績(jī)效考核的困境外文翻譯及原文

原文一：TheDilemmaofPerformanceAppraisalByPeterProwseandJulieProwseItwilloutlinethedevelopmentofindividualperformancebeforelinkingtoperformancemanagementinorganizations.Theoutcomesoftechniquestoincreaseorganizationalcommitment,increasejobsatisfactionwillbecriticallyevaluated.ItwillfurtherexaminethetransatlanticdebatesbetweenliteratureonefficiencyandeffectivenessintheNorthAmericanandtheUnitedKingdom)evidencetoevaluatetheHRMdevelopmentandcontributionofperformanceappraisaltoindividualandorganizationalperformance.Appraisalpotentiallyisakeytoolinmakingthemostofanorganisation’shumanresources.Theuseofappraisaliswidespreadestimatedthat80–90%oforganizationsintheUSAandUKwereusingappraisalandanincreasefrom69to87%oforganisationsbetween1998and2004reportedaformalperformancemanagementsystem(ArmstrongandBaron,1998:200).Therehasbeenlittleevidenceoftheevaluationoftheeffectivenessofappraisalbutmoreonthedevelopmentinitsuse.Between1998and2004asamplefromtheCharteredInstituteofPersonnelandDevelopment(CIPD,2007)of562firmsfound506wereusingperformanceappraisalinUK.Whatisalsovitaltoemphasiseistherisinguseofperformanceappraisalfeedbackbeyondperformanceforprofessionalsandmanagerstonearly95%ofworkplacesinthe2004WERSsurvey(seeTable13.1).ClearlytheuseofAppraisalshasbeenthedevelopmentandextensionofappraisalstocoveralargeproportionoftheUKworkforceandthecoverageofnonmanagerialoccupationsandtheextendeduseinprivateandpublicsectors.Critiquesofappraisalhavecontinuedasappraisalshaveincreasedinuseandscopeacrosssectorsandoccupations.Thedominantcritiqueisthemanagementframeworkusingappraisalasanorthodoxtechniquethatseekstoremedytheweaknessandproposeofappraisalsasasystemtodevelopperformance.This“orthodox”approacharguesthereareconflictingpurposesofappraisal(Strebleretal,2001).Appraisalcanmotivatestaffbyclarifyingobjectivesandsettingclearfutureobjectiveswithprovisionfortraininganddevelopmentneedstoestablishtheperformanceobjective.Theseconflictswithassessingpastperformanceanddistributionofrewardsbasedonpastperformance(Bach,2005:301).Employeesarereluctanttoconfideanylimitationsandconcernsontheircurrentperformanceasthiscouldimpactontheirmeritrelatedrewardorpromotionopportunities(NewtonandFindley,1996:43).ThisconflictswithperformanceasacontinuumasappraisersarechallengedwithdifferingrolesasbothmonitorsandjudgesofperformancebutanunderstandingcounsellorwhichRandell(1994)arguesfewmanagershavenotreceivedtherainingtoperform.AppraisalManager’sreluctancetocriticisealsostemsfromclassicevidencefromMcGregorthatmanagersarereluctanttomakeanegativejudgementonanindividual’sperformanceasitcouldbedemotivating,leadtoaccusationsoftheirownsupportandcontributiontoindividualpoorperformanceandtoalsoavoidinterpersonalconflict(McGregor,1957).Oneconsequenceofthisavoidanceofconflictistorateallcriterionascentralandavoidanyconflictknownasthecentraltendency.InastudyofseniormanagersbyLongneckeretal.(1987),theyfoundorganisationalpoliticsinfluencedratingsof60seniorexecutives.Thefindingswerethatpoliticsinvolveddeliberateattemptsbyindividualstoenhanceorprotectself-interestswhenconflictingcoursesofactionarepossibleandthatratingsanddecisionswereaffectedbypotentialsourcesofbiasorinaccuracyintheirappraisalratings(Longeneckeretal.,1987).TherearemethodsoffurtherbiasbeyondLongenecker’sevidence.Thepoliticaljudgementsandtheyhavebeendistortedfurtherbyoverratingsomeclearcompetenciesinperformanceratherthanbeingcriticalacrossallratedcompetenciesknownasthehaloeffectandifsomecompetenciesarelowertheymayprejudicethejudgmentacrossthepositivereviewsknownasthehornseffect(ACAS,1996).OneconsequenceofthisavoidanceofconflictistorateallcriterionascentralTherearemethodsSomeratingsmayonlycincluderecenteventsandtheseareknownastherecencyeffects.Inthiscaseonlyrecenteventsarenotedcomparedtomanagersgatheringandusingdatathroughouttheappraisalperiod.Aparticularconcernistheequityofappraisalforratingswhichmaybedistortedbygender,ethnicityandtheratingsofappraisersthemselves.ArangeofstudiesinboththeUSandUKhavehighlightedsubjectivityintermsofgender(Alimo-Metcalf,1991;White,1999)andethnicityoftheappraiseandappraiser(GeddesandKonrad,2003).Suggestionsandsolutionsonresolvingbiaswillbereviewedlater.Thesecondanalysisistheradicalcritiqueofappraisal.Thisisthemorecriticalmanagementliteraturethatarguesthatappraisalandperformancemanagementareaboutmanagementcontrol(NewtonandFindley,1996;Townley,1993).Itarguesthattightermanagementcontroloveremployeebehaviourcanbeachievedbytheextensionofappraisaltomanualworkers,professionalasmeanstocontrol.ThisdevelopstheliteratureofFoucaultusingpowerandsurveillance.Thisliteratureusescasesinexamplesofpublicservicecontrolonprofessionalssuchateachers(Healy,1997)andUniversityprofessionals(Townley,1990).Thisevidencearguestheincreasedcontrolofpublicservicesusingappraisalasamethodofcontrolandthattheoutcomeofmanagerialobjectivesignoresthedevelopmentalroleofappraisalandratingsareawardedforpeoplewhoacceptandembracethecultureandorganizationalvalues.However,thisliteratureignorestheemployeeresistanceandtheuseofprofessionalunionstochallengetheattemptstoexertcontroloverprofessionalsandstaffintheappraisalprocess(Bach,2005:306).ThisevidencearguesOneofthedifferentissuesofremovingbiaswastheuseofthetestmetaphor(Folgeretal.,1992).Thiswasbasedontheassumptionthatappraisalratingswereatechnicalquestionofassessing“true”performanceandthereneededtobeincreasedreliabilityandvalidityofappraisalasaninstrumenttodevelopmotivationandperformance.Thesourcesofraterbiasanderrorscanberesolvedbyimprovedorganisationaljusticeandincreasingreliabilityofappraiser’sjudgement.Howevertherewereproblemssuchasanassumptionthatyoucanstatejobrequirementsclearlyandtheorganizationis“rational”withobjectivesthatreflectvaluesandthatthejudgmentbyappraisers’arevaluefreefrompoliticalagendasandpersonalobjectives.Secondlythereisthesecondissueofsubjectivityifappraisalratingswheredecisionsonappraisalareratedbya“politicalmetaphor”(Hartle,1995).This“politicalview”arguesthataappraisalisoftendonebadlybecausethereisalackoftrainingforappraisersandappraisersmayseetheappraisalasawasteoftime.Thisbecomesaprocesswhichmanagershavetoperformandnotasapotentialtoimproveemployeeperformance.Organisationsinthiscontextare“political”andtheappraisersseektomaintainperformancefromsubordinatesandviewappraisesasinternalcustomerstosatisfy.Thismeansmanagersuseappraisaltoavoidinterpersonalconflictanddevelopstrategiesfortheirownpersonaladvancementandseekaquietlifebyavoidingcensurefromhighermanagers.Thisperceptionmeansmanagersalsoseeappraiseeseeksgoodratingandgenuinefeedbackandcareerdevelopmentbyseekingevidenceofcombiningemployeepromotionandpayrise.Thismeansappraisalratingsbecomepoliticaljudgementsandseektoavoidinterpersonalconflicts.Theapproachesofthe“test”and“political”metaphorsofappraisalareinaccurateandlackobjectivityandjudgementofemployeeperformanceisinaccurateandaccuracyisavoided.Theissueishowcanorganisationsresolvethislackofobjectivity?Grint(1993)arguesthatthesolutionstoobjectivityliesinpartwithMcGregor’s(1957)classiccritiquebyretrainingandremovalof“topdown”ratingsbymanagersandreplacementwithmultipleraterevaluationwhichremovesbiasandtheobjectivitybyupwardperformanceappraisal.Thevalidityofupwardappraisalmeanstheremovalofsubjectiveappraisalratings.Thisapproachisalsosuggestedtoremovegenderbiasinappraisalratingsagainstwomeninappraisals(Fletcher,1999).Thesolutionofmultiplereporting(internalcolleagues,customersandrecipientsofservices)willreducesubjectivityandinequityofappraisalratings.Thisargumentdevelopsfurtherbytheriseintheneedtoevaluateprojectteamsandincreasinglevelsofteamworktoincludepeerassessment.Thesolutionsalsointheorymeanincreasedclosercontactwithindividualmanagerandappraisesandincreasingserviceslinkedtocustomerfacingevaluations.However,negativefeedbackstilldemotivatesandplentyoffeedbackandexplanationbymanagerwhocollatesfeedbackratherthanjudgesperformanceandfailtosummariseevaluations.TherearehoweverstillproblemswithaccuracyofappraisalobjectivityasWalkerandSmither(1999)5yearstudyof252managersover5yearperiodstillidentifiedissueswithsubjectiveratingsin360degreeappraisals.Therearestillissuesonthesubjectivityofappraisalsbeyondtheareasoflackoftraining.Thecontributionofappraisalisstronglyrelatedtoemployeeattitudesandstrongrelationshipswithjobsatisfaction(FletcherandWilliams,1996).Theevidenceonappraisalstillremainspositiveintermsofreinvigoratingsocialrelationshipsatwork(Townley,1993)andthewidespreadadoptioninlargepublicservicesintheUKsuchasthenationalhealthService(NHS)isthevaluablecontributiontolinemanagersdiscussionwithstaffontheirpastperformance,discussingpersonaldevelopmentplansandtraininganddevelopmentaspositiveissues.Onefurtherconcernistheopennessofappraisalrelatedtoemployeerewardwhichwenowdiscuss.Appraisalandperformancemanagementhavebeeninextricablylinkedtoemployeerewardsincethedevelopmentofstrategichumanresourcemanagementinthe1980s.Theearlyliteratureonappraisallinkedappraisalwithemployeecontrol(Randell,1994;Grint,1993;Townley,1993,1999)anddiscussedtheuseofperformancerelatedrewardtoappraisals.Howevertherecentliteraturehassubstitutedthechaptertitlesemployee“appraisal”with“performancemanagement”(Bach,2005;Storey,2007)andmovedthefocusonperformanceandperformancepayandthelimitsofemployeeappraisal.Theappraisalandperformancepaylinkhasdevelopedintodebatestothreekeyissues:Thefirstissueishasperformancepayrelatedtoappraisalgrowninuse?Thesecondissueiswhattypeofperformancedowereward?andthefinalissueiswhojudgesmanagementstandards?Thefirstdiscussiononinfluencesofgrowthofperformancepayschemesistheassumptionthatincreasinglinkagebetweenindividualeffortandfinancialrewardincreasesperformancelevels.Thislinkagebetweeneffortandfinancialrewardincreasinglevelsofperformancehasprovedanincreasingtrendinthepublicandprivatesector(BevanandThompson,1992;ArmstrongandBaron,1998).Thedrivetoincreasepublicsectorperformanceeffortandsettingoftargetsmayevenbeinconsistentintheexperiencesofsomeorganizationalsettingsaimedatachievinglong-termtargets(KesslerandPurcell,1992;Marsden,2007).ThedevelopmentofmeritbasedpaybasedonperformanceassessedbyamanagerisrisingintheUKMarsden(2007)reportedthatthe:Useofperformanceappraisalsasabasisformeritpayareusedin65percentofpublicsectorand69percentoftheprivatesectoremployeeswhereappraisalcoveredallnonmanagerialstaff(p.109).Meritpayhasalsogrowninuseasin199820%ofworkplacesusedperformancerelatedschemescomparedto32%inthesameorganizations2004(Kersleyetal.,2006:191).TheachievementsofsatisfactoryratingsorabovesatisfactoryperformanceaverageswereusedasevidencetorewardindividualperformanceratingsintheUKCivilService(Marsden,2007).Table13.2outlinestheextentofmeritpayin2004.Thesecondissueiswhatformsofperformanceisrewarded.Theuseofpastappraisalratingsasevidenceofachievingmerit-relatedpaymentslinkedtoachievinghigherperformancewasthepredominantfactordevelopedinthepublicservices.TheevidenceonSettingperformancetargetshavebeenasKessler(2000:280)reported“inconsistentwithinorganizationsandproblematicforcertainprofessionalorlessskilledoccupationswheregoalshavenotbeeneasilyformulated”.Therehasbeeninconclusiveevidencefromorganizationsontheimpactofperformancepayanditseffectivenessinimprovingperformance.Evidencefromanumberofindividualperformancepayschemesreportorganizationssuspendingorreviewingthemonthegroundsthatindividualperformancerewardhasproducednoeffectinperformanceorevendemotivatesstaff(Kessler,2000:281).Morein-depthstudiessettingperformancegoalsfollowedbyappraisalonhowwelltheywereresultedinlossofmotivationwhilstmaintainingproductivityandachievedmanagersusingimposingincreasedperformancestandards(MarsdenandRichardson,1994).AsRandell(1994)hadhighlightedearlier,thepotentialobjectivityandself-criticisminappraisalreviewsbecomeareasthatappraiseesrefusetoacknowledgeasweaknesseswithappraisersifthisleadstoareductionintheirmeritpay.Objectivityandselfreflectionfordevelopmentbecomesaweaknessthatappraisesfailtoacknowledgeasadevelopmentalissueifitreducestheirchancesofareducedevaluationthatwillreducetheirmeritreward.Thereviewofcivilservicemeritpay(Makinson,2000)reportedfrom4majorUKCivilServiceAgenciesandtheNationalHealthServiceconcludedthatexistingformsofperformancepayandperformancemanagementhadfailedtomotivatemanystaff.Theconclusionswerethatemployeesfoundindividualperformancepaydivisiveandledtoreducedwillingnesstoco-operatewithmanagement,citingmanagerialfavoritesandmanipulationofappraisalscorestolowerratingstosavepayingrewardstostaff(MarsdenandFrench,1998).Thishasclearimplicationsontherelationshipbetweenlinemanagersandappraisesandthedemotivationalconsequencesandreducedcommitmentprovideclearevidenceofthedangertolinkingindividualperformanceappraisaltorewardinthepublicservices.Employeesfocusontheissuesthatgainkeyperformancefocusbyfocusingonspecificobjectivesrelatedtokeyperformanceindicatorsratherthanallpersonalobjectives.AstudyofbankingperformancepaybyLewis(1998)highlightedimposedtargetswhichwereunattainablewitharangeof20performancetargetswithnarrowshorttermfinancialorientatatedgoals.Thenarrowfocusonkeytargetsandneglectofotherperformanceaspectsleadstotasksnotbeingdelivered.Thisfinalissueofjudgingmanagementstandardshasalreadyhighlightedissuesofinequityandbiasbasedongender(Beyer,1990;ChenandDiTomasio,1996;Fletcher,1999).ThesuggestedsolutionstoresolvedIscriminationhavebeenproposedasenhancedinterpersonalskillstrainingareincreasedequitableuseof360degreeappraisalasamethodtoevaluatefeedbackfromcolleaguesasthisreducestheuseofthe“politicalmetaphor”(Randell,1994;Fletcher,1999).Onmeasureslinkingperformancetoimprovementrequireawiderapproachtoenhancedworkdesignandmotivationtodevelopandenhanceemployeejobsatisfactionandthedesignoflinkagesbetweeneffortandperformancearesignificantintheprivatesectorandfeedbackandawarenessinthepublicsector(FletcherandWilliams,1996:176).Whererisesbeinpayweredeterminedbyachievingcriticalratedappraisalobjectives,employeesarelessselfcriticalandopentoanydevelopmentalneedsinaperformancereview.Therearekeyissuesthatrequireresolutionandagreatdealdependsontheextenttowhichyouhaveagoodrelationshipwithyourlinemanager.Barlow(1989)argued`ifyougetoffbadlywithyourfirsttwomanagers,youmayjustaswellforgetit(p.515).Theevidenceonthecontinuedpracticeofappraisalsisthattheyarestillinstitutionallyelaboratedsystemsofmanagementappraisalanddevelopmentissignificantrhetoricintheapparatusofbureaucraticcontrolbymanagers(Barlow,1989).Inrealitythecompaniescreate,review,changeandevenabolishappraisalsiftheyfailtodevelopandenhanceorganisationalperformance(Kessler,2000).Despiteallthecriticismandevidencethecriticshavefailedtosuggestanalternativeforaprocessthatcanprovidefeedback,developmotivation,identifytrainingandpotentialandevidencethatcanjustifypotentialcareerdevelopmentandjustifyreward(Hartle,1997).Source:JournalofAccountingResearch,Jun2009譯文一：績(jī)效考核的困境作者：彼得·布朗斯，茱莉亞·布朗斯績(jī)效管理發(fā)展中的個(gè)人業(yè)績(jī)與企業(yè)組織相聯(lián)系，以提高組織承諾的成果的實(shí)現(xiàn)性，審慎評(píng)估以增加工作滿意度。它將進(jìn)一步研究文獻(xiàn)的跨領(lǐng)域的效率和有效性議題在北美和英國(guó)的證據(jù)，以評(píng)估個(gè)人和組織績(jī)效的人力資源開(kāi)發(fā)和考核貢獻(xiàn)。評(píng)估是充分利用企業(yè)組織人力資源的一個(gè)關(guān)鍵工具。績(jī)效考核的使用分布廣泛，根據(jù)1998年至2004年一個(gè)正式的績(jī)效管理系統(tǒng)的報(bào)告(ArmstrongandBaron,1998:200)，估計(jì)80-90％的美國(guó)組織正在使用，而英國(guó)使用比例從69%增加至87％。有很少關(guān)于在發(fā)展考核的證據(jù)，而有更多的使用效益。1998年至2004年從英國(guó)特許人事樣本562，發(fā)現(xiàn)在英國(guó)506人使用表現(xiàn)評(píng)估，這是還必須強(qiáng)調(diào)的是越來(lái)越多地使用的表現(xiàn)。在2004年WERS調(diào)查中，在幾乎95％的工作場(chǎng)所強(qiáng)調(diào)的關(guān)鍵是基于專業(yè)人員和管理人員的績(jī)效的績(jī)效考核反饋。顯然，考核已經(jīng)是不斷發(fā)展和拓展，已經(jīng)覆蓋很大比例的英國(guó)勞動(dòng)人口和非職業(yè)管理以及在私營(yíng)和公共部門推廣使用?？己嗽u(píng)比繼續(xù)作為績(jī)效波動(dòng)被更多的部門和行業(yè)使用。占主導(dǎo)地位的批判是作為一個(gè)正統(tǒng)的技術(shù)的管理框架，旨在糾正弱點(diǎn)及評(píng)估作為一個(gè)發(fā)展績(jī)效的系統(tǒng)。這種“正統(tǒng)”的做法認(rèn)為有考核沖突目的(Strebleretal,2001）?？己丝梢酝ㄟ^(guò)明確的目標(biāo)激勵(lì)工作人員，制定明確的培訓(xùn)和發(fā)展的需要，提供未來(lái)的目標(biāo)來(lái)確定績(jī)效目標(biāo)。這些與過(guò)去的績(jī)效考考核和獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)與分配的沖突是基于過(guò)去的表現(xiàn)(Bach,2005:301)。員工不愿意吐露任何限制和關(guān)注他們目前績(jī)效因?yàn)檫@可能對(duì)績(jī)效的影響，與相關(guān)獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)或晉升機(jī)會(huì)（NewtonandFindley,1996:43）。這些績(jī)效沖突對(duì)于考核人來(lái)說(shuō)是連續(xù)作為管理者和判定者的業(yè)績(jī)不同角色的挑戰(zhàn)，而是理解輔導(dǎo)員的蘭德?tīng)?994）認(rèn)為少數(shù)管理人員沒(méi)有得到執(zhí)行。McGregor認(rèn)為績(jī)效考核經(jīng)理不愿意考核是有典型的證據(jù)的，管理者不愿意就個(gè)人的表現(xiàn)和培訓(xùn)服務(wù)進(jìn)行判斷可能使士氣低落，導(dǎo)致自己的支持和貢獻(xiàn)個(gè)人表現(xiàn)欠佳，并同時(shí)避免人際沖突（McGregor,1957)。避免沖突一個(gè)后果是，以速度為中心的所有標(biāo)準(zhǔn)并避免為中心的高級(jí)管理人員傾向的沖突。由longneckeretal（1987年）對(duì)于高級(jí)管理者的研究，他們發(fā)現(xiàn)組織政策的影響比率60名高級(jí)管理人員，調(diào)查結(jié)果顯示，通過(guò)加強(qiáng)個(gè)人或保護(hù)自身利益來(lái)刻意的參與政策行動(dòng)時(shí)，當(dāng)可能的沖突情況，在他們的評(píng)估等級(jí)比率和是由偏見(jiàn)或受影響的潛在來(lái)源決定的（Longeneckeret，1987）。這有Longenecker’s的證據(jù)進(jìn)一步證明偏見(jiàn)的方法。他們的政治判斷和已扭曲不自量力，一些表現(xiàn)能力進(jìn)一步明確而不是在關(guān)鍵的環(huán)節(jié)和已知的額定能力，如果一些較低的判決他們可能影響作為角色整個(gè)正面影響（ACAS，1996年）。有些評(píng)級(jí)可能只包括最近發(fā)生的事件，這些都是近期的已知影響。在這種情況下，經(jīng)理搜集和使用的只有在整個(gè)考核期間最近的比較事件。特別關(guān)注對(duì)績(jī)效數(shù)據(jù)的公平性的考核，這可能通過(guò)性別，種族和考核者的階層自身而扭曲。一些對(duì)于美國(guó)和英國(guó)的研究凸顯了對(duì)于性別（Alimo-Metcalf,1991;White,1999）考核和考核者的級(jí)別的主觀性（GeddesandKonrad,2003）。建議和解決偏見(jiàn)的方案稍后將檢討。第二個(gè)分析是對(duì)考核激進(jìn)的批判。這是更多重要管理文獻(xiàn)中認(rèn)為，評(píng)估和表現(xiàn)管理都是關(guān)于管理控制(NewtonandFindley,1996;Townley,1993)。Itargues它認(rèn)為加強(qiáng)對(duì)員工行為的管理控制，可實(shí)現(xiàn)的對(duì)人工考核的拓展，是控制的專業(yè)手段。這發(fā)展了Foucault利用職權(quán)和監(jiān)視的文獻(xiàn)。