績效考核的困境外文翻譯及原文

原文一：TheDilemmaofPerformanceAppraisalByPeterProwseandJulieProwseItwilloutlinethedevelopmentofindividualperformancebeforelinkingtoperformancemanagementinorganizations.Theoutcomesoftechniquestoincreaseorganizationalcommitment,increasejobsatisfactionwillbecriticallyevaluated.ItwillfurtherexaminethetransatlanticdebatesbetweenliteratureonefficiencyandeffectivenessintheNorthAmericanandtheUnitedKingdom)evidencetoevaluatetheHRMdevelopmentandcontributionofperformanceappraisaltoindividualandorganizationalperformance.Appraisalpotentiallyisakeytoolinmakingthemostofanorganisation’shumanresources.Theuseofappraisaliswidespreadestimatedthat80–90%oforganizationsintheUSAandUKwereusingappraisalandanincreasefrom69to87%oforganisationsbetween1998and2004reportedaformalperformancemanagementsystem(ArmstrongandBaron,1998:200).Therehasbeenlittleevidenceoftheevaluationoftheeffectivenessofappraisalbutmoreonthedevelopmentinitsuse.Between1998and2004asamplefromtheCharteredInstituteofPersonnelandDevelopment(CIPD,2007)of562firmsfound506wereusingperformanceappraisalinUK.Whatisalsovitaltoemphasiseistherisinguseofperformanceappraisalfeedbackbeyondperformanceforprofessionalsandmanagerstonearly95%ofworkplacesinthe2004WERSsurvey(seeTable13.1).ClearlytheuseofAppraisalshasbeenthedevelopmentandextensionofappraisalstocoveralargeproportionoftheUKworkforceandthecoverageofnonmanagerialoccupationsandtheextendeduseinprivateandpublicsectors.Critiquesofappraisalhavecontinuedasappraisalshaveincreasedinuseandscopeacrosssectorsandoccupations.Thedominantcritiqueisthemanagementframeworkusingappraisalasanorthodoxtechniquethatseekstoremedytheweaknessandproposeofappraisalsasasystemtodevelopperformance.This“orthodox”approacharguesthereareconflictingpurposesofappraisal(Strebleretal,2001).Appraisalcanmotivatestaffbyclarifyingobjectivesandsettingclearfutureobjectiveswithprovisionfortraininganddevelopmentneedstoestablishtheperformanceobjective.Theseconflictswithassessingpastperformanceanddistributionofrewardsbasedonpastperformance(Bach,2005:301).Employeesarereluctanttoconfideanylimitationsandconcernsontheircurrentperformanceasthiscouldimpactontheirmeritrelatedrewardorpromotionopportunities(NewtonandFindley,1996:43).ThisconflictswithperformanceasacontinuumasappraisersarechallengedwithdifferingrolesasbothmonitorsandjudgesofperformancebutanunderstandingcounsellorwhichRandell(1994)arguesfewmanagershavenotreceivedtherainingtoperform.AppraisalManager’sreluctancetocriticisealsostemsfromclassicevidencefromMcGregorthatmanagersarereluctanttomakeanegativejudgementonanindividual’sperformanceasitcouldbedemotivating,leadtoaccusationsoftheirownsupportandcontributiontoindividualpoorperformanceandtoalsoavoidinterpersonalconflict(McGregor,1957).Oneconsequenceofthisavoidanceofconflictistorateallcriterionascentralandavoidanyconflictknownasthecentraltendency.InastudyofseniormanagersbyLongneckeretal.