英文質(zhì)疑氣候變化的年齡差距

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PolicyResearchWorkingPaper10918

QuestioningtheClimateChangeAgeGap

AlexandruCojocaru

MichaelLokshin

ArinaNikandrova

WORLDBANKGROUP

EuropeandCentralAsiaRegion&PovertyandEquityGlobalPracticeSeptember2024

PolicyResearchWorkingPaper10918

Abstract

Awidelyheldviewinthemediaandamongsomeresearch-ersisthatyoungerpeoplearemoreworriedaboutclimatechangeandmorewillingtosupporttheclimateagendathanoldergenerations.Sucha“climatechangeagegap”isoftenexplainedbythelongertimeyoungerpeopleexpecttoliveunderworseningclimaticconditions.Thispaperdevelopsatheoreticalmodelthatproposesanalternativeexplanationfortherelationshipbetweenageandattitudestowardcli-matechange.Theempiricalanalysisisbasedondatafrom

38countriesinEurope,CentralAsia,andtheMiddleEastfromthe2023roundoftheLifeinTransitionSurvey.Thefindingsdemonstrateapositiverelationshipbetweentherespondents’ageandtheirconcernsaboutclimatechange.Olderpeoplearemorelikelytoobjecttohighertaxestofinancepublicpoliciesingeneral,includingclimatechangepolicies,buteventhisresultissensitivetotheframingofclimateactionquestions.

ThispaperisaproductoftheOfficeoftheChiefEconomist,EuropeandCentralAsiaRegionandthePovertyandEquityGlobalPractice.ItispartofalargereffortbytheWorldBanktoprovideopenaccesstoitsresearchandmakeacontributiontodevelopmentpolicydiscussionsaroundtheworld.PolicyResearchWorkingPapersarealsopostedontheWebathttp:///prwp.Theauthorsmaybecontactedatmlokshin@.

ThePolicyResearchWorkingPaperSeriesdisseminatesthefindingsofworkinprogresstoencouragetheexchangeofideasaboutdevelopmentissues.Anobjectiveoftheseriesistogetthefindingsoutquickly,evenifthepresentationsarelessthanfullypolished.Thepaperscarrythenamesoftheauthorsandshouldbecitedaccordingly.Thefindings,interpretations,andconclusionsexpressedinthispaperareentirelythoseoftheauthors.TheydonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheInternationalBankforReconstructionandDevelopment/WorldBankanditsaffiliatedorganizations,orthoseoftheExecutiveDirectorsoftheWorldBankorthegovernmentstheyrepresent.

ProducedbytheResearchSupportTeam

QuestioningtheClimateChangeAgeGap.

AlexandruCojocaru,MichaelLokshin,

andArinaNikandrova1

JEL:Q54,O13,O15

Keywords:Climatechange,EuropeandCentralAsia;governmentpolicies,perceptions.

1AlexandruCojocaruisSeniorEconomistinthePovertyandEquityGlobalPractice,andMichaelLokshinisLeadEconomistintheChiefEconomistOfficeoftheEuropeandCentralAsiaRegion,bothareattheWorldBank.ArinaNikandrovaisSeniorLecturerinEconomicsattheCityUniversityofLondon.Thispaper’sfindings,interpretations,andconclusionsareentirelythoseoftheauthorsanddonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheWorldBank,itsExecutiveDirectors,orthecountriestheyrepresent.MiguelPurroyprovidedexcellentassistanceincollecting,processing,andanalyzingdataforthispaper.WethankThomasFarole,IvailoIzvorski,andRicharRecordfortheirconstructivecommentsandsuggestions.Sendcorrespondencetomlokshin@.

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1.Introduction

InDecember2023,representativesof199countriesconfirmedtheircommitmentstoaddressingtheglobalclimateemergencyandacceleratingclimateactions

(UN2024)

.Thesuccessoftheseglobaleffortsrestsonthewillingnessofindividualcountriestoactupontheirvoluntarily-setmitigationtargets,knownasnationallydeterminedcontributions(NDCs).Theambitionstoimplementsuchpoliciesvarywidelyacrosscountries

(Albalateetal.2023)

.

