管理層權(quán)力理論

AssessingManagerialPowerTheory:AMeta-AnalyticApproachto

UnderstandingtheDeterminantsofCEOCompensation評價管理層權(quán)力理論（MPT）：用元分析的方法來理解CEO薪酬的的決定因素MarcvanEssen（UtrechtUniversity）.2015,JournalofManagement：164-203一、提出問題盡管對CEO薪酬的研究在不斷增加，但是關(guān)于形成高管薪酬類型的基本決定因素，各學(xué)科之間仍缺少共識。這種缺少的共識最常見的在：一方面：提倡基于市場解釋的經(jīng)濟和金融學(xué)者另一方面：經(jīng)濟和金融學(xué)科之外的學(xué)者挑戰(zhàn)這些解釋，他們主在薪酬實踐創(chuàng)新過程中強調(diào)權(quán)力、社會心理過程和機構(gòu)環(huán)境的重要性。這種差異引起了更多有創(chuàng)造性的討論，最近對純粹基于市場解釋最杰出的挑戰(zhàn)是管理層權(quán)力理論（MPT）。這個理論由BebchukandFried（Bebchuk&Fried,2004;Bebchuk,Fried,&Walker,2002推動。這個理論框架的核心是對代理理論最優(yōu)契約假設(shè)的一種直接挑戰(zhàn)。最優(yōu)契約理論中，董事會致力于和高管在薪酬安排上達成正常交易;這種正常交易可以通過建立高管和股東利益最緊密連接的薪酬機制來解決代理問題。相反，BebchukandFried（2004）發(fā)現(xiàn)，董事會很少致力于建立這種正常交易，因為企業(yè)特殊的結(jié)構(gòu)和社會心理機制會對董事會制定高管薪酬的決策過程產(chǎn)生很重要的影響，所以CEOs通常會擁有比董事會更大的權(quán)力。這些機制為董事會提供了了新的動機來挑戰(zhàn)薪酬安排，而這樣的安排更偏向高管的利益而不是股東的利益，也就是董事會提供了更高層次的薪酬以及與業(yè)績不太相關(guān)的薪酬。MPT的目標不是反駁代理理論，而是去深化，通過提出管理層權(quán)力和它對高管薪酬的影響引起了對最優(yōu)契約假設(shè)的質(zhì)疑。一些經(jīng)濟和金融領(lǐng)域的學(xué)者用了多種類型的證據(jù)反過來批評了MPT，雖然他們對MIP范圍和影響提出了很重要的問題，但是對于MPT有效性，他們沒有提供有效的決定性的證據(jù)來反駁。BebchukandFried（2004）已經(jīng)直接提出了對這些批評的直接抗辯。最重要的是在公司層面，大部分挑戰(zhàn)沒有基于對管理層權(quán)力和薪酬支出指標關(guān)系的直接檢驗。相反，這些批評傾向于集中在集團層面相關(guān)的董事會獨立性、薪酬、公司業(yè)績和CEO更替。因此，我們主張用兩個核心的問題來檢驗MPT的有效性：比董事會擁有更多權(quán)力的CEO是否比擁有較少權(quán)力的CEO有更高的薪酬？比董事會擁有更多權(quán)力的CEO是否有跟公司業(yè)績不相符（對公司業(yè)績不敏感）？已經(jīng)有大量和多樣的研究在公司層面實證檢驗了這些關(guān)系，然而這些文獻仍然是不確定性的，特點就是不同的和沖突的發(fā)現(xiàn)允許支持者和反對者對不同的結(jié)論進行論證。所以，現(xiàn)階段需要一個對現(xiàn)存文獻更嚴格的評價方法，能夠鞏固這種混合的實證發(fā)現(xiàn)以及從薪酬水平和薪酬業(yè)績敏感性的角度來評價對MPT有效性的一般解釋。這篇文章我們用元分析的方法提供了一種對現(xiàn)有文獻鞏固和評價。元分析(meta-analysis)統(tǒng)計方法是對眾多現(xiàn)有實證文獻的再次統(tǒng)計，通過對相關(guān)文獻中的統(tǒng)計指標利用相應(yīng)的統(tǒng)計公式，進行再一次的統(tǒng)計分析，從而可以根據(jù)獲得的統(tǒng)計顯著性等來分析兩個變量間真實的相關(guān)關(guān)系。元分析是一種有用和穩(wěn)健的方法，用來分析在大量研究中已經(jīng)被檢驗過的變量之間的關(guān)系。當(dāng)存在大量混合結(jié)果和沖突結(jié)果研究的情形下，元分析方法提供了綜合和嚴密的評價來均衡最接近結(jié)果的數(shù)據(jù)證據(jù)。二、 研究方法Weusethesetechniquestoassesstheaccumulatedevidenceof219studiesthatmeasuretheinfluenceofmanagerialpowerdirectlyonbothCEOcompensationlevelsandtherelationshipbetweencorporateperformanceandCEOpay.Ifouranalysisfindshigherlevelsofpayandpaythatislesssensitivetoperformancewhenexecutiveshavemorepower,andtheoppositewhendirectorshavemorepower,thiswillprovideempiricalevidenceinfavorofMPT.Totestthesepredictions,scholarshavereliedonanumberofdifferentindicatorsofCEOandboardpowerWefocusonthetwosetsofmechanismsonwhichresearchershavefocusedmostfrequentlywhenanalyzingmanagerialpower:boardstructuresandownershipcharacteristics三、 研究假設(shè)BoardCharacteristicsVariables：CEOduality,CEOtenure,sizeoftheboard,andthepercentageofindependentdirectorsHypothesis1a:CEOdualityispositivelyassociatedwiththevalueoftotalCEOcompensation.Hypothesis1b:InthepresenceofCEOduality,theassociationbetweencorporateperformanceandCEOcompensationwillbeweaker.Hypothesis2a:CEOtenureispositivelyassociatedwiththevalueoftotalCEOcompensation.Hypothesis2b:InthepresenceofCEOswithlongertenure,theassociationbetweencorporateperformanceandCEOcompensationwillbeweaker.Hypothesis3a:BoardsizeispositivelyassociatedwiththevalueoftotalCEOcompensation.Hypothesis3b:Inthepresenceoflargerboards,theassociationbetweencorporateperformanceandCEOcompensationwillbeweaker.Hypothesis4a:ThepercentageofindependentdirectorsisnegativelyassociatedwiththevalueoftotalCEOcompensation.Hypothesis4b:Athigherlevelsofboardindependence,therelationshipbetweencorporateperformanceandCEOcompensationwillbestronger.OwnershipCharacteristicsVariables：concentratedownership,institutionalownershipHypothesis5a:HigherlevelsofconcentratedownershipisnegativelyassociatedwiththevalueoftotalCEOcompensation.Hypothesis5b:Athigherlevelsofconcentratedownership,theassociationbetweencorporateperformanceandCEOcompensationwillbestronger.Hypothesis6a:Higherlevelsofinstitutionalownershipisnegativelyassociatedwiththe

