美國(guó)防部-太空安全面臨的挑戰(zhàn)

1、DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE A GENC YCHALLENGESTOSECURITY IN SPACECommitted to Excellence in Defense of the NationEXECUTIVE SUMMARYSpace-based capabilities provide integral support to military, commercial, and civilian applications. Longstandingtechnologicalandcostbarrierstospacearefalling,enablingmorecount

2、riesandcommercialfirms to participate in satellite construction, space launch, space exploration, and human spaceflight.Although these advancements are creating new opportunities, new risks for space-enabled services have emerged. Having seen the benefits of space-enabled operations, some foreign go

3、vernments are developingcapabilitiesthatthreatenothersabilitytousespace.ChinaandRussia,inparticular,havetaken steps to challenge the United States:ChineseandRussianmilitarydoctrinesindicatethattheyviewspaceasimportanttomodernwarfare and view counterspace capabilities as a means to reduce U.S. and al

4、lied military effectiveness. Both reorganizedtheirmilitariesin2015,emphasizingtheimportanceofspaceoperations.Both have developed robust and capable space services, including space-based intelligence, surveillance,andreconnaissance.Moreover,theyaremakingimprovementstoexistingsystems,includingspacelau

5、nchvehiclesandsatellitenavigationconstellations.Thesecapabilitiesprovide their militaries with the ability to command and control their forces worldwide and also with enhancedsituationalawareness,enablingthemtomonitor,track,andtargetU.S.andalliedforces.Chinese and Russian space surveillance networks

6、 are capable of searching, tracking, and characterizingsatellitesinallearthorbits.Thiscapabilitysupportsbothspaceoperationsand counterspacesystems.Bothstatesaredevelopingjammingandcyberspacecapabilities,directedenergyweapons,on-orbit capabilities,andground-basedantisatellitemissilesthatcanachieveara

7、ngeofreversibleto nonreversibleeffects.Iran and North Korea also pose a challenge to militaries using space-enabled services, as each has demonstrated jamming capabilities. Iran and North Korea maintain independent space launch capabilities, which can serve as avenues for testing ballistic missile t

8、echnologies.TheadvantagetheUnitedStatesholdsinspaceanditsperceiveddependenceonitwilldriveactorsto improvetheirabilitiestoaccessandoperateinandthroughspace.Theseimprovementscanposeathreat tospace-basedservicesacrossthemilitary,commercial,andcivilspacesectors.INTENTIONAL LY LEFT BLANK CONTENTS7Key Spa

9、ce Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8Key Counterspace Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9Space-based Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11Orbit Types and Uses . . . . . . .

10、. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250008 Doctrine, and14 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250007 Space andCounterspaceOrganizations14 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250006 Space andCounterspaceCapabilities16 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250005 SpaceLaunchCapabilities16 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250004 Human Spa

11、ceflight andSpaceExploration18 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250003 ISR, Navigation, andCommunicationsCapabilities18 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250002 CounterspaceCapabilities20 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250001 23 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250000 Doctrine,and23 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25 . .

12、 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28Space and Counterspace Capabilities . . . . .Space Launch Capabilities. . . . . . . . . . . . .Human Spaceflight and Space Exploration . . .

13、 .ISR, Navigation, and Communications Capabilities.Counterspace Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31Iran31NorthA:andB:36C: GlossaryINTENTIONAL LY LEFT BLANK INTRODUCTIONAlthoughtheUnitedStatesandtheformerSovietUniondominatedearlyspaceactivities,spacecapabilities have prolif

14、erated over the past six decades as technological and cost barriers have fallen. These capabilities provideimportantsupporttomanyofsocietysdailyactivities,includingcommunications,navigation, financial transactions, and weather monitoring. As of 2018, over 1,800 active satellites are on orbit, which

15、areownedandoperatedbyover50countriesandmultinationalorganizations.1 Ninecountriesandoneinternationalorganizationcanindependentlylaunchspacecraft:China,India,Iran,Israel,Japan,Russia, NorthKorea,SouthKorea,theUnitedStates,andtheEuropeanSpaceAgency(fromFrenchGuiana).2Spacehasalsobecomemorecommercializ

16、ed.Thecommercialspacesectorisinvolvedinspacelaunch, communications, space situational awareness, remote sensing, and even human spaceflight. These firms notonlysupplyproductstogovernments,buttheyalsocompetecommercially.3The number of objects on orbitboth active satellites and orbital debriswill cont

17、inue to increase rapidly with the wider availability of lower cost, small satellites and with the prospect of largeconstellationsconsistingofthousandsofsatellites.Thechallengeofspacecongestionwillgrow,andactorswillneed better capabilities to track and identify objects and prevent collisions in space