Amongfactorsthatinfluencecross-countryvariationsinclimatechangeactions,the“climatechangeagegap”-thenotionthatyoungerpeoplecaremoreaboutclimatechangethanolderpeople-causesconcernsabouttheimplementationoftheclimatechangeagenda.

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Youngclimateactivistscapturingthemediaandpublicattentionreinforcetheperceptionofawideningclimatechangegenerationalgap.

Theagestructureofpopulationsplaysasignificantroleinclimatepolicies.Populationagingresultsinagrowingshareofolderpeoplewhoestablishthemselvesasapowerfulpoliticalforceindecisionsabouttheprovisionofpublicgoods.Theinfluenceofoldergenerationsonpublicpolicy,includingclimatechange,isreinforcedbytheirgreaterparticipationintheelectoralprocesscomparedwithyoungergenerations

(Goerres2007)

.

Differencesinattitudestowardclimatechangeamonggenerationsareoftenattributedtothefactthatyoungerpeoplewilllivelongerunderdeterioratingclimateconditionsand,thus,bemoreaffectedbyitsconsequences.Inversely,theshortertimehorizonsoftheagingpopulationandthefactthatthemainclimatechangecostsaccrueinthefuturesuggestthatolderpeopleshouldbelesssupportiveofclimatechangepolicies.Infact,theempiricalevidenceofthepresenceandthesizeoftheclimatechangeagegapismixedandcontext-dependent(e.g.,

Grayetal.2019)

.

Inthispaper,wedevelopatheoreticalmodelthatexplainswhyandhowpeopleofdifferentagesperceivetheincreasingthreatofglobalwarming.Themodelguidesourempiricalanalysis,whichreliesondatafrom38countriesofEurope,CentralAsia,theMiddleEast,andNorthAfricacollectedin2022-23,duringthefourthroundoftheLifeinTransitionSurvey(LITS).

2Factorsaffectingclimatechangeactioninclude:politicaltrustandbeliefs

(Fairbrotheretal.2019)

;publicoppositionandpoliticalpolarization

(Lachapelleetal.,2012,

Hornseyetal.2016)

;gender,race,education,andincomedistribution

(Ballewetal.2020)

;andsocialnormsandsocialcapital

(Bergquistetal.2019)

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Wefindnoevidenceofan“agegap”inperceptionsofclimatechange.Olderrespondentsseemtobeas(orevenmore)concernedaboutclimatechangeasyoungerrespondents.However,wedofindthatolderindividualsaremorelikelytoobjecttotaxincreasestofinanceclimateadaptationandmitigationpolicies,whichislikelytoreflectthegeneraldeclineinwillingnesstopaytaxeswithageratherthanaspecificlackofwillingnesstofinanceclimatechangepolicies.

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Pastexposuretonaturaldisasters,aperson’sphysicalandpsychologicalhealth,thedegreeofriskaversion,sourcesofinformation,trustininstitutions,andwhetherarespondentwasplanningtomoveawayalsoaffectperceptionsandwillingnesstopayforclimatechange,butnoneoftheseconfoundingfactorsreversetheclimatechange-agegradientestimatedbythemostparsimoniousmodels.Thepositiveagegradientisalsorobusttoarangeofspecifications,definitionsofthedependentvariable,andcorrectionsofpotentialomittedvariablebiases.

