(戰(zhàn)略管理)連鎖店的定價(jià)策略文獻(xiàn)翻譯

1、原文：Chain-Store Pricing for Strategic AccommodationThe chain store has been one of the principal factors in the movement towards the simplification of distributive functions. As such, it has caused pronounced concern among manufactures, jobbers, and retailers. It has been the subject of litigation, o

2、f recrimination, and of endless discussion. The manufacturer has hesitated to make full use of the chain store system as an outlet, because of his desire not to offend the members of his regular distributive systems. The jobber has made open war upon the chain because it has frankly attempted to sup

3、plant him, and to independent retailer has often failed to recognize the decisive line of division between price merchandising and service merchandising.Every concern which ultimately markets its products to the consumer is vitally affected by the status of chain retailing; more particularly with th

4、e position which it will occupy in the future. The following pages contain a brief resume of the present chain store situation in the fields of retailing where it has become well established.Trends of developmentThe most rapid growth of the chain store has taken place in the grocery, drug, dry goods

5、, tobacco, and confectionery lines. It is essential to understand the reasons for this:1. The public demand in these lines is well defined; is not subject to great fluctuation in times of business depression; and in each case there is a “repeat market.”2. The articles handled fall mainly in the clas

6、s of necessities, or semi-necessities. That is, they are regarded as essential by a proportion of the market large enough to insure a steady demand.3. Because of the standard character of the stocks, and the broad demand, a high rate of turnover may be maintained, which allows the chain to make a sm

7、all but steady margin of profit at frequent intervals.4. Buying or purchasing is standardized and centralized at headquarters.5. Since articles are of small unit value, and not bulky or heavy, the chain store is able to operate on a cash and carry basis-a factor of great importance in chain store gr

8、owth.6. Merchandising is largely a matter of display and price advertising.7. Standardization of methods has made it possible to centralize management at headquartersand control member stores under managers who, while they may have a pecuniary interest in sales made by their stores, have nothing to

9、say about the conducting of them.Our analytic focus in this paper is the geographic scope of pricing. Specifically, is it better for a chain-store retailer to set prices according to local market conditions(reflecting differences in cost, demand and competition) or set common prices that apply acros

10、s all its stores, i.e. adopt a uniform pricing policy? Are likely firm decisions on this in line with consumer preferences?In contrast to the entry deterrence issue considered by Selten (1978), Milgrom and Roberts (1982) and Kreps and Wilson(1982), we look to see whether pricing policy, other than d

11、eterring entry, might instead be employed strategically to accommodate entry when it is inevitable.The geographic scope for pricing is a very real issue for multiple retailers. It is evident that in practice some chain-store groups adopt uniform pricing while others do not. In some sectors, all mult

12、iple retailers price identically across their stores, e.g. UK electrical goods retailers (MMC, 1997a,b). While in other sectors, local pricing is practised to the extent that product prices might vary considerably from one store to another, e.g. the FTC found that for office supply superstores avera

13、ge prices varied by as much 16% depending on the extent of local competition in the US. Moreover, this pricing policy distinction applies not just to different sectors but can apply within the same sector, e.g. amongst UK supermarkets where, of the leading fifteen groups, eight priced uniformly whil

14、e seven priced according to local conditions (Competition Commission, 2000).Yet, in these days of computer-based pricing systems, it can hardly be said that ticketing costs are high, or that local demand and cost conditions cannot be effectively gauged. Hence, choosing a uniform price must be seen a

15、s a conscious act. Of course,uniform pricing might not be practicable when retailing costs are substantially different from one area to another. Nevertheless, for many multiple retailers both local and uniform pricing might be feasible but a choice has to be made on which to adopt. This leads to two

16、 questions, first why it might ever be preferable for the incumbent to impose a constraint on its own behaviour, and second the circumstances under which the constraint is desirable. Our key insight on the first question is as follows: A firm will find itself more under competition in some markets t

