歐債危機(jī)的原因(全英)_第1頁(yè)
歐債危機(jī)的原因(全英)_第2頁(yè)
歐債危機(jī)的原因(全英)_第3頁(yè)
歐債危機(jī)的原因(全英)_第4頁(yè)
歐債危機(jī)的原因(全英)_第5頁(yè)
已閱讀5頁(yè),還剩12頁(yè)未讀 繼續(xù)免費(fèi)閱讀

下載本文檔

版權(quán)說明:本文檔由用戶提供并上傳,收益歸屬內(nèi)容提供方,若內(nèi)容存在侵權(quán),請(qǐng)進(jìn)行舉報(bào)或認(rèn)領(lǐng)

文檔簡(jiǎn)介

1、這篇文章的重點(diǎn)是A(accountability)R(representation)C (control),我們學(xué)的這門課就是ARC這篇文章的目的要從ARC的角度去分析歐債危機(jī)的原因和影響。這文章寫了features(這就是原因)和影響,但是沒有占在ARC的角度去分析。這文章沒有對(duì)ARC定義這文章最大的問題是雖然寫了原因和影響,但是沒有結(jié)合ARC去分析原因和影響也就是說要把原因和影響跟ARC對(duì)應(yīng)起來哪些原因和影響屬于A,哪些屬于R,哪些屬于C(時(shí)間緊個(gè)別不能對(duì)應(yīng)別對(duì)應(yīng)也可以)對(duì)ARC的定義,和詳細(xì)介紹我課件里面有,最快的速度只能從課件入手了。每個(gè)ppt的后半部分老師都有分析一些觀點(diǎn),那些觀點(diǎn)是

2、都有對(duì)應(yīng)的一片article,這些資料,我都有發(fā)過去。Conclusion 可以寫一些對(duì)歐債危機(jī)的可能的解決方案,時(shí)間緊,不寫也沒關(guān)系重點(diǎn)是要把原因和影響跟ARC結(jié)合起來,先要對(duì)ARC定義一下3.2 ARC analysis 這個(gè)標(biāo)題是從ARC去分析但是內(nèi)容是從三張財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表(Balance sheet,Profit and loss account,Cashflow statement)去分析了,這財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表時(shí)屬于R的范圍。這是題目Discuss whether the concepts of accountability, representation and control can help

3、 explain the Euro crisis. Use course materials in your answer. 重點(diǎn):先定義ARC三個(gè)概念是什么,然后通過ARC三個(gè)概念去分析原因和影響。The total numbers of words excluding appendices: 2852Should Euro-system be Responsible for the Euro Crisis?contents1Introduction12Features of the Euro-system12.1.Inconsistent control resulted by “Sing

4、le currency, different fiscal policy”22.2.Intolerance of asymmetric shocks22.3.Slow reaction under the collective decision mechanism33The influence caused by the Euro-system33.1.Matthew Effect43.2.ACR analysis43.2.1Balance sheet: devalued assets, high liabilities43.2.2Profit and loss account: out-of

5、-balance63.2.3Cashflow statement: soaring financing cost64Conclusion71 IntroductionThe Greek fiscal crisis in the autumn of 2009 created unprecedented challenges to both the governance of the euro area and of Greece. In response of the subprime crisis in 2008, the Greek government helped the commerc

6、ial banks and financial institutions overcome the difficulties through contracting a loan to other countries. As a result, until October 2009, the successive government of Athens announced the deficit budget and government obligations were up to 12.7% and 113% of GDP respectively, while the upper bo

7、unds stipulated by European Central Bank (ECB) and European System of Central Banks (ESCB) are 3% and 60%. With the increasingly deterioration of the fiscal position of Greek, the global credit rating agencies junked down the grade of Greece, which raised its financing cost in turn and began the cre

8、dit crisis (New York Times, 2010a). In parallel, Greek huge market crash risked a worldwide conflagration, alongside created the “PIGS”, which was referred to the economic recession of Portuguesa, Italy, Greece and Spain. These four countries raised worldwide attention and were fallen down the grade

9、s, meanwhile triggering panics all over the world (Eichengreen, 2010). American subprime crisis may be the trigger of the Euro Crisis, but not the intrinsic fundamental cause. The purpose of this article is to find out the foundation stone of Euro Crisis from the terms of ACR. The fiscal data of sev

10、eral countries of euro area provide us a new perspective of their financial situation that the inevitability of this crisis, and maybe euro itself and its operation system is the main culprit. As Soros (2012) pointed out the Euro Crisis is stemmed from the euro, which is built above the flawed finan

11、cial system caused by American subprime crisis in 2008, we believe the construction of euro might be much responsible for the crisis. In order to develop this theme, this article begins with the introduction of euros features; shifts to an analysis of euros effect on the crisis from ACR concepts.2 F

