外層空間遙感法律制度淺析

外層空間遙感法律制度淺析

PrematureLegalFrameworkofRemoteSensingfromOuterSpace

Fromtheintroductionoftechnicaldoctrines，Remotesensingsatellitesmakeitpossibletogatherinformationonmineralresources，weatherandclimaticchanges，aswellasresourcesmanagementanditcanbedrawnaconclusionthatremotesensingisahumanactivitywhichhasalreadybeenpracticeinconnectionwithcommoninterestsallovertheworldforscoresofyears.InitialdiscussionsregardingremotesensingfromouterspacetookplaceattheFirstUNConferenceonPeacefulUsesofOuterSpaceinViennain1968.Intheearly1970s，Argentina，BrazilandotherDevelopingcountriesassertedthateachStatehaspermanentsovereigntyovernaturalresourceswithintheirterritoryandthatanyinformationacquiredregardingthoseresourceswasincludedintheconceptofsovereignty.Thus，developingcountriesarguedthattheconsentofthesensedStatewasaprerequisitetoanyspace-basedremotesensingoftheirsovereignterritory.Moreover，theymaintainedthatifremotesensingdidoccur，theywereentitledtoanydatageneratedandthatthedistributionofsuchdatatothirdpartieswasimpermissiblewithouttheconsentoftheStatesensed.

Actually，followingthelaunchofthefirstcivilianremotesensingsatellitein1972，developedaswellassomedevelopingcountrieshadbeendemandingsomespeciallegalregime，significantlysince1978，whentheWorkingGroupsetupunderUNCOPUOSfinallyfinishedtheirdraftof17principles.“EventsintheWorkingGroupmaywellhavebeenastrawinthewindforatrendthatwassoontobecomeapparentinanotherforum.Thistrendclearlyreflectedthemountinginfluenceofdevelopingcountriesandthepressureoftheircombinedweightininternationalaffairs.ItwasmanifestintheSecondUNConferenceontheExplorationandPeacefulUsesofOuterSpace，whichwasconvenedinViennainAugust1982.”However，ifthemisgivingsentertainedbysomeWesternindustrializedpowersaboutpossiblecontroversyregardingtheinterpretationandapplicationofsomeofthepotentialprinciplestreaty，wereignored，theultimateresultwouldbecompletelydifferent.AfteralengthydebateontheConference，thePrinciplesRelatingtoRemoteSensingoftheEarthfromSpace，whichwasannexedinUNresolution41/65，wasapprovedandadoptedunanimouslyonDecember11th，1986.

Thesefinal15principles，generalspeaking，recognizethegreatbenefitpossiblyderivedfromremotesensingandalsotheopportunitiespotentiallyarisingfromthemisuse.Afterall，itisunderstandableforaUNresolution，inandbyitself，beingnotlegallybindingornotleadingtoseriousconflicts.Rather，it‘sbeenhighlightedintheensuingdiscussionforacoupledecades.Beforefocusingonpossiblecontroversialissues，aglanceatthoseunlikelyfordisputeisnecessary.Apartfromthetechnicaldefinition，basically，thoseprinciples，asreiterationsofalreadyacceptedprinciplesofouterspacelaw，inparticular，supervisedunderorevencopiedverbatimetliteratimfrom1967theTreatyonPrinciplesGoverningtheActivitiesofStatesintheExplorationandUseofOuterSpace，includingtheMoonandOtherCelestialBodies，arecandidatesofdisqualificationforcontroversy.Forexample，PrincipleII，“Remotesensingactivitiesshallbecarriedoutforthebenefitandintheinterestsofallcountries”，III，“shallbeconductedinaccordancewithinternationallaw”，andIV，“irrespectiveoftheirdegreeofeconomicorscientificdevelopmentandstipulatestheprincipleoffreedomofexplorationanduseofouterspaceonthebasisofequality”.TheseparticularUNPrinciplesaremerelyarestatementoftermsfromtheOuterSpaceTreatyorotherwell-establishedcustomaryinternationallaw.Inasense，suchprinciplesmightnotescapethecharacteristicsofobscurityorambiguity，eitherofwhich，however，isnotauniqueissuetothelevelofremotesensingframeworkbuttothelevelofinternationalspacelawanddoesnotrefertotheemergencyofdivergenttextualinterpretationsofsuchresolution.