17、han others. By practicing uniform pricing, it softens competition between itself and rival players. This entails setting a higher price in those markets subject to (more) competition, at the expense of lower prices in markets where it is not subject (or is less subject) to competition, compared with

18、 a practice of market-specific pricing. The higher price in turn makes the action one which rivals find attractive, so it does not require agreement. Thus if the markets under competition are important enough to the firm, its net gain is positive. Hence our paper psrime focus is on the parameters as

19、sociated with the nature and intensity of competition that might influence this choice.There is some commonality in this issue with related questions on third-degree price discrimination in oligopoly (e.g. Holmes, 1989). More specifically, the issues raised here tie in with why oligopolistic firms w

20、ould wish to limit or even entirely avoid price discrimination, e.g. Winter (1997) and Corts (1998), or adopt practices which provide the same outcome, notably contemporaneous MFC clauses, e.g. DeGraba (1987) and Besanko and Lyon (1993).There are obvious links between our paper and Corts (1998) whic

21、h also considers the question of uniform versus discriminatory pricing under duopoly (within a rather different framework). However, in Corts model, it turns out that it is usually not in a firm usnilateral interest to practise uniform pricing. Therefore, where uniform pricing is profitable, strateg

22、ic commitments not to price discriminate are normally involved and hence discussion focuses on the form these might take. By contrast, within our framework, and for a specified range of parameters, we find that it is in the firmintesroewstnnot to discriminate and that uniform pricing arises as an eq

23、uilibrium strategy. This is important, and provides a new insight, because it means that uniform pricing need not be accompanied by evidence of strategic commitment to that policy in order for it to be worthwhile and practised.1. IntroductionOur result that firms can commonly be better off under a u

24、niform pricing regime casts an interesting light on some other previous models. The result is not new - it was first encountered in Holmes (1989) “ weakmarket-strong market ” model of price discrimination in oligopoly. However, in their investigation of a model similar to Holmes ,Armstrong and Vicke

25、rs (2001) find that if a market is sufficiently competitive, profits always increase with discrimination. This leads them to conclude that “ Holmes result that profits may fall with discrimination reqreusi markets to be reasonably uncompetitive. ” (p. 597). Our model shows this is not completely tru

26、e. In our framework, which in effect has a weak and a strong market, profits may fall with discrimination whatever the degree of competition. That is, however uncompetitive the market, uniform pricing can be profitable. What is required for this is each individual monopoly market, in our context, to

27、 be sufficiently large.To consider how different competitive conditions affect the scope-of-pricing decision, the model developed here has an incumbent monopoly chain-store operating across afinite number of local markets, analogous to Selten -known c hasinw-setlolre paradox analysis. However, in co

28、ntrast to Selten s framework, these local markets areassumed to differ in respect of the scale of consumer demand and this in turn affects entry conditions. There are two market types. In each of the larger,“ affluententry barriers are insufficient to prevent entry by a new, independent rival. Yet,

29、in smaller, less affluent markets the chain-store is taken to have a protected monopoly position(arising from natural or institutional barriers). In this setting, we show that a chain-store would not necessarily prefer to use local pricing as a profit-enhancing price discrimination tool. Competitive

30、 conditions exist in the form of a region trading off the degree of substitutability between entrant and incumbent psroducts and the degree to which duopoly markets are larger than monopoly markets. Under these conditions, the chain-store would prefer to commit to a policy of uniform pricing since t

31、his allows for softer competition in contested local markets and hence raises itsaggregate profits.While the prospect of strategic accommodation through dampening price competition influences the preference between local or national pricing, a chain-store chsoice is not inevitably at variance with t

32、hat preferred by society. In particular, a store s willingness to commit to national pricing can in certain circumstances not only enhance its profits but also raise social welfare if not consumer surplus. Yet market conditions commonly exist under which welfare would be adversely affected by the ch

33、ain-store following its preferred choice.Although our model is undoubtedly specific, the results are considerably more general. Our general results are (1) that under a range of conditions including very competitive markets, uniform pricing is privately optimal both for incumbent and entrant without