這些文獻(xiàn)使用像教師這樣的專業(yè)人員的公共服務(wù)控制的例子(Healy,1997)和大學(xué)專業(yè)人員的(Townley,1990)。這方面的證據(jù)認(rèn)為使用考核來(lái)加強(qiáng)對(duì)公共服務(wù)的控制，作為一種控制方法并認(rèn)為，管理客觀性結(jié)果忽視了考核和等級(jí)評(píng)定的發(fā)展作用，均獲得人們接受和支持的文化和組織價(jià)值。然而，這種文獻(xiàn)忽略員工阻力與利用工會(huì)來(lái)挑戰(zhàn)試圖對(duì)專業(yè)人員和工作人員在評(píng)估過(guò)程施加控制。(Bach,2005:306)消除偏見(jiàn)的不同議題之一是使用隱喻的測(cè)試（Folgeretal，1992年）。這是基于假設(shè)考核比率一個(gè)評(píng)估“真實(shí)”績(jī)效的技術(shù)性問(wèn)題，這需要增加考核的可靠性和有效性作為一種發(fā)展動(dòng)力和績(jī)效的工具。評(píng)價(jià)者偏見(jiàn)和錯(cuò)誤的來(lái)源可以通過(guò)改進(jìn)組織公平，增加考核者鑒定可靠性解決的。但有一個(gè)假設(shè)的問(wèn)題，如你可以清晰描述工作要求，該組織是通過(guò)考核人從價(jià)值和政治議程自由裁量權(quán)的價(jià)值觀和判定反映“理性”的目標(biāo)。其次存在第二個(gè)問(wèn)題是主觀性，如果由考核決定的的績(jī)效比率是由一個(gè)“政治隱喻”決定的(Hartle,1995)。這種“政治觀點(diǎn)”認(rèn)為，考核做不好是因?yàn)榭?jī)效評(píng)估者缺少訓(xùn)練，他們把績(jī)效考核看成是一種浪費(fèi)時(shí)間。這成為管理者必須執(zhí)行，而不是作為一個(gè)潛在的改進(jìn)員工績(jī)效的一個(gè)過(guò)程。本文中的組織是“政治”的，評(píng)估師設(shè)法維持下屬的績(jī)效并視考核為內(nèi)部顧客滿意。這意味著管理人員使用考核，以避免人際沖突和發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略的個(gè)人地位，并尋求一個(gè)安靜的生活，避免較高的管理人員的譴責(zé)。這種看法是指管理者也看到考核者尋找好考核比率和反饋以及職業(yè)發(fā)展，通過(guò)尋求員工促進(jìn)和支付手段相結(jié)合的證據(jù).這意味著考核比率成為政治上的判斷并設(shè)法避免人際沖突。在績(jī)效的“測(cè)試”和“政治”的比喻是不準(zhǔn)確的考核，缺乏判斷雇員績(jī)效客觀性，精度偏差。這問(wèn)題是組織如何能解決這種缺乏客觀性？格林特（1993）認(rèn)為，在對(duì)客觀的解決方案的一部分，是麥格雷戈的（1957年）由再培訓(xùn)的經(jīng)典批判和清除“向下”的管理人員評(píng)分封頂和更換多個(gè)考核者考核以消除偏見(jiàn)和由績(jī)效評(píng)估的客觀性基礎(chǔ)上。向上有效性的考核意味著主觀性的考核比率，這種方法還消除建議考核評(píng)分，以消除對(duì)婦女的考核(Fletcher,1999)多元化報(bào)表解決方案（內(nèi)部同事，客戶和收件人服務(wù)）將減少評(píng)分的主觀性和考核比率的不公平。這爭(zhēng)論的進(jìn)一步發(fā)展所需要評(píng)估的項(xiàng)目團(tuán)隊(duì)和越來(lái)越多的增加團(tuán)隊(duì)合作水平，包括同事評(píng)估。在該解決方案的理論上，平均增加經(jīng)理和加強(qiáng)與個(gè)別考核和聯(lián)系以增加與客戶服務(wù)所面臨的考核。但是，負(fù)反饋仍然是傷害性很大的。通過(guò)整理反饋意見(jiàn)，而不是考核績(jī)效表現(xiàn)的經(jīng)理大量工作。然而，我們總結(jié)反饋和解釋考核。這與考核的準(zhǔn)確性仍然存在客觀問(wèn)題，沃克和史密瑟（1999）用360考評(píng)法五年研究了252位經(jīng)理五年期間，這主觀考核問(wèn)題仍然在評(píng)估主體的問(wèn)題超出缺乏培訓(xùn)等領(lǐng)域。在考核的貢獻(xiàn)是密切相關(guān)員工的態(tài)度和強(qiáng)烈與工作滿意度(FletcherandWilliams,1996)。該證據(jù)正面考核仍然在振興工作中的社會(huì)關(guān)系方面（湯利，1993年）和大型公共服務(wù)的廣泛采用，英國(guó)等作為國(guó)家衛(wèi)生服務(wù)體系（NHS）是各級(jí)管理人員的寶貴貢獻(xiàn)討論有關(guān)其員工過(guò)去的表現(xiàn)，討論個(gè)人發(fā)展計(jì)劃和培訓(xùn)，并積極議題，進(jìn)一步關(guān)注發(fā)展是開(kāi)放性與員工的報(bào)酬，我們現(xiàn)在討論的考核。20世紀(jì)80年代，由于戰(zhàn)略人力資源管理的發(fā)展，考核和績(jī)效管理已與雇員獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)密不可分。關(guān)于考核的早期文獻(xiàn)中就將考核與員工控制(Randell,1994;Grint,1993;Townley,1993,1999)相聯(lián)系，并討論了有關(guān)考核獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)績(jī)效的使用問(wèn)題.然而有一部分文獻(xiàn)已經(jīng)取代了章節(jié)標(biāo)題雇員“考核”與“績(jī)效管理”(Bach,2005;Storey,2007)，焦點(diǎn)轉(zhuǎn)移到績(jī)效和績(jī)效激勵(lì)與員工考核的限制上來(lái)。績(jī)效與績(jī)效工資的聯(lián)系已發(fā)展為對(duì)三個(gè)關(guān)鍵問(wèn)題的討論：第一問(wèn)題討論績(jī)效工資是否已經(jīng)與考核發(fā)展在使用中同步進(jìn)行？第二個(gè)問(wèn)題是什么類型的績(jī)效，我們應(yīng)該獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)？最后的問(wèn)題是誰(shuí)來(lái)判斷工作標(biāo)準(zhǔn)？關(guān)于績(jī)效工資方案不斷增長(zhǎng)的影響是第一個(gè)討論的問(wèn)題，它是在增加個(gè)人的努力和物質(zhì)回報(bào)之間的聯(lián)系以提高績(jī)效水平。這種個(gè)人努力和物質(zhì)回報(bào)聯(lián)動(dòng)以提高績(jī)效水平，證明了在公共和私營(yíng)部門的發(fā)展趨勢(shì)(BevanandThompson,1992;ArmstrongandBaron,1998)。這樣促使增加公共部門的績(jī)效努力和目標(biāo)設(shè)置可能甚至在實(shí)現(xiàn)旨在實(shí)現(xiàn)長(zhǎng)期目標(biāo)的某些組織設(shè)置中會(huì)不一致(KesslerandPurcell,1992;Marsden,2007），通過(guò)經(jīng)理的基于績(jī)效評(píng)估的工資的優(yōu)點(diǎn)的發(fā)展是由英國(guó)的馬斯登（2007）報(bào)告中提出：考績(jī)用作績(jī)效工資的基礎(chǔ)是在覆蓋了非管理層員工的公共部門中的使用比率為65%，私營(yíng)部門的使用比率為69%（109頁(yè)）?？?jī)效工資的使用也在增加，在1998年組織使用績(jī)效工資的比率為20％，而在相同的組織2004年這一比率達(dá)到32%(Kersleyetal.,2006:191)。