Thispapercontributestotheliteratureonthedeterminantsofindividualperceptionsandengagementsinclimatechangeactionsinseveralways.First,itdevelopsatheoreticalmodelthatshowsthattherelationshipbetweenageandconcernsaboutclimatechangeandthewillingnesstopayforclimatechangeactionsisambiguousanddependsonvariousfactors.Second,thepaperdistinguishesbetweenclimate-relatedbeliefsandactionstowardclimatechangemitigation,animportantdistinction,asonecanbelievethatclimatechangeisrealandmanmadebutstillnotbewillingtobearanadditionaltaxburdentomitigateitsimpacts.Third,theLiTSdataallowustoaccountforthewiderangeofdeterminantsofclimatebeliefsthatearlierstudieshaveidentifiedasvaryingacrossdifferentagegroups,includingideology,attitudestowardriskandfairness,trustingovernment,primarysourcesofinformation,andhealthconditionswhichcanexacerbateclimatemorbidity.

Thepaperisorganizedasfollows.Section2reviewsrelevantliteratureongenerationaldifferencesinbeliefsaboutclimatechange.Section3discussesthestudy’stheoreticalframeworkandempiricalmethodology.Section4describesthedata.Section5presentsthemainresultsoftheempiricalanalysis.Section6showstheresultofrobustnesstests.Section7summarizesthepaper’smainfindings.

3InApril2024,theEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsissuedarulinginfavorofagroupof2,400Swisswomenoverage64whoarguedthatbecauseolderwomenaremorelikelytodieinheatwaves,SwitzerlandmusttakegreateractiontopreventtheplanetheatingbeyondtheParisagreementtargetof1.5°Canddemandcompensationforthelostconsumptionfromthegovernment,ratherthanpayingtaxestofinanceclimatechangemitigationpolicies

(Daly2024)

.

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2.Literaturereview

Theliteraturefindsthatclimatechangebeliefsareshapedbyawidearrayofsocio-structuralandpsychologicalfactors,includingage,gender,levelofeducation,socioeconomicstatus,politicalorientation,andvaluesystems

(Milfontetal.,2015;

Echavarren,2017;

Poortingaetal.,2019)

.Thisstudyfocusesonhowbeliefsaboutclimatechangeandwillingnesstotakeclimatechangeactionvarybyage.Manydeterminantsofclimatechangebeliefsmaynotbeuniformlydistributedacrossagegroupsandmaythusmediatetheobservedgradientbetweenageandclimatechangebeliefs.

Theeffectofageonperceptionsofclimatechangehasbeendocumentedacrossmanycountries.

Poortingaetal.(2019)

showthatageisanimportantpredictorofclimatechangebeliefsandconcernsin22EuropeancountriesandIsrael.TheyfindthatthesizeoftheeffectisgenerallysmallerinCentralandEasternEuropeancountriesthanelsewhereintheirsampleandlargerinNorthernEuropeanthaninWesternEuropeancountries.IntheEU,youngerpeoplearemorelikelythanoldpeopletoperceiveclimatechangeasaseriousproblemandplacetheresponsibilityofaddressingtheclimatechangeissuesonbusiness/industrialsectorsandenvironmentalgroups

(Skeiryt?etal.,2022)

.

Milfontetal.(2021)

reportasizeableandpersistentnegativegenerationalgapinthebeliefthatclimatechangeisrealandcausedbyhumans.Theyarguethatthegapoccursbecauseoldercohorts

startedfromalowerbelieflevelbutshowthatpeopleofallagesincreasedtheirbeliefsatasimilarrateovera10-yearperiod.

Albalateetal.(2023)

findanegativeassociationbetweentheshareofolderpeopleinapopulationandboththepolicyambitionsofclimateagreementsandtheintensityofregulatoryinitiativestofightclimatechange,witha1percentincreaseintheshareoftheelderlypopulationassociatedwitha2percentincreaseinthepredictedNDCpercapitaemissionsby2030.

Poortingaetal.(2023)

showthatlevelsofclimate-relatedbeliefs,riskperceptions,andemotionsamongtheyoungergenerationsarehigherthanthoseofoldergenerationsintheUK,withawiderandmoreconsistentgapforclimate-relatedemotionsthanclimate-relatedbeliefs.

Milfontetal.