18、.4,5Spacecapabilitieshavebecomecentraltomanymilitaryoperations,includingmissilewarning,geolocation and navigation, target identification, and tracking of adversary activities. The military and intelligence collectioncapabilitiesthatgovernmentandcommercialremotesensingsatellitesprovideisreducingtheab

19、ilityofallcountriestoremainundetectedwhileperformingsensitivetestingandevaluationactivitiesor military exercises andoperations.6,7Some actors are seeking ways to deny the effectiveness of the United States, having witnessed more than25yearsofU.S.militarysuccessesenabledbyspacecapabilities.8ChinaandR

20、ussia,inparticular,are developingavarietyofmeanstoexploitperceivedU.S.relianceonspace-basedsystemsandchallengetheU.S.positioninspace.9IranandNorthKoreaalsohavedemonstratedsomecounterspacecapabilitiesthat couldposeathreattomilitariesusingspace-basedservices.WhileChinaandRussiaaredevelopingcounterspac

21、eweaponssystems,theyarepromotingagreementsat theUnitedNationsthatlimitweaponizationofspace.Theirproposalsdonotaddressmanyspacewarfarecapabilities,andtheylackverificationmechanisms,whichprovidesroomforChinaandRussiatocontinuetodevelopcounterspaceweapons.10,11 The1967OuterSpaceTreatyprohibitsplacingwe

22、aponsofmass destructiononorbitandonanycelestialbodyanditprohibitsusingcelestialbodiesformilitarybases,testing,ormaneuvers.107stateshaveratifiedthetreaty,includingtheUnitedStates,China,NorthKorea,and Russia. Iran is one of 23 states that have signed, but not ratified, the treaty.12Key Space ConceptsC

23、ommunication Satellites: Communication satellites provide voice communications, television broad- casts,broadbandinternet,mobileservices,anddatatransferservicesforcivil,military,andcommercial usersworldwide.13Intelligence,Surveillance,andReconnaissance(ISR):ISRsatellitessupportcivil,commercial,andmi

24、li- tarypurposes.CivilandcommercialISRsatellitesprovideremotesensingdata,whichincludesdataon theEarthsland,sea,andatmosphere.ISRsatellitessupportavarietyofmilitaryactivitiesbyproviding signalsintelligence,warning(includingofballisticmissileactivity),battledamageassessments,andmil- itary forcedisposi

25、tion.14,15MissileWarning:Missilewarningusesspace-basedandterrestrialsensorstonotifycountriesofmissileattacks andcanenabledefensiveoroffensiveoperationsinresponse.Space-basedsensorsusuallyprovidethefirst indicationofalaunchandground-basedradarsprovidefollow-oninformationandconfirmtheattack.Positionin

26、g, Navigation, and Timing (PNT): Satellite navigation constellations provide PNT data that enablecivilian,commercial,andmilitaryuserstodeterminetheirpreciselocationandlocaltime.TheEuropean Union, Russia, and the United States satellite navigation constellations offer global coverage,andJapanandIndia

27、operateregionalsystems.Chinaoperatesbotharegionalandworldwidesatellitenavigation system.16Satellite Command and Control (C2) Architecture: The satellite C2 architecture is how users control andcommunicatewithsatellites.Thecontrolcenterusestheuplinktothespacecrafttodelivercom- mands.Thespacecraftdown

28、linkishowdataissentfromthespacecrafttoagroundstationthathasthe necessaryantennas,transmitters,andreceiverstoreceivethedata.Somesatelliteconstellationsuse relaysatellites,whichenablecommunicationbetweensatellitesoutsidethereceptionareaofaground station.17 Anycomponentofthearchitectureisvulnerabletoat

29、tack,rangingfromphysicalvulnerabili- tiesofagroundsitetoelectronicwarfare(EW)disruptingtheconnectionbetweenthespacesegment and theoperator.Primary SatelliteRelayPrimary SatelliteRelaySatelliteControl CenterControl CenterVisualization: DIA, D3 Design 1812-20206SpaceLaunch:Spacelaunchistheabilitytodel

30、iverpayloadsintospace.Spacelaunchvehicles(SLV)can deploy,sustain,augment,orreconstitutesatelliteconstellationsinsupportofmilitary,civilian,orcom- mercialcustomers.18Key Counterspace ConceptsCyberspace Threats: Cyberspace pervades all other warfighting domains, including space, and many spaceoperatio

31、nsdependoncyberspaceandviceversa.19WithsophisticatedknowledgeofsatelliteC2 and data distribution networks, actors can use offensive cyberspace capabilities to enable a range ofreversibletononreversibleeffectsagainstspacesystems,associatedgroundinfrastructure,users,andthe links connecting them.Direct

32、edEnergyWeapons(DEW):DEWusedirectedenergytodisrupt,damage,ordestroyenemyequip- mentandfacilities.20Theseweapons,whichcanhaveeffectsrangingfromtemporarytopermanent,include lasers, high-power microwaves, and other types of radiofrequency weapons. It can be difficult to attributethe origin of a DEW att

33、ack, depending on the type.Visualization: DIA, D3 Design 1812-20433a a a Uplink JammingCommunications SatelliteUplink JammingCommunications SatelliteDownlink JammingCommunications SatelliteJammerJammerVisualization: DIA, D3 Design 1812-20208KineticEnergyThreats:Kineticenergythreats,orantisatellite(A

34、SAT)missiles,aredesignedtodestroysatel- liteswithoutplacingtheweaponsystemoranyofitscomponentsintoorbit.Thesesystemstypicallyconsistofafixedormobilelaunchsystem,amissile,andakinetickillvehicle.Theseweaponscouldalsobelaunchedfromaircraft.Oncereleased,thekinetickillvehicleusesanonboardseekertointercep

35、tthetargetsatellite.Ground-basedASATmissileattacksaremoreeasilyattributedthansomeothercounterspaceweapons, such as DEW, and their effects can create orbitaldebris.OrbitalThreats:Orbitalorspace-basedsystemsaresatellitesthatcandelivertemporaryorpermanent effects against other spacecraft. These systems

36、 could include payloads such as kinetic kill vehicles, radiof- requency jammers, lasers, chemical sprayers, high-power microwaves, and robotic mechanisms. Some ofthesesystems,suchasrobotictechnologyforsatelliteservicingandrepairanddebrisremoval,havepeace-ful uses but can also be used for military pu

37、rposes.High-powerMicrowavesRadiofrequencyJammersLasersChemicalKinetic KillRobotic MechanismsVisualization: DIA, D3 Design 1812-20432Space Situational Awareness (SSA): SSA is having current knowledge of a space objects location and the abilitytotrackandpredictitsfuturelocation;italsoincorporatesunder

38、standingofanactorsintentfortheir spacecraft.22 SSA is necessary for space operations, including the ability to successfully target space objectsand assess the effectiveness of an attack. Space object surveillance and identification sensors, which caninclude telescopes, radars, and space-based sensor

39、s, provide the data for SSA.23Space-basedSpace-basedVisualization: DIA, D3 Design 1812-20207Space-based ServicesSincethelate1950s,space-enabledtechnologieshavecometoprovidecritical,yetoftenunrecognized, supporttomanyofmodernsocietysdailyactivities.Technologicaladvancementandlower-costbarri- ersmeans

40、ocietyisincreasinglyreliantonthesetechnologies,andlosingaccesstospace-basedserviceswould have far-reaching effects.Space-enabled applications heavily impact our daily lives in four areas: navigation, communications, remote sensing, and science and exploration.24Space-basedPNTservices,suchasGPS,provi

41、depositionandnavigationdatathatenablestheuseofsatel-litenavigationfordirectionsforroutineactivities.Positioningandnavigationservicessupportsea,ground, and air transportation services, such as by helping plan more efficient routes and managing route conges- tion.Formilitaries,PNTdata,amongotherthings

42、,allowsfortheprecisetargetingformunitionsandair,land, and sea navigation.PNTsignals,especiallyprecisetiming,alsoprovidecriticalsupporttomoderninfrastructure.Withoutprecise timing, financial institutions would be unable to create timestamps for transactions, impacting the publics ability to use ATMs

43、and credit cards, and utility companies would be unable to efficiently transmitpower.25Communications satelliteswhich comprise the majority of satellites on orbitsupport global com- municationsandcomplementterrestrialcommunicationsnetworks.26 Losingthesesatellitescanhave wide-ranging impacts, which

44、was illustrated in 1998 when a U.S. communications satellite suffered a computerfailurepeoplewereunabletopayforgas,hospitalswereunabletocontactphysicianswhorelied on pagers, and television stations were unable to deliver programming.27 For militaries, satellite communications improve situational awa

45、reness and allow forces greater mobility by eliminating the need for ground-based infrastructure.28WithoutremotesensingsatelliteswhichprovidedataontheEarthsland,sea,andatmospheresoci- ety would be unable to benefit from weather forecasting, including preparing for weather emergencies. Thesesatellite

