代理成本和股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)外文翻譯（可編輯）

1、代理成本和股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)外文翻譯 外文翻譯agency costs and ownership structure material source: the journal of finance ?vol.lv,no.1?february 2000 page83-87 author: james s. ang, rebel a. cole, and james wuh lin i. agency costs among small businesses when compared to publicly traded firms, small businesses come closest to t

2、he type of firms depicted in the stylized theoretical model of agency costs developed by jensen and meckling1976. at one extreme of ownership and management structures are firms whose managers own 100 percent of the firm. these firms, by their definition, have no agency costs. at the other extreme a

3、re firms whose managers are paid employees with no equity in the firm. in between are firms where the managers own some, but not all, of their firms equity. agency costs arise when the interests of the firms managers are not aligned with those of the firms owners, and take the form of preference for

4、 on-the-job perks, shirking, and making self-interested and entrenched decisions that reduce shareholder wealth. the magnitude of these costs is limited by how well the owners and delegated third parties, such as banks, monitor the actions of the outside managers. to illustrate, consider those firms

5、 where a single owner controls 100 percent of the stock but hires an outsider to manage the business. on the one hand, agency costs may be small because the sole owner can internalize all monitoring costs and has the right to hire and fire the manager. more specifically, such an owner incurs 100 per

6、cent of the monitoring costs and receives 100 percent of the resulting benefits. on the other hand, the sole owner may not be able to monitor perfectly for the same reasons that he or she hired an outside manager, such as lack of time or ability. owners of small firms typically lack financial sophis

7、tication, and may not be capable of performing random audits or fully understanding the operating or financial results. consequently, these firms incur residual agency costs. if these costs are significant, they must reflect a failure of the owners monitoring activities. potential explanations for t

8、his failure are lax monitoring by the owners and the lack of an adequate monitoring technology available for the owners. in this case, the separation of the management function initiation and implementation versus the control function by nonmanaging owners/shareholders ratification and monitoring, a

9、s suggested by fama and jensen 1983a, 1983b, may not be complete or effective. thus, residual agency costs are still expected in a sole owner firm when the manager is an outsider. agency costs attributable to the divergence of interests vary inversely with the managers ownership stake. as the number

10、 of shareholders increases from one, the ownership of the owner/manager falls to , where 0 1. because the manager gains 100 percent of each dollar spent on perks, but only percent of each dollar in firm profit, the manager who owns less than 100 percent of the firm has the incentive to consume perks

11、 rather than to imize the value of the firm to all shareholders. at the extreme is the manager with zero ownership 0, who gains 100 percent of perquisite consumption, but zero percent of firm profits in the case when salary is independent of firm performance. aggregate expenditure on monitoring by t

12、he nonmanaging shareholders decreases as their individual ownership shares decline. this is due to the well-known free-rider problem in spending for quasi-public goods, such as monitoring effort. each monitoring shareholder, with ownership i must incur 100 percent of the monitoring costs, but realiz

13、es only i percent of the monitoring benefits (in the form of reduced agency costs). a nonmonitoring shareholder, however, enjoys the full benefits of a monitoring shareholders activity without incurring any monitoring cost. thus, as the number of nonmanager shareholders increases, aggregate expendit

14、ure on monitoring declines, and the magnitude of owner-manager agency-cost problems increases. offsetting this relationship are concerns among shareholders about an increase in the probability that the firm will be unable to pay off bank debt or secure future financing from the same or new investors

15、, which may produce some restraint in agency behavior. however, as noted by williams 1987, these countervailing forces to agency behavior are expected to decline in effectiveness when the firm is not in imminent danger of insolvency to summarize, against the null hypothesis that agency costs are ind

16、ependent of the ownership and control structure,1 we postulate the following hypotheses derived from agency theory when compared to the base case: iagency costs are higher at firms whose managers own none of the firms equity, ii agency costs are an inverse function of the managers ownership stake, a