(2015)

findbothclimatechangeskepticismandanthropogenicclimateskepticismtobemoreprevalentamongolderadultsthanyoungeradultsinNewZealand.

Otherstudiesdonotfindthatolderpeoplearelesslikelythanyoungerpeopletobelieveinclimatechange.

Grayetal.(2019)

reportonlytrivialdifferencesinconcernsaboutclimatechangebetween

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youngerandolderrespondentsintheUnitedStates.Theirfindingssuggestthatageisnotastrongpredictorofenvironmentalconcernorclimatechangeattitudes.Instead,otherfactors,suchas

politicalideologyandeducation,playmoresignificantrolesinshapingtheseattitudes.

Tranterand

Booth(2015)

findthatagepoorlypredictsclimatechangeskepticismin14advancedindustrialnationsin2010-2011.UsingtheWorldValuesSurvey(2010–14),whichcovers51countries,

Echevarria

(2017)findsthatageispositivelyassociatedwithenvironmentalconcerns.

Better-educatedindividualsareusuallymoreconcernedwithclimatechangethanpeoplewithless

education

(Poortingaetal.2011,

Milfontetal.2015,

Echevarren2017,

Poortingaetal.2019)

.Thelevelofeducationhasincreasedconsiderablyoverthepastcentury.Inbothadvancedanddevelopingcountries,youngercohortstendtobemoreeducatedthanoldercohorts,whichmaymediatetherelationshipbetweenageandclimatechangebeliefs.

Politicalconservatismisassociatedwithclimatechangeskepticism

(McCrightandDunlap2011,

Whitmarsh2011,

Milfont2015)

,butconservativebeliefstendtobenegativelyassociatedwitheducationalattainment

(PewResearchCenter,2016)

.

Poortingaetal.(2019)

showthatindividualsontherightsideofthepoliticalspectrumhavelowerlevelsofeducation,aremorelikelyto

prioritizeself-enhancementoverself-transcendence,andaremorelikelytobeskepticalofclimatechangeoritsanthropocentriclinksthanothers.

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Conservatismismoreprevalentamongolderindividuals

(Cornelisetal.2009;

Whitmarsh2011)

.

Inameta-analysisofclimatechangebeliefsacross25pollsand171academicstudiesspanning56countries,

Hornseyetal.(2016)

findideology,worldviews,andpoliticalorientationtobeamongthestrongestpredictorsofclimatebeliefs.Free-marketideologyisoneofthestrongestpredictorsofclimatechangeskepticism.InEuropeandCentralAsia,supportforthemarketeconomytendstobegreateramongyoungeradults,whichmayberelated,inpart,totheresistancetochangeofolderindividuals,whospentmuchoftheirlivesunderasocialistsystem

(EBRD2007)

.

Mediaisanessentialsourceofinformationaboutclimatechange,andmoreknowledgecaninfluenceconcernaboutclimatechange(Lokshinetal.2024).

Malkaetal.(2009)

reportthatintheUS,increasedknowledgeisassociatedwithgreaterconcernamongadultswhoidentifyas

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Schwartz(1992)

definesself-enhancementascharacterizedbyanemphasisonthepursuitofone’sowninterestsanddominanceoverothers;self-transcendenceemphasizesconcernforthewelfareandinterestsofothers.

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DemocratsorIndependentsbutnotamongRepublicans.

UdalovandWelfens(2021)

demonstratethatInternetuseispositivelyassociatedwithseveraldimensionsofenvironmentalconcern,

includingknowledgeandpro-environmentalbehaviors,inhigh-incomeandlow-incomecountries.

Diehletal.(2021)

findthatrelianceonsocialmediaisassociatedwithadecreasedclimateskepticism,basedonsurveydatafrom20countries.Atthesametime,themediacanalsobeasourceofclimatechangedisinformation

(Ejazetal.,2023)

.Thesepatternsarecrucialforunderstandingtherelationshipbetweenageandclimateactionbecauseyoungercohortstendtousedigitalcommunicationtoolsmorethanolderadultsdo

(SeifertandCotten2021)

.

