph.Diederiks-Verschoor:AnIntroductiontoSpaceLaw,p.68,KluwerLawandTaxationPublishers,Deventer-Boston,1993
2PrincipleI,partofparagraph,“Theterm‘remotesensing’meansthesensingoftheEarth‘ssurfacefromspacebymakinguseofthepropertiesofelectromagneticwavesemitted,reflectedordiffractedbythesensedobjects”and–。
3PartofPrincipleII,“RemoteSensingactivitiesshallbecarriedoutforthebenefitandintheinterestsofallcountries,irrespectiveoftheirdegreeofeconomic,socialorscientificandtechnologicaldevelopment,…”
4PrincipleIII,“Remotesensingactivitiesshallbeconductedinaccordancewithinternationallaw,includingtheCharteroftheUnitedNations,theTreatyonPrinciplesGoverningtheActivitiesofStatesintheExplorationandUseofOuterSpace,includingtheMoonandOtherCelestialBodies,andtherelevantinstrumentsoftheInternationalTelecommunicationUnion.”
5PartofPrincipleIV,“RemotesensingactivitiesshallbeconductedinaccordancewiththeprinciplescontainedinarticleIoftheTreatyonPrinciplesGoverningtheActivitiesofStatesintheExplorationandUseofOuterSpace,includingtheMoonandOtherCelestialBodies,which,inparticular,providesthattheexplorationanduseofouterspaceshallbecarriedoutforthebenefitandintheinterestsofallcountries,irrespectiveoftheirdegreeofeconomicorscientificdevelopment,andstipulatestheprincipleoffreedomofexplorationanduseofouterspaceonthebasisofequality”。
6PartofPrincipleIV,“TheseactivitiesshallbeconductedonthebasisofrespectfortheprincipleoffullandpermanentsovereigntyofallStatesandpeoplesovertheirownwealthandnaturalresources,withdueregardtotherightsandinterests,inaccordancewithinternationallaw,ofotherStatesandentitiesundertheirjurisdiction.SuchactivitiesshallnotbeconductedinamannerdetrimentaltothelegitimaterightsandinterestsofthesensedState”。
7See,MatteH.DeSaussure:LegalImplicationsofRemoteSensingfromOuterSpace,eds.1974,1976,contributionspresentedatproceedingsoftheSymposiumappearedincitationofLegalImplications,heldatMcGillUniversity,Montreal,Canada,Oct.1975
8See,StephenGorove:DevelopmentinSpaceLaw,IssuesandPolicies,,MartinusNijhoffPublishers,Box163,3300ADDordrecht,TheNethelands,KluwerAcademicPublishersincorporatesthepublishingprogrammesof,1991.PartofPrincipleIX,“InaccordancewitharticleIVoftheConventiononRegistrationofObjectsLaunchedintoOuterSpace4andarticleXIoftheTreatyonPrinciplesGoverningtheActivitiesofStatesintheExplorationandUseofOuterSpace,includingtheMoonandOtherCelestialBodies,aStatecarryingoutaprogrammeofremotesensingshallinformtheSecretary-GeneraloftheUnitedNations”.
9“Nonetheless,issuesmayberaised,forinstance,astowhetherdroughtsaretobeincludedinnaturaldisastersowhetheraparticularremotesensingactivitypromotestheprotectionoftheEarth‘snaturalenvironmentinagivencaseorwhetherthedataorinformationrelativetonaturaldisastershasinfactbeentransmitted’aspromptlyaspossible.‘”Id.AndtheresponseofrelatedpartiesduringthetsunamihappeningonDec.26th,2004,mightrevealsuchraisingproblems.——Author
10PrincipleX,“RemotesensingshallpromotetheprotectionoftheEarth‘snaturalenvironment.Tothisend,StatesparticipatinginremotesensingactivitiesthathaveidentifiedinformationintheirpossessionthatiscapableofavertinganyphenomenonharmfultotheEarth’snaturalenvironmentshalldisclosesuchinformationtoStatesconcerned”;PrincipleXI,“Remotesensingshallpromotetheprotectionofmankindfromnaturaldisasters.Tothisend,StatesparticipatinginremotesensingactivitiesthathaveidentifiedprocesseddataandanalysedinformationintheirpossessionthatmaybeusefultoStatesaffectedbynaturaldisasters,orlikelytobeaffectedbyimpendingnaturaldisasters,shalltransmitsuchdataandinformationtoStatesconcernedaspromptlyaspossible”。
11PrincipleI,partofparagraph。
12See,Sloup:Mediasat,GrayReconnaissance,andtheUnitedNationsPrinciplesonRemoteSensing,,p.327,30Proc.Colloq.L.OuterSpace322,1987.
13SeethestatisticsontheofficialwebsiteofUNOfficeatVienna:
14Id.Note8supra,
15PartofPrincipeII
16See,E.Galloway:RemoteSensingfromOuterSpace:LegalIm
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