Additionally，thesameasforegoingcases，toprovideanaddedprotectionforthesensedstate，PrincipleIVaddsthatremotesensingactivitiesmustbeconductedwithrespecttoallStates‘permanentsovereigntyoveritswealthandnaturalresources，andmaynotbeconductedinsuchamannerdetrimentaltothelegitimaterightsofthesensedState，eventhoughtheissueofsovereigntyofsatesovertheirownnaturalresources，includinginformationderivedfromremotesensingregardingsuchresourceshadbeenoneofthemostbothersomeissuesformanyyearsduringthedraftingprocessandhasservedasastumblingblocktoachievingconsensus，whichwillbediscussedhereinafter.Besides，“[A]nassociatedprinciple，lackingexpectationsoffuturecontroversiality，istheprinciplethataStatecarryingoutremotesensingprogramsistoinformtheSecretary-GeneralinaccordancewithArticleIVoftheRegistrationConventionandArticleXIoftheOuterSpaceTreaty”；“Also，theprinciplerelatingtothepromotionoftheprotectionoftheEarth’senvironmentanddisclosureofinformationthatiscapableofavertinganyphenomenonharmfultosuchenvironmentaswellastheprincipleapplicabletothepromotionoftheprotectionofmankindfromnaturaldisastersandthetransmittalofrelevantinformationtoaffectedStates.”Hence，theUNPrinciplesalsomakeitclearthattheprotectionoftheearth‘senvironmentandtheprotectionofmankindfromnaturaldisastersareofextremeimportance.

Incontrasttothoseforegoingprinciples，thereareplentyofpossibleareaswheredifferencesofinterpretationmayarise.Firstofall，theUNPrinciplesapplyonlyto“naturalresourcesmanagement，landuse，andtheprotectionoftheenvironment，”media，meteorologicalandmilitaryapplicationsaresupposednotincluded.ThusitisconceivablethatnewsorganizationsmaydisregardtheentirePrinciplesifstrictlyinterpretedfromaliteralstandpoint.Andalso，thePrinciplesdonotapplytomilitaryreconnaissanceorsurveillance.SuchkindofidentificationinnarrowsensewascontributedtothosesufficientlybroadtermsinthecontextofthePrinciples，inavoidanceoffailuretoachieveunanimityonasetofothercivilianactivities.Infact，inutmostcircumstances，unanimityplaysarolenomorethanadoptionbynegativeconsensuswithoutmajorityvotes.ThisisjustthebeautyofaUNresolutionwithtolerationondeliberationspermeatedthrough，ratherthananinternationalconvention，whichmaynotbetracedtoopposedpositions.Asmentionedhereinbefore，despitethegreatinfluencebydevelopingcountriesandtheircombinationssuchas“Group77”，thedevelopedcountriesespeciallytheWesternpowers‘endeavoroftryingnottoconcludeatreatywasevenmoresignificant.“OnechampionedbytheUnitedStatesandmanywesternnationsregardedthefreedomofacquiringandimpartinginformationasafundamentalhumanrightwhereasdevelopingnationsandtheSoviet-ledsocialistcountriespredictedtheircaseastheirinalienablerighttodisposeoftheirnaturalresourcesandofinformationconcerningsuchresources.”

Hence，thecontroversialissuesarecenteringonthoseprinciplesnewlyintroducedunderinternationalcooperation，whichcanbutbeledbytechnicallydevelopedcountriesandseeminglybenefitthedevelopingnations，payingattentionto“andtakingintoparticularconsiderationtheneedsofthedevelopingcountries”.Simplyspeaking，theUnitedSateshadlongbeenaproponentoftheinternationalavailabilityofremotelysenseddataonanondiscriminatorybasis，commonlyreferredtoasthe“OpenSkies”policy.TheUNPrincipleslargelyembodiedthispolicyinthewayoftripleconceptions，whichareequitableparticipation，technicalassistanceandaccesstodata.Althoughnon-binding，mercialremotesensingregulatoryregimerecognizesthem，forthemostpart，asinternationalobligationsandrequiresthoselicensedinthetocomplywiththedataaccessibilityprinciple.ThereasonisthatthePrinciplesgivenbirthtoinmultilateralmovesweresubstantiallyinvirtueoftheAmericanpreviouspracticesinbilateralapproach.

