中美貿(mào)易緊張持續(xù)亞洲貿(mào)易自由化正酣（宏觀）

1、Asian Regional and Bilateral Trade DealsRegional agreements (% of world GDP covered)Global GDP 2018 = USD85.8trn(32.1%)(3.5%)(12.9%)Cambodia Myanmar Thailand Indonesia LaosSingaporeVietnamBrunei DarussalamMalaysiaJapan AustraliaNew ZealandCanada Chile Mexico PeruKoreaChinaSource: HSBC; World Bank; A

2、sian Development Bank.IndiaBangladesh Sri Lanka(4.0%)Afghanistan Bhutan Maldives Nepal PakistanList of regional trade agreementsAPTA = Asia-Pacific Trade AgreementASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian NationsCPTPP = Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific PartnershipRCEP = Regiona

3、l Comprehensive Economic PartnershipSAFTA = South Asian Free Trade AgreementFigures in parentheses represent share of world GDP covered by membersRCEP negotiations are on-goingRatification pending:EU-VietnamRatification pending:EU-VietnamEU-SingaporeUnder negotiation:EU-IndonesiaSource: HSBC.Executi

4、ve SummaryA positive response to trade risk in the Asia-Pacific regionis in to by in on of in in HYPERLINK /R/10/nhhxRNBWZ7fj?docid=1123717 2 in in to in of in of it is A to be Trade-led economic transformation in AsiaThe story of trade-led economic transformation in Asia is dramatic. During a time

5、when global exports of goods and services grew from roughly US7trn to USD25trn (constant 2010 USD), the East Asia-Pacific region expanded its share of the pie from 20% to 29% (World Bank, WDI). The economic benefits have been tangible. Over the past 25 years, the share of the regions population livi

6、ng in extreme poverty2 has declined from 63% to 2.3%. In South Asia, where trade reform has been slower to take root, similar economic dynamism may now also be gaining traction. During 2014 to 2018, the growth rate of GDP in India exceeded that of China, though our forecasts for 2019 once again see

7、China in the lead (6.5% for China versus 6.0% for India).31 RCEP = Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, a proposed 16 nation pan-Asian free trade agreement.2 Extreme poverty is defined as USD1.90 a day, in 2011 PPP constant dollars3 See HSBC, HYPERLINK /R/10/nhhxRNBWZ7fj?docid=1123717 Global

8、 Economic Quarterly Q3 2019, 2 July 2019 and subsequent updates including HSBC, HYPERLINK /R/10/QPGnbjSWZ7fj?docid=1125775 India RBI watch, 31 July 2019.Across this period, South Asia more than tripled its share in global trade, albeit from a low base (from 0.7% to 2.6%) and reduced extreme poverty

9、from 47% to 16% (as of 2013). Further trade reforms now under consideration across Asia and the Pacific could expand the range of economic opportunity for businesses engaged in this region. This is particularly relevant in the emerging market economies that have substantial room to reap additional g

10、ains from reductions in persistent impediments to trade, including tariffs and non-tariff barriers (e.g., regulatory impediments and customs administration). Given the weight of the Asia-Pacific region in the global economy (e.g., it encompasses half of the worlds population), success in trade refor

11、m in the region can have a meaningful impact for businesses and consumers worldwide.Risk, reform and opportunity in Asia-PacificOur review of trade policy has highlighted the policy turbulence affecting Asian-Pacific trade, a situation that looks set to continue with a risk of new protectionist acti

12、ons on the horizon. This is in particular due to the shift in US trade policy and the ramping up of US-China trade tensions (see Box 1.2). But, other nations around the world have contributed as well, including countries in the Asia-Pacific region (see Table 1.1). Nonetheless, trade reform has advan

13、ced in the region along certain corridors thanks in part to the emergence of bilateral and regional free trade agreements like the Chinese and EU bilateral deals, ASEAN, and CPTPP4 (a recent Pacific Basin trade deal, anchored by Japan with 10 other members, but not including the US or China). Region

14、al integration could be set to take a big step forward if members can drive the proposed RCEP agreement to a conclusion later this year or next. (RCEP is a pan-Asian agreement covering ASEAN, Japan, Korea, China, India, Australia and New Zealand.) Such accords can help to lock in reform commitments,

15、 set an agenda for further trade reform, and provide a means of dispute resolution. They help reduce uncertainty and preserve the openness required in the current fast-paced trade environment for value chain production. This unlocks commercial opportunities and is conducive to trade and investment.