12、eatures of the Euro-system11 euro area countries adoption of a single currency-the euro on 1999 means a new era of monetary policy called EMU (European Monetary Union) and the birth of Euro-system. The Euro-system consists in defining and implementing the euro area's monetary policy. Its basic t

13、asks include achieving price stability; holding foreign exchange operations under the Article 109 of the Maastricht Treaty; managing the official foreign reserves of participating EU countries; driving on the operation of payment systems; and conducting the policies of governmental responsible for t

14、he prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system (Otmar, 1999). Besides, the Euro-system has important functions to advisory about new EU and national legislation. However, expect for the advantages the Euro-system providing the participating countries, its

15、dark side would make them pay the price. From a ACR view, the euro area is out of condition to be the optimal currency area. The typical institutional feature of EMU is using the single currency but different financial policy, which means EMUs members use the euro as their currency in circulation wh

16、ile they are independent in constituting the fiscal policy. Many scholars have improved its witnesses during economic development.2.1. Inconsistent control resulted by “Single currency, different fiscal policy” Unlike sovereign states, countries in EMU could conduct the financial policy and executio

17、n by themselves even if they transfer the autonomy of monetary policy. This system results in a special macro-economy policy hierarchy that EMU play the dominant role overstepping the national sovereignty, leading to the biggest setback in the euro operation mechanism (Featherstone and Papadimitriou

18、, 2009). The inconsistence of conductors would get rise to conflictions of domestic economic policy and deviation of resources distribution, both makes it difficult to form unified strategic target for member states. However, there is distinction of goals between ECB and member states. Yet ECB is ai

19、med at maintaining inflation in a low level and achieving price stability, while member states focus on promoting domestic economic growth and national welfare (Featherstone and Papadimitriou, 2008). Since the currency is fixed, member states can only use a single fiscal policy to solve with differe

20、nt shocks, so that it is easier for financial indicators like deficit and government debt beyond the Maastricht Treaty. So its no doubt that the inconsistent control of currency and fiscal policy make a dilemma for member states.2.2. Intolerance of asymmetric shocksSingle currency is not a result of

21、 single level of economic development. On the other side, EMU is the very union consisted of countries with multiple growth patterns and developmental speed. The imbalance of member states economy deteriorates the weak ones development by using the same currency and exchange rate. As the EMU spread

22、eastwards in recent years, more central and east part of Europe under economic transition gradually join the EMU. Obviously, there is a huge prosperity gap between the prior developed countries and the later underdeveloped ones, which brings up the asymmetric shocks. Although the topic raised much d

23、iscussion and oppugn from many economists since the establishment of EMU, it is still not resolved, or even worse along with the time. For example, the dominant member such as Germany and France maintain a prosperous economic development, in the meantime, the South Europe and Portuguesa are sufferin

24、g from great uncertainty caused by debt crisis, not to mention Greek government nearly go bankrupt under this crisis. Since financial crisis has different effects on every member, and every member has different demands on currency policy, it is really a piece of work for ECB to account the benefits

25、of all members, making the asymmetric shocks an intolerant problem under the single euro system.2.3. Slow reaction under the collective decision mechanismEuropean Union (EU) is based on a serious of supranational institutions, such as the Council of Europe, the European Commission, the European Parl

26、iament, the European Court of Justice etc., whose structural establishment, distribution of seats, voting mechanism are adjusted and confirmed through sustained debates and arguments. As another supranational institution, the duties of ECB are maintaining euro stability, and setting down currency po

27、licy independently (Moravcsik, 1998). Whats more, as Euro area is inseparable with the EU, it happens to coordinate with the EU on major decision. This collective decision makes benefits in most time, but when suffering from sudden situation, slow reaction under this decision mechanism would pay a h

28、eavy price. Due to the collective decision mechanism, all members fight for their own interests, so that the huge cost of the decision-making prevents them from making up the efficient solution soon and miss the best response time. For example, in the beginning of the Euro crisis, the United Kingdom

29、 took steps in the first time, otherwise EMU spent much time debating whether and how to help Greece in danger, without making a quick response on deracinating crisis before it change to unprecedented disaster (Pisani-Ferry and Sapir, 2009; De Grauwe, 2010). All in all, when facing states of emergen

30、cy, EMU and EU hardly figure out an impactful solution under collective decision, besides, they work hard to rescue as the emergency growing worse. The economic fluctuation in this process brings uncertainty for all members in EMU (Enderlein and Verdun, 2009).3 The influence caused by the Euro-syste