valueoftotalCEOcompensation.Hypothesis6b:Athigherlevelsofinstitutionalownership,theassociationbetweencorporateperformanceandCEOcompensationwillbestronger.四、研究設(shè)計Model:whereRiisthepartialcorrelationbetweenfirmperformanceandCEOtotalcompensationyQistheconstantterm,Disavectorofwhetheraparticularvariableisincludedinaregressionornot,Sisavectorofmeasurementartifacts,Risavectorofstudycharacteristics,anduiistherandomcomponent.weincludedintheDvectorasetofdummyvariablesindicatingwhetherthefollowingvariableswereincludedintheregression(Q)ornot(1):CEOduality,CEOtenure,boardsize,boardindependence,ownershipconcentration,andinstitutionalownership.weincludedintheSvectorseveralcontrolvariables.TocontrolfortheinfluenceofmeasurementartifactsoneffectsizesweincludedintheRvectorthreeothercontrolvariables.Tocontrolfortheinfluenceofstudyartifacts五、研究結(jié)果：1.CEOTotalCompensationTahle4Mom-AnalyticStructunilEquationModilin^ResultsPrediclnrCEOTbmlPayP iCmduaJiiy.02*].K2CEOicnurc-.00-0.29Boardike.12**14妣f^oardindependence-睫好3.09-.04**4.24[n^LiEulionalownership-.03**-3.69FirmpuRmn池皿.12**15.68Firmsize33.76FirmdebtInN-.10**-10,2?Firmdivensificalion.02*2.10FirmriskJI**13,97FiunK&Dlevel.03心3.21CIDaoe一一皓**-7.M?Insideownership-.02*-2.23Hanmo-nicmean-VX1。.如（1一〔〕。）R.MSEA.00FLMSR..00JOIHypothesis1a,whichpredictsthatCEOdualityispositivelyrelatedtotheleveloftotalCEOcompensation,isconfirmedbytheresultsinTable4.WefindthatCEOdualityispositivelyrelatedtoCEOtotalpay(b=.Q2,p<.Q5).WefindnosupportforHypothesis2athatCEOtenureis