(1987),theyfoundorganisationalpoliticsinfluencedratingsof60seniorexecutives.Thefindingswerethatpoliticsinvolveddeliberateattemptsbyindividualstoenhanceorprotectself-interestswhenconflictingcoursesofactionarepossibleandthatratingsanddecisionswereaffectedbypotentialsourcesofbiasorinaccuracyintheirappraisalratings(Longeneckeretal.,1987).TherearemethodsoffurtherbiasbeyondLongenecker’sevidence.Thepoliticaljudgementsandtheyhavebeendistortedfurtherbyoverratingsomeclearcompetenciesinperformanceratherthanbeingcriticalacrossallratedcompetenciesknownasthehaloeffectandifsomecompetenciesarelowertheymayprejudicethejudgmentacrossthepositivereviewsknownasthehornseffect(ACAS,1996).OneconsequenceofthisavoidanceofconflictistorateallcriterionascentralTherearemethodsSomeratingsmayonlycincluderecenteventsandtheseareknownastherecencyeffects.Inthiscaseonlyrecenteventsarenotedcomparedtomanagersgatheringandusingdatathroughouttheappraisalperiod.Aparticularconcernistheequityofappraisalforratingswhichmaybedistortedbygender,ethnicityandtheratingsofappraisersthemselves.ArangeofstudiesinboththeUSandUKhavehighlightedsubjectivityintermsofgender(Alimo-Metcalf,1991;White,1999)andethnicityoftheappraiseandappraiser(GeddesandKonrad,2003).Suggestionsandsolutionsonresolvingbiaswillbereviewedlater.Thesecondanalysisistheradicalcritiqueofappraisal.Thisisthemorecriticalmanagementliteraturethatarguesthatappraisalandperformancemanagementareaboutmanagementcontrol(NewtonandFindley,1996;Townley,1993).Itarguesthattightermanagementcontroloveremployeebehaviourcanbeachievedbytheextensionofappraisaltomanualworkers,professionalasmeanstocontrol.ThisdevelopstheliteratureofFoucaultusingpowerandsurveillance.Thisliteratureusescasesinexamplesofpublicservicecontrolonprofessionalssuchateachers(Healy,1997)andUniversityprofessionals(Townley,1990).Thisevidencearguestheincreasedcontrolofpublicservicesusingappraisalasamethodofcontrolandthattheoutcomeofmanagerialobjectivesignoresthedevelopmentalroleofappraisalandratingsareawardedforpeoplewhoacceptandembracethecultureandorganizationalvalues.However,thisliteratureignorestheemployeeresistanceandtheuseofprofessionalunionstochallengetheattemptstoexertcontroloverprofessionalsandstaffintheappraisalprocess(Bach,2005:306).ThisevidencearguesOneofthedifferentissuesofremovingbiaswastheuseofthetestmetaphor(Folgeretal.,1992).Thiswasbasedontheassumptionthatappraisalratingswereatechnicalquestionofassessing“true”performanceandthereneededtobeincreasedreliabilityandvalidityofappraisalasaninstrumenttodevelopmotivationandperformance.Thesourcesofraterbiasanderrorscanberesolvedbyimprovedorganisationaljusticeandincreasingreliabilityofappraiser’sjudgement.Howevertherewereproblemssuchasanassumptionthatyoucanstatejobrequirementsclearlyandtheorganizationis“rational”withobjectivesthatreflectvaluesandthatthejudgmentbyappraisers’arevaluefreefrompoliticalagendasandpersonalobjectives.Secondlythereisthesecondissueofsubjectivityifappraisalratingswheredecisionsonappraisalareratedbya“politicalmetaphor”(Hartle,1995).This“politicalview”arguesthataappraisalisoftendonebadlybecausethereisalackoftrainingforappraisersandappraisersmayseetheappraisalasawasteoftime.Thisbecomesaprocesswhichmanagershavetoperformandnotasapotentialtoimproveemployeeperformance.Organisationsinthiscontextare“political”andtheappraisersseektomaintainperformancefromsubordinatesandviewappraisesasinternalcustomerstosatisfy.Thismeansmanagersuseappraisaltoavoidinterpersonalconflictanddevelopstrategiesfortheirownpersonaladvancementandseekaquietlifebyavoidingcensurefromhighermanagers.Thisperceptionmeansmanagersalsoseeappraiseeseeksgoodratingandgenuinefeedbackandcareerdevelopmentbyseekingevidenceofcombiningemployeepromotionandpayrise.Thismeansappraisalratingsbecomepoliticaljudgementsandseektoavoidinterpersonalconflicts.Theapproachesofthe“test”and“political”metaphorsofappraisalareinaccurateandlackobjectivityandjudgementofemployeeperformanceisinaccurateandaccuracyisavoided.Theissueishowcanorganisationsresolvethislackofobjectivity?Grint(1993)arguesthatthesolutionstoobjectivityliesinpartwithMcGregor’s(1957)classiccritiquebyretrainingandremovalof“topdown”ratingsbymanagersandreplacementwithmultipleraterevaluationwhichremovesbiasandtheobjectivitybyupwardperformanceappraisal.Thevalidityofupwardappraisalmeanstheremovalofsubjectiveappraisalratings.Thisapproachisalsosuggestedtoremovegenderbiasinappraisalratingsagainstwomeninappraisals(Fletcher,1999).Thesolutionofmultiplereporting(internalcolleagues,customersandrecipientsofservices)willreducesubjectivityandinequityofappraisalratings.Thisargumentdevelopsfurtherbytheriseintheneedtoevaluateprojectteamsandincreasinglevelsofteamworktoincludepeerassessment.Thesolutionsalsointheorymeanincreasedclosercontactwithindividualmanagerandappraisesandincreasingserviceslinkedtocustomerfacingevaluations.However,negativefeedbackstilldemotivatesandplentyoffeedbackandexplanationbymanagerwhocollatesfeedbackratherthanjudgesperformanceandfailtosummariseevaluations.TherearehoweverstillproblemswithaccuracyofappraisalobjectivityasWalkerandSmither(1999)5yearstudyof252managersover5yearperiodstillidentifiedissueswithsubjectiveratingsin360degreeappraisals.Therearestillissuesonthesubjectivityofappraisalsbeyondtheareasoflackoftraining.Thecontributionofappraisalisstronglyrelatedtoemployeeattitudesandstrongrelationshipswithjobsatisfaction(FletcherandWilliams,1996).Theevidenceonappraisalstillremainspositiveintermsofreinvigoratingsocialrelationshipsatwork(Townley,1993)andthewidespreadadoptioninlargepublicservicesintheUKsuchasthenationalhealthService(NHS)isthevaluablecontributiontolinemanagersdiscussionwithstaffontheirpastperformance,discussingpersonaldevelopmentplansandtraininganddevelopmentaspositiveissues.Onefurtherconcernistheopennessofappraisalrelatedtoemployeerewardwhichwenowdiscuss.Appraisalandperformancemanagementhavebeeninextricablylinkedtoemployeerewardsincethedevelopmentofstrategichumanresourcemanagementinthe1980s.Theearlyliteratureonappraisallinkedappraisalwithemployeecontrol(Randell,1994;Grint,1993;Townley,1993,1999)anddiscussedtheuseofperformancerelatedrewardtoappraisals.Howevertherecentliteraturehassubstitutedthechaptertitlesemployee“appraisal”with“performancemanagement”(Bach,2005;Storey,2007)andmovedthefocusonperformanceandperformancepayandthelimitsofemployeeappraisal.Theappraisalandperformancepaylinkhasdevelopedintodebatestothreekeyissues:Thefirstissueishasperformancepayrelatedtoappraisalgrowninuse?Thesecondissueiswhattypeofperformancedowereward?andthefinalissueiswhojudgesmanagementstandards?Thefirstdiscussiononinfluencesofgrowthofperformancepayschemesistheassumptionthatincreasinglinkagebetweenindividualeffortandfinancialrewardincreasesperformancelevels.Thislinkagebetweeneffortandfinancialrewardincreasinglevelsofperformancehasprovedanincreasingtrendinthepublicandprivatesector(BevanandThompson,1992;ArmstrongandBaron,1998).Thedrivetoincreasepublicsectorperformanceeffortandsettingoftargetsmayevenbeinconsistentintheexperiencesofsomeorganizationalsettingsaimedatachievinglong-termtargets(KesslerandPurcell,1992;Marsden,2007).ThedevelopmentofmeritbasedpaybasedonperformanceassessedbyamanagerisrisingintheUKMarsden(2007)reportedthatthe:Useofperformanceappraisalsasabasisformeritpayareusedin65percentofpublicsectorand69percentoftheprivatesectoremployeeswhereappraisalcoveredallnonmanagerialstaff(p.109).Meritpayhasalsogrowninuseasin199820%ofworkplacesusedperformancerelatedschemescomparedto32%inthesameorganizations2004(Kersleyetal.,2006:191).TheachievementsofsatisfactoryratingsorabovesatisfactoryperformanceaverageswereusedasevidencetorewardindividualperformanceratingsintheUKCivilService(Marsden,2007).Table13.2outlinestheextentofmeritpayin2004.Thesecondissueiswhatformsofperformanceisrewarded.Theuseofpastappraisalratingsasevidenceofachievingmerit-relatedpaymentslinkedtoachievinghigherperformancewasthepredominantfactordevelopedinthepublicservices.TheevidenceonSettingperformancetargetshavebeenasKessler(2000:280)reported“inconsistentwithinorganizationsandproblematicforcertainprofessionalorlessskilledoccupationswheregoalshavenotbeeneasilyformulated”.Therehasbeeninconclusiveevidencefromorganizationsontheimpactofperformancepayanditseffectivenessinimprovingperformance.Evidencefromanumberofindividualperformancepayschemesreportorganizationssuspendingorreviewingthemonthegroundsthatindividualperformancerewardhasproducednoeffectinperformanceorevendemotivatesstaff(Kessler,2000:281).Morein-depthstudiessettingperformancegoalsfollowedbyappraisalonhowwelltheywereresultedinlossofmotivationwhilstmaintainingproductivityandachievedmanagersusingimposingincreasedperformancestandards(MarsdenandRichardson,1994).AsRandell(1994)hadhighlightedearlier,thepotentialobjectivityandself-criticisminappraisalreviewsbecomeareasthatappraiseesrefusetoacknowledgeasweaknesseswithappraisersifthisleadstoareductionintheirmeritpay.Objectivityandselfreflectionfordevelopmentbecomesaweaknessthatappraisesfailtoacknowledgeasadevelopmentalissueifitreducestheirchancesofareducedevaluationthatwillreducetheirmeritreward.Thereviewofcivilservicemeritpay(Makinson,2000)reportedfrom4majorUKCivilServiceAgenciesandtheNationalHealthServiceconcludedthatexistingformsofperformancepayandperformancemanagementhadfailedtomotivatemanystaff.Theconclusionswerethatemployeesfoundindividualperformancepaydivisiveandledtoreducedwillingnesstoco-operatewithmanagement,citingmanagerialfavoritesandmanipulationofappraisalscorestolowerratingstosavepayingrewardstostaff(MarsdenandFrench,1998).Thishasclearimplicationsontherelationshipbetweenlinemanagersandappraisesandthedemotivationalconsequencesandreducedcommitmentprovideclearevidenceofthedangertolinkingindividualperformanceappraisaltorewardinthepublicservices.Employeesfocusontheissuesthatgainkeyperformancefocusbyfocusingonspecificobjectivesrelatedtokeyperformanceindicatorsratherthanallpersonalobjectives.AstudyofbankingperformancepaybyLewis(1998)highlightedimposedtargetswhichwereunattainablewitharangeof20performancetargetswithnarrowshorttermfinancialorientatatedgoals.Thenarrowfocusonkeytargetsandneglectofotherperformanceaspectsleadstotasksnotbeingdelivered.Thisfinalissueofjudgingmanagementstandardshasalreadyhighlightedissuesofinequityandbiasbasedongender(Beyer,1990;ChenandDiTomasio,1996;Fletcher,1999).ThesuggestedsolutionstoresolvedIscriminationhavebeenproposedasenhancedinterpersonalskillstrainingareincreasedequitableuseof360degreeappraisalasamethodtoevaluatefeedbackfromcolleaguesasthisreducestheuseofthe“politicalmetaphor”(Randell,1994;Fletcher,1999).Onmeasureslinkingperformancetoimprovementrequireawiderapproachtoenhancedworkdesignandmotivationtodevelopandenhanceemployeejobsatisfactionandthedesignoflinkagesbetweeneffortandperformancearesignificantintheprivatesectorandfeedbackandawarenessinthepublicsector(FletcherandWilliams,1996:176).Whererisesbeinpayweredeterminedbyachievingcriticalratedappraisalobjectives,employeesarelessselfcriticalandopentoanydevelopmentalneedsinaperformancereview.Therearekeyissuesthatrequireresolutionandagreatdealdependsontheextenttowhichyouhaveagoodrelationshipwithyourlinemanager.Barlow(1989)argued`ifyougetoffbadlywithyourfirsttwomanagers,youmayjustaswellforgetit(p.515).Theevidenceonthecontinuedpracticeofappraisalsisthattheyarestillinstitutionallyelaboratedsystemsofmanagementappraisalanddevelopmentissignificantrhetoricintheapparatusofbureaucraticcontrolbymanagers(Barlow,1989).Inrealitythecompaniescreate,review,changeandevenabolishappraisalsiftheyfailtodevelopandenhanceorganisationalperformance(Kessler,2000).Despiteallthecriticismandevidencethecriticshavefailedtosuggestanalternativeforaprocessthatcanprovidefeedback,developmotivation,identifytrainingandpotentialandevidencethatcanjustifypotentialcareerdevelopmentandjustifyreward(Hartle,1997).Source:JournalofAccountingResearch,Jun2009譯文一：績效考核的困境作者：彼得·布朗斯，茱莉亞·布朗斯績效管理發(fā)展中的個人業(yè)績與企業(yè)組織相聯(lián)系，以提高組織承諾的成果的實現(xiàn)性，審慎評估以增加工作滿意度。它將進一步研究文獻的跨領域的效率和有效性議題在北美和英國的證據(jù)，以評估個人和組織績效的人力資源開發(fā)和考核貢獻。評估是充分利用企業(yè)組織人力資源的一個關鍵工具。績效考核的使用分布廣泛，根據(jù)1998年至2004年一個正式的績效管理系統(tǒng)的報告(ArmstrongandBaron,1998:200)，估計80-90％的美國組織正在使用，而英國使用比例從69%增加至87％。有很少關于在發(fā)展考核的證據(jù)，而有更多的使用效益。1998年至2004年從英國特許人事樣本562，發(fā)現(xiàn)在英國506人使用表現(xiàn)評估，這是還必須強調(diào)的是越來越多地使用的表現(xiàn)。在2004年WERS調(diào)查中，在幾乎95％的工作場所強調(diào)的關鍵是基于專業(yè)人員和管理人員的績效的績效考核反饋。顯然，考核已經(jīng)是不斷發(fā)展和拓展，已經(jīng)覆蓋很大比例的英國勞動人口和非職業(yè)管理以及在私營和公共部門推廣使用?？己嗽u比繼續(xù)作為績效波動被更多的部門和行業(yè)使用。占主導地位的批判是作為一個正統(tǒng)的技術的管理框架，旨在糾正弱點及評估作為一個發(fā)展績效的系統(tǒng)。