SIPRI-新技術(shù)與核裁軍：概述前進(jìn)的道路（英文）-2021.5-34正式版

NEWTECHNOLOGIESANDNUCLEARDISARMAMENT

OutliningaWayForward

TYTTIER?ST?

STOCKHOLMINTERNATIONAL

PEACERESEARCHINSTITUTE

SIPRIisanindependentinternationalinstitutededicatedtoresearchintoconflict,armaments,armscontrolanddisarmament.Establishedin1966,SIPRIprovidesdata,analysisandrecommendations,basedonopensources,topolicymakers,researchers,mediaandtheinterestedpublic.

TheGoverningBoardisnotresponsiblefortheviewsexpressedinthepublicationsoftheInstitute.

GOVERNINGBOARD

AmbassadorJanEliasson,Chair(Sweden)

DrVladimirBaranovsky(Russia)

AmbassadorChanHengChee(Singapore)

EspenBarthEide(Norway)

Jean-MarieGuéhenno(France)

DrRadhaKumar(India)

AmbassadorRamtaneLamamra(Algeria)

DrPatriciaLewis(Ireland/UnitedKingdom)

DrJessicaTuchmanMathews(UnitedStates)

DrFeodorVoitolovsky(Russia)

DIRECTOR

DanSmith(UnitedKingdom)

HIROSHIMAPREFECTURE

NEWTECHNOLOGIESANDNUCLEARDISARMAMENT

OutliningaWayForward

TYTTIER?ST?

May2021

Contents

Acknowledgements

iv

Summary

v

Abbreviations

vi

1.Introduction

1

2.Thenucleardeterrenceparadigm:Anenduringchallengeto

3

disarmament

I.‘Transitional’approach:Bridgingthegapbetweendeterrenceanddisarmament

3

II.Minimaldeterrence:Aninterimsteptowardsanuclearweapon-freeworld

4

III.Increasingrelianceonconventionaldeterrence

6

IV.Theneedforamorecooperativeinternationalsociety

8

3.Newtechnologiesandprospectsforminimalnucleardeterrencein

10

RussiaandtheUnitedStates

I.Conventionalprecision-strike:Alternativetonuclearweapons?

10

II.Missiledefences:Obstacletofurthercutsinstrategicnucleararsenals?

14

Box3.1.Thelinkbetweenmissiledefenceandnucleararmscontrol

15

Box3.2.Non-kineticweapons

16

4.Thepathtoglobalzero

18

I.Strategicchallengestomultilateralnucleardisarmament

18

II.Theroleoftechnologyinmaintaininganuclearweapon-freeworld

20

5.Policyrecommendations

21

6.Conclusions

24

Acknowledgements

TheauthorwouldliketothanktheHiroshimaPrefecturalGovernmentforitsgenerousfundingofthispaper.Sheisalsoindebtedtoseveralreviewerswhoprovidedvaluablefeedbackonthereport:externalreviewersProfessorAndrewFutterandDmitryStefanovich,aswellasSIPRIcolleagues,includingDrIanAnthony,DrSibylleBauer,DrLoraSaalman,DanSmith,DrPetrTopychkanovandPieterD.Wezeman.

DrTyttiEr?st?

Summary

Thisreportanalysestheprospectsfornucleardisarmamentinlightofrecentmilitary-technologicaladvances,focusingonprecision-strikeweaponsandmissiledefences.Whilemanyofthetechnologiesemployedintheseadvancedweaponsystemscannotbedescribedasnew,theirapplicationtostrategicmilitaryusesrepresentsamorerecentdevelopmentwhoseimpactonnucleardeterrenceand,inparticular,nucleardisarmamentremainspoorlyunderstood.