Toillustrate，thoseLandsatagreementsbeforethePrinciplesmaybestbetakenasanexample，whichareagreementsconcludedbetweentheNationalAeronauticsandSpaceAdministrationofandanumberofcountriesspreadovertheworld：Argentina，Australia，Brazil，Canada，India，Italy，Japan，Swedenetc.“TheauthorityforNASAtoenterintosuchagreementsderivesfromtheNASAActof195，whichprovides‘thatactivitiesinspaceshouldbedevotedtopeacefulpurposesforthebenefitofallmankind’，whileSection205ofthatActempowersNASAto‘engageinaprogramofinternationalcooperationinworkdonepursuanttothisAct，andinthepeacefulapplicationoftheresultsthereof’?！盕orthosecountries，theLandsatagreementsinvolvedthebuildingofgroundstationsforacquisitionandprocessingofremotesensingsatellitedata，attheirownexpense.Inadditiontoeachcountrypayingforitsownshareintheproject，itwasalsoagreedunderLandsatarrangementsthatdataobtainedfromexperimentswouldbemadeavailabletotheinternationalscientificcommunity.Besides，countrieswithoutLandsatfacilitiesbutwithintheovercastrangeofthegroundstationswouldbeservedwithinformationbonafide，prevailingtheprincipleofpactatertiisnecnocentnecprosunt.Suchpracticewasbornetheacquiescenceinmeetingofmindsthatasensorstatemightconductwithoutconsentinadvancefromsensedstate.Besides，advancedtechnologywasnotinmonopolybymutualagreementsandthedatawouldbeinpublicityfortheworld.

Hence，imitationallyandcorrespondingly，PrincipleVsays，“Statescarryingoutremotesensingactivitiesshallpromoteinternationalcooperationintheseactivities.Tothisend，theyshallmakeavailabletootherStatesopportunitiesforparticipationtherein.Suchparticipationshallbebasedineachcaseonequitableandmutuallyacceptableterms”；andPrincipleVI，“Inordertomaximizetheavailabilityofbenefitsfromremotesensingactivities，Statesareencouraged，throughagreementsorotherarrangements，toprovidefortheestablishmentandoperationofdatacollectingandstoragestationsandprocessingandinterpretationfacilities，inparticularwithintheframeworkofregionalagreementsorarrangementswhereverfeasible.”Themutualagreementsareherebyhighlightedasaguaranteeforfeasibilityofparticipation，becausewithoutcontractualtransactions，theterm“equitable”mayfallintoinconsequentialextensionofitssubjectsaswellasobjects，whereofthe“opportunities”seemsurprisingchanceratherthanrationalexpectation.Inanutshell，theUNPrinciplesareconsideredtopermitStatestofreelysenseandpubliclydistributedatafromouterspacewithouttheconsentofthesensedState.Moreover，itisnowregardedaswell-establishedcustomaryinternationallawthatremotesensingmaybeconductedwithoutpriorconsent.Fordissemination，suchkindsofconclusionsareatleastdrawndirectlybysomescholarsongroundoftheabsenceofspecificprovisionsinthePrinciplesconcerningdisseminationofdata.

Asforsensing，“[A]lthoughithasbeenarguedbysomenationsthatpriorconsentforremotesensingofaStateshouldbesought，suchprotestationshaveneveradverselyaffectedoperationalprogress.PrincipleXIIIoftheResolutionmentionsprior‘consultation’andnot‘priorconsent’。Itisformulatedasfollows：topromoteandintensifyinternationalcooperation，especiallywithregardtotheneeds，ofdevelopingcountries，aStatecarryingoutremotesensingoftheearthfromspaceshall，uponrequest，enterintoconsultationwithaStatewhoseterritoryissensedinordertomakeavailableopportunitiesforparticipationandenhancethemutualbenefitstobederivedtherefrom.Consensuscouldnotbereachedregardingpriorconsultation，butitisclear，nonetheless，thatastateconsideringthatitislikelytobesubjectedtoforeignremotesensinghasaright，andwithoutrestriction，torequestthatconsultationstakeplaceandthattherequestedState‘shall’enterintoconsultationswithaStatewhoseterritoryissensed.”Suchinferencerepresentssomeoptimisticviewpointsbutdoesn‘tstandadequatereasonsforitsfeasibility.AsMyerspointedout，“[T]heThirdWorldStatesarefacedwithseriousproblems，primarilybecausetheydonotpossessthetechnologyandmeanstoconductremotesensing.TheymustrelyonthedevelopedStatestoprovidethedataandtoassistintheanalysis”.