3.Theoreticalframework

Westartfromtheassumptionthattheage-relatedvariationinsupportforclimatepoliciesisdeterminedbythelengthofexposuretoclimatechange,theintensityofclimatechangeimpactsonwellbeing,andtheeffectivenessofmitigationandadaptationmeasures.Theexpectedexposureoftheelderlytoclimatechangeisshorterthanthatofyoungerpeople,buttherisksfromtheeffectsofclimatechangeincreasewithageatanygiventime.

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Olderdemographicgroupsareathigherriskofbeingaffectedbynaturaldisasterslikedroughts,floods,andhurricanes

(Harper2019)

.Comorbiditiesandfrailtyincreasetheadverseeffectsofairpollutionandexposuretohightemperaturesbyolderpeople

(Gambleetal.2016)

.

Asimpletheoreticalframeworkillustrateshowtheinterplaybetweenthelengthofexposuretoclimatechangeimpactsandtheintensityofsuchimpactsaffectsanindividual’sattitudestowardclimatechange.

ConsideranindividualwholivesforTperiods.Ineveryperiodt,shederivesutilityU(ct)fromconsumingctandfacesthecostofclimatechangeD(pt)causedbypollutionstockpt.FunctionUisincreasingandstrictlyconcaveinconsumption,thatis,U′>0,U′′<0,andfunctionDisincreasingandstrictlyconvexinpollutionstock,thatis,D′>0,D′′>0.TheassumptionthatDisconveximpliesthathigherpollutionstockcausesgreatermarginaldamagetoanindividual’swellbeing.Theoveralllifetimewelfareoftheindividualis

5Climatechangeisalsooneoftheleadingthreatstohealthandwellbeingofchildrenunderfive

(Zhangetal.2007)

.

7

(1)

whereristheindividual’sdiscountrateandktistheperceivedintensityofclimatechangeeffectonanindividual’swellbeing.

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Thesizeofktdependsonmanyconsiderationsandislikelytovarywithage.Intheanalysis,weassumethatinearlylife,theintensityoftheeffectofpollutionontheindividual’swellbeingisk>0,andthatinthelastyearoflifeisθk,whereθ>1toreflectthattherisksfromandawarenessoftheimpactofclimatechangeincreasewithage.

Thepollutionstockgrowsatanexogenousratey.Ineachperiod,anindividualcantakecostlyclimatechangeactionattoslowtheaccumulationofthepollutionstockinthenextperiod.Thepollutionstockthenevolvesaccordingto:

Δpt+1≡pt+1?pt=ypt?ηat,(2)

whereηistheperceivedeffectivenessofclimatechangeactionat.Thesizeofηdependsonvariousfactors,suchastrustinthegovernmentandbeliefsinitsabilitytodeployresourcestowardeffectivemitigationoradaptationmeasures.Theinitialstockofpollutionp0isexogenouslygiven.AslongasΔpt+1>0,thepollutionstockgrows,sothenegativewelfareconsequencesofclimatechangeintensifyovertime.

Theindividualreceivesincomeytineachperiodwhichshetakesasgiven.Shecanborroworsaveatanexogenouslygivenratersubjecttotheconstraintthatanyoutstandingdebtmustberepaidattheendofherlife.Anindividual’soptimalchoicesofconsumptionandclimatechangeactionthusdependonthelifetimebudgetconstraint:

Withinthisframework,wecancomparetheoptimalconsumptionandclimatechangeactionsthatolderandyoungerindividualschoose.

Intheappendix,weconsidertheutilityoptimizationproblemsofanoldandayoungindividual.Theoldindividualhastwoperiodstolive;theyoungindividualhasthreeperiodstolive.Both

6Following

Long(1992),

fortractability,weassumethattheindividual’swelfareisadditivelyseparableinctandpt.