16、DMs and maturing EMs in the Asia Pacific region are well positioned to benefit mutually from such an increasingly open economicenvironment.Asian value chains are evolvingThe rise of along value chains and Chinas rise as a hub over the past two decades have led to a shift in trade As a result, region

17、al trade in Asia has and chains have become highly integrated. Asian supply chains are Using a unique dataset from the OECD, we find that Asian are using locally inputs to goods, rather than sourcing inputs from This evolution is most in China, its share of content in from74%in2005to83%in2016.Chinan

18、owplaysaroleinsupplyinginputs and to other the region. Asian value chains vary by for regional supply chains are highly owing to the use of smallthatareeasilyThemotorsectorismorein terms of (e.g. India) and that lead world The andclothingindustryisakeysourceofformanyemergingAsian(e.g.andVietnam)give

19、ntheiradvantage,isa key of integration in How exposed are Asian economies to US-China trade tensions?Given the highly integrated nature of Asian supply chains, ongoing US-China trade tensions are affecting other economies in the region. This presents both risks and opportunities for businesses in As

20、ia. The overall impact will depend on how exposed these markets are to the4 CPTPP = the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, a free trade agreement among 11 Pacific Basin countries.US and Chinese economies. According to our analysis, Japan, Korea, Thailand and India

21、 are most exposed to the US (with a direct exposure rate of over 35%, relative to their total exports to the US). Korea, Hong Kong, India, Vietnam and Thailand are most exposed to China. These economies also remain vulnerable to US protectionism via their role in Chinese supply chains. If trade tens

22、ions persist, there could be opportunities for Asian economies to boost exports of electronics, toys and furniture to the US, at the expense of Chinese import marketshare.Equally, there could be opportunities for these economies to increase exports of electronics components to China. But this will d

23、epend on how substitutable US and Chinese products are with goods from elsewhere. Asian supply chains have already started to rejig as emerging economies (e.g. Vietnam, Cambodia, India) are providing lower-cost alternatives for manufacturing to China. Ongoing US-China trade tensions may simply accel

24、erate this shift.However, there is also a risk that US trade policy action could target these other suppliers directly, as well. Measures from the US trade policy toolkit (Box 1.1) have been deployed at times not just against China, but also against other Asian nations with large US trade surpluses

25、such as Japan and Korea. The US President has also recently mentioned Vietnams trade surplus as a policy concern.The structure of the analysisIn this review of leading Asian trading nations, we consider four dimensions of their situation with respect to international commerce. The report opens with

26、a survey of the trade policy landscape facing the regions economies. It continues with an assessment of Asian value chain developments over the long run for a sample of countries and sectors of particular interest for trade. We then look at the exposure of Asian trade corridors to new opportunities

27、and potential disruption associated with trade policy changes. The final section considers potential scenarios for growth going forward over the medium to long term.Contents HYPERLINK l _bookmark1 ExecutiveSummary2 HYPERLINK l _bookmark2 A positive response to trade risk in HYPERLINK l _bookmark2 th

28、eAsia-Pacific region2 HYPERLINK l _bookmark3 Asiantradematures6 HYPERLINK l _bookmark5 Turbulenttimes continue6 HYPERLINK l _bookmark6 Uncertain and potentially dangerous HYPERLINK l _bookmark6 HYPERLINK l _bookmark7 HYPERLINK l _bookmark7 HYPERLINK l _bookmark8 US HYPERLINK l _bookmark8 HYPERLINK l

29、 _bookmark9 Asian nationsact23 HYPERLINK l _bookmark10 Pulling thestrands together28 HYPERLINK l _bookmark11 Annex 1: Infrastructure development HYPERLINK l _bookmark11 inAsia29 HYPERLINK l _bookmark12 Sectorsupplychains33 HYPERLINK l _bookmark14 Regionalvaluechains33 HYPERLINK l _bookmark15 HYPERLI

30、NK l _bookmark16 Electronics HYPERLINK l _bookmark17 Motor vehicles53 HYPERLINK l _bookmark18 Textiles andapparel59 HYPERLINK l _bookmark19 Agri-food69 HYPERLINK l _bookmark20 Exposure totradetensions78 HYPERLINK l _bookmark22 Impact oftrade uncertainty78 HYPERLINK l _bookmark23 Exposure to US-China