34、 co-ordination and (2) that enforcing uniform pricing where firms would prefer local pricing by no means necessarily advances social welfare. The significance of the first is that existing papers have concentrated heavily on co-ordinated action on uniform pricing. By contrast, policy has often focus

35、ed on whether firms practice uniform pricing, viewing this with approval, something in conflict with our second point.The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discussesthe analytical framework whereby an incumbent chain-store retailer faces certain entry in a (fixed) number of i

36、ts local monopoly markets. As with the original Selten story, entry into such “ contested m” arkets is, in each case, by an independent, non-affiliated local retailer. Section 3 then examines and compares the outcomes where the chain-store uses local pricing against where it adopts a uniform (nation

37、al) pricing approach. Section 4 addressesconsumer welfare considerations. Section 5 concludes the paper.2. The FrameworkFollowing Selten and others, we consider the situation of a chain-store retailer holding a monopoly position in a finite number of independent, local markets. In each market there

38、is one potential entrant; should that firm enter, post-entry competition would be characterisedby the Bertrand-Nash outcome in a duopoly pricing game.Complete information applies and it is assumedthat the incumbent has no cost or demand advantage over the entrant, or vice versa. In this situation en

39、try is inevitable in each local market when entry costs are low (at least when there is some minimal differentiation between the firms allowing for positive returns for the entrant) and when there are no institutional impediments such as planning restrictions that prevent new stores being opened. Ho

40、wever, if entry costs are substantial or there are no available sites then the local market is blockaded and entry does not occur.Our key departure from the previous literature is that we allow entry not be viable in all local markets. That is for the N markets originally held by the chain-store we

41、assume that M (<N) are blockaded or otherwise provide insufficient demand for two firms, but that the remainder C (= N-M) can become “contested " by virtue ofbecoming local duopolies. The relevance of this assumption will become apparent from the analysis.We have a two-stage game, depicted i

42、n Figure 1. In the first stage, each entrant simultaneously decides whether or not to enter; we illustrate with only two markets and potential entrants. Then in the second stage, the incumbent decides pricing policy whether to practice local (L) or uniform (U) pricing. There is no commitment stage.

43、The equilibrium concept is subgame perfection. Hence, in determining its move, the entrant (e.g. E1) knows the payoffs facing the incumbent (I), as its aggregated profits (PI); knows that the incumbent will choose the path that is the more profitable. However, because an entrant does not know how ma

44、ny other entrants will enter for certain (given simultaneous entry moves), it will not necessarily know whether the incumbent will practise local or uniform pricing.Source: Paul W. Dobson and Michael Waterson, April 2003“Chain-Store Pricing for Strategic Accommodation” The university of warwick Depa

45、rtment of Economica in its series The Wateick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) with number 677,PP.1-4.譯文：連鎖店的定價(jià)策略市場(chǎng)環(huán)境的變動(dòng)對(duì)連鎖店的分布而言是主要因素之一。這樣， 很明顯的它也引起制造商、零售商、連鎖店的關(guān)注。因而已成為爭(zhēng)論的主體，或受到指責(zé),成為沒完沒了的討論主體。制造商會(huì)對(duì)充分利用連鎖店系統(tǒng)作為出口的政策有些猶豫， 因?yàn)樗倪@一欲望會(huì)違反成員間的定期的規(guī)律性分配。由于連鎖店想要取代零售店，因而他們之間的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)已經(jīng)開始，并且對(duì)獨(dú)立的零售商來講很難從價(jià)格商品銷售和