31、m3.1. Matthew EffectThe Euro-system changes the way of setting up the exchange rate. Before the emergence of euro, all countries in euro area decide their own currency by themselves, so as the exchange rate and other economic indicators. After the euro was created, the euro area implements united cu

32、rrency and exchange rate policy, determined by the entire euro areas economic situation instead of their own condition. Unless the uniform of the euro area, the diversity of member states economic growth situation, industrial structure, productivity level and international balance of payments make i

33、t complex to achieve the optimal situation of all members. The difference causes the Matthew Effect, with respect to “the good to be better, the bad to be worse”. For the dominant member like Germany, the trade environment improved because of the uniform of euro. Deutsche Mark used to be under the p

34、ressure to appreciate due to Germanys expansion of foreign trade surplus. Fortunately, the uniform of euro made Deutsche Marks appreciation trend to stop and actually produce the relative effect of a devaluation, which strengthened Germanys export competitiveness outside the euro area, making its co

35、ntinued growth in exports and economic growth possible. On the other side, for the vulnerable countries like Greece, its own currency should have continued the trend of depreciation, but the euro produce the relative appreciation effect causing its export competitiveness naturally weakened, which al

36、so contributed to the Greek economic slowdown and the debt crisis. In general, the uniform of euro fixes down the existing exchange rate, stopping the prior trends about appreciation and devaluation. It might improve the strong members, at the same time harm the weaker members.3.2. ACR analysisIf th

37、e relevant countries in the Euro crisis are seen as enterprises, the influence of euro is represented in: a. asset-liability ratio is too high for the balance sheet; b. profit and loss sustained losses; c. the depletion of cash flow in the statement of cash flows.3.2.1 Balance sheet: devalued assets

38、, high liabilitiesAccording to the Maastricht Treaty, the base line of the budget deficit proportion of current GDP is 3%, and the public debt proportion of current GDP is 60%. Some EU countries, especially PIGS, began to exceed the emergent line of 3% as budget deficits proportion of GDP (see Figur

39、e 1) and 60% as public debts proportion of GDP (see Figure 2) since 2000. Among the seven member states, Greece has the highest public debt proportion of GDP and a fast rate of growth, with no doubt to overbreak the crisis firstly. In any event, Greeces debt may be close to 150 per cent of GDP by 20

40、13. To some in the markets, the Greek position even after its 2010 bail-out seemed untenable with a major risk of it having to default on its debts. To its critics, the euro area was seen as sustaining severe demand imbalances, exacerbating divergences between the other PIGSs growing deficits (Tsaka

41、lotos, 2010). In contrast, German banks lending to the PIGS created demand for its own exports (Rajan, 2010). And France also has the reasonable values, representing their economy develop healthily. Under the terrible shock of Euro Crisis, many countries were forced to live behind the debt. As a res

42、ult, the increase in liabilities and assets devaluation led to the continued deterioration of the balance sheet, so as to country's future economic development.Figure 1: Partial EU members budget deficit proportion of GDPGreeceIrelandItalyPortuguesaSpainFranceGermany2000-3.74.7-0.8-2.9-0.9-1.51.

43、12001-4.50.9-3.1-4.3-0.5-1.5-3.12002-4.8-0.4-3.1-2.9-0.2-3.1-3.82003-5.60.4-3.6-3.0-0.3-4.1-4.22004-7.51.4-3.5-3.4-0.1-3.6-3.82005-5.21.7-4.4-5.91.3-2.9-3.32006-5.72.9-3.4-4.12.4-2.3-1.62007-6.50.1-1.6-3.11.9-2.70.22008-9.8-7.3-2.7-3.6-4.5-3.3-0.12009-15.6-14.0-5.4-10.2-11.2-7.5-3.22010-10.3-31.2-4.

44、6-9.8-9.3-7.1-4.32011-9.1-13.1-3.9-4.2-8.5-5.2-1.0Source: European CommissionFigure 2: Partial EU members public debt proportion of GDPGreeceIrelandItalyPortuguesaSpainFranceGermany2000103.437.5108.548.559.457.360.22001103.735.256.959.12002101.731.9105.153.852.658.860.7200397.430.7103.9

45、55.948.862.964.4200498.629.4103.457.646.364.966.32005100.027.2105.462.843.166.468.62006106.124.7106.163.939.663.768.12007107.424.8103.168.336.264.265.22008113.044.2105.771.640.268.266.72009129.465.1116.083.153.979.274.42010145.092.5118.693.361.282.383.02011165.3108.2120.1107.868.585.881.2Source: Eur

46、opean Commission3.2.2 Profit and loss account: out-of-balanceThe reasons for fast increasing public debts of PIGS are the deteriorated situation of fiscal expenses and receipts during the period of American subprime crisis and Euro Crisis. The worse the out-of-balance condition, the higher budget de

47、ficit would be, for this reason the government must cover the deficit by debt. It takes a representation on the fiscal account, that receipts drop because of economic decline but expenses maintain as similar level as before, leading to a continued down-trend account. There are three internal causes.

