第10章-外部性-曼昆經(jīng)濟學(xué)原理第七版課件

Externalities1ppt課件Externalities1ppt課件ExternalitiesGovernmentactioncansometimesimproveuponmarketoutcomesWhymarketssometimesfailtoallocateresourcesefficientlyHowgovernmentpoliciescanpotentiallyimprovethemarket’sallocationWhatkindsofpoliciesarelikelytoworkbest2ppt課件ExternalitiesGovernmentactionExternalitiesExternalityTheuncompensatedimpactofoneperson’sactionsonthewell-beingofabystanderMarketfailureNegativeexternalityImpactonthebystanderisadversePositiveexternalityImpactonthebystanderisbeneficial3ppt課件ExternalitiesExternality3ppt課件ExternalitiesNegativeexternalitiesExhaustfromautomobilesBarkingdogsPositiveexternalitiesRestoredhistoricbuildingsResearchintonewtechnologies4ppt課件ExternalitiesNegativeexternalExternalitiesandMarketInefficiencyWelfareeconomics:arecapDemandcurve:valuetoconsumersPricestheyarewillingtopaySupplycurve:costtosuppliersEquilibriumquantityandpriceEfficientMaximizesthesumofproducerandconsumersurplus5ppt課件ExternalitiesandMarketIneffFigure1TheMarketforAluminumPriceofAluminumQuantityofAluminum0Demand(privatevalue)Supply(privatecost)Thedemandcurvereflectsthevaluetobuyers,andthesupplycurvereflectsthecostsofsellers.Theequilibriumquantity,QMARKET,maximizesthetotalvaluetobuyersminusthetotalcostsofsellers.Intheabsenceofexternalities,therefore,themarketequilibriumisefficient.QMARKETEquilibrium6ppt課件Figure1TheMarketforAluminuExternalitiesandMarketInefficiencyNegativeexternalitiesCosttosociety(ofproducingagood)Largerthanthecosttothegoodproducers“AllIcansayisthatifbeingaleadingmanufacturermeansbeingaleadingpolluter,sobeit.”7ppt課件ExternalitiesandMarketIneffExternalitiesandMarketInefficiencyNegativeexternalitiesSocialcostPrivatecostsoftheproducers(supply)PlusthecoststothosebystandersaffectedadverselybythenegativeexternalitySocialcostcurveisabovethesupplycurveTakesintoaccounttheexternalcostsimposedonsociety8ppt課件ExternalitiesandMarketIneffFigure2PollutionandtheSocialOptimumPriceofAluminumQuantityofAluminum0Demand(privatevalue)Supply(privatecost)Inthepresenceofanegativeexternality,suchaspollution,thesocialcostofthegoodexceedstheprivatecost.Theoptimalquantity,QOPTIMUM,isthereforesmallerthantheequilibriumquantity,QMARKET.QMARKETOptimumSocialcost(privatecostandexternalcost)ExternalCostQOPTIMUMEquilibrium9ppt課件Figure2PollutionandtheSociExternalitiesandMarketInefficiencyNegativeexternalitiesOptimumquantityproducedMaximizetotalwelfareSmallerthanmarketequilibriumquantityGovernment–correctmarketfailureInternalizingtheexternalityAlteringincentivessothatpeopletakeaccountoftheexternaleffectsoftheiractions10ppt課件ExternalitiesandMarketIneffExternalitiesandMarketInefficiencyPositiveexternalitiesEducationBenefitofeducationisprivateExternalities:bettergovernment,lowercrimerates,higherproductivityandwagesSocialvalueisgreaterthanprivatevalueSocialvaluecurveAbovethedemandcurve11ppt課件ExternalitiesandMarketIneffFigure3EducationandtheSocialOptimumPriceofEducationQuantityofEducation0Demand(privatevalue)Supply(privatecost)Inthepresenceofapositiveexternality,thesocialvalueofthegoodexceedstheprivatevalue.Theoptimalquantity,QOPTIMUM,isthereforelargerthantheequilibriumquantity,QMARKET.QMARKETEquilibriumSocialvalue(privatevalueandexternalbenefit)ExternalBenefitQOPTIMUMOptimum12ppt課件Figure3EducationandtheSociExternalitiesandMarketInefficiencyPositiveexternalitiesSociallyoptimalquantityisgreaterthanmarketequilibriumquantityGovernment–correctmarketfailureInternalizetheexternalitySubsidy13ppt課件ExternalitiesandMarketIneffExternalitiesandMarketInefficiencyNegativeexternalitiesMarketsproducealargerquantitythanissociallydesirableGovernment:taxPositiveexternalitiesMarketsproduceasmallerquantitythanissociallydesirableGovernment:subsidy14ppt課件ExternalitiesandMarketIneffTechnologyspillovers,industrialpolicy,andpatentprotectionTechnologyspillover=PositiveexternalityImpactofonefirm’sresearchandproductioneffortsonotherfirms’accesstotechnologicaladvanceGovernment:internalizetheexternalitySubsidy=valueofthetechnologyspillover15ppt課件Technologyspillovers,industrTechnologyspillovers,industrialpolicy,andpatentprotectionIndustrialpolicyGovernmentinterventionintheeconomythataimstopromotetechnology-enhancingindustriesPatentlawProtecttherightsofinventorsbygivingthemexclusiveuseoftheirinventionsforaperiodoftime16ppt課件Technologyspillovers,industrPublicPoliciesTowardExternalitiesCommand-and-controlpoliciesRegulatebehaviordirectlyRegulationMarket-basedpoliciesProvideincentivessothatprivatedecisionmakerswillchoosetosolvetheproblemontheirownCorrectivetaxesandsubsidiesTradablepollutionpermits17ppt課件PublicPoliciesTowardExternaPublicPoliciesTowardExternalitiesRegulationRegulatebehaviordirectly:makingcertainbehaviorseitherrequiredorforbiddenCannoteradicatepollutionEnvironmentalProtectionAgency(EPA)DevelopandenforceregulationsDictatesmaximumlevelofpollutionRequiresthatfirmsadoptaparticulartechnologytoreduceemissions18ppt課件PublicPoliciesTowardExternaPublicPoliciesTowardExternalitiesCorrectivetaxesandsubsidiesCorrectivetaxes(Pigoviantaxes)InduceprivatedecisionmakerstotakeaccountofthesocialcoststhatarisefromanegativeexternalityPlacesapriceontherighttopolluteReducepollutionatalowercosttosocietyRaiserevenueforthegovernmentEnhanceeconomicefficiency19ppt課件PublicPoliciesTowardExternaWhyisgasolinetaxedsoheavily?NegativeexternalitiesassociatedwithdrivingCongestion,accidents,pollution20ppt課件WhyisgasolinetaxedsoheaviWhyisgasolinetaxedsoheavily?Thegastax=correctivetaxDoesn’tcausedeadweightlossesMakestheeconomyworkbetterLesstrafficcongestionSaferroadsCleanerenvironment21ppt課件WhyisgasolinetaxedsoheaviWhyisgasolinetaxedsoheavily?Howhighshouldthetaxongasolinebe?MostEuropeancountriesHighergasolinetaxthanintheU.S.2007,JournalofEconomicLiteratureOptimalcorrectivetaxongasoline$2.28pergallonin2005dollars$2.70pergallonin2012dollarsActualtaxintheU.S.in2012:50centspergallon22ppt課件WhyisgasolinetaxedsoheaviWhyisgasolinetaxedsoheavily?TaxrevenuefromagasolinetaxUsedtolowertaxesthatdistortincentivesandcausedeadweightlossesSomegovernmentregulationsProductionoffuel-efficientcars–unnecessary23ppt課件WhyisgasolinetaxedsoheaviPublicPoliciesTowardExternalitiesTradablepollutionpermitsVoluntarytransferoftherighttopollutefromonefirmtoanotherNewscarceresource:pollutionpermitsMarkettotradepermitsFirm’swillingnesstopayDependonitscostofreducingpollution24ppt課件PublicPoliciesTowardExternaPublicPoliciesTowardExternalitiesAdvantageoffreemarketforpollutionpermitsInitialallocationofpollutionpermitsdoesn'tmatterIffirmscanreducepollutionatalowcost:SellwhateverpermitstheygetIffirmscanreducepollutiononlyatahighcost:buywhateverpermitstheyneedEfficientfinalallocation25ppt課件PublicPoliciesTowardExternaPublicPoliciesTowardExternalitiesReducingpollutionusingpollutionpermitsorcorrectivetaxesFirmspayfortheirpollutionCorrectivetaxes:paytothegovernmentPollutionpermits:paytobuypermitsInternalizetheexternalityofpollution26ppt課件PublicPoliciesTowardExternaFigure4TheEquivalenceofCorrectiveTaxesandPollutionPermitsPriceofpollutionInpanel(a),theEPAsetsapriceonpollutionbylevyingacorrectivetax,andthedemandcurvedeterminesthequantityofpollution.Inpanel(b),theEPAlimitsthequantityofpollutionbylimitingthenumberofpollutionpermits,andthedemandcurvedeterminesthepriceofpollution.Thepriceandquantityofpollutionarethesameinthetwocases.0Quantityofpollution(a)CorrectiveTax(b)PollutionPermitsDemandforpollutionrightsQPCorrectivetax1.Acorrectivetaxsetsthepriceofpollution...2....which,togetherwiththedemandcurve,determinesthequantityofpollution.Priceofpollution0QuantityofpollutionDemandforpollutionrightsPQSupplyofpollutionpermits1.Pollutionpermitssetthequantityofpollution...2....which,togetherwiththedemandcurve,determinesthepriceofpollution.27ppt課件Figure4TheEquivalenceofCorPublicPoliciesTowardExternalitiesObjectionstotheeconomicanalysisofpollution“Wecannotgiveanyonetheoptionofpollutingforafee.”-bylateSenatorEdmundMuskiePeoplefacetrade-offsEliminatingallpollutionisimpossibleCleanwaterandcleanair–opportunitycostLowerstandardofliving28ppt課件PublicPoliciesTowardExternaPublicPoliciesTowardExternalitiesCleanenvironmentisanormalgoodPositiveincomeelasticityRichcountriescanaffordacleanerenvironmentMorerigorousenvironmentalprotectionCleanairandcleanwater-lawofdemandThelowerthepriceofenvironmentalprotectionThemorethepublicwillwantit29ppt課件PublicPoliciesTowardExternaPrivateSolutionstoExternalitiesThetypesofprivatesolutionsMoralcodesandsocialsanctionsCharitiesSelf-interestoftherelevantpartiesIntegratingdifferenttypesofbusinessesInterestedpartiescanenterintoacontract30ppt課件PrivateSolutionstoExternaliPrivateSolutionstoExternalitiesTheCoasetheoremIfprivatepartiescanbargainwithoutcostovertheallocationofresourcesTheycansolvetheproblemofexternalitiesontheirownWhatevertheinitialdistributionofrightsInterestedpartiescanreachabargaininwhichEveryoneisbetteroffOutcomeisefficient31ppt課件PrivateSolutionstoExternaliPrivateSolutionstoExternalities1.Dickhasthelegalrighttokeepabarkingdog.Dickgetsa$500benefitfromthedogJanebearsan$800costfromthebarkingEfficientoutcome:JanecanofferDick$600togetridofthedogDickwillgladlyaccept32ppt課件PrivateSolutionstoExternaliPrivateSolutionstoExternalities2.Dickhasthelegalrighttokeepabarkingdog.Dickgetsa$1,000benefitfromthedogJanebearsan$800costfromthebarkingEfficientoutcome:Dickturnsdownanyofferbelow$1,000Janewillnotofferanyamountabove$800Dickkeepsthedog33ppt課件PrivateSolutionstoExternaliPrivateSolutionstoExternalities3.JanecanlegallycompelDicktogetridofthedogDickcanoffertopayJanetoallowhimtokeepthedogIfthebenefitofthedogtoDickexceedsthecostofthebarkingtoJaneThenDickandJanewillstrikeabargaininwhichDickkeepsthedog34ppt課件PrivateSolutionstoExternaliPrivateSolutionstoExternalitiesWhyprivatesolutionsdonotalwaysworkHightransactioncostsCoststhatpartiesincurintheprocessofagreeingtoandfollowingthroughonabargainBargainingsimplybreaksdownLargenumberofinterestedpartiesCoordinatingeveryoneiscostly35ppt課件PrivateSolutionstoExternaliExternalities36ppt課件Externalities1ppt課件ExternalitiesGovernmentactioncansometimesimproveuponmarketoutcomesWhymarketssometimesfailtoallocateresourcesefficientlyHowgovernmentpoliciescanpotentiallyimprovethemarket’sallocationWhatkindsofpoliciesarelikelytoworkbest37ppt課件ExternalitiesGovernmentactionExternalitiesExternalityTheuncompensatedimpactofoneperson’sactionsonthewell-beingofabystanderMarketfailureNegativeexternalityImpactonthebystanderisadversePositiveexternalityImpactonthebystanderisbeneficial38ppt課件ExternalitiesExternality3ppt課件ExternalitiesNegativeexternalitiesExhaustfromautomobilesBarkingdogsPositiveexternalitiesRestoredhistoricbuildingsResearchintonewtechnologies39ppt課件ExternalitiesNegativeexternalExternalitiesandMarketInefficiencyWelfareeconomics:arecapDemandcurve:valuetoconsumersPricestheyarewillingtopaySupplycurve:costtosuppliersEquilibriumquantityandpriceEfficientMaximizesthesumofproducerandconsumersurplus40ppt課件ExternalitiesandMarketIneffFigure1TheMarketforAluminumPriceofAluminumQuantityofAluminum0Demand(privatevalue)Supply(privatecost)Thedemandcurvereflectsthevaluetobuyers,andthesupplycurvereflectsthecostsofsellers.Theequilibriumquantity,QMARKET,maximizesthetotalvaluetobuyersminusthetotalcostsofsellers.Intheabsenceofexternalities,therefore,themarketequilibriumisefficient.QMARKETEquilibrium41ppt課件Figure1TheMarketforAluminuExternalitiesandMarketInefficiencyNegativeexternalitiesCosttosociety(ofproducingagood)Largerthanthecosttothegoodproducers“AllIcansayisthatifbeingaleadingmanufacturermeansbeingaleadingpolluter,sobeit.”42ppt課件ExternalitiesandMarketIneffExternalitiesandMarketInefficiencyNegativeexternalitiesSocialcostPrivatecostsoftheproducers(supply)PlusthecoststothosebystandersaffectedadverselybythenegativeexternalitySocialcostcurveisabovethesupplycurveTakesintoaccounttheexternalcostsimposedonsociety43ppt課件ExternalitiesandMarketIneffFigure2PollutionandtheSocialOptimumPriceofAluminumQuantityofAluminum0Demand(privatevalue)Supply(privatecost)Inthepresenceofanegativeexternality,suchaspollution,thesocialcostofthegoodexceedstheprivatecost.Theoptimalquantity,QOPTIMUM,isthereforesmallerthantheequilibriumquantity,QMARKET.QMARKETOptimumSocialcost(privatecostandexternalcost)ExternalCostQOPTIMUMEquilibrium44ppt課件Figure2PollutionandtheSociExternalitiesandMarketInefficiencyNegativeexternalitiesOptimumquantityproducedMaximizetotalwelfareSmallerthanmarketequilibriumquantityGovernment–correctmarketfailureInternalizingtheexternalityAlteringincentivessothatpeopletakeaccountoftheexternaleffectsoftheiractions45ppt課件ExternalitiesandMarketIneffExternalitiesandMarketInefficiencyPositiveexternalitiesEducationBenefitofeducationisprivateExternalities:bettergovernment,lowercrimerates,higherproductivityandwagesSocialvalueisgreaterthanprivatevalueSocialvaluecurveAbovethedemandcurve46ppt課件ExternalitiesandMarketIneffFigure3EducationandtheSocialOptimumPriceofEducationQuantityofEducation0Demand(privatevalue)Supply(privatecost)Inthepresenceofapositiveexternality,thesocialvalueofthegoodexceedstheprivatevalue.Theoptimalquantity,QOPTIMUM,isthereforelargerthantheequilibriumquantity,QMARKET.QMARKETEquilibriumSocialvalue(privatevalueandexternalbenefit)ExternalBenefitQOPTIMUMOptimum47ppt課件Figure3EducationandtheSociExternalitiesandMarketInefficiencyPositiveexternalitiesSociallyoptimalquantityisgreaterthanmarketequilibriumquantityGovernment–correctmarketfailureInternalizetheexternalitySubsidy48ppt課件ExternalitiesandMarketIneffExternalitiesandMarketInefficiencyNegativeexternalitiesMarketsproducealargerquantitythanissociallydesirableGovernment:taxPositiveexternalitiesMarketsproduceasmallerquantitythanissociallydesirableGovernment:subsidy49ppt課件ExternalitiesandMarketIneffTechnologyspillovers,industrialpolicy,andpatentprotectionTechnologyspillover=PositiveexternalityImpactofonefirm’sresearchandproductioneffortsonotherfirms’accesstotechnologicaladvanceGovernment:internalizetheexternalitySubsidy=valueofthetechnologyspillover50ppt課件Technologyspillovers,industrTechnologyspillovers,industrialpolicy,andpatentprotectionIndustrialpolicyGovernmentinterventionintheeconomythataimstopromotetechnology-enhancingindustriesPatentlawProtecttherightsofinventorsbygivingthemexclusiveuseoftheirinventionsforaperiodoftime51ppt課件Technologyspillovers,industrPublicPoliciesTowardExternalitiesCommand-and-controlpoliciesRegulatebehaviordirectlyRegulationMarket-basedpoliciesProvideincentivessothatprivatedecisionmakerswillchoosetosolvetheproblemontheirownCorrectivetaxesandsubsidiesTradablepollutionpermits52ppt課件PublicPoliciesTowardExternaPublicPoliciesTowardExternalitiesRegulationRegulatebehaviordirectly:makingcertainbehaviorseitherrequiredorforbiddenCannoteradicatepollutionEnvironmentalProtectionAgency(EPA)DevelopandenforceregulationsDictatesmaximumlevelofpollutionRequiresthatfirmsadoptaparticulartechnologytoreduceemissions53ppt課件PublicPoliciesTowardExternaPublicPoliciesTowardExternalitiesCorrectivetaxesandsubsidiesCorrectivetaxes(Pigoviantaxes)InduceprivatedecisionmakerstotakeaccountofthesocialcoststhatarisefromanegativeexternalityPlacesapriceontherighttopolluteReducepollutionatalowercosttosocietyRaiserevenueforthegovernmentEnhanceeconomicefficiency54ppt課件PublicPoliciesTowardExternaWhyisgasolinetaxedsoheavily?NegativeexternalitiesassociatedwithdrivingCongestion,accidents,pollution55ppt課件WhyisgasolinetaxedsoheaviWhyisgasolinetaxedsoheavily?Thegastax=correctivetaxDoesn’tcausedeadweightlossesMakestheeconomyworkbetterLesstrafficcongestionSaferroadsCleanerenvironment56ppt課件WhyisgasolinetaxedsoheaviWhyisgasolinetaxedsoheavily?Howhighshouldthetaxongasolinebe?MostEuropeancountriesHighergasolinetaxthanintheU.S.2007,JournalofEconomicLiteratureOptimalcorrectivetaxongasoline$2.28pergallonin2005dollars$2.70pergallonin2012dollarsActualtaxintheU.S.in2012:50centspergallon57ppt課件WhyisgasolinetaxedsoheaviWhyisgasolinetaxedsoheavily?TaxrevenuefromagasolinetaxUsedtolowertaxesthatdistortincentivesandcausedeadweightlossesSomegovernmentregulationsProductionoffuel-efficientcars–unnecessary58ppt課件WhyisgasolinetaxedsoheaviPublicPoliciesTowardExternalitiesTradablepollutionpermitsVoluntarytransferoftherighttopollutefromonefirmtoanotherNewscarceresource:pollutionpermitsMarkettotradepermitsFirm’swillingnesstopayDependonitscostofreducingpollution59ppt課件PublicPoliciesTowardExternaPublicPoliciesTowardExternalitiesAdvantageoffreemarketforpollutionpermitsInitialallocationofpollutionpermitsdoesn'tmatterIffirmscanreducepollutionatalowcost:SellwhateverpermitstheygetIffirmscanreducepollutiononlyatahighcost:buywhateverpermitstheyneedEfficientfinalallocation60ppt課件PublicPoliciesTowardExternaPublicPoliciesTowardExternalitiesReducingpollutionusingpollutionpermitsorcorrectivetaxesFirmspayfortheirpollutionCorrectivetaxes:paytothegovernmentPollutionpermits:paytobuypermitsInternalizetheexternalityofpollution61ppt課件PublicPoliciesTowardExternaFigure4TheEquivalenceofCorrectiveTaxesandPollutionPermitsPriceofpollutionInpanel(a),theEPAsetsapriceonpollutionbylevyingacorrectivetax,andthedemandcurvedeterminesthequantityofpollution.Inpanel(b),theEPAlimitsthequantityofpollutionbylimitingthenumberofpollutionpermits,andthedemandcurvedeterminesthepriceofpollution.Thepriceandquantityofpollutionarethesameinthetwocases.0Quantityofpollution(a)CorrectiveTax(b)PollutionPermitsDemandforpollutionrightsQPCorrectivetax1.Acorrectivetaxsetsthepriceofpollution...2....which,togetherwiththedemandcurve,determinesthequantityofpollution.Priceofpollution0QuantityofpollutionDemandforpollutionrightsPQSupplyofpollutionpermits1.Pollutionpermitssetthequantityofpollution...2....which,togetherwiththedemandcurve,determinesthepriceofpollution.62ppt課件Figure4TheEquivalenceofCorPublicPoliciesTowardExternalitiesObjectionstotheeconomicanalysisofpollution“Wecannotgiveanyonetheoptionofpollutingforafee.”-bylateSenatorEdmundMuskiePeoplefacetrade-offsEliminatingallpollutionisimpossibleCleanwaterandcleanair–opportunitycostLowe