美國農(nóng)業(yè)合作社與農(nóng)業(yè)產(chǎn)業(yè)化外文文獻(xiàn)翻譯中英文

PAGEPAGE10美國農(nóng)業(yè)合作社與農(nóng)業(yè)產(chǎn)業(yè)化外文文獻(xiàn)翻譯中英文最新（節(jié)選重點(diǎn)翻譯）英文Managinguncertaintyandexpectations:ThestrategicresponseofU.S.agriculturalcooperativestoagriculturalindustrializationJulieHogelandAbstractThe20thcenturyindustrializationofagricultureconfrontedU.S.agricultural cooperatives with responding to an event they neitherinitiatednordrove.Agrarian-influencedcooperativesusedtwometaphors,“serfdom”and“cooperativesarelikeafamily”tomanageuncertaintyandinfluenceproducerexpectationsbypredictingindustrialization'seventualoutcomeandcooperatives’producerdrivencompensation.Theserfdommetaphoralludedtoindustrialization'spotentialtoeitherbypassfamilyfarmers,thecornerstoneoftheeconomyaccordingto agrarian ideology,or to transform them into the equivalent piece-wagelaborascontractgrowers.The“family”metaphorreflectshowcooperativespersonalizedtheconnectionbetweencooperativeandfarmer-membertopositionthemselvesastheexactoppositeofserfdom.HypothesesadvancedbyRoessl(2005)andGoel(2013)suggestintrinsiccharacteristicsoffamilybusinessessuchasaresistancetochangeandoperatingaccordingtoamythofunlimitedchoiceandindependencereinforcedtheriskofinstitutionallock-inposedbyagrarianideology.To determine whether lock-in occurred,Woerdman's(2004)neo-institutionalmodeloflock-inwasexaminedinthecontextoflate20thcenturycooperativegrainandlivestockmarketing.Increasinglyineffectiveopenmarketspromptedthreeregionalcooperativestodeveloptheirownmodelsofindustrializedporkproduction.Directexperiencewithproducercontractingallowedcooperativestoevadeinstitutionalandideologicallock-in.Keywords：Cooperatives，Agricultural industrialization，AgrarianisExpectationFamilybusinesFamilyLock-inIntroductionRecent fluctuation in global financial markets led a panel ofcooperativeleaderstoidentifyuncertaintyastheprimarymanagerialdifficultyanticipatedbycooperativesinthefuture(Boland,Hogeland,&McKee,2011).Likewise,the20thcenturyindustrializationofagricultureconfrontedcooperativeswiththechallengeofrespondingtoaneventneitherinitiatednordrove.Whentheenvironmentishighlyuncertainandunpredictable,Oliverpredictsthatorganizationswillincreasetheireffortstoestablishtheillusionorrealityofcontrolandstabilityoverfutureorganizationaloutcomes(Oliver,1991:170).Thisstudyarguescooperativesusedtwometaphors,“serfdom”and“cooperativesarelikeafamily”tomanageuncertaintybypredictingindustrialization'seventualoutcomeandcooperatives’producer-drivencompensation.Thesemetaphorsareagrarian.Recentresearchhighlightstheimpactof agrarian ideologyon cooperatives.Foreman and Whetten 623)observe,“co-opshavehistoricallysoughttoreinforcethetraditionsandvaluesofagrarianismthrougheducationandsocialinterventions.Indeed,formanymembersthesenormativegoalsofaco-ophavebeenpreeminent.”Theseauthorsstudiedthetensionwithinruralcooperativesproducedbyanormativesystemencompassingfamilyandideologyandutilitariansystemdefinedbyeconomicrationality,profitmaximizationand self-interest. They argue that this split in values implies thatcooperativesareessentiallytwodifferentorganizationstryingtobeone.Tocapturethetensionbetweenthesemultipleidentities,theyfocusedonapotentialfamily/businessdivideincooperatives,basingthisonaoftennotedincooperativecommunityandtradepublications.Theauthorsfoundthatrespondentswantedtheirlocalco-optobemorebusinessorientedandatthesametime,expectedco-opsideallyasanidealorganizationalform)tobemorefamilyfocused.Theseconflictingexpectationssuggestedthatmultiple-identityorganizationsneedtobeassessedintermsoftheindividualcomponentsoftheiridentityandthetension(orinteraction)betweenthem.ForemanandWhettenregarddualormultipleidentityorganizationsashybrids.Thereareconsequencestohybridity:manymembersofahybridorganizationwillidentifywithbothaspectsofitsdualidentity,“andthusfindthemselvesembracing competing goals and concerns associated with distinctlydifferentidentityelements”(ForemanandWhetten,2002).Theyconcludethatcompetinggoalsandconcernsfostercompetingexpectationswithconsequences for organizational commitment (and I would add,performance).ThesplitfocusobservedbyForemanandWhettencanberegardedasacontemporaryexpressionofavalueconflictbeginningearlyinthe20thcenturyoverhowproductionagricultureshouldbeorganized.Decentralized,autonomous,andtypicallysmall,familyfarmersusedskillatdecidingthe“what,when,where,howandwhy”ofproductionand marketingto