31、 trade tensions 79 HYPERLINK l _bookmark24 Opportunities from the US-China HYPERLINK l _bookmark24 HYPERLINK l _bookmark25 HYPERLINK l _bookmark26 ReinforcingAsiantrade92 HYPERLINK l _bookmark27 Awayforward92 HYPERLINK l _bookmark0 Disclosureappendix102 HYPERLINK l _bookmark0 Disclaimer104Asian trad

32、ematuresThe policy turbulence currently affecting Asian-Pacific trade set to continue, with a risk of more protectionism on thehorizonBut, trade reform is still advancing in the region and with trade partners like the EU, thanks to bilateral & regional free tradeaccordsIncreased openness is helping

33、EMs in Asia achieve scale; access technologies; overcome US & UK policy shifts and WTO Turbulent times continueInternational trade in Asia is facing a turbulent environmentA majority of trade for Asian EMs is now intra-regionalin a in HYPERLINK /R/10/LHVTd9bWZ7fj?docid=1120762 HYPERLINK /R/10/FKFr7z

34、dWZ7fj?docid=1123966 4 is is is to in is in a to is to is to HYPERLINK /R/10/dtKRNzvWZ7fj?docid=1122894 to to HYPERLINK /R/10/T6nJmKVWZ7fj?docid=1118684 to in HYPERLINK /R/10/S9gstgM5dKax?docid=1111970 Trade within Asia is intensifying (HSBC, HYPERLINK /R/10/7FmjSBrWZ7fj?docid=1114020 South-South tr

35、ade, 17 February 2019) such that a majority of trade for Asian EMs is now intra-regional. Trade in intermediate products remains strong in the region, even as local consumption of regional final goods is rising. Good fundamentals in some emerging markets e.g., ASEAN6 are fuelled by favourable demogr

36、aphics, opportunities for gains from technological catch-up, and advantageous resource endowments (HSBC, HYPERLINK /R/10/sQRpslJWZ7fj?docid=1104632 The world in 2030, 25 September 2018). This is contributing to economic growth, improved productivity, and expansion of the middle class. As local suppl

37、iers mature in their capabilities (discussed in the next section), the scale of the regional market is now such that there is a measure of momentum and sustainability in the regional economy even though5 CPTPP, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, entered into f

38、orce for 6 countries on 30 December 2018 (Canada, Mexico, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and Singapore) and for Vietnam on 14 January 2019. Ratification is pending for: Peru, Chile, Brunei Darussalam and Malaysia. China and the United States are not members.6 ASEAN is the Association of Southeast Asi

39、an Nations comprising Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.Tensions weigh on trade: US tariffs and partner retaliation, Chinese technology support, Brexit, Korea-Japan stressNorth America and Europe continue to play very signif

40、icant roles as export markets and suppliers for critical technology products and capital goods (e.g., aircraft, scientific instruments, specialised machine tools).But, impediments to trade are emerging. The United States has led the charge in this regard, shifting its trade policy towards one based

41、on economic nationalism. The opening salvo came very early in the tenure of the current administration, with the US withdrawal from the Trans- Pacific Partnership Agreement in January 2017 (HSBC, HYPERLINK /R/10/NrdgpFDWZ7fj?docid=546224 What next after TPP?, 26 January 2017). But, while that action

42、 resulted in the loss of some much-anticipated future trade liberalisation, the subsequent imposition of new tariffs and quantitative restrictions by the US has actually rolled back some previous liberalisation.The US has imposed a variety of punitive tariff measures to shield its domestic industrie

43、s from import competition and challenge alleged trade abuses by China. This has elicited retaliationfromUStradepartnersincludinginAsia.But,theUSischallengingChinainparticular. Chinas trade practices allegedly continue to distort technology transfer, intellectual property rights,cybersecurity,andmark

44、etoperationwithrespecttostate-ownedenterprises.Inadditionto imposing tariffs, the US has also launched a case on these issues via the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism. A number of Chinas other trade partners have joined as third parties, includingAustralia,India,Japan,SouthKorea,andTaiwan,amongother