46、服務(wù)的銷售活動(dòng)中認(rèn)識(shí)到自己的不足之處。每個(gè)關(guān)心最終市場(chǎng)的產(chǎn)品給消費(fèi)者都會(huì)受到連鎖店?duì)顟B(tài)重大的影響；特別是未來將會(huì)占有的分布情況。本文以下的內(nèi)容包括一個(gè)簡(jiǎn)短的摘要以說明目前連鎖店在連鎖業(yè)領(lǐng)域的發(fā)展情況以及它將會(huì)有什么樣好的建設(shè)。發(fā)展趨勢(shì)連鎖店的快速增長(zhǎng)發(fā)生在雜貨店、藥物、干貨、煙草和糖果行。經(jīng)過了解至關(guān)重要的原因如下：1. 在這些行業(yè)中有很好的公共需求；不受經(jīng)濟(jì)不景氣的時(shí)候業(yè)務(wù)的抑制；每次有大波動(dòng)的情況下，會(huì)有一個(gè)“重復(fù)”的市場(chǎng)。2. 文章討論的主題主要是立足于必需品和半必需品這類產(chǎn)品。這就是說，它們被認(rèn)為是基本的市場(chǎng)中所占比例足夠大以確保穩(wěn)定的需求。3. 由于存貨的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)特征，為儲(chǔ)備和廣泛的需求

47、保持了很高的流動(dòng)比率，從而允許連鎖店是一個(gè)小規(guī)模但具有穩(wěn)定的盈利的單位。4. 購(gòu)買或購(gòu)買標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化, 集中在總部。5. 盡管本文是從小單位價(jià)值而不是大的方面來描述，但連鎖店能夠起到操縱市場(chǎng)現(xiàn)金，對(duì)連鎖店的成長(zhǎng)起到了重要的基礎(chǔ)作用。6. 購(gòu)貨很大程度上是一種展示和價(jià)格廣告。7. 標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化的方法有可能集中在總部的管理和控制下的商店經(jīng)理人手中，然而毫無疑問的他們或許會(huì)在商店銷售中會(huì)受到罰款。1. 介紹本章分析的重點(diǎn)是地域定價(jià)范圍。具體地說, 是零售商連鎖店如何更好地根據(jù)當(dāng)?shù)厥袌?chǎng)條件制定價(jià)格（ 反映不同的成本、需求和競(jìng)爭(zhēng)） 或在所有申請(qǐng)的店面里建立同樣的價(jià)格, 即采用一個(gè)統(tǒng)一的定價(jià)政策。公司做這個(gè)決定是否會(huì)

48、符合消費(fèi)者的喜好?和澤爾滕（1978） 、爾格羅姆和羅伯茨（ 1982 年） 和科瑞普和威爾遜 （1982） 提出的各種威懾問題相比，我們想看看在否定價(jià)格政策上的其他威懾條目 , 可能會(huì)在相反的時(shí)候使用, 以適應(yīng)戰(zhàn)略上不可避免的要求。對(duì)多數(shù)零售商而言地域范圍的價(jià)格是很實(shí)際的問題。實(shí)際上這是很明顯的,是某連鎖企業(yè)組隊(duì)采用統(tǒng)一的定價(jià), 但另外一些卻不會(huì)這么做。在某些領(lǐng)域, 所有的多個(gè)零售商的價(jià)格一致, 例如在英國(guó)零售商的商店，然而在其他的行業(yè), 當(dāng)?shù)氐幕径▋r(jià)從一家商店到另一家在產(chǎn)品價(jià)格上可能相差很大,公平貿(mào)易委員會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn), 對(duì)于辦公用品的超市平均價(jià)格的修改, 有多達(dá)16%取決于在美國(guó)本地競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的程度