Thereportarguesthatthetensionbetweendeterrenceanddisarmamentcanbebridgedthrougha‘transitionalapproach’whichacknowledgesboththeurgentneedforprogresstowardsanuclearweapon-freeworldandthesecurity-relatedchallengesinitsway.ItviewstheresumptionofbilateralarmscontrolbetweenRussiaandtheUnitedStatesasthemostimportantsteptowardsdisarmamentatthepresentmoment,asabroaderprocessinvolvingallnuclear-armedstatesishardlypossiblewithout-priorandsignificantreductionsinthelargestnuclearweaponarsenals.Toenablesuchreductions,thesetwocountriesshouldmoveawayfromtheircold-wareranucleardoctrinesthatseekanabilitytowinanuclearwar.Instead,theyshouldpursueapolicyof‘minimalnucleardeterrence’focusedondeterringanuclearattack.Ifthesetwocountriesweretoadoptsuchapolicy—and,ideally,alsomakeanuclearno-first-use(NFU)pledge—thiswouldconstituteacrucialintermediategoaltowardscomprehensivenucleardisarmament.

Althoughdisarmamentultimatelymeansgivingupnucleardeterrence,theinter-mediategoalofminimalnucleardeterrencewouldnotrequireconsensusonthefeasibilityoftheendgoalofnuclearabolition.Instead,thesharedgoalofnuclearriskreductionmightbeasufficientmotivationforRussiaandtheUSAtoembarkonsignificantnuclearweaponreductions.

Theycouldbeginsuchcutsbyremovingnuclearweaponsfromregionalconflictdynamics,meaningthattheywouldnolongerserveasadeterrentagainstcon-ventionalaggression.Suchachange—whichcouldinvolveabanonnon-strategicnuclearweaponsinEurope—wouldnotundermineregionaldeterrence.Thismove,thereportargues,wouldnotundermineregionaldeterrence,aseachsidealreadyhasrobustconventionalforcescomprisedofprecision-strikeweaponsandotheradvancedmilitary-systems.Togetherwiththeabandonmentofcoldwar-eranucleardoctrinesfocusedonextensivecounter-forcetargeting,thiswouldopenthedoorforsignificant-reductionsofnuclearstockpiles.

Suchprogress,however,wouldbecomplicatedbycurrentchallengestostrategicstabilityposedbyUSmissiledefencesandlong-rangeprecision-strikeweapons,notablyhypersonicweapons.ThesesystemshaveraisedthebarforcrediblenucleardeterrencebycreatinguncertaintyaboutUSadversaries’second-strikecapabilities.Toaddressthisproblem,thereportproposestreaty-basedlimitsonstrategicmissiledefencesandstrengthenedinternationalnormsagainstbothnuclearandconventional-aggression,-inparticularagainstpreventivewar.Togetherwithaclearstigmaagainstnuclearweapons,suchmeasurescouldalsopavethewayforthekindofsystemicchangethatisrequiredforfurtherprogresstowardsanuclearweapon-freeworld.