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individualsformlifetimeplansforconsumption.Inperiod0,theyalsochoseclimatechangeaction,whichisthenapplicableforthedurationoftheirlife.Theindividual’soptimalclimatechangeactionshouldbeinterpretedasmakingthedesiredregularcontributions,suchastaxes,tocombatclimatechange.

Weshowthattheoptimalclimatechangeactionofanolderindividualcanexceedthatofayoungerindividualifthefollowingconditionsaremet.First,theimpactofclimatechangeonwellbeingintensifiessignificantlywithage(i.e.,θissufficientlyhigh).Second,individualsdiscountthefuturesufficientlystrongly–thatis,rissufficientlyhigh-sothatyoungpeoplearenottooconcernedaboutthehigherintensityofclimatechangeimpactsintheiroldage.Third,thepollutionstockgrowssufficientlyslowly-thatis,yissufficientlysmall-sothatinthefuture,youngindividualsdonotexpecttoliveinasignificantlyworseenvironmentthantheycurrentlydo.

Linkingthetheoreticalandempiricalmodels

Thetheoreticalmodelidentifiesthreeparametersgoverningtheimpactofageonwillingnesstopayforclimatechangepolicies.Thesearetheperceivedeffectivenessofgovernmentinmitigatingtheimpactofclimatechangeη,theperceivedintensityofclimatechangeeffectkt,andtheindividual’sdiscountrater.Becausetheseparametersarenotdirectlyobservable,weuseproxyvariablestoidentifytheirimpactsonrespondents’attitudestoclimatechangeandtheirwillingnesstopayhighertaxestosupportclimatechangeactions.

Inthetheoreticalmodel,theeffectofηonconcernsaboutclimatechangeandwillingnesstofinanceclimatechangepoliciesisambiguous,astheanalysisintheappendixshows.Asηincreases,theclimatechangeactionbecomesmoreeffective,promptingtheindividualtosubstituteawayfromconsumptiontoclimatechangeaction.Atthesametime,higherηmeansthattheindividualcanachievehigherutilitywiththesameincome,relaxingthebudgetconstraint.Thisincomeeffectpushespeopletoconsumemoreandspendlessonclimatechangeaction.Assubstitutionandincomeeffectsworkinoppositedirections,theoveralleffectofηisambiguous.

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Inreality,thesizeofηmaydifferdependingonthespecificnatureoftheclimatechangemeasureinquestion.Furthermore,itwillalsodependontheindividuals’trustinthegovernmentandbeliefsinitsabilitytodeploytheseresourcestowardeffectivemitigationoradaptationmeasures

(OECD

7Similarintuitionexplainsthebackward-bendinglaborsupplycurve(e.g.,

Dickinson1999)

.

9

2022)

.Weusequestionsabouttrustingovernmentandbeliefsinfairnessasproxiesforthisparameter.

Severalfactorsmightaffecttheperceivedintensityofclimatechangeeffect(kt),includingage,gender,levelofeducation,andfamilycomposition.Thepastexposuretoadverseclimatechangeshockscouldalsoinfluencekt.Olderindividualsmayperceivehigherrisksoffutureclimatechangeimpactsdespiteshorterfutureexposure,astheyhavelivedlongerand,therefore,haveahigherprobabilityofhavingbeenexposedtoadverseclimateshocksinthepast.Morenuancedrelationscouldworkthroughdifferencesinthecapacitytoadapttoclimatechange.Ontheonehand,youngerpeoplearemoremobile,cantoleratetemperaturefluctuations,andcanmoreeasilyescapefromdisaster-affectedareas.Ontheotherhand,aswealthandsavingstendtopeakaroundretirementage

(Modigliani1976)

,olderpeopleareabletoinsureagainsttheimpactsofclimatechangeanddealwiththefinancialshocksofnaturaldisasters.

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Weusehealthself-assessmentandinformationaboutpastexposuretoclimaticshockstoproxytheeffectofthisparameter.