49、各不相同。此外, 這種價(jià)格政策不僅適用于區(qū)別不同部門申請(qǐng)而且也適用于在相同的部門, 例如在英國(guó)超級(jí)市場(chǎng)的位置，十五個(gè)主導(dǎo)牌子的商品的八個(gè)價(jià)格統(tǒng)一而其他的七個(gè)的定價(jià)則根據(jù)當(dāng)?shù)貤l件（競(jìng)爭(zhēng)委員會(huì)2000年 ）。然而 , 基于計(jì)算機(jī)的定價(jià)系統(tǒng)的今天，可以幾乎說成是票務(wù)成本很高，或本地需求和成本條件不能有效地衡量。因此， 選擇一個(gè)統(tǒng)一的價(jià)格必須看作是一種有意識(shí)的行為。當(dāng)然 , 當(dāng)零售成本從一個(gè)地方到另一個(gè)地方還是完全不同的時(shí)候，統(tǒng)一的定價(jià)這一行為是不可行的。不過, 對(duì)于很多零售商來說自行定價(jià)和統(tǒng)一定價(jià)或許可以行得通, 不過要在其采用上做出的一種選擇。這會(huì)導(dǎo)致出現(xiàn)兩個(gè)問題,首先為什么它可能永遠(yuǎn)受現(xiàn)任征收而

50、抑制自己的行為, 其次在某些情況下約束是可取的。 我們對(duì)第一個(gè)問題的關(guān)鍵性認(rèn)知如下：一個(gè)公司將會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)自己在市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)中會(huì)比其他的公司有優(yōu)勢(shì)。通過實(shí)踐統(tǒng)一定價(jià), 會(huì)使其與競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手之間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)關(guān)系變得緩和。這就意味著在那些競(jìng)爭(zhēng)激烈的市場(chǎng)中更要樹立比較高的價(jià)格, 與那些特定市場(chǎng)的定價(jià)的做法相比，使較低的價(jià)格不受市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的影響。反過來看更高的價(jià)格會(huì)使其競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手更具有吸引力, 所以它不需要協(xié)議。因此判斷是否足夠重要的是該公司在市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)條件下, 其公司凈收益是正的。所以本文的主要重點(diǎn)是競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的性質(zhì)與競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的激烈性，以及可能會(huì)影響這種選擇的有關(guān)參數(shù)。在寡頭壟斷就這一問題上三度價(jià)格歧視會(huì)有一些共性（ 例如霍姆斯，19

51、89年 ） 。更具體地說，為什么寡頭公司在這里提出配合問題，想限制甚至完全避免價(jià)格上的歧視，例如溫特（1997） 和 柯爾 （ 1998 年） ， 為采取的做法提供了相同的結(jié)果，尤其是同期的 MFC條款，如迪格林顧爾拜（1987年）和 班思科和里昂 （1993 年 ） 。很明顯的，本文和霍爾茨（1998 年） 也認(rèn)為統(tǒng)一的問題與價(jià)格歧視在寡頭壟斷之間的存在聯(lián)系。然而， 在霍爾茨的模型中，原來它通常不是一個(gè)公司的單方面利益實(shí)行統(tǒng)一定價(jià)。因此，實(shí)行統(tǒng)一的定價(jià)是盈利的, 承諾不價(jià)格歧的戰(zhàn)略通常視為涉及這些可采取的形式。相比之下 , 在我們的框架中, 指定了參數(shù)的整定范圍 , 我們就會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)它是在公司的自身的利益下不歧視和統(tǒng)一定價(jià)而產(chǎn)生一個(gè)平衡的策略。提供了新的研究思路是重要的, 因?yàn)檫@個(gè)政策意味著統(tǒng)一定價(jià)不用伴隨戰(zhàn)略承諾的證據(jù), 以便它值得去實(shí)行。我們的結(jié)果顯示與先前的模型相比，一般企業(yè)在統(tǒng)一定價(jià)政策下可以做的更好。 這個(gè)結(jié)果并不是最新的，第一次是在福爾摩斯的（1989） “軟弱市場(chǎng)、 較強(qiáng)市場(chǎng)價(jià)格歧視”模式的寡頭壟斷的市場(chǎng)中被提及。然而 , 在他們的調(diào)查一個(gè)類似于福爾摩斯的模型中, 阿姆斯特朗和維（2001） 發(fā)現(xiàn) , 如果市場(chǎng)是充分競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的、價(jià)格歧視的利潤(rùn)始終是增加的。這導(dǎo)致他們總結(jié)說: “福爾摩斯的結(jié)果可能在盈利上需要市