這種“正統(tǒng)”的做法認為有考核沖突目的(Strebleretal,2001）。考核可以通過明確的目標激勵工作人員，制定明確的培訓和發(fā)展的需要，提供未來的目標來確定績效目標。這些與過去的績效考考核和獎勵與分配的沖突是基于過去的表現(xiàn)(Bach,2005:301)。員工不愿意吐露任何限制和關注他們目前績效因為這可能對績效的影響，與相關獎勵或晉升機會（NewtonandFindley,1996:43）。這些績效沖突對于考核人來說是連續(xù)作為管理者和判定者的業(yè)績不同角色的挑戰(zhàn)，而是理解輔導員的蘭德爾1994）認為少數(shù)管理人員沒有得到執(zhí)行。McGregor認為績效考核經(jīng)理不愿意考核是有典型的證據(jù)的，管理者不愿意就個人的表現(xiàn)和培訓服務進行判斷可能使士氣低落，導致自己的支持和貢獻個人表現(xiàn)欠佳，并同時避免人際沖突（McGregor,1957)。避免沖突一個后果是，以速度為中心的所有標準并避免為中心的高級管理人員傾向的沖突。由longneckeretal（1987年）對于高級管理者的研究，他們發(fā)現(xiàn)組織政策的影響比率60名高級管理人員，調(diào)查結果顯示，通過加強個人或保護自身利益來刻意的參與政策行動時，當可能的沖突情況，在他們的評估等級比率和是由偏見或受影響的潛在來源決定的（Longeneckeret，1987）。這有Longenecker’s的證據(jù)進一步證明偏見的方法。他們的政治判斷和已扭曲不自量力，一些表現(xiàn)能力進一步明確而不是在關鍵的環(huán)節(jié)和已知的額定能力，如果一些較低的判決他們可能影響作為角色整個正面影響（ACAS，1996年）。有些評級可能只包括最近發(fā)生的事件，這些都是近期的已知影響。在這種情況下，經(jīng)理搜集和使用的只有在整個考核期間最近的比較事件。特別關注對績效數(shù)據(jù)的公平性的考核，這可能通過性別，種族和考核者的階層自身而扭曲。一些對于美國和英國的研究凸顯了對于性別（Alimo-Metcalf,1991;White,1999）考核和考核者的級別的主觀性（GeddesandKonrad,2003）。建議和解決偏見的方案稍后將檢討。第二個分析是對考核激進的批判。這是更多重要管理文獻中認為，評估和表現(xiàn)管理都是關于管理控制(NewtonandFindley,1996;Townley,1993)。Itargues它認為加強對員工行為的管理控制，可實現(xiàn)的對人工考核的拓展，是控制的專業(yè)手段。這發(fā)展了Foucault利用職權和監(jiān)視的文獻。這些文獻使用像教師這樣的專業(yè)人員的公共服務控制的例子(Healy,1997)和大學專業(yè)人員的(Townley,1990)。這方面的證據(jù)認為使用考核來加強對公共服務的控制，作為一種控制方法并認為，管理客觀性結果忽視了考核和等級評定的發(fā)展作用，均獲得人們接受和支持的文化和組織價值。然而，這種文獻忽略員工阻力與利用工會來挑戰(zhàn)試圖對專業(yè)人員和工作人員在評估過程施加控制。(Bach,2005:306)消除偏見的不同議題之一是使用隱喻的測試（Folgeretal，1992年）。這是基于假設考核比率一個評估“真實”績效的技術性問題，這需要增加考核的可靠性和有效性作為一種發(fā)展動力和績效的工具。評價者偏見和錯誤的來源可以通過改進組織公平，增加考核者鑒定可靠性解決的。但有一個假設的問題，如你可以清晰描述工作要求，該組織是通過考核人從價值和政治議程自由裁量權的價值觀和判定反映“理性”的目標。其次存在第二個問題是主觀性，如果由考核決定的的績效比率是由一個“政治隱喻”決定的(Hartle,1995)。這種“政治觀點”認為，考核做不好是因為績效評估者缺少訓練，他們把績效考核看成是一種浪費時間。這成為管理者必須執(zhí)行，而不是作為一個潛在的改進員工績效的一個過程。本文中的組織是“政治”的，評估師設法維持下屬的績效并視考核為內(nèi)部顧客滿意。這意味著管理人員使用考核，以避免人際沖突和發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略的個人地位，并尋求一個安靜的生活，避免較高的管理人員的譴責。這種看法是指管理者也看到考核者尋找好考核比率和反饋以及職業(yè)發(fā)展，通過尋求員工促進和支付手段相結合的證據(jù).這意味著考核比率成為政治上的判斷并設法避免人際沖突。在績效的“測試”和“政治”的比喻是不準確的考核，缺乏判斷雇員績效客觀性，精度偏差。這問題是組織如何能解決這種缺乏客觀性？格林特（1993）認為，在對客觀的解決方案的一部分，是麥格雷戈的（1957年）由再培訓的經(jīng)典批判和清除“向下”的管理人員評分封頂和更換多個考核者考核以消除偏見和由績效評估的客觀性基礎上。向上有效性的考核意味著主觀性的考核比率，這種方法還消除建議考核評分，以消除對婦女的考核(Fletcher,1999)多元化報表解決方案（內(nèi)部同事，客戶和收件人服務）將減少評分的主觀性和考核比率的不公平。這爭論的進一步發(fā)展所需要評估的項目團隊和越來越多的增加團隊合作水平，包括同事評估。在該解決方案的理論上，平均增加經(jīng)理和加強與個別考核和聯(lián)系以增加與客戶服務所面臨的考核。但是，負反饋仍然是傷害性很大的。通過整理反饋意見，而不是考核績效表現(xiàn)的經(jīng)理大量工作。然而，我們總結反饋和解釋考核。這與考核的準確性仍然存在客觀問題，沃克和史密瑟（1999）用360考評法五年研究了252位經(jīng)理五年期間，這主觀考核問題仍然在評估主體的問題超出缺乏培訓等領域。在考核的貢獻是密切相關員工的態(tài)度和強烈與工作滿意度(FletcherandWilliams,1996)。該證據(jù)正面考核仍然在振興工作中的社會關系方面（湯利，1993年）和大型公共服務的廣泛采用，英國等作為國家衛(wèi)生服務體系（NHS）是各級管理人員的寶貴貢獻討論有關其員工過去的表現(xiàn)，討論個人發(fā)展計劃和培訓，并積極議題，進一步關注發(fā)展是開放性與員工的報酬，我們現(xiàn)在討論的考核。20世紀80年代，由于戰(zhàn)略人力資源管理的發(fā)展，考核和績效管理已與雇員獎勵密不可分。關于考核的早期文獻中就將考核與員工控制(Randell,1994;Grint,1993;Townley,1993,1999)相聯(lián)系，并討論了有關考核獎勵績效的使用問題.然而有一部分文獻已經(jīng)取代了章節(jié)標題雇員“考核”與“績效管理”(Bach,2005;Storey,2007)，焦點轉(zhuǎn)移到績效和績效激勵與員工考核的限制上來?？冃c績效工資的聯(lián)系已發(fā)展為對三個關鍵問題的討論：第一問題討論績效工資是否已經(jīng)與考核發(fā)展在使用中同步進行？第二個問題是什么類型的績效，我們應該獎勵？最后的問題是誰來判斷工作標準？