外文翻譯-中國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)會(huì)計(jì)監(jiān)督模式的進(jìn)化和思考

EvolutionandThinkingoftheAccountingSupervisionModeofChina’sState-ownedEnterprisesGuoYaxiongSchoolofAccountancy,JiangxiUniversityofFinance4.COUNTERMEASURES4.1.IMPLEMENTMODECOMBINATIONMANAGEMENTAccountingsupervisionmodesofstate-ownedenterprisesarevarious.Fullimplementationofthesemodeswouldbeawasteofresources,increasethedifficultyofaccountingmanagement.It’snecessarytotargetedselecttwoormoreaccountingsupervisionmodestoimplementaccountingsupervisionaccordingtooperationcharacteristicsofthesupervisedstate-ownedenterprises.Theauthorbelievesthat,generally,theinternalauditsystemisaconventionalsystem.Ifyouwanttoselectsystemsamongtheassignedaccountantsystem,assignmentboardofsupervisorssystemandoutsidedirectorsystem,thenumberofsystemschosenisbetternomorethantwo.Atthesametime,it’snoneedtoimplementassigningaccountantssystemanddispatchingboardofsupervisorssysteminthesameenterprise,andit’sinappropriatetopromoteoutsidedirectorsysteminalargescale.4.2.Improvetheefficiencyofaccountingsupervision.Asymmetricinformationtheorysuggeststhatprivateinformationpossessedbyagentsisunobservable,hiddenactionisunverifiable,thusthebiggestproblembroughtistheopportunisticbehavior.Therefore,it’snotnecessarytoemphasizethediversifiedformsofaccountingsupervisionofstate-ownedenterprises,butnecessarytoemphasizetheactualresults,theefficiencyoftheaccountingsupervision,andlimitopportunisticbehaviorofagents.Firstly,theappointmentandassignmentpersonnelshouldquicklymasterfinancialinformationoftheenterprisesuchasfinancialresults,operatingresultsandcashflow,andbefamiliarwithproductionandbusinessactivitiesoftheenterprise.Secondly,theresponsibilitiesmustbeassignedtoindividuals,safeguardmechanismsforimplementationshouldbeestablished,andsomeoneshouldbeassignedtotrack,supervise,inspectandevaluatetheimplementationofthesystem.Thirdly,establishanationalaccountingsupervisionexpert’sdatabaseofstate-ownedenterprises,strengthenjobtraining,andbuildaprofessionalteamofhigh-levelandrichexperienceinbusinessmanagement.Finally,theinformationacquiredinimplementationofavarietyofaccountingsupervisionmodesshouldbeshared.StateAssetSupervisionandAdministrationCommissionshouldorganizeavarietyofcommunicationmeetings,on-sitemeetingsandseminarswhichcanattractalotofappointmentandassignmentpersonneltoparticipatein,toconsultproblemsappearinginaccountingsupervisionandcommunicatemeasuresagainsttheproblems.4.3.MakeclearthelimitsofaccountingsupervisionInthecaseofseparationofownershipandmanagement,insidercontroltheorytellsusthatdirectorsofenterpriseinfactorinlawcontroltheenterprise,andmakeuseofavailableinformationandthefacilityofmanagementtogainmoreinterestsinenterprisemanagementanddecision-making.Accountingsupervisionistomaintaintheeconomicorderandpreventinsidercontroltoensurenormaleconomicactivityofstate-ownedenterprises.StateAssetSupervisionandAdministrationCommission,thepersonnelappointedandassignedshouldclearlyunderstandthenatureandlimitsofaccountingsupervision.Accountingsupervisionshouldbebasedontheeconomicdevelopmentandeconomicefficiencyofenterprises,andfocusonlong-terminterestsofenterprises.Regulationnotonlyshouldbeinplace,butalsomoderate,andshouldnotdirectlyinterfereorparticipateinthedailymanagementactivities.Thepersonnelcanactas"judge,"butshouldnotactas"athletes",neitheractasacombinationofboth.4.4.DevelopincentiveandrestraintsystemAccordingtoprincipal-agenttheory,astheprincipalneedthehelpandcooperationofagentstoaccomplishtheintendedgoal,theclientwilluseaseriesofincentivestomotivateagentstoworkhardtomaximizethevalueoftheoverallagent,soastoachieveabalancedrelationshipbetweenprincipalandagent.Underthecircumstanceofmarketeconomy,incentiveandrestraintmechanismsofaccountingsupervisionareparticularlyimportantanddirectlyrelatedtotheefficiencyoftheaccountingsupervision.Thesubjectsofaccountingsupervisionarehumanbeings,sotheyalsoneedtobestimulatedandrestrainedinaccountingsupervisionactivities.Incentivemechanismpromotesaccountingsupervisorystafftocontinuallyidentifyproblems,andactivelyfightagainstaccountingfraud.Restraintmechanismmakestheactionsofaccountingsupervisorypersonneldonotexceedthescopeoflawsandregulations.Todoagoodjobofaccountingsupervision,first,alawofencouragingandsupportingappointedpersonneltoperformtheirdutiesshouldbecoordinated.Variousformsofincentivemechanisms,suchasthepriorityinemployment,optionincentivesanddifferencebetweentherewards,shouldbedeveloped.Second,thesenseofresponsibilityshouldbestrengthened,restraintmechanismssuchasoccupationalban,administrativepenalties,andlegalliabilityaccountabilityshouldbeestablished,andaccountabilityshouldbeintensified.中國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)會(huì)計(jì)監(jiān)督模式的進(jìn)化和思考4應(yīng)對(duì)措施4.1實(shí)施模式組合管理國(guó)有企業(yè)的會(huì)計(jì)監(jiān)管模式是多方面的。全面實(shí)施這些模式將會(huì)浪費(fèi)資源,提高會(huì)計(jì)管理的難度。針對(duì)性的選擇兩個(gè)或兩個(gè)以上的會(huì)計(jì)監(jiān)管模式來(lái)實(shí)現(xiàn)會(huì)計(jì)監(jiān)督根據(jù)運(yùn)行特點(diǎn)監(jiān)督國(guó)有企業(yè)是非常必要的。筆者認(rèn)為,一般來(lái)說(shuō),內(nèi)部審計(jì)系統(tǒng)是一個(gè)傳統(tǒng)的系統(tǒng)。如果你想選擇系統(tǒng)分配的會(huì)計(jì)系統(tǒng)中,分配的監(jiān)事會(huì)制度和外部董事系統(tǒng),系統(tǒng)數(shù)量的選擇更好的不超過(guò)兩個(gè)。與此同時(shí),你就不需要實(shí)現(xiàn)分配會(huì)計(jì)師系統(tǒng)和調(diào)度的監(jiān)事會(huì)制度在相同的企業(yè),它不太合適,促進(jìn)外部董事系統(tǒng)在較大范圍的。4.2提高效率的會(huì)計(jì)監(jiān)管。信息不對(duì)稱理論表明,私人信息被察覺(jué)到的代理,隱藏的行動(dòng)是無(wú)憑無(wú)據(jù),因此帶來(lái)的最大問(wèn)題是投機(jī)行為。因此,不需要強(qiáng)調(diào)國(guó)有企業(yè)會(huì)計(jì)監(jiān)督的多種形式,但有必要強(qiáng)調(diào)實(shí)際結(jié)果,會(huì)計(jì)監(jiān)管的效率,并限制代理的機(jī)會(huì)主義行為。首先,任命和分配任務(wù)人員應(yīng)迅速掌握企業(yè)的財(cái)務(wù)信息如財(cái)務(wù)業(yè)績(jī)、經(jīng)營(yíng)成果、現(xiàn)金流量,熟悉企業(yè)的生產(chǎn)和經(jīng)營(yíng)活動(dòng)。其次,責(zé)任必須分配到個(gè)人,保障機(jī)制的實(shí)施措施應(yīng)該被建立,某人應(yīng)該分配給追蹤、監(jiān)督、檢測(cè)和評(píng)價(jià)這一制度的實(shí)施。第三,建立一個(gè)國(guó)有企業(yè)的全國(guó)的會(huì)計(jì)監(jiān)管專家的數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù),加強(qiáng)職業(yè)培訓(xùn),在企業(yè)管理方面建立一個(gè)有高水平和豐富經(jīng)驗(yàn)的專業(yè)的團(tuán)隊(duì)。最后,在會(huì)計(jì)監(jiān)督模式實(shí)施過(guò)程中所獲得的各種各樣的信息應(yīng)該被共享。國(guó)有資產(chǎn)監(jiān)督管理委員會(huì)應(yīng)組織各種交流會(huì)議,現(xiàn)場(chǎng)會(huì)議和研討會(huì),能吸