令人滿意的比率或以上的績(jī)效超過(guò)令人滿意的成果平均數(shù)的將作為證據(jù)，以獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)英國(guó)公務(wù)員中個(gè)人業(yè)績(jī)?cè)u(píng)級(jí)(Marsden,2007)。第二個(gè)問(wèn)題是什么樣的績(jī)效形式應(yīng)該獲得獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)。對(duì)于過(guò)去績(jī)效比率的使用是為實(shí)現(xiàn)與實(shí)現(xiàn)更高的獎(jiǎng)賞支付的證據(jù)在公共服務(wù)中式鑒定評(píng)級(jí)績(jī)效的主要因素。TheevidenceonSettingperformancetargetshavebeenasKessler(2000:280)關(guān)于設(shè)置業(yè)績(jī)目標(biāo)已被證明凱斯勒（2000:280）的報(bào)告“不一致的內(nèi)部組織和目標(biāo)模糊的組織中的某些專業(yè)問(wèn)題或技術(shù)水平較低的地方”。這里有從組織對(duì)績(jī)效工資的影響payanditseffectivenessinimprovingperformance.和提高表現(xiàn)的效率的不確定的證據(jù)。從大量的個(gè)人績(jī)效薪酬計(jì)劃報(bào)告的證據(jù)中，機(jī)構(gòu)暫?；?qū)彶樗麄儗?duì)個(gè)別表現(xiàn)卻沒(méi)有獲得任何報(bào)酬的影響，甚至傷害工作人員（Kessler,2000:281)。建立績(jī)效目標(biāo)更深入的研究,緊隨其后的是取決于他們的評(píng)估,是如何導(dǎo)致失去動(dòng)力,同時(shí)保持生產(chǎn)率和實(shí)現(xiàn)管理者使用性能提高的績(jī)效標(biāo)準(zhǔn)(MarsdenandRichardson,1994)。正如As蘭德?tīng)枺?994）早前曾強(qiáng)調(diào)，潛在的客觀性和自我批評(píng)在考核區(qū)域中，成為評(píng)核者拒絕承認(rèn)評(píng)估師的弱點(diǎn)如果從而導(dǎo)致了他們的績(jī)效工資的減少?？陀^性和自我反思的發(fā)展成為一個(gè)弱點(diǎn)，那就是考核失敗作為一個(gè)發(fā)展問(wèn)題，如果它減少了降低評(píng)估的機(jī)會(huì)，這將減少他們的績(jī)效獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)。審視公務(wù)員的績(jī)效工資(Makinson,2000)來(lái)自于英國(guó)4大公務(wù)員服務(wù)機(jī)構(gòu)和公務(wù)員國(guó)家衛(wèi)生服務(wù)的結(jié)論，績(jī)效工資和存在形式績(jī)效管理沒(méi)能激勵(lì)許多工作人員得出的結(jié)論是，雇員發(fā)現(xiàn)個(gè)人績(jī)效工資分裂并且導(dǎo)致降低管理合作的意愿，管理偏好的引用，對(duì)于績(jī)效分?jǐn)?shù)降低比率以減少員工的績(jī)效工資的問(wèn)題的修復(fù)(MarsdenandFrench,1998)。這有明確含義關(guān)于一線管理人員和考核之間的關(guān)系，被動(dòng)的結(jié)果并減少承諾提供明確的證據(jù)將個(gè)人績(jī)效考核與在公共部門的獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)聯(lián)系起來(lái)。雇員注重這樣的問(wèn)題，以獲取關(guān)鍵績(jī)效以集中與關(guān)鍵因素有關(guān)的而不是所有的個(gè)人性格相聯(lián)系的具體目標(biāo)為重點(diǎn)相關(guān)的關(guān)鍵績(jī)效指標(biāo)。Lewis（1998）的一個(gè)銀行業(yè)績(jī)效工資的研究強(qiáng)調(diào)，實(shí)施目標(biāo)是一個(gè)在20個(gè)績(jī)效目標(biāo)范圍內(nèi)遙不可及的狹隘的短期業(yè)績(jī)目標(biāo)。這種狹隘的對(duì)重點(diǎn)對(duì)象關(guān)注而忽略其他績(jī)效方面將導(dǎo)致工作無(wú)法實(shí)現(xiàn)。最后一個(gè)問(wèn)題是這種判斷管理標(biāo)準(zhǔn)已經(jīng)突出基于性別的不公平和偏見(jiàn)的問(wèn)題(Beyer,1990;ChenandDiTomasio,1996;Fletcher,1999)。建議的解決歧視的方案為加強(qiáng)人際技巧訓(xùn)練來(lái)增加運(yùn)用360度考核的公平性并作為考核評(píng)估的方法從同事的反饋，因?yàn)檫@可以減少在“政治隱喻”使用(Randell,1994;Fletcher,1999)。連接績(jī)效與工作改進(jìn)的措施連接績(jī)效和連接需要更廣泛的方法，加強(qiáng)工作設(shè)計(jì)和發(fā)展動(dòng)力以及提高員工工作滿意度和努力和績(jī)效之間的聯(lián)系的設(shè)計(jì)，是重要的私營(yíng)部門和反饋和在公共部門的宣傳(FletcherandWilliams,1996:176)。凡在工資上升由實(shí)現(xiàn)的關(guān)鍵考核目標(biāo)決定的，員工缺乏自我批判和開(kāi)放在任何績(jī)效考核的發(fā)展需要中。需要討論和解決的關(guān)鍵問(wèn)題是取決于你與您的頂頭上司是否有良好的關(guān)系。Barlow(1989)如果你說(shuō)你跟的兩位經(jīng)理不好，你可能只是把這事給忘它（第515頁(yè)）。Therearekeyissuesthatrequireresolutionandagreatdealdependsonthe關(guān)于考核繼續(xù)實(shí)踐的證據(jù)，他們還闡述了管理體制和發(fā)展的系統(tǒng)考核在戰(zhàn)略決策控制上的應(yīng)用(Barlow,1989).Inrealitythecompaniescreate,review,changeandevenabolish(Barlow,1989)。在現(xiàn)實(shí)中，如果他們沒(méi)有評(píng)估發(fā)展和提高組織績(jī)效(Kessler,2000)，公司將會(huì)創(chuàng)建，審查，變更，甚至取消考核。盡管所有的批評(píng)和批評(píng)者的證據(jù)都沒(méi)有顯示一個(gè)過(guò)程，可以提供反饋，發(fā)展動(dòng)力，確定培訓(xùn)和潛在的理由和證據(jù)，可以潛在的職業(yè)發(fā)展并斷定獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)（Hartle,1997)。資料來(lái)源：大學(xué)會(huì)計(jì)研究所。2009年6月。