Abbreviations

ABMTreaty

ASAT

C3

CPGS

GBI

ICBM

INFTreaty

MDR

NATO

NewSTART

NFU

NPR

NPT

RMA

SALT

SDI

SLBM

STARTI

TPNW

WMD

1972Anti-BallisticMissileTreaty

anti-satellite

command,controlandcommunications

ConventionalPromptGlobalStrike

ground-basedinterceptor

intercontinentalballisticmissile

1987IntermediateRangeNuclearForcesTreaty

MissileDefenseReview

NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization

2010TreatyonMeasuresfortheFurtherReductionand

LimitationofStrategicOffensiveArms

nofirstuse

NuclearPostureReview

1968TreatyontheNon-ProliferationofNuclearWeapons

RevolutioninMilitaryAffairs

StrategicArmsLimitationsTalks

StrategicDefenseInitiative

submarine-launchedballisticmissile

1991TreatyontheReductionandLimitationofStrategic

OffensiveArms

2017TreatyontheProhibitionofNuclearWeapons

weaponsofmassdestruction

1.Introduction

Muchofthecurrentanalysisontheimpactofongoingtechnologicalevolutiononnucleardeterrenceisdrivenbyconcernsaboutstrategicstability.Reflectingtheviewthatthisimpactispredominantlynegative,theattribute‘disruptive’isoftenusedtorefertonewkindsofdestabilizingweapons,ortotechnologiesthatpotentially-enabletheirdevelopment.1Whilespecificweaponstypesaresometimesidentified-asrepresentingnewtechnologies,theissueisperhapsbestunderstoodintermsofageneraltrendtowardsgreaterprecision,speed,manoeuvrability,stealthandtrackingcapabilities-ofcontemporarymilitarysystems,aswellasnon-kineticmeansofattack,notablyinthecyberrealm.2

Thistrendposesachallengetostrategicstability.3Morespecifically,newtechnologiesmaycreate‘crisisinstability’throughtheirpotentialtoincreasetheriskofnuclearescalation,forexamplethroughmiscalculationandtheentanglementofnuclearandconventionalweapons.4Arelatedproblemisthat—insofarastheyareabletodestroyhardenedandconcealedtargets—modernconventionalsystemscouldbeusedtoforcefullydisarmanadversary.5Togetherwithimprovementsinstrategicdefencesthatcouldneutralizetheeffectsofretaliatorystrikes,theseemergingcapabil-itiesareweakeningdeterrencebyunderminingnuclear-armedstates’confidenceintheirabilitytolauncharetaliatorysecondstrike.6Bydrivingnuclear-armedstatestoengageinnewarmamentdynamicstopreservetheirsecond-strikecapability,newtechnologies-arethusalsoundermining‘a(chǎn)rmsracestability’:theotherkeypillarofstrategicstability.

Focusinginparticularonthelatteraspectofstrategicstability,thisreportanalysesthepitfallsandpossibilitiesthatsuchweakeningofdeterrencepresentsfornucleardis-armament.Ontheonehand,itstartsfromtheassumptionthatthearmsraceinstabilitycreatedbynewtechnologieswilllikelycomplicateeffortstocutnuclearweaponstockpiles.Illustrativeofthepitfalls,ChinaandRussiahavealreadyrespondedtotheemergingUnitedStates’strategiccapabilitiesbyreinforcingtheirnucleararsenalsinanefforttomaintainmutualdeterrence.Ontheotherhand,thereportconsidersthepossibilities-forharnessingthecurrentmilitary-technologicalevolutiontofacilitatedisarmament,-notablybyexploringtheideaofsubstituting-nucleardeterrencewithconventionaldeterrence.

1?Roberts,B.,

‘Emerginganddisruptivetechnologies,multi-domaincomplexity,andstrategicstability:Areview

andassessmentoftheliterature’,

LawrenceLivermoreNationalLaboratory,CenterforGlobalSecurityResearch,Feb.2021.

2?Futter,A.,

‘Therisksposedbyemergingtechnologiestonucleardeterrence’,

edsB.Unal,Y.AfinaandP.Lewis,Perspectivesonnucleardeterrenceinthe21stcentury,ChathamHouseResearchPaper(RoyalInstituteofInternationalAffairs:London,Apr.2020).

3?Strategicstabilityhasbeendefinedasconsistingofcrisisstabilityandarmsracestability.Crisisstabilityisdefinedasasituationinwhichleadersarenotincentivized‘tostrikefirst,inparticularwithnuclearweapons,toavoidsufferingtheconsequencesofanenemy’sfirstmove’.Armsracestabilityrefersto‘theabsenceofperceivedoractualincentivestoaugmentanuclearforce—qualitativelyorquantitatively—outofthefearthatinacrisisanopponentwouldgainameaningfuladvantagebyusingnuclearweaponsfirst’.SeeBrustlein,C.,‘Theerosionofstrategicstability’,InstitutFranc?aisdesRelationsInternationales(IFRI),ProliferationPaperno.60(Nov.2018);andActon,J.M.,‘Reclaimingstrategicstability’,edsE.A.ColbyandM.S.Gerson,StrategicStability:ContendingInterpretations(USArmyWarCollegePress:CarlisleBarracks,PA,Feb.2013),pp.117–45.