45、ssuchastheEU.7ButtheUSandChinaarenottheonlytosuchturbulenceaffectingAsianThereisalsorisingtradetensionbetweenKoreaandJapan.InearlyJuly2019,citingabout leakage of to North Japan an for South Korean firms to each of three used in the of computer display panels and other Japan largely the of these thre

46、e fluorinated and fluoride. In on 1 2019 Japan that it remove South KoreafromthewhitelistofauthorisedtotradefreelywithJapanacrossabroadrange of dual use technology products potential military such as ball and machine tools (ca. 850 The removal is to take effect on 28 August. Once South Korea is from

47、 the list, Japanese firms need to apply for to suchtothatcountry.10 Asnotedinthethisissueisrenderedmorecomplex due to a continuing dispute over claims dating to the Second World War and the of the 1965 meant to relations between the two nations.11 A and of the trade of the dispute could have negativ

48、e for the of the global valueThe United Kingdoms decision to leave the European Union (EU) including the Single Market and the Common Commercial Policy on 31 October 2019 will also have some potential negative repercussions in Asia. This will increase the complexity for Asian economies doing busines

49、s with Europe. For Asian exporters, Brexit will segment access to the European market (the UK is about 15% of the EU market), making it harder to operate European-wide distribution channels. For Asian importers and exporters, Brexit may result in a reduction in preferential marketaccess7 See WTO, HY

50、PERLINK /english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds542_e.htm China Certain Measures Concerning the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, DS542, viewed on 30 July 2019.8 The Economist, A trade dispute between Japan and South Korea has Trumpian echoes, 18 July 2019.9 The Diplomat, Whats driving Japans

51、trade restrictions on South Korea?, 29 July 2019.10 New York Times, Japan imposes broad new trade restrictions on South Korea, 1 August, 2019; and The Diplomat, Japans Economic Restrictions on South Korea, 5 August 2019.11 See, e.g., Financial Times, Japan cuts S Korea from export white list as trad

52、e tensions rise, 2 August 2019; and South China Morning Post, Japan-South Korea tensions could dash Chinas hopes for a trade deal, 27 July 2019.The rise of economic nationalism in the United States is posing a challenge to Asian suppliersUS tariff actions hit suppliers of solar cells, washers, alumi

53、nium, steel, capital goods, and industrial inputsthat would be available via EU trade agreements (e.g., with Japan, and potentially with Singapore and Vietnam). However, the UK may over time be able to negotiate deals with new preferential partners in Asia not yet reached by the EU (e.g., possibly C

54、hina).US fuels trade tensionsThe rise of economic nationalism in the United States is posing a larger challenge to the region and to China in particular. Beginning in early 2018, the US began ramping up protectionist measures using a variety of tools. (For an overview of the US trade policy toolkit,

55、 see Box 1.1.) Punitive tariffs were levied in addition to US standard tariffs, though in some cases subject to exclusions for certain countries, products, or specific quantities of covered imports, depending on the measure (Chart 1.1) (HSBC, HYPERLINK /R/10/LfF7ZL2WZ7fj?docid=1117795 US Trade Polic

56、y, 4 April 2019). In contrast, the US Administration has also indicated an openness to consider bilateral free trade agreements with certain Asian partners such as Japan.InJanuary2018,theUSimposedglobaltariffsoncertainsolarcellsandasaslargemachinesandduetoallegedimportsurges.12For solar cells and mo

57、dules, these additional tariffs were imposed on global imports for a four year period, starting at 30% in year one and phasing out with 5ppt reductions in each of the three following years. The US Trade Representative (USTR) factsheet13 on the case explicitly named China as distorting the US market

58、and noted that the solar measure would cover US preferential partners Korea, Thailand and the Philippines, as well as Canada and Mexico. A recent study by a US industry think tank found that the increase in costs driven by the tariffs had been associated with a decline of US employment in the sector

59、 of 3.2% (ca. 8000jobs).14For large residential washing machines, the additional tariffs would be imposed on global imports for three years range up to 50% in year one (with certain countries excluded and certain volumes excluded or facing reduced tariffs), with a 5ppt decrease in the maximum tariff

60、 in each of the subsequent two years. The USTR (Office of the United States Trade Representative) factsheet on the case explicitly mentioned distortions caused by Korean and Chinese producers, noting that the measure will cover Mexico and Thailand, but that Canada would be excluded. A recent academi