48、 Firstly, the ratchet effect about social welfare in eastern countries make it a single upward way to grow, which means it can only increase the financial expenses on welfare (Featherstone, 2005; Papadimitriou, 2005; Katrougalos and Lazaridis, 2003; Featherstone and Tinios, 2006). Secondly, the meas

49、ures aimed to cope with individual consumption have a dark side on fiscal condition. Thirdly, the rescue issues due to the crisis generate to expense. Otherwise, the business unbalance also makes an effect. In summary, the countries usually have the high deficit in current account might raise budget

50、 deficit more easily, because the trade deficit of current account is the captain making up the budget deficit. Maastricht Treaty requires member states a balance account. But PIGS all have severe unbalance on profit and loss account, so that it is difficult for them to recover in a short time.3.2.3

51、 Cashflow statement: soaring financing costThe cashflow statement consists of three parts, which are operation activities, investment activities and financing activities. This article has analyzed the cashflow produced in governmental activities, which is referred to fiscal profits and losses. Since

52、 there is less investment transaction in developed countries, we might mainly discuss the financing cashflow. Firstly, PIGSs balance sheets were not kept on during their flourish time. And the government had to make debts constantly, which are accumulated from time to time and grow to a huge-sized d

53、ebt that they cannot return by their own. It is just like snowball effect, that the final result would be tremendous enough to destroy everything, even a country.Secondly, the cost of financing is growing higher. The fast growth trend of budget deficits raises their uncertainty about the debt consta

54、ncy. As the rating grade agencies depress the affected countries rating, these countries budget deficits increase contrarily. Furthermore, the increasing budget deficits haunt capital market, so that more investors dump the budget deficits, which actions enhance the deterioration of budget deficits.

55、 It is similar as Gamblers Effect, turns a bad thing even worse.Thirdly, the budget and current account for a long time have a high occupancy of capital, resulting in the situation that PIGS are always lack of money and have to borrow from foreign investors. IMF reported that in 2011, the percentage

56、 foreign holdings were up to 65%. Since the outbreak of Euro crisis, the additional requirements from foreign investors are getting more and more, such as the economic policy adjustment, limits on fiscal expenses and deficits, etc., pushing the financing environment into a darker side (Olivares-Cami

57、nal, 2009; Buckley, 2006, 2010; Porzecanzki, 2005). Finally, there are no ultimate lenders and core leader in euro area, so it is impossible to implement the “soft law” in any circumstance (Tilford and Whyte, 2010). This external restrain prevents the lighter developed members from issuance of currency when they are suffered in a financial crisis, so they have no way to improve the fiscal revenue but apply the deflation policy or contract foreign loans.4 ConclusionThis article suggests the Euro-system is the fundamental reason of Euro crisis fro

溫馨提示

  • 1. 本站所有資源如無特殊說明,都需要本地電腦安裝OFFICE2007和PDF閱讀器。圖紙軟件為CAD,CAXA,PROE,UG,SolidWorks等.壓縮文件請(qǐng)下載最新的WinRAR軟件解壓。
  • 2. 本站的文檔不包含任何第三方提供的附件圖紙等,如果需要附件,請(qǐng)聯(lián)系上傳者。文件的所有權(quán)益歸上傳用戶所有。
  • 3. 本站RAR壓縮包中若帶圖紙,網(wǎng)頁(yè)內(nèi)容里面會(huì)有圖紙預(yù)覽,若沒有圖紙預(yù)覽就沒有圖紙。
  • 4. 未經(jīng)權(quán)益所有人同意不得將文件中的內(nèi)容挪作商業(yè)或盈利用途。
  • 5. 人人文庫(kù)網(wǎng)僅提供信息存儲(chǔ)空間,僅對(duì)用戶上傳內(nèi)容的表現(xiàn)方式做保護(hù)處理,對(duì)用戶上傳分享的文檔內(nèi)容本身不做任何修改或編輯,并不能對(duì)任何下載內(nèi)容負(fù)責(zé)。
  • 6. 下載文件中如有侵權(quán)或不適當(dāng)內(nèi)容,請(qǐng)與我們聯(lián)系,我們立即糾正。
  • 7. 本站不保證下載資源的準(zhǔn)確性、安全性和完整性, 同時(shí)也不承擔(dān)用戶因使用這些下載資源對(duì)自己和他人造成任何形式的傷害或損失。

評(píng)論

0/150

提交評(píng)論