17、nd iii agency costs are an increasing function of the number of nonmanager shareholders. ii. data our empirical approach utilizes two fundamental assumptions about agency costs: 1afirm managed by a 100 percent owner incurs zero agency costs and, 2 agency costs can be measured as the difference in th

18、e efficiency of an imperfectly aligned firm and the efficiency of a perfectly aligned firm. to operationalize this approach for measuring agency costs, we need certain data inputs: i data on firm efficiency measures; ii data on firm ownership structure, including a set of firms that are 100 percent

19、owned by managers; and iii data on control variables, including firm size, characteristics, and monitoring technology. of these data requirements, the most demanding in terms of availability is item ii because sole-ownership firms typically are not publicly listed, and because financial information

20、on u.s. private firms usually is not available to the public. the federal reserve boards national survey of small business finances nssbf, fortunately, does provide financial information about privately held firms, including their ownership structure, and does include a set of firms entirely owned b

21、y managers. consequently, we use data from the nssbf to measure agency costs. the nssbf is a survey conducted by the federal reserve board to gather information about small businesses, which have largely been ignored in the academic literature because of the limited availability of data. the survey

22、collected detailed information from a sample of 4,637 firms that is broadly representative of approximately 5 million small nonfarm, nonfinancial businesses operating in the united states as of year-end 1992. cole and wolken 1995 provide detailed information about the data available from nssbf. for

23、this study, we limit our analysis to small c-corporations, collecting information on the governance structure, management alignment, extent of shareholder and external monitoring, size, and financial information. we focus on corporations to minimize problems associated with the financial statements

24、of proprietorships, which typically commingle personal and business funds. we eliminate partnerships and s-corporations because, unlike c-corporations, they are not subject to corporate taxation, and this may lead owner-managers to take compensation in the form of partner distributions or dividends

25、rather than salary expense because there is no double taxation of such earnings at the firm level. by focusing solely on c-corporations, we avoid the complications of comparing operating expenses across organizational forms. this restriction on the nssbf database yields an analysis sample of 1,708 f

26、irms. a. agency costs to measure agency costs of the firm, we use two alternative efficiency ratios that frequently appear in the accounting and financial economics literature: the expense ratio, which is operating expense scaled by annual sales, and the asset utilization ratio, which is annual sale

27、s divided by total assets. the first ratio is a measure of how effectively the firms management controls operating costs, including excessive perquisite consumption, and other direct agency costs. more precisely, the difference in the ratios of a firm with a certain ownership and management structur

28、e and the no-agency-cost base case firm, multiplied by the assets of the former, gives the excess agency cost related expense in dollars. the second ratio is a measure of how effectively the firms management deploys its assets. in contrast to the expense ratio, agency costs are inversely related to

29、the sales-to-asset ratio. a firm whose sales-to-asset ratio is lower than the base case firm experiences positive agency cost. these costs arise because the manager acts in some or all of the following ways: makes poor investment decisions, exerts insufficient effort, resulting in lower revenues; co

30、nsumes executive perquisites, so that the firm purchases unproductive assets, such as excessively fancy office space, office furnishing, automobiles, and resort properties. these efficiency ratios are not measured without error. sources of measurement error include differences in the accounting meth

31、ods chosen with respect to the recognition and timing of revenues and costs, poor recordkeeping typical of small businesses, and the tendency of small-business owners to exercise flexibility with respect to certain cost items. for example, owners may raise/lower expenses, including their own pay, wh

32、en profits are high/low. fortunately, these items are sources of random measurement errors that may be reduced with a larger sample across firms in different industries and age. b. ownership structure the corporate form of organization, with the limited-liability provision that makes it more efficie

33、nt for risk-sharing than proprietorships or partnerships, allows the firm to expand and raise funds from a large number of investors.5 thus, it has a richer set of ownership and management structures. the nssbf provides four variables that we use to capture various aspects of the ownership structure

34、 of small-business corporations: i the ownership share of the primary owner, ii an indicator for firms where a single family controls more than 50 percent of the firms shares, iii the number of nonmanager shareholders, and, iv an indicator for firms managed by a shareholder rather than an outsider.