46、sprovidedataabouttheterrainandenvironment,whichrangefromassistingbusinessesin determining areas with mineral resources to assisting farmers in identifying potential agricultural disasters.ThesesatellitesalsosupportthemilitarybyprovidingISRdatathatenablesmilitariestoiden- tifyadversarycapabilities,tr

47、acktroopmovements,andlocatepotentialtargets.29An inability to access space for scientific purposes could impact technological innovation. In addition to providing insights into the nature of Earth and the universe, society has benefitted from technological advances enabled by space research and spac

48、e exploration activities. These advancements include cell phone cameras, better metal alloys for jet engine turbines, solar panels, memory foam, portable com- puters, and compact water purification systems.30,31Orbit Types and Uses32,33GEOOrbitsarenotionalandforillustrativepurposesonly.HEOMEOLEOORBI

49、TALTITUDE*USESLow Earth Orbit (LEO)Up to 2,000 kmCommunicationsISRHuman SpaceflightMedium Earth Orbit (MEO)Approx . 2,000 to 35,000 kmCommunicationsPosition,Navigation,andTimingHighly Elliptical Orbit (HEO)LEO altitudes at perigee (nearest to Earth)Approx . 40,000 km at apogee (farthest from Earth)C

50、ommunicationsISRMissile WarningGeosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO)Approx . 36,000 kmCommunicationsISRMissile Warning* The advantages of higher orbits for communications and ISR are near-persistent coverage of most of the Earth in view of the satellite, but limited access to polar regions. LEO satellite

51、s cover all parts of the world, including the poles, but for shorter periods based on the speed of the satellite. With the exception of nine U.S. Apollo missions to the Moon, all human spaceflight has been completed in LEO.Visualization: DIA, D3 Design 1811-19948C H I N A“To explore the vast cosmos,

52、 develop the space industry, and build China into a space power is a “To explore the vast cosmos, develop the space industry, and build China into a space power is a dream we pursueunremittingly.”ChinasSpaceWhiteDecember26,201634China has devoted significant economic and politi- calresourcestogrowin

53、gallaspectsofitsspacepro-gram,fromimprovingmilitaryspaceapplicationsto developing human spaceflight and lunar explora- tionprograms.Chinasjourneytowardaspacecapa- bility began in 1958, less than 9 months after the launchofSputnik-1.However,ChinasaspirationstomatchtheSovietUnionandtheUnitedStatessoon

54、 facedself-imposeddelaysduetointernalpolitical dynamicsthatlasteduntilthelate1960s.Chinanot launch its first satellite until April 1970. In the early 1980s, Chinas space program began movingwith purpose.35Beijing now has a goal of China into a power in all Its growingprogramChinaisonlytotheStates in

55、 the number of operational a of national pride and part of Dream” to a powerful prosperous China. The program bothandinterests,includingitsandinternationaland efforts.Chinatogoalsthroughintheanddevelopmentofandtechnology.37,38,39,40,41China officially advocates for peaceful use of space, anditispurs

56、uingagreementsattheUnitedNationsonthenonweaponizationofspace.42 Nonetheless, Chinacontinuestoimproveitscounterspaceweap- ons capabilities and has enacted militaryreforms tobetterintegratecyberspace,space,andEWintoImageImageSource:AFPChinalaunchedtheShenzhou-9inJune2012,whichthefirstcrewedspacecraftt

57、odockwiththeTiangong-1 spacelaboratory.Strategy, Doctrine, and IntentChinas Military StrategyChinas Military StrategyInbeon bein planning, force posture, and modernization.The PLA uses “informatized” warfare to describe theprocessofacquiring,transmitting,process- ing, and using information to conduc

58、t joint mil- itary operations across the domains of land,sea,air,space,cyberspace,andtheelectromag- netic spectrum during a conflict. PLA writings highlight the benefit of near-real-time shared awareness of the battlefield in enabling quick,unified effort to seize tactical opportunities.43ThePLAview

59、sspacesuperiority,theabilitytocon- trol the information sphere, and denying adver- saries the same as key components of conduct-ing modern “informatized wars.44,45,46,47,48,49 Sinceobserving the U.S. militarys performance during the 1991 Gulf War, the PLA embarked on an effort tomodernizeweaponsyste

60、msandupdatedoctrinetoplacethefocusonusingandcounteringadver- sary information-enabledwarfare.Spaceandoperationswillforminte- gral of PLA givenChinas perceptions of the importance of operationstoandforcesandthegrowing importanceoftobeyond-line-of-sight operationsfordeployedChineseforces.ThePLAoperati