4?See.e.g.Boulanin,V.etal.,Artificialintelligence,strategicstabilityandnuclearrisk(SIPRI:June2020);andActon,

‘Escalationthroughentanglement:Howthevulnerabilityofcommand-and-controlsystemsraisestherisksofan

inadvertentnuclearwar’,

InternationalSecurity,vol.43,no.1(2018).

5?‘Hardening’isacommonpracticetoprotectnuclearweaponfacilitiesbyplacingthemdeepundergroundandbyreinforcingthemwithmaterialsthatcanwithstandtheeffectsofpotentialcounterforcestrikes.‘Concealment’—notablythoughthedeploymentofnuclear-armedmissilesinsubmarinesormobileland-basedlaunchers—providessuchprotectionbymakinglocationandtrackingdifficult.Seee.g.Lieber,K.A.andPress,D.G,‘Theneweraofcounterforce:Technologicalchangeandthefutureofnucleardeterrence’,InternationalSecurity,vol.41,no.4(spring2017).

6?Futter(note2).

NEWTECHNOLOGIESANDNUCLEARDISARMAMENT

Inlinewiththebroaddefinitionofnewtechnologiespresentedabove,theanalysisisnotlimitedtoanyspecificnewlyemergedoremergingweapontype.Rather,thereportfocusesonexistingbutcontinuouslyevolvingadvancedconventionalsystems—notablyprecision-strikeweaponsandmissiledefences—thatareincreasinglyshapingstrategicdynamicsamongnuclear-armedstates.Thesesystemsrelyonvari-oustechnologies,inparticulardigitalinformationtechnologythathasenabledthemoderncommand,controlandcommunications(C3)underlyingmuchoftherecentadvancements-inweaponaccuracyandspeed.Whilenotentirelynew,theapplication-ofsuchsystemstostrategicmilitaryusesrepresentsamorerecentdevelopmentwhoseimpactonnucleardeterrenceand,especially,onnucleardisarmamentstillremainspoorlyunderstood.

Thisreportconsistsofthreeparts.Chapter2discussestheprospectsofover-comingthepersistentsecurityparadigmofnucleardeterrence,drawingfrompreviousdiscussionsonminimalandconventionaldeterrence,aswellasthegeneralrequirementsforanuclearweapon-freeworld.Onthisbasis,thereportarguesfora‘transitionalapproach’thatacknowledgespragmaticconcernsregardingsecurity-relatedobstaclestodisarmamentbutatthesametimeaspiresforaprofoundsystemicchangeintheinternationalnuclearstatusquotowardsanuclearweapon-freeworld.

Chapter3considerswaysinwhichrecentadvancesinconventionalprecision-strikeweaponsandmissiledefencesaffecttheprospectsforfurthernuclearweaponreductionsbyRussiaandtheUSA.Itarguesthattheadoptionofthepolicyof‘minimalnucleardeterrence’bythesetwolargestnuclearweaponpossessorswouldbeacrucialintermediate-goaltowardsanuclearweapon-freeworld.Asnotedinchapter4,thecurrentstrategicinstabilitycreatedbyadvancedconventionalweaponsalsoaffectsothernuclear-armedstatesandtheprospectsformultilateraldisarmament.Inaddition,chapter4considerswaysinwhichnewtechnologiescould,intheory,beusedtofacilitatenucleardisarmament.Finally,chapter5containspolicyrecommendations-forshort-andmedium-termmeasurestoaddresssomemainbottleneckstonucleardisarmamentidentifiedinthereportandchapter6providesconclusions.