Inlightofthenegotiatingpositions，suchprinciplesprovidedformaymakenomoresensebutforanyStateinpossessionofripetechnology，whetherit‘sadevelopedcountryoradevelopingcountry.Asexemplified，therehasbeenabrightnovaintheouterspaceundertakinginrecentthreedecades，People’sRepublicofChina，sincetheChinesefirstrecoverableremotesensingwassuccessfullylaunchedandrecoveredin1975andChinaRemoteSensingSatelliteGroundStationbeganoperatedfunctioningin1986.Chinahasmadesufficientlyrapidprogressinspatialundertakingandbecomeoneoftheleadingcountriesinremotesensingtechnology，onthebasisofwhich，Chinaissubstantiallycapabletoparticipateininternationalcooperationwithotherforeignsatellitemanagementauthorities，forexample，in1999，theChina-BrazilEarthResourcesSatellite01collectivelyexploredanddevelopedbybothcountrieswassuccessfullylaunchedasthebeginningofasatelliteseries；in2003，ChinaRSGShadconcludedorcontinuedimplementingaseriesofinternationalorregionalagreements，includingLandsat-5/7withAmericaUSGS，Spot-1/2/4/5andEnvisatwithFranceCNESandSpotImage，Radarsat-1withCanadaCSAandRSI，ERS-2withESRINsubsidiarytoESA，EnvisatDataReceptionwithNorwaysKongsbergSpacetec，attendanceonIndiaIRSConf.etc.ConsideringthepreviousexamplesofandChina，it‘sobviousthatavailableopportunitiesforequitableparticipationmustnotbelackofthereciprocaltechnicalabilityandnegotiations.

Insummary，PrincipleVandVIaredeemedtoconfirmtheunrestrictedrighttoremotesensingwithoutpriorconsentornotification.Additionally，remote-sensingStatesarerequiredtoenterintoconsultationswithsensedStatesuponrequest.Inthissense，PrincipleXIIIisattributedmuchmoreinreturnfortechnicaldiscrepancysituations.Furthermore，Statesconductingremotesensingarerequiredtoprovidetechnicalassistanceonmutuallyagreedtermsandareencouraged，preferablythroughregionalagreements，toestablishdatacollection，storage，processingandinterpretationfacilities，byPrincipleVII.Thereasonfortheseprovisionsisevidentinasmuchastheapplicationoftherelevantprinciplesinsuchcaseismadedependenton“mutuallyacceptableterms”。Concretely，suchmadeavailable“technicalassistance”shouldalsoapplytheprevioustwoprinciples，asstipulatingtheneedsofdevelopingcountriesand“wheneverfeasible”isathands.Moreover，inreturn，thestatesubjecttoremotesensinghasaccesstothedataonanon-discriminatorybasisandatareasonableprice.ThosestatesconductingremotesensingactivitiesmustmakeavailabletoallStates，attheirrequestandtothegreatestextentfeasibleandpracticable，anyrelevantnon-discriminatoryaccessanditwaspartofthe“OpenSkies”policytobeginwithandcodifiedbyPrincipleXII.ThisincludesaccesstoavailableanalyzedinformationinthepossessionofanyStateparticipatinginremotesensingonthesamebasisandterms，andmostsignificantly，sensedStatesshallhaveaccesstoprimaryandprocesseddataconcerningtheterritoryundertheirjurisdictionassoonasitisproducedonanondiscriminatorybasisandonreasonablecostterms.Nevertheless，thiscouldnotbeviewedasavictorywhenitcomestofurtheringthedevelopmentoflesserdevelopedcountriesinthattheyshouldhaveimmediateaccesstostateoftheartdataandinformationonreasonableterms，providedtheguaranteethattheyhavethemeanstopayforit.