reducethe risk of being aprice takerat open,competitivemarkets.Farmersalsodiversifiedthefarmenterprisetospreadpriceriskoverseveralcommodities.Corporate-ledindustrializedagriculture(integrators)by-passedbothmarketsandindependentfarmers.Integratorscoordinatedsupplyanddemandinternallybasedontop-downadministrativecontroloverproductionandmarketingdecisions.Theyengagedinproductioncontractingwithgrowerswhowereheldtocompetitive performance standards and paid according to theirproductivity.In contrast, family farmers were accountable only tothemselves.StudyoverviewFoss(2007)observesthatthebeliefsorganizationsholdabouteachotherorthecompetitiveenvironmentareakeyaspectofstrategicmanagementwhichhave beenunderstudied.Beliefs,which normsandexpectations,areimportantbecausetheycanbewrong.Cooperativesareoftenconsideredtohaveanideologicalcomponentbuthowsuchideologydevelopsandpersistsalsohasbeenunderstudied.Thisstudyaddressesthatgapbyexamininghowagrarianlanguageandassumptionsshapedcooperatives’reactionto20thcenturyagriculturalindustrialization.Duringthisera,industrialmethodstransformedtheproductionandmarketingofprocessingvegetables,poultry,beef,andpork and were initiated for dairy and grains. An historical institutional perspective is used to examine how two metaphorsbroughtcooperativestothebrinkofinstitutionallock-in.Thestudyspanstheentire20thcenturyfrombeginningtoclose.Thestudyopenswithabriefdiscussionofmetaphorsandnormsthen presents a theoretical model of lock-in. Discussion of overarchingroleofagrarianismfollows.Discussionthenaddresseswhythecooperativealternativetocorporate-ledindustrialization–themodel developed by Aaron Sapiro – was not palatable agrarian-influenced cooperatives (this section also definesagrarian-influencedcooperatives).Discussionthenturnstoconsideringhowthedisturbingimplicationsof serfdom paved the way for the agrarian-influenced “cooperatives as a competitive yardstick” and the cooperativemetaphorical norm, “cooperatives are like a family.” Producerexpectationstriggeredby“serfdom”and“cooperativesarelikeafamily”are addressed. Parallels are briefly drawn between exchangeinlate19thcenturyruralCaliforniaandbehaviorimpliedin“cooperativesarelikeafamily.”Parallelsarethendrawnbetweenfamilybusinesstraitsandcooperativeandproducerexperienceinlivestockandidentity-preserved grain markets. ThisprovidesafoundationforexaminingingreaterdetailhowwellcooperativeexperienceinporkandgrainscorrespondedtoWoerdman'sfourpartmodeloflock-in(2004).Studyconclusionsandsuggestionsforfutureresearchfollow.Importanceofideology,metaphorandnormsEconomistshavebegunstudyinghowcognitionanddiscourseaffectcooperativeoutcomes(Fulton,1999).Thisstudycontinuesthatlineofinquiry by considering how a dominant ideology like agrarianismproducedwordsandassociationsthat,formostofthe20thcentury,arguablyhadadeterministiceffectonfarmerandcooperativeperceptionsofthefuture.Eventoday,fewguidelinesorpredictionsexistthatsuggesthoworganizationscanmanageideologicalconflict(Greenwood,Raynard,Kodeih,Micelotta,&Lounsbury,2011).Moreover,thedifficultiesofescapingahegemonicideologyhaveseldombeenrecognized(Spencer,1994).Metaphors are a pithy word or expression meant to evoke acomparison.Theyareusedtounderstandonethinginterms ofanother(Lakoff&Johnson,1980:5).Understandingwhatmetaphorsrepresentandhowtheyemergeandpersistcanofferawindowintothesalientfactorsinfluencingfarmerandcooperativedecision-making.Moreover,as in this text, metaphors“allow for the sorts of story in whichoverwhelmingevidenceinfavorofoneinterpretationoftheworldcanberepeatedlyignored,eventhoughthisputstheassetsofthefirmandthepositionofthedecision-makersatextraordinaryrisk”(Schoenberger,1997:136).MuchofwhatPfefferandSalancik(2003)sayaboutnormsalsoappliestohowmetaphorsareusedinthisstudy.Forexample,theseauthorsobservethatanimportantfunctionofnormsistoprovidepredictabilityinsocialrelationshipssothateachpartycanrelyontheassurancesprovidedbytheother.Consequently,normsstressthemeetingofexpectationsinanexchangerelationship.Certainly,themetaphor,cooperativesarelikeafamily,canbeunderstoodinthesamemanner.Definingnormsascommonlyorwidelysharedsetsofbehavioralexpectations,Pfefferetal.alsoindicatethatnormsdevelopunderconditionsofsocialuncertaintytoincreasethepredictabilityofrelationshipsforthemutualadvantageofthoseinvolved.Oncetheyceasetoservethoseinterestsnormsbreakdown.California'searlyindustrializationItseemsreasonabletoassumethatagrarianism'sbeliefinthepivotalimportance