外文翻譯--港口集群治理-其他專業(yè)

1、Governance In Seaport Clusters Peter W. de Erlangen 1. IntroductionApart from well-known physical factors such as the location, maritime accessibility and hinterland infrastructure, the governance of seaports is an important determinant of their performance.An analysis of the governance of seaports

2、has mostly been limited to the role of the port authority. Notwithstanding the central role of port authorities in ports, we argue that an analysis of governance in seaports requires attention for the role of (private) firms. Institutional economic literature offers a useful framework for ana lysing

3、 advantages and disadvantages of alternative governance mechanisms and provides a basis for ana lysing the roles of port authorities. In this paper we deal with the issue of cluster governance in seaports and illustrate our approach with an analysis of the port of Rotterdam.First, we briefly discuss

4、 the theoretical foundations of the cluster governance concept. Second, we discuss the role of port authorities in the governance of seaports. Third, we present empirical results of a survey among 43 cluster experts in Rotterdam on the governance of Rotterdams port cluster. We feminality the paper w

5、ith conclusions.he Quality Of Cluster Governance We define cluster governance as the mix of and relations between various mechanisms of coordination used in a cluster. The quality of the governance differs between clusters. The quality depends on the level of coordination costs and the scope of coor

6、dination beyond price. Low coordination costs and much coordination beyond price improve the quality of governance.When the benefits of coordination are distributed unequally, when (the threat of) opportunistic behaviour prevents coordination or when benefits of coordination are uncertain, coordinat

7、ion beyond price does not arise spontaneously or instantaneously, even when benefits of coordination exceed costs. Therefore there is in general a shortage of coordination beyond price. More coordination beyond price improves the quality of the governance of clusters.Trust In clusters where the leve

8、l of trust is high, (average) transaction costs are relatively low, because of low costs to specify contracts and low monitoring costs. Furthermore, costs of coordination beyond price are lower and as a consequence, more coordination beyond price will arise. The level of trust in a cluster is influe

9、nced by the importance of reputation effects in a cluster. If reputation effects are strong, abusing trust has negative effects and therefore a culture of trust is sustained. IntermediariesThe presence of intermediaries lowers coordination costs and expands the scope of coordination beyond price, fo

10、r three related reasons. First, they provide a bridging tie (Weevily and Zachery, 1999) between two or more otherwise not connected exchange partners. Second, intermediaries reduce coordination costs because they connect cognitions. Intermediaries can bridge cognitive differences between firms that

11、operate in different market environments. This role of connecting cognitions is especially important in clusters given the fact that clusters are characterism by a cognitive division of Limbourg (Belus and Tardigrada, 2000). Leader firmsLeader firms are strategic Centre with superior coordination sk

12、ills and the ability to steer change (Lorenz and Baden fuller, 1995). The behaviour of leader firms influences the performance of the cluster as a whole, because leader firms have both the ability and incentive to invest in the competitiveness of a whole network of firms. We identify three investmen

13、ts of leader firms with positive effects (these can be termed leader firm externalities) on other firms in the cluster:· Internationalism;· innovation;· contributing to solving collective action problems (Olson, 1971)Thus, leader firms can enable or even enforce cooperation and for th

14、at reason add to the performance of clusters. Collective action in clustersThe problem of collective action (Olson, 1971) is relevant in clusters. Even when collective benefits of co-operation to achieve collective goals exceed (collective) costs, such co-operation does not (always) develop spontane

15、ously. Different CAPs (Collective Action Problems), such as education and training and innovation are relevant in clusters. For each CAP a governance regime arises. In this context, a regime can be defined as a relatively stable collaborative agreement that provides actors with the capacity to overc

16、ome collective action problems.3.Port authorities as cluster managersEven though a variety of actors play a role in the governance of a seaport cluster, the port authority is the most central actor. The term cluster manager can be used to describe the role of the port authority. We discuss the role

17、of a cluster manager in general, the institutional position of port authorities and sources of revenue and investment decisions of port authorities. The role of a cluster managerA perfect cluster manager would be an galvanization with the following four characteristics.1. A cluster manager has incen

18、tives to invest in the cluster, because its revenues are related to the performance of the cluster. The perfect cluster manager would receive a share of the value added generated in the cluster as revenue, for instance through a cluster tax.2. A cluster manager invests in activities with cluster ben