Problemsremain，certainly.HowwillthesensedStateknowthedataorinformationhasbeenproduced？Whatistherealmeaningofinformationregardingsuchactivities？Furthermore，apartfromthecontractualtransmission，isthereisocracyinremotesensinglegalframework，especiallyinthecaseoftechnicalassistance，whereasitisnotpureassistancebuttheassistedstatesconductpartialarm‘slengthdeals，interalia，bindingthedemandedaccesstodata？Lastbutnottheleast，apartfromthemethodofcovenantencouraged，evenalittlebitbroadlyinterpreting，fromtheangleofathirdpartystate，aretheacquirementandthedisseminationofremotesensingdataneedingthepriorapprovalofoperatorstateorsensedstate，orisitadlibitumonsovereignty？SuchproblemshavekeptGordianknotsinthecircumstancesofgreattechnical，economicandpoliticaldiscrepancyamongstthecountries.Notonlythesensedstatesemphasizedsovereigntyinremotesensingactivities，butalsothesensorstateshighlighteditonverificationissue.Dataistreasure，andbeforeideallycontributedtoandsharedbytheworld，mustbeproprietarybysomesubjects，whetherthereisanyagreementornot.Toresolvesuchcommunicativeproblem，in1978，aproposaltocreateanInternationalSatelliteControlAgencywastabledbyFranceduringthefirstsessionoftheDisarmamentConferenceoftheUnitedNationsheldinNewYork.ThisproposalagaincameupfordebateattheSecondDisarmamentConferencein1982.Themainmotivationbehindtheproposalwasinspiredbymilitaryconsiderations.

“AmongthemostimportanttaskstobeentrustedtotheAgencyundertheFrenchproposalwouldbetheacquisition，processinganddisseminationofdataand/orinformation.‘Data’inthiscontextwouldincluderoughimagesandelectromagneticsignalsobtainedbytheAgency‘ssatellites，orputatitsdisposalbysatellite-operatingStates.’Information‘wouldincludetheanalysedresultsofthedataaswellasallotherinformationonarmssystems，geographicalconditions，militaryinstallationsetc.，whichwouldbeusefultotheAgencyinaccomplishingitsduties.SuchauxiliaryinformationwouldbecomeavailableeitherfromfreelyaccessiblesourcesorbesuppliedbyindividualmemberStates.”Regretfully，suchproposaldidnotseekforsupportivecommentsfromorUSSRatthattime，andwasnullifiedwithregardstoexcessiveexpenditureinvolved.Albeit；intheUNPrinciples，suchdirectivespiritwasincorporatedinPrincipleVIII，“TheUnitedNationsandtherelevantagencieswithintheUnitedNationssystemshallpromoteinternationalcooperation，includingtechnicalassistanceandcoordinationintheareaofremotesensing”。However，withoutrealisticattractiontotechnicallydevelopedcountries，howcomeitseemsmuchchanceofthisstrategyrealizedintheforeseeablefuture？So，suchproblemsarestayingahostofdiscussioninthescholarlyliteratures.

Finally，turningbackwardstoPrincipleIV，thedeclarationofsensedstate‘slegitimaterightsonsovereignty，deemedasnotincentiveforcontroversyasaforementioned，hadstrictlyinterpretedasonlyreferringtotheconductofremotesensingactivitiesbutnotincludingthedetrimentalresultscausedbydisseminationofdata，especiallytothenon-participantstates.Whiletheacceptedinternationalresponsibilityfortheouterspaceactivitiesofitsgovernmentalornon-governmentalentities，itcouldneveraccepttheextensionofsuchresponsibilitytoterrestrialactivities，aschampionedbytheSoviet-ledsocialistcountries，exceptinaccordancewithgenerallyrecognizedprincipleofinternationallaw.Reachingcompromisesincorrespondencewithsuchattitudes，thePrinciplesstateslogicallycircularrecommendationsinPrincipleXIV，andanon-envisageddisputesettlementprocedureinPrincipleXV.Insum，theenforcementofinternationalliabilityisalsocontroversialbutbeyondthisarticle.

「注釋」

1See，Prof.Dr.Ph.Diederiks-Verschoor：AnIntroductiontoSpaceLaw，p.68，KluwerLawandTaxationPublishers，Deventer-Boston，1993

2PrincipleI，partofparagraph，“Theterm‘remotesensing’meansthesensingoftheEarth‘ssurfacefromspacebymakinguseofthepropertiesofelectromagneticwavesemitted，reflectedordiffractedbythesensedobjects”and–。

3PartofPrincipleII，“RemoteSensingactivitiesshallbecarriedoutforthebenefitandintheinterestsofallcountries，irrespectiveoftheirdegreeofeconomic，socialorscientificandtechnologicaldevelopment，…”

4PrincipleIII，“Remotesensingactivitiesshallbeconductedinaccordancewithinternationallaw，includingtheCharteroftheUnitedNations，theTreatyonPrinciplesGoverningtheActivitiesofStatesintheExplorationandUseofOuterSpace，includingtheMoonandOtherCelestialBodies，andtherelevantinstrumentsoftheInternationalTelecommunicationUnion.”