positivelyrelatedtoCEOcompensationlevels(b=-.00,p>.05).WefindclearsupportforHypothesis3a,asthesizeofboardsisassociatedwithhigherlevelsoftotalpay(b=.12,p<.01).Infact,afterfirmsize,boardsizehasthelargestimpactontotalpay.IncontrasttothepredictionofHypothesis4a,thedegreeofboardindependenceispositivelyrelatedtototalpaylevels(b=.06,p<.01).OurfindingsalsoprovidesupportforHypothesis5a:Ashypothesized,concentratedownershipisnegativelyrelatedtotheleveloftotalCEOcompensation(b=-.04,p<.01).Finally,wefindsupportforHypothesis6athatthepresenceofhigherlevelsofinstitutionalownershipisassociatedwithlowerlevelsoftotalpay(b=-.03,p<.01).2.Performance-PaySensitivityTable5MAR.4PartialCorrelationCoefficientResuIts0VariableModel{1)ManagerialpowrindiemorsCEOduality0.00(0.01)CEOLdnuie-0.04(o.orr*Budrd5ii2.e0.06(0.02}**llofirdindepeEideiiMO.OSflLDlgOwnershipccncemration0.0](0.01)Lnsiitutionalcwiiership0.03(0.01)*CmirolvaTiab!esFinnsue0.03(0.01)*Finnrisk0.0](0.01}FirmdiversilkaliiDn0.03(0.02)FimnR&Dlevel0.Q2(0.02}Firmdebtlc\-c]-0.02(0.02)CEOatjti0.01(o.on[nsid€cmnf「ship-0.02(0.01)FqwIvariubleu-ptTdf/o/ru/Accowinringperformance-an?(o.oir*Chnngcvariiblcsused-0,04(0.01)**Pans!design-0.01Ml)Endog.eneiii.y「hark.U.OU(0.00)Numb-erofvanabJesmreores&ionU.0U(0.00)CDntmlyearelleci0.D2(O.ni/Cnntnolindustr>peffect-0.04(0.01)**SmdvanifydsPublishedo.o3<o.oi)*Medianyearsample\tjndow-U.DO餌一Five-yearIS1impacilatior0.00(0.00)0.27K554令mu5)244.R6(O.OD)**^Residual伽673.89(0.00}**V0.00391^UnstandardizedrcgncsRinncoefficientsarcpresemedfrrMudyTnaderawTSendEubfitaTiti^modcraroriiwithstandaidcr/oisinpdfvntticses.kis(tietutiiliiiinibiiruf峙ffixtsiz姑一OisthehtdnugCMityscnMtkwithitbpiubabilit>-mpaitiiitheses,visthei^ndoineffectsvaridnee,05**p<.01.TheMARAresults,asreportedinTable5,donotprovidesupportforHypothesis1b.CEOdualityhasnosignificantmoderatingeffectontheperformance-payrelationship.WefindsupportforHypothesis2b,whichpredictsthatthepresenceofCEOswithlongertenurenegativelymoderatestheperformance—payrelationship.TheresultsshowthatstudiesthatfailtocontrolforCEOtenureintheirregressionanalysesfindaweakerperformance-payrelationship(Doucouliagos&Uluba§oglu,2008).Hence,inthepresenceofCEOswithlongertenure,theassociationbetweenfirmperformanceandCEOcompensationbecomesweaker.IncontrasttoHypothesis3b,wefindthatinthepresenceoflargerboards,theassociationbetweenfirmperformanceandCEOcompensationactuallybecomesstronger.WefindsupportforHypothesis4,thatboardindependencepositivelymoderatestheperformance—payrelationship.However,wefindnomoderatingeffectofownershipconcentrationontheperformance—payrelationship,ashypothesizedbyHypothesis5b.Finally,wefindsupportforHypothesis6b,asinstitutionalownershippositivelymoderatestheperformance—payrelationship.Tahle6

SumiiMnoiPrtdkdonsandResultsIndicarorot-'PowerTotalPayPcrfcmnarKCFaySensitivityPikjdictcdActualRrediciedActualCEOdually(HypcthusisL〕++CEOtenure(HypottieMS2)+Heardsize(IlypodiMis3}+++Ekjiirdindependtjiiut! J)+++Chvncrsliipconccmiation(Hypoihcsis5)+InsLiiution^lpwnersfnp(.1 引++Inassessingtheevidenceregardingtherelationshipbetweenmanagerialpowerandtotalcompensationlevels,wefindoverallsupportforMPT.TwoofthethreeindicatorsofCEOpower(boardsizeandCEOduality)arepositivelyassociatedwithtotalpay,suggestingthatinmostsituationswhereCEOsareexpectedtohavemorepoweroverthepaysettingprocess,theyhavehigherlevelsoftotalcompensation.Similarly,twooutofthethreeindicatorsofboardpower(ownershipconcentrationandinstitutionalownership)arenegativelyassociatedwithtotalpay,suggestingthatinmostsituationswhereboardshavemorepoweroverthepaysettingprocess,CEOshavelowertotalcompensation.ThetwoexceptionstothesepatternsarethatboardindependenceispositivelyassociatedwithtotalcompensationandtheeffectofCEOtenureisnotsignificantlyrelatedtototalcompensation.Theresultsforperformance-paysensitivitiesprovidelesssupportforMPT.OnlyoneoftheindicatorsofCEOpower(CEOtenure)isstatisticallysignificantandintheexpectednegativedirection,whereasCEOdualityisnotsignificant,andboardsizeissignificantbutintheopposite(posi