Inthetheoreticalmodel,strongdiscountingofthefuture(higherr)increasestheasymmetrybetweenoldandyoungindividualsandmayleadtohigheroptimalinvestmentinclimate?changeactionforoldindividuals.Olderindividualsexperiencetheintensificationoftheimpactsofclimatechangesoonerandsodonotdiscountthemasmuchasyoungindividualsdo.Forasufficientlyhighr,youngpeoplearenottooconcernedaboutthehigherintensityofclimatechangeimpactsintheiroldage.Weapproximatethefuturediscussionraterwithresponsestoaquestionthatasksrespondentstoselectbetweenlessmoneynowandmoremoneyinamonth.

Willingnesstosupportclimatechangeactionscanbeconstrainedbyeitheralackofawarenessofclimatechangeimpacts,whichmayrecedewithage,orideologicalbeliefsthatmaybecorrelatedwithage.Politicalconservatism,whichhasbeenassociatedwithclimatechangeskepticism,ismoreprevalentamongoldercohorts.Butolderadultsmayhavegreaterconcernsaboutfuturegenerationsandexpressstrongerpro-socialgenerationalorientationcomparedtoyoungeradults

(Maxfieldetal.2014).

8Intheproposedtheoreticalframework,individualscanfreelyborrowagainsttheirfutureincome;inreality,uncollateralizedborrowingagainstfutureincomeislimited,sosavingsmatterfordeterminingcapacitytodealwithclimatechangeshocks.

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Thetheoreticalframeworkmotivatesourestimationstrategy.Ourempiricalmodelestimatestherelationshipbetweenresponsestoclimatechangequestionsccicandageoftherespondentcontrollingforrespondent’scharacteristics:

ccic=βxic+YGic+θc+εic,(4)

where,xicisasetofindividualcharacteristicssuchastherespondent’sage,gender,highestlevelofeducation,maritalstatus,religiousaffiliation,indicatorsofmentalhealth,riskaversion,trustingovernment,mainsourcesofinformation,householdcomposition,andaproxyforhouseholdincome.Gicisavectorofregionalcharacteristicssuchastypeoflocation(urbanorrural).θcistime-invariantcountrycfixedeffect,andεicisaninnovationterm.

4.Thedata

Weusethelatest2023roundoftheLifeinTransitionSurvey(LiTS),implementedbytheEuropeanBankofReconstructionandDevelopment(EBRD)andtheWorldBank

(EBRD2023)

.ItcoversthetransitioneconomiesofEuropeandCentralAsiaandseveralcomparatorcountriesinWesternEurope,theMiddleEast,andNorthAfrica,includingatotalof38countries.Thesurveyincludedanationallyrepresentativesampleofaround1,000householdspercountry.

Theanalysisfocusesonclimatebeliefsandclimateactions.Beliefsaboutclimatechangearecapturedbythefollowingquestions:“Howconvincedareyoupersonallythatclimatechangeisreal?”and“Howconvincedareyoupersonallythatclimatechangeismanmade?”Responsesarerecordedona5-stepLikertscalerangingfrom“entirelyunconvinced”to“entirelyconvinced.”

Wedistinguishbetweenimpactsonone’sselfandimpactsaffectingthenextgeneration.Theformerisbasedonresponsestotheyes/noquestion“Doyouthinkclimatechangeseriouslyaffectsorwillseriouslyaffectyouduringyourlifetime?”,whilethelatterisbasedonresponsestothequestion“Doyouthinkclimatechangeseriouslyaffectsorwillseriouslyaffectthechildrenoftodayduringtheirlifetime?”.Weassesspastimpactsofclimatechangeusingthequestion,“Haveyoupersonallyexperienceddisruptionordamageduetoflooding,drought,orothernaturaldisasters?(Yes/No).”

Wecaptureclimateactionthroughquestionsconcerningsupportforgovernmentandpersonalactionintheclimatespace.Supportforgovernmentactionisbasedonresponsestothequestion

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“Herearetwostatementspeop