Bycombiningboththepragmaticandvisionaryperspectivesonnucleardisarmament,thereportseekstonarrowthegapbetweenabolitionismanddeterrence-focusedapproachesthatmarkscurrentdebatesrelatedtothe1968TreatyontheNon-ProliferationofNuclearWeapons(Non-ProliferationTreaty,NPT),andthe2017TreatyontheProhibitionofNuclearWeapons(TPNW).7Atthesametime,itshedslightontheimpactofnewtechnologiesonbothnucleardeterrenceanddisarmament,towhichthosedebateshavethusfarpaidrelativelylittleattention.

7?Er?st?,T.,

‘TheNPTandtheTPNW:Compatibleorconflictingnuclearweapontreaties?’,

SIPRIWritePeaceBlog,6Mar.2019;and

TreatyontheNon-ProliferationofNuclearWeapons(Non-ProliferationTreaty,NPT),

openedforsignature1July1968,enteredintoforce5Mar.1970,INFCIRC/140,22Apr.1970;and

TreatyontheProhibitionof

NuclearWeapons(TPNW),

openedforsignature20Sep.2017;enteredintoforce22Jan.2021,A/CONF.229/2017/8.

Thenucleardeterrenceparadigm:Anenduringchallengetodisarmament

DespitetheNPT-basedinternationalconsensusontheneedfordisarmamentandnon-proliferationofnuclearweapons,severalcountriesclaimarighttopossessandthreatentousesuchweaponstodeteraggression.Inadditiontoensuringnationalsecurity,thesecountriesoftenalsoperceivenucleardeterrencetobeessentialformaintaining-internationalstability.8Althoughthemajorityoftheworld’scountriesdonotsubscribetothisparadigm,theninenuclear-armedstatesandthose30non-nuclearweaponstatesthatrelyonextendednucleardeterrencearedeeplyinvestedinit.9Thischapterconsiderswaystoovercomethisdependenceonnucleardeterrence.Itexploreshowtomanageinsecuritywithin,andduring,thetransitiontowardsanuclearweapon-freeworld.Italsodiscussessomemechanismsthathavebeenproposedtomaintainanuclearweapon-freeworld.

I.‘Transitional’approach:Bridgingthegapbetweendeterrenceanddisarmament

Whilestatesthatrelyonnucleardeterrenceoftenexpresssupportfornucleardisarmamentasalong-termobjective,theytendtohighlightsecurity-relatedobstaclesthatpreventanypracticalmeasuresformovingtowardsthatobjective.Thisoftenleadstoacautiousapproachthatrarelylooksbeyondmodeststeps,orevengivesrisetocomplacencyabouttherisksinherentintheprevailingstatusquo.Disarmament-advocates,incontrast,tendtoviewthiscomplacencyasakeyobstacletoreducingandultimatelyeliminatingnuclearweapons,andseektoaddressitbybuildingpoliticalwillandbystrengtheningtheanti-nuclearweaponnorm.SincethenegotiationoftheTPNWin2017,manydisarmamentadvocateshavefocusedsucheffortsonsupportingthetreaty.10

ThecurrentpoliticaldebatessurroundingtheTPNWsometimesgivetheimpressionthattheobjectivesofnucleardeterrenceanddisarmamentareirreconcilable;whilethesupportersoftheTPNWhighlighttheurgencyofnuclearabolition,itsopponentswarnofthedangersofweakeningdeterrenceinaninsecureworld.11Thecontradiction-canbetracedtovaryingdegreesofbeliefinthepossibilityofchangeintheglobalstatusquo,muchinlinewiththerealistandidealistInternationalRelationstraditions.Whilethedeterrence-mindedtendtobeguidedbytherealistassumptionthatthepropensityforconflictintheinternationalsystemisrelativelyimmutable,disarmamentbuildsontheidealistbeliefintheprospectsforchangebasedoninternationalcooperationandstrongerinternationalnorms.12

Seenintheseterms,thegapbetweendeterrenceanddisarmamentisbridgeablethrougha‘transitional’approach—meaningagradualandmanaged,ratherthana

8?USMissiontotheUnitedNations,

‘JointpressstatementfromthepermanentrepresentativestotheUNofthe

UnitedStates,UnitedKingdom,andFrancefollowingtheadoptionofatreatybanningnuclearweapons’,

7July2017.