關于績效工資方案不斷增長的影響是第一個討論的問題，它是在增加個人的努力和物質(zhì)回報之間的聯(lián)系以提高績效水平。這種個人努力和物質(zhì)回報聯(lián)動以提高績效水平，證明了在公共和私營部門的發(fā)展趨勢(BevanandThompson,1992;ArmstrongandBaron,1998)。這樣促使增加公共部門的績效努力和目標設置可能甚至在實現(xiàn)旨在實現(xiàn)長期目標的某些組織設置中會不一致(KesslerandPurcell,1992;Marsden,2007），通過經(jīng)理的基于績效評估的工資的優(yōu)點的發(fā)展是由英國的馬斯登（2007）報告中提出：考績用作績效工資的基礎是在覆蓋了非管理層員工的公共部門中的使用比率為65%，私營部門的使用比率為69%（109頁）。績效工資的使用也在增加，在1998年組織使用績效工資的比率為20％，而在相同的組織2004年這一比率達到32%(Kersleyetal.,2006:191)。令人滿意的比率或以上的績效超過令人滿意的成果平均數(shù)的將作為證據(jù)，以獎勵英國公務員中個人業(yè)績評級(Marsden,2007)。第二個問題是什么樣的績效形式應該獲得獎勵。對于過去績效比率的使用是為實現(xiàn)與實現(xiàn)更高的獎賞支付的證據(jù)在公共服務中式鑒定評級績效的主要因素。TheevidenceonSettingperformancetargetshavebeenasKessler(2000:280)關于設置業(yè)績目標已被證明凱斯勒（2000:280）的報告“不一致的內(nèi)部組織和目標模糊的組織中的某些專業(yè)問題或技術水平較低的地方”。這里有從組織對績效工資的影響payanditseffectivenessinimprovingperformance.和提高表現(xiàn)的效率的不確定的證據(jù)。從大量的個人績效薪酬計劃報告的證據(jù)中，機構暫?；?qū)彶樗麄儗€別表現(xiàn)卻沒有獲得任何報酬的影響，甚至傷害工作人員（Kessler,2000:281)。建立績效目標更深入的研究,緊隨其后的是取決于他們的評估,是如何導致失去動力,同時保持生產(chǎn)率和實現(xiàn)管理者使用性能提高的績效標準(MarsdenandRichardson,1994)。正如As蘭德爾（1994）早前曾強調(diào)，潛在的客觀性和自我批評在考核區(qū)域中，成為評核者拒絕承認評估師的弱點如果從而導致了他們的績效工資的減少?？陀^性和自我反思的發(fā)展成為一個弱點，那就是考核失敗作為一個發(fā)展問題，如果它減少了降低評估的機會，這將減少他們的績效獎勵。審視公務員的績效工資(Makinson,2000)來自于英國4大公務員服務機構和公務員國家衛(wèi)生服務的結論，績效工資和存在形式績效管理沒能激勵許多工作人員得出的結論是，雇員發(fā)現(xiàn)個人績效工資分裂并且導致降低管理合作的意愿，管理偏好的引用，對于績效分數(shù)降低比率以減少員工的績效工資的問題的修復(MarsdenandFrench,1998)。這有明確含義關于一線管理人員和考核之間的關系，被動的結果并減少承諾提供明確的證據(jù)將個人績效考核與在公共部門的獎勵聯(lián)系起來。雇員注重這樣的問題，以獲取關鍵績效以集中與關鍵因素有關的而不是所有的個人性格相聯(lián)系的具體目標為重點相關的關鍵績效指標。Lewis（1998）的一個銀行業(yè)績效工資的研究強調(diào)，實施目標是一個在20個績效目標范圍內(nèi)遙不可及的狹隘的短期業(yè)績目標。這種狹隘的對重點對象關注而忽略其他績效方面將導致工作無法實現(xiàn)。最后一個問題是這種判斷管理標準已經(jīng)突出基于性別的不公平和偏見的問題(Beyer,1990;ChenandDiTomasio,1996;Fletcher,1999)。建議的解決歧視的方案為加強人際技巧訓練來增加運用360度考核的公平性并作為考核評估的方法從同事的反饋，因為這可以減少在“政治隱喻”使用(Randell,1994;Fletcher,1999)。連接績效與工作改進的措施連接績效和連接需要更廣泛的方法，加強工作設計和發(fā)展動力以及提高員工工作滿意度和努力和績效之間的聯(lián)系的設計，是重要的私營部門和反饋和在公共部門的宣傳(FletcherandWilliams,1996:176)。凡在工資上升由實現(xiàn)的關鍵考核目標決定的，員工缺乏自我批判和開放在任何績效考核的發(fā)展需要中。需要討論和解決的關鍵問題是取決于你與您的頂頭上司是否有良好的關系。Barlow(1989)如果你說你跟的兩位經(jīng)理不好，你可能只是把這事給忘它（第515頁）。Therearekeyissuesthatrequireresolutionandagreatdealdependsonthe關于考核繼續(xù)實踐的證據(jù)，他們還闡述了管理體制和發(fā)展的系統(tǒng)考核在戰(zhàn)略決策控制上的應用(Barlow,1989).Inrealitythecompaniescreate,review,changeandevenabolish(Barlow,1989)。在現(xiàn)實中，如果他們沒有評估發(fā)展和提高組織績效(Kessler,2000)，公司將會創(chuàng)建，審查，變更，甚至取消考核。盡管所有的批評和批評者的證據(jù)都沒有顯示一個過程，可以提供反饋，發(fā)展動力，確定培訓和潛在的理由和證據(jù)，可以潛在的職業(yè)發(fā)展并斷定獎勵（Hartle,1997)。資料來源：大學會計研究所。2009年6月。原文二：PerformanceEvaluationsandEfficientSortingBy:RAY,KOROK.Muchoftheproductioninfirmstakesplaceovertime.Thispaperseekstounderstandthevalueofinterimperformanceinformationonlongprojects.Inparticular,themodelexploresthesortingeffectsofperformanceevaluations.Conductinganinterimperformanceevaluationincreasesefficiencybyprovidingtheoptiontoendprojectswithlowearlyreturns.Themainresult:Itisefficienttoallocatemoreresourcestowardstheendofaproject.Thisresultholdsunderavarietyofscenarios:whentheworkerhasunknownability,whentheoutsideoptionsvarywithoutput,andevenunderanagencyframeworkwitharisk-averseagent.Theproductionofgoodsandservicestakestime.Ittakestimetobuildcars,writesoftware,developdrugs,formulatestrategy,marketproducts,auditclients,andvaluecompanies.Infact,manyfirmstodayorganizetheirproductionintheformofprojectsthatrunforweeks,months,orevenyearsatatimebeforethefirmcansellthefinishedproductinamarket.Forexample,softwaredevelopmentrunsthroughdesign,implementation,andtestingstagesbeforefinalrelease.Thispaperexaminestheproblemofperformanceevaluationbeforeaprojectisfinished.Themainideaisthatperformanceevaluationsgenerateefficientsorting.Theyprovidethefirmwiththeoptionofendingprojectswithlowearlyreturns.Aperformanceevaluationconductedattheinterimstagesortsemployeesintotwogroups:stayorquit.Itisefficienttoquitiftheearlyreturnsareweak,andtostayotherwise.Iftheagent’searlyoutputislow,itisintheinterestofboththefirmandtheagenttodiscontinueworkandcollecttheirrespectiveoutsideoptions.Inthissense,theperformanceevaluationassignsanagenttohismostefficientuse.Theroleoftheevaluation,therefore,istoperformthissorting.Interimperformanceevaluationschangetheefficientallocationofre-sourcesovertimeinsurprisingways.Themainresultshowsthatitisefficienttoassignmoreresourcestothelaterstagesoftheproject.Theevaluationcreatesthepossibilityofterminationaftertheearlystage,whichreducesthemarginalreturnfromfirst-stageeffort,andsotheagentshadeshiseffortdownwardintheearlystage.Oncetheagentadvances,thepossibilityofterminationvanishesandthemarginalreturntoeffortrises,soheworksharder.Insum,itisefficienttostayiftheearlyreturnsarehigh,andforthosethatstay,itisefficienttoworkharder.Theusualanalysisofperformanceevaluationstakesplaceinagencymod-Theusualanalysisofperformanceevaluationstakesplaceinagencymodelsthatspananenormousliteratureinaccounting,economics,andfinance(seeBaiman[1982,1990],Indjejikian[1999],Lambert[2001],Prendergast[1999]forreviews).Agencytheoryhasenjoyedwidetheoreticalattentionoverthelast20years,andhasdramaticallyadvancedourunderstandingofperformancemeasurement.Unfortunately,itsempiricalsupportremainsmixed,asPrendergast[2002]andLazear[2003]document.Theresultsofmostagencymodelsarehighlysensitivetotheirdetails—theinformationstructure,thetimingofthegame,therestrictionsonthecontracts,etc.Sowhenthedetailsofthegamechange,evenslightly,sodothepredictionsofthemodel.Thispapertakesadifferentapproach.Thefocushereisnotonincentives,butonsorting.Iproposeasimpleandrobustefficiencymodelthatdoesnotrelyonacomplexcontractinggamewithinthefirm.Theaimistounderstandthevalueofinterimperformanceinformationtoallparties,nottheopportunisticuseofinformationbyoneside.Theanalysishereshiftsattentionawayfromdistortionsfromfirst-besttoimprovementsinfirst-best.Performanceevaluationsdon’tjustsliceupafixedpie,butmakethepieitselfbigger.Exploringthesortingeffectsofinterimperformanceevaluationsinafirst-bestworldabstractsfromconflictsofinterestsbetweenpartiesandmakesmoreapparenttheeconomicforcesdrivingtheeffortallocationdecision.Nonetheless,Ishowthatthemainresultofthemodelisstillrobustwithinanagencycontext.Inparticular,whenarisk-neutralprincipalcannotobserveeffortandcontractswitharisk-averseagent,theagent