5PartofPrincipleIV，“RemotesensingactivitiesshallbeconductedinaccordancewiththeprinciplescontainedinarticleIoftheTreatyonPrinciplesGoverningtheActivitiesofStatesintheExplorationandUseofOuterSpace，includingtheMoonandOtherCelestialBodies，which，inparticular，providesthattheexplorationanduseofouterspaceshallbecarriedoutforthebenefitandintheinterestsofallcountries，irrespectiveoftheirdegreeofeconomicorscientificdevelopment，andstipulatestheprincipleoffreedomofexplorationanduseofouterspaceonthebasisofequality”。

6PartofPrincipleIV，“TheseactivitiesshallbeconductedonthebasisofrespectfortheprincipleoffullandpermanentsovereigntyofallStatesandpeoplesovertheirownwealthandnaturalresources，withdueregardtotherightsandinterests，inaccordancewithinternationallaw，ofotherStatesandentitiesundertheirjurisdiction.SuchactivitiesshallnotbeconductedinamannerdetrimentaltothelegitimaterightsandinterestsofthesensedState”。

7See，MatteH.DeSaussure：LegalImplicationsofRemoteSensingfromOuterSpace，eds.1974，1976，contributionspresentedatproceedingsoftheSymposiumappearedincitationofLegalImplications，heldatMcGillUniversity，Montreal，Canada，Oct.1975

8See，StephenGorove：DevelopmentinSpaceLaw，IssuesandPolicies，，MartinusNijhoffPublishers，Box163，3300ADDordrecht，TheNethelands，KluwerAcademicPublishersincorporatesthepublishingprogrammesof，1991.PartofPrincipleIX，“InaccordancewitharticleIVoftheConventiononRegistrationofObjectsLaunchedintoOuterSpace4andarticleXIoftheTreatyonPrinciplesGoverningtheActivitiesofStatesintheExplorationandUseofOuterSpace，includingtheMoonandOtherCelestialBodies，aStatecarryingoutaprogrammeofremotesensingshallinformtheSecretary-GeneraloftheUnitedNations”.

9“Nonetheless，issuesmayberaised，forinstance，astowhetherdroughtsaretobeincludedinnaturaldisastersowhetheraparticularremotesensingactivitypromotestheprotectionoftheEarth‘snaturalenvironmentinagivencaseorwhetherthedataorinformationrelativetonaturaldisastershasinfactbeentransmitted’aspromptlyaspossible.‘”Id.AndtheresponseofrelatedpartiesduringthetsunamihappeningonDec.26th，2004，mightrevealsuchraisingproblems.——Author

10PrincipleX，“RemotesensingshallpromotetheprotectionoftheEarth‘snaturalenvironment.Tothisend，StatesparticipatinginremotesensingactivitiesthathaveidentifiedinformationintheirpossessionthatiscapableofavertinganyphenomenonharmfultotheEarth’snaturalenvironmentshalldisclosesuchinformationtoStatesconcerned”；PrincipleXI，“Remotesensingshallpromotetheprotectionofmankindfromnaturaldisasters.Tothisend，StatesparticipatinginremotesensingactivitiesthathaveidentifiedprocesseddataandanalysedinformationintheirpossessionthatmaybeusefultoStatesaffectedbynaturaldisasters，orlikelytobeaffectedbyimpendingnaturaldisasters，shalltransmitsuchdataandinformationtoStatesconcernedaspromptlyaspossible”。

11PrincipleI，partofparagraph。

12See，Sloup：Mediasat，GrayReconnaissance，andtheUnitedNationsPrinciplesonRemoteSensing，，p.327，30Proc.Colloq.L.OuterSpace322，1987.

13SeethestatisticsontheofficialwebsiteofUNOfficeatVienna：

14Id.Note8supra，

15PartofPrincipeII

16See，E.Galloway：RemoteSensingfromOuterSpace：LegalIm