9?Inadditiontothefivenuclear-armedpartiestotheNPT(China,France,Russia,theUnitedKingdomandtheUnitedStates),Israel,India,NorthKoreaandPakistanpossessnuclearweapons.The27NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization(NATO)membersthataredefinedasnon-nuclearweaponstatesundertheNPTallrelyonextendednucleardeterrenceprovidedbytheUSA,andfiveofthem(Belgium,Germany,Italy,theNetherlandsandTurkey)hostUSnuclearweapons.IntheAsia-Pacificregion,theUSAhasextendednucleardeterrencecommitmentstoAustralia,JapanandSouthKorea.

10?SeeforexampletheInternationalCampaigntoAbolishNuclearWeapons(ICAN)‘CitiesAppeal’wherebycitiesareurgingtheirgovernmentstojointheTPNW.SeeICAN,

‘#ICANSaveMyCity’,

n.d.

11?Seee.g.Er?st?(note7).

12?Brown,C.,‘Structuralrealism,classicalrealismandhumannature’,Internationalrelations,vol.23,no.2(June

2009).

NEWTECHNOLOGIESANDNUCLEARDISARMAMENT

suddenandrevolutionarychangetowardsanuclearweapon-freeworld.Althoughanincremental-approachhaslongbeenadvocatedbynuclear-armedstatesandtheiralliesinthecontextoftheNPTreviewprocess,theirlong-standingfailuretomatchwordswithactionshasundermineditscredibility.Incontrast,thetransitionalapproach,asunderstoodhere,stressestheurgencyoftakingconcretestepstotackleobstaclesinthewayoffurthernuclearcutsand,ultimately,ofuniversaldisarmament.Althoughthegradualapproachhasbecomeassociatedwithcomplacencyandapologismfornucleardeterrence,disarmamentadvocateswouldsurelywelcomeanyinterimstepstowardsreducingnuclearweaponnumbersandrelatedrisksifactuallytaken.Intermsofreducingnuclearweaponnumbers,themostimportantstepwouldbeforRussiaandtheUSAtoresumebilateralarmscontrolnegotiations,whichhavebeendead-lockedsincethenegotiationofthe2010TreatyonMeasuresfortheFurtherReductionandLimitationofStrategicOffensiveArms(NewSTART).13

Minimaldeterrence:Aninterimsteptowardsanuclearweapon-freeworld

ProgressonglobalnucleardisarmamentdependstoalargeextentonRussiaandtheUSA.Thesetwocountries’nuclearweaponstockpilesnumberinthethousands,whilenoothernuclear-armedstatepossessesmorethanChina’s320nuclearweapons.14UnlikeRussiaandtheUSA,theothernuclear-armedstateshavenotseentheneedforhugearsenalsbecausetheirnuclearweaponsmainlyservethepurposeofdeterringaggression.Reflectiveofthislimitedpurpose,China,FranceandtheUnitedKingdombasetheirpostureson‘minimalnucleardeterrence’—thatis,apolicyofmaintaining-nuclearweaponnumbersatthelowestpossiblelevelperceivednecessaryforacredibledeterrenteffect.WhileChina‘keepsitsnuclearcapabilitiesattheminimumlevelrequiredfornationalsecurity’andtheUKmaintainsa‘minimum,credible,independentnucleardeterrent’,France‘a(chǎn)ppliestheprincipleofstrictsufficiencyinmaintenance-ofitsnucleardeterrencecapability’.15

MinimaldeterrencecanalsobeseentounderliecallsformajorreductionsinRussianandUSnuclearstockpiles.Proponentsofsuchreductionsoftenarguethatbothcountriescouldlowertheirarsenalstoafewhundredwhilestillretainingaviablenucleardeterrent.16Indeed,deterringaggressiondoesnotrequirelargestockpiles,asevenasmallnumberofnuclearweaponscaninflictunacceptabledamagetotheadversary.17Rather,thelargeRussianandUSstockpilesarealegacyofcoldwarnucleardoctrinesthatwerefocusednotonlyondeterringbutalsowinninganuclearwarincasedeterrencefailed.