19、efits (instead of firm specific benefits). Furthermore, the cluster manager aims to invest when cluster benefits exceed costs.3. A cluster manager aims to distribute investment costs for investments to those firms that benefit. This involves co-finance arrangements with a specific group of beneficia

20、ry firms.4. A cluster manager operates self-sustaining: over time investments equal revenues.The port authority matches all four criteria: they have incentives and resources to invest in the cluster. The port dues and lease revenues are resources to invest in the port cluster. Furthermore, they gene

21、rally are self-sustaining and invest in the performance of the cluster as a whole. Port authorities invest in activities with general benefits, such as port expansion, safety and dredging. Given their institutional position, most port authorities are not profit drivenThe port authority owns and expl

22、oits the port area and benefits when the port cluster is an attractive location because they can lease more land and charge higher prices. Furthermore, port authorities collect port dues. Thus, the more ships call a port the higher the port dues. For these two reasons, port authorities have a clear

23、incentive to invest in the performance of the port cluster.Thus, port authorities can be regarded as cluster managers. Revenues of port authorities The port authority has various sources of revenue. The existence and relative importance of various charges differs between ports (Asar, 2001). In gener

24、al, port authorities generate revenue from three sources:· charges to shipowners/ ship operators;· charges to tenants in the port, including terminal operators;· charges to cargo-owners.Charges for shipowners/ship operators are termed port dues and in most cases related to the size of

25、 vessels. These port dues are justified by investments in dredging, safety systems, and investments in port basins. Charges for tenants are lease charges to firms such as terminal operators and warehousing and production firms. Charges for cargo owners are termed wharfage and are mostly related to c

26、argo volume or to the value of goods. Some port authorities do not have wharfage charges, because cargo owners indirectly pay both other charges as well. In such cases, a part of both other charges can be conceived as pseudo-wharfage. This implies that the port charges do not have to be fully justif

27、ied on the basis of investments with benefits for either tenants or shipowners. Investments for the benefit of cargo owners, such as investments in hinterland infrastructure, hinterland access or warehousing facilities, can be justified because the cargo owners as users of the port pay the port char

28、ges in the end. Therefore, investments with benefits for these cargo owners are justified, even if port charges are paid only by tenants and shipping firms. Investment decisions of port authoritiesThe port charges have to be justified by investments of the port authority. Investment appraisal on the

29、 basis of which criteria do port authorities decide to invest- is therefore a central issue for port authorities. We claim that the following simple rule is a guideline for investment appraisal of port cluster managers: benefits for the cluster of an investment should exceed costs for the cluster. C

30、luster benefits are the sum of all benefits of firms in the cluster, cluster costs are the costs of an investment for firms in the cluster. In most cases costs are incurred because port charges are required for cluster investments. Since costs equal revenues, a high investment level requires high po

31、rt charges.4. Cluster governance in the port of RotterdamIn this section we present an empirical case study of the port of Rotterdam. We interviewed 43 port experts in the port of Rotterdam. First, we deal with the importance of cluster governance for the performance of the cluster. In the next four

32、 paragraphs, we discuss the empirical results for the four variables that influence the quality of the cluster governance. Sixth, we briefly discuss the role of the port authority in Rotterdam and end with conclusions. The importance of cluster governance in Rotterdams seaport clusterThese results s

33、how that cluster governance is less important than the structure of the cluster and the economic development in general, but more important than national and international policies. The experts were also asked to indicate the relative importance of the four variables of cluster governance, also by r

34、anking them. Trust in Rotterdams port clusterVirtually all cluster experts agree with the proposition that trust is important for the quality of the cluster governance, and as discussed above, argue that trust is the most important governance variable. The cluster experts evaluated the port of Rotte

35、rdam and its main competitors, Antwerp and Hamburg, with regard to the presence of trust. Leader firms in Rotterdams port clusterVirtually all cluster experts also agree that the presence of leader firms is an important determinant of the quality of cluster governance. The experts evaluate the three

36、 competing ports as follows:RotterdamAntwerpHamburgpresence of leader firmsbb significantly better than in worst portAntwerp is evaluated the most positive, Hamburg has the lowest score. In general the experts indicate that all three ports do score relatively good with regard to leader firms. Interm