原文二：PerformanceEvaluationsandEfficientSortingBy:RAY,KOROK.Muchoftheproductioninfirmstakesplaceovertime.Thispaperseekstounderstandthevalueofinterimperformanceinformationonlongprojects.Inparticular,themodelexploresthesortingeffectsofperformanceevaluations.Conductinganinterimperformanceevaluationincreasesefficiencybyprovidingtheoptiontoendprojectswithlowearlyreturns.Themainresult:Itisefficienttoallocatemoreresourcestowardstheendofaproject.Thisresultholdsunderavarietyofscenarios:whentheworkerhasunknownability,whentheoutsideoptionsvarywithoutput,andevenunderanagencyframeworkwitharisk-averseagent.Theproductionofgoodsandservicestakestime.Ittakestimetobuildcars,writesoftware,developdrugs,formulatestrategy,marketproducts,auditclients,andvaluecompanies.Infact,manyfirmstodayorganizetheirproductionintheformofprojectsthatrunforweeks,months,orevenyearsatatimebeforethefirmcansellthefinishedproductinamarket.Forexample,softwaredevelopmentrunsthroughdesign,implementation,andtestingstagesbeforefinalrelease.Thispaperexaminestheproblemofperformanceevaluationbeforeaprojectisfinished.Themainideaisthatperformanceevaluationsgenerateefficientsorting.Theyprovidethefirmwiththeoptionofendingprojectswithlowearlyreturns.Aperformanceevaluationconductedattheinterimstagesortsemployeesintotwogroups:stayorquit.Itisefficienttoquitiftheearlyreturnsareweak,andtostayotherwise.Iftheagent’searlyoutputislow,itisintheinterestofboththefirmandtheagenttodiscontinueworkandcollecttheirrespectiveoutsideoptions.Inthissense,theperformanceevaluationassignsanagenttohismostefficientuse.Theroleoftheevaluation,therefore,istoperformthissorting.Interimperformanceevaluationschangetheefficientallocationofre-sourcesovertimeinsurprisingways.Themainresultshowsthatitisefficienttoassignmoreresourcestothelaterstagesoftheproject.Theevaluationcreatesthepossibilityofterminationaftertheearlystage,whichreducesthemarginalreturnfromfirst-stageeffort,andsotheagentshadeshiseffortdownwardintheearlystage.Oncetheagentadvances,thepossibilityofterminationvanishesandthemarginalreturntoeffortrises,soheworksharder.Insum,itisefficienttostayiftheearlyreturnsarehigh,andforthosethatstay,itisefficienttoworkharder.Theusualanalysisofperformanceevaluationstakesplaceinagencymod-Theusualanalysisofperformanceevaluationstakesplaceinagencymodelsthatspananenormousliteratureinaccounting,economics,andfinance(seeBaiman[1982,1990],Indjejikian[1999],Lambert[2001],Prendergast[1999]forreviews).Agencytheoryhasenjoyedwidetheoreticalattentionoverthelast20years,andhasdramaticallyadvancedourunderstandingofperformancemeasurement.Unfortunately,itsempiricalsupportremainsmixed,asPrendergast[2002]andLazear[2003]document.Theresultsofmostagencymodelsarehighlysensitivetotheirdetails—theinformationstructure,thetimingofthegame,therestrictionsonthecontracts,etc.Sowhenthedetailsofthegamechange,evenslightly,sodothepredictionsofthemodel.Thispapertakesadifferentapproach.Thefocushereisnotonincentives,butonsorting.Iproposeasimpleandrobustefficiencymodelthatdoesnotrelyonacomplexcontractinggamewithinthefirm.Theaimistounderstandthevalueofinterimperformanceinformationtoallparties,nottheopportunisticuseofinformationbyoneside.Theanalysishereshiftsattentionawayfromdistortionsfromfirst-besttoimprovementsinfirst-best.Performanceevaluationsdon’tjustsliceupafixedpie,butmakethepieitselfbigger.Exploringthesortingeffectsofinterimperformanceevaluationsinafirst-bestworldabstractsfromconflictsofinterestsbetweenpartiesandmakesmoreapparenttheeconomicforcesdrivingtheeffortallocationdecision.Nonetheless,Ishowthatthemainresultofthemodelisstillrobustwithinanagencycontext.Inparticular,whenarisk-neutralprincipalcannotobserveeffortandcontractswitharisk-averseagent,theagent