13?InFebruary2021,RussiaandtheUSAdecidedtoextendtheNewSTART,witheachstatingtheirinterestinfollow-onnegotiations,whichhavenotyetbegunatthetimeofwriting.SeeReif,K.andBugos,S.,

‘USA,Russiaextend

NewSTARTforfiveyears’,

ArmsControlToday,Mar.2021;and

Russian–USTreatyonMeasuresfortheFurther

ReductionandLimitationofStrategicOffensiveArms(NewSTART),

signed8Apr.2010,enteredintoforce5Feb.2011.

14?WhileRussiaandtheUSAareestimatedtopossess6375and5800nuclearwarheads,respectively,andChinaisbelievedtopossess320nuclearweapons,thearsenalsoftheremainingsixnuclear-armedstatesareallbelow300.SeeKile,S.N.andKristensen,H.M.,

‘WorldNuclearForces’,

SIPRIYearbook2020:Armaments,DisarmamentandInternationalSecurity(OxfordUniversityPress:Oxford,2020).

15?ChineseMinistryofNationalDefense(MND),China’sNationalDefenseintheNewEra(MND:Beijing,24July

2019);BritishGovernment,

GlobalBritaininaCompetitiveAge:TheIntegratedReviewofSecurity,Defence,Development

andForeignPolicy

,CP403(StationeryOffice:London,16Mar.2021);andFrenchMinistryfortheArmedForces,

White

PaperonDefenceandNationalSecurity2013

(FrenchDirectorateofLegalandAdministrativeInformation:Paris,2013).

16?Whilethefigureof300hasbeenmentionedinpastUSdebatesasthebasisforminimaldeterrence,oneRussiananalystrecentlyarguedthatRussiaandtheUSAcouldreducetheirarsenals‘a(chǎn)tleastto1000’asanextstepinjointreductions.SeePerkovich,G.,

Towardaccountablenucleardeterrents:Howmuchistoomuch?

,Workingpaper(CarnegieEndowmentforInternationalPeace:Washington,DC,Feb.2020);andKortunov.A.,

‘Perspectivesonthearmscontrol

agendain2021:Obstaclesandopportunities’,

onlinepaneldiscussion,SIPRI,14Apr.2021.

17?Perkovich(note16).

THENUCLEARDETERRENCEPARADIGM5

Thisquestfornuclearsupremacyrevolvedaroundeffortstoachieveanabilitytocontrolanddominateescalation.18Thiswasseentorequire‘counterforce’targeting—thatis,directingnuclearweaponsagainsttheadversary’srespectivenuclearforcesandC3systems.Whilesometimesportrayedasmorallylessreprehensiblethan‘counter-value’targeting—wherebynuclearweaponsareaimedathigh-valuetargets,suchaspopulationcentres—thecounterforcemissioncanhardlybedescribedassuch.Military-targetsareoftenlocatedwithinornearcivilianpopulationcentresandtheyaretypicallyhardtodestroy,thereforecallingfortheneedtodirectseveralnuclearweaponsatasinglelocation.19Counterforcetargetingalsohighlightedtheneedtomatchtheothersideintermsofthenumberandqualityofitsnuclearweaponsandtokeepmodernizingone’sownforcessoastomakethembothmoresurvivableandeffectiveagainsttheotherside’sprotectivemeasures.20

Theworst-casescenarioinUSandSovietnuclearthinkingduringthecoldwarwasasurpriseattackwherebyonesidewouldseektodisabletheretaliatorycapabilityofanother,whomightthentrytopre-emptsuchanattackwithafirststrikeofitsown.21Yet,arguablyamuchgreaterriskwasposedbytheideaoflimitednuclearwar,whichwasmostexplicitlyarticulatedinthe