37、ediaries in Rotterdams port clusterWith regard to intermediaries, a significant majority of the experts agree with the presumed positive effect of intermediaries on cluster governance, but nine out of the 43 disagree.4.5 Solutions for CAPs in Rotterdams port clusterFinally, we discuss the quality of

38、 solutions for collective action problems. Out of the five proposed CAPs in seaports, the cluster experts judged four relevant：IssueCollective action problemRelevantNot relevantTraining and education38a3Marketing and promotion37 a4Hinterland access37 a4Innovation29 a12Internationalism1328 aa signifi

39、cant majority4.6 The role of the port authority in RotterdamThe Rotterdam municipal port authority (RMPM) is a public landlord port. The galvanization formally is a part of the municipality Rotterdam but operates to a large extent autonomous. Currently, a modification of the institutional structure,

40、 to grant the port authority more autonomy, and to change the monitoring and control function from the city council to an independent board of directors is discussed. However, even when the suggested new structure is approved, the municipality will remain the major shareholder.5. ConclusionsIn this

41、paper we argue that an analysis of the governance in port clusters adds to our understanding port competition, port development and port performance. We have presented an analytic framework for ana lysing (port) cluster governance. The quality of the governance of a cluster depends on the level of t

42、ransaction costs in a cluster and the scope of coordination beyond price. Four variables influence both: the presence of leader firms, the presence of intermediaries, the level of trust and solutions to collective action problems. Cluster governance can be evaluated by ana lysing those four variable

43、s. In this approach, port authorities are no longer Centre stage; they do play an important role in the governance of the cluster, but their role is interrelated with the activities of private firms, associations and public-private organicists. The scope of activities of the port authority has thus

44、to be ana lysed in this broader framework.港口集群治理Peter W. de Erlangen 1、Introduction引言除了眾所周知的地理因素，如位置、海上交通方便程度和腹地的根底設(shè)施，港口治理是其功能發(fā)揮的決定性因素。作者分析了港口治理大多被限定為港口當(dāng)局的職能。盡管港口當(dāng)局在港口中起著核心作用, 但我們認(rèn)為分析港口治理對(duì)港口的作用同時(shí)需要關(guān)注私營(yíng)企業(yè)。制度經(jīng)濟(jì)文獻(xiàn)分析提供了一個(gè)有益的框架，分析優(yōu)點(diǎn)和缺點(diǎn)替代治理機(jī)制提供根底分析港口當(dāng)局的作用。在本文中,我們處理港口集群治理的問題，說明我們的方法并分析了鹿特丹港。首先,我們簡(jiǎn)要的討論了集群治理

45、概念的理論根底。其次,我們討論港口當(dāng)局在港口治理中的作用。第三,我們分析了來自于43位專家對(duì)鹿特丹市鹿特丹港口集群治理的一項(xiàng)調(diào)查的研究結(jié)果。最后完成文章的結(jié)論。2、集群治理的質(zhì)量我們定義集群治理為“混合之間的關(guān)系，以及各種機(jī)制的協(xié)調(diào)用于集聚。集群之間的治理質(zhì)量不同。質(zhì)量取決于協(xié)調(diào)本錢水平和“范圍的“協(xié)調(diào)無價(jià)。 低協(xié)調(diào)本錢和多協(xié)調(diào)本錢無價(jià)能提高治理質(zhì)量。當(dāng)協(xié)調(diào)的利益分配不均，當(dāng)威脅防止投機(jī)行為協(xié)調(diào)或協(xié)調(diào)利益不確定時(shí)，協(xié)調(diào)無價(jià)不會(huì)自發(fā)或立即產(chǎn)生，即使協(xié)調(diào)收益超過本錢。因此一般缺少協(xié)調(diào)無價(jià)。更多的無價(jià)協(xié)調(diào)能改善集群治理的質(zhì)量。在集群中信任水平高，平均)交易本錢那么相對(duì)較低, 因?yàn)榈捅惧X指定合同和監(jiān)督