35、according to theory, agency costs should be inversely related to the ownership share of the primary owner. for a primary owner who is also the firms manager, the incentive to consume perquisites declines as his ownership share rises, because his share of the firms profits rises with ownership while

36、his benefits from perquisite consumption are constant. for a primary owner who employs an outside manager, the gains from monitoring in the form of reduced agency costs increase with his ownership stake. here, the primary owner fulfills the monitoring role that large blockholders perform at publicly

37、 traded corporations. agency costs should be lower at firms where a single family controls more than 50 percent of the firms equity. at a small, closely held corporation where a single family controls the firm, the controlling family also fulfills the monitoring role that large blockholders perform

38、at publicly traded corporations. due to more diffused ownership among older businesses with larger families, however, monitoring by family members whose interests may not always be aligned should be less effective than monitoring by a sole owner. agency costs should increase with the number of nonma

39、nager shareholders. as the number of shareholders increases, the free-rider problem reduces the incentives for limited-liability shareholders to monitor. with less monitoring, agency costs increase. hence, we hypothesize that the expense and asset-utilization ratios should be positively and negative

40、ly related to the natural logarithm of one plus the number of nonmanaging shareholders, respectively. finally, agency costs should be higher at firms managed by an outsider. this relationship follows directly from the agency theory of jensen and meckling 1976. as noted above, this is the extreme cas

41、e where the manager gains 100 percent of perquisite consumption, but little of the firms profits.譯文代理成本和股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu) 資料來(lái)源:財(cái)務(wù)雜志2000年2月第1期 作者:james s. ang, rebel a. cole, and james wuh lin 1、小企業(yè)的代理成本 與上市公司相比,小企業(yè)與代理成本的程式化理論模型描述的公司類(lèi)型更相近,由jensen和meckling1976提出。一種極端的股東與管理者結(jié)構(gòu)是公司中管理者擁有100%的股權(quán)。這些公司,他們的解釋是沒(méi)有代理成本。另外一種

42、極端是管理者作為被支付的受雇者在公司中沒(méi)有股票。處在公司的兩者間的是管理者持有一部分股權(quán),但不是公司的所有。 代理成本的產(chǎn)生是當(dāng)公司管理層與所有者的利益不一致時(shí),采取的以減少股東財(cái)富的方式如在職消費(fèi)的偏好,因懶惰而逃避工作,制定些不可更改的決定以謀取自身的利益。這些成本的巨大受限于所有者是否很好地授權(quán)第三方如銀行往來(lái)監(jiān)督外部管理者的行為。 為了論證這個(gè)事實(shí),假設(shè)這些公司是由一個(gè)所有者持有100%的股票,但雇傭一個(gè)外人去管理。一方面,代理成本由于獨(dú)立所有者有權(quán)雇傭和解雇管理者使監(jiān)督成本內(nèi)在化而可能較小。更具體些,這樣的所有者會(huì)招致100%的監(jiān)督成本由此收到由這個(gè)成本產(chǎn)生的100%的收益。另一方面,獨(dú)立所有者也許不能很好地監(jiān)督由于相同原因雇傭的外部管理者,如他或她缺乏時(shí)間或者動(dòng)力。小企業(yè)的所有者通常缺乏復(fù)雜的財(cái)務(wù)頭腦,有可能沒(méi)有能力執(zhí)行任意的審計(jì)或完全理解經(jīng)營(yíng)或財(cái)務(wù)的結(jié)果。因此,這些公司出現(xiàn)了剩余的代理成本。如果這些成本是不可忽略的,他們就必須反映出所有者監(jiān)督活動(dòng)的失敗之處。這個(gè)失敗的潛在解釋是所有者的不嚴(yán)格的監(jiān)督以及缺乏可用的能充分監(jiān)督的技術(shù),在這種情況下,fama和jensen1983提出,管理者的作用(實(shí)施和執(zhí)行)和不參與管理的股東或所有者的控制作用(批準(zhǔn)和監(jiān)控)之間的分離,也許并不完整或有效