46、本錢低。此外,協(xié)調(diào)本錢無價(jià)越低，更多的協(xié)調(diào)無價(jià)會(huì)因此出現(xiàn)。在一個(gè)集群中的信任水平受到聲譽(yù)效應(yīng)的影響。如果聲譽(yù)效應(yīng)強(qiáng), 濫用信任會(huì)產(chǎn)生負(fù)面影響，因此信任文化是持續(xù)的。中介機(jī)構(gòu)存在降低協(xié)調(diào)本錢和擴(kuò)大協(xié)調(diào)無價(jià)的范圍有三個(gè)相關(guān)的原因。首先, 他們提供了一個(gè)“橋梁紐帶 在兩個(gè)或多個(gè)之間否那么不能連接交換伙伴(Weevily and Zachery, 1999)。其次，中介機(jī)構(gòu)降低協(xié)調(diào)本錢，因?yàn)樗鼈儭斑B接認(rèn)知。 企業(yè)之間的橋梁中介機(jī)構(gòu)可以認(rèn)知不同市場(chǎng)環(huán)境中運(yùn)作的差異。而連接認(rèn)知有特別重要的作用在集群中考慮集群實(shí)際的特征是“認(rèn)知分工 (Belus and Tardigrada, 2000)。領(lǐng)導(dǎo)公司是“具有

47、卓越協(xié)調(diào)能力和駕馭能力，改變戰(zhàn)略中心 (Lorenz and Baden fuller, 1995)。領(lǐng)導(dǎo)公司的行為影響整個(gè)集群的功能，因?yàn)轭I(lǐng)導(dǎo)企業(yè)有能力和動(dòng)力投資于一個(gè)有競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力的整體公司網(wǎng)絡(luò)。我們確定了三個(gè)投資于領(lǐng)導(dǎo)公司的其他公司的積極作用這些可以被稱為“領(lǐng)導(dǎo)公司外部性在集群中:國(guó)際化、創(chuàng)新、有助于解決集體行動(dòng)問題(Olson, 1971)。因此, 領(lǐng)導(dǎo)公司能加強(qiáng)合作,甚至可以增加企業(yè)的業(yè)績(jī)。集體行動(dòng)的“問題在集群中是相關(guān)的 (Olson, 1971)。即使在合作的集體利益中實(shí)現(xiàn)集體目標(biāo)超過集體本錢，這種合作不總是自發(fā)開展的。不同的集體行動(dòng)問題如教育、培訓(xùn)和創(chuàng)新是相互聯(lián)系的在集群中。對(duì)每個(gè)集

48、體行動(dòng)問題會(huì)產(chǎn)生相應(yīng)的管理體制。在這種情形下, 一個(gè)管理體制可以被定義為一種“相對(duì)穩(wěn)定的合作協(xié)議處理克服集體行動(dòng)問題的能力。3、港口當(dāng)局作為集群管理者雖然有各種行為者參與集群治理，但港務(wù)局起著最核心的作用?？梢园选凹汗芾碚呙枋鰹楦劭诋?dāng)局的作用。我們討論集群管理者的一般作用，港務(wù)當(dāng)局所處的位置、收入來源和投資決策。一個(gè)“完美的集群管理者將是一個(gè)具有以下四個(gè)特點(diǎn)的組織：1、集群管理者鼓勵(lì)來投資在產(chǎn)業(yè)集群中，因?yàn)樗氖杖肱c集群績(jī)效有關(guān)。一個(gè)“完美的集群管理者將收到一份增值產(chǎn)生的收入在集群中，比方通過“集群稅。2、集群管理者進(jìn)行投資活動(dòng)獲得集群收益替代公司特殊收益。此外, 集群管理者的目標(biāo)是當(dāng)投資的“集群收益超過本錢。3、集群管理者的目的是把投資本錢分配給那些投資獲益的公司。這涉及到一起籌措資金安排于一組特定的受益人公司。4、集群管理者經(jīng)營(yíng)到達(dá)自給自足：經(jīng)過一段時(shí)間投資等于收入。港務(wù)局匹配所有四項(xiàng)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)：它們有動(dòng)機(jī)和資金投資于集群。在港口集群中港口費(fèi)和租賃向投資提供資金。此外,它們通常自給自足及投資于整個(gè)集群的績(jī)效。港口當(dāng)局投資于一般福利活動(dòng)，例如港口拓展、平安、疏浚?？紤]到制度的關(guān)系 ,大多數(shù)港口當(dāng)局沒有利潤(rùn)的驅(qū)動(dòng)。港務(wù)局擁有并開發(fā)港區(qū)而獲得收益，港口集群是一個(gè)具有吸引力的位置，