of agriculture was shared to some degree by all U.S.cooperatives. However, unique features of California's agriculture,particularlyintheCentralValley,predisposedittoindustrializesomedecades earlier than the Midwest, Great Plains, and Northeast(McClelland,1997).Thelattercontinuedtorelyonpatriarchalfamilyfarmlaborandso,forthispaper,areassumedtorepresentthecoredomainofagrarian-influencedcooperatives.TheseareaslackedaccesstothesupplyofexcessethnicorminoritylaborwhichMcClellandindicatespreparedCaliforniaforindustrializationby1910.AddedtothisadvantagewasCalifornia'slegacyofestateorhaciendaproductionwhichboostedculturalfamiliarityandacceptanceoflargescaleproduction(Hogeland,2010).In1922,CaliforniaattorneyandcooperativeorganizerAaronSapirocombinedelementsofCaliforniaexperienceintoamodelofcooperativeorganizationandmarketingpopularlyknownas“orderlymarketing.”Sapiro began byextolling industrialization: “Thefactory systemisrecognizedasthekeytoallformsofproductiveindustriesto-dayallovertheworld-exceptinagriculture…Thefarmeristheonlypartofmodernindustry…inwhichyouhaveindividualproduction”(Sapiro,1993:81).Ingeneral,Sapiroofferedacooperativealternativetoproducers’tendencytodumpexcesssupplyfrombumperharvestsonthemarket.Instead,cooperativesshouldprovideahomeforthegrowers’productanduseaccumulatedinventorytodevelopnewproductstostimulateconsumerdemand.Investinginprocessingorpreservationtechnologies–canning,refrigerationanddrying–wouldallowcooperativestoreleaseexcessproductiontothemarketinaprogressive“orderly”manner.Forexample,by1925Sunkistgrowershadincreasedfruitutilizationbytransformingorangesfromasinglehand-heldbreakfastfruittoaglassof juice made from multiple oranges. The Sunkist extractor wasspecificallydesignedtouseoff-sizefruitandwind-damagedfruitthatwouldnotsellasfancySunkisttablefruitbecauseallproducedthesamequalityjuice(Nourse,1925).In1922,SunMaidscoredaconsumersuccessbypackagingraisinsinconvenientsnack-sizedboxes“LittleSunMaids”(GaryMarshburn,telephoneconversation,July24,2008;Cotterill,1984).Thefar-sightedorderlymarketingnormanticipatedthevaluesofindustrializedagriculture,urgingcooperativestoguaranteesupplythroughmarketingcontractswithsome85–95percentofproducer-members(Sapiro'srecommendedtarget).Thiscommitmentcouldpropelthecooperativeintobeingsolesupplierofaparticularspecialtycrop.(SuchspecializationwasfacilitatedbyCalifornia'sgeographicallycompactmicro-climates).Sapiro'smodelprovidedatemplateforimportant20thcenturyspecialtycropcooperativesoutsideofCalifornia,notably,OceanSprayCooperative (cranberries) and Welch's(Concord grapes). Sapiro'smodelrepresentedahighlyspecialized, cooperativethatwasconceptuallyandfinanciallyoutofreachofthesmallfamilyfarmersintheMidwest,GreatPlains,andtheNortheastwhoproducedfungiblecommoditieslikemilk,meatandgrains.6CooperativephilosopherandeconomistEdwinNoursecommentedoncooperativesperformingagriculturalrationingsuchasorderlymarketing:Tobesure,afewcooperativeswhichstandinaclassbythemselveshavealreadyattainedadegreeofsuccesscomparablewiththebestachievementsinindustriallines.Buttheseareincomparativelysmallbranchesofspecializedagriculturewhereeconomicorganizationwasalreadyonahighlevel.Beforeanythinglikethesameresultcouldbeachievedinthegreatstaplelinesofproduction,wherethedemandfor[price]stabilizationismostacute,therewouldhavetobeafairdegreeofconcentrationofexecutiveresponsibilityintheiroperatingorganization(Nourse,1930:132).Serfdom'simplicationsDuring the1920sand1930s – considereda “golden age”agriculture–collectiveactionsurged.Rudimentarymarketsandchaoticdistributionchannelsforbasiccommoditieslikemilk,grain,andfruitprovidednewopportunitiesforcooperativemarketing.Moreover,newantitrustlegislationcurbedmanyofthehorizontally-integrated“trusts”dominating19thcenturymeatpacking,oil,railroadsandgrainmarkets.Nevertheless, as early as 1922, Nourse saw emerging withinagriculturemarketpowersocentralizedandhierarchicalitseemedfeudal(Nourse,1922:589).Subsequently,themetaphorof“serfdom”wasusedthroughout the 20th century by agrarian-influenced cooperatives suggest how industrialization's contract production could reduceentrepreneurialandindependentfarmerstotheequivalentofhiredhands–so-called“piecewagelabor.”In1900,mostcountiescouldpointtosomeonewhostartedasatenantorlaborerandthroughhardwork,luck,sharpdealingorintelligentcultivation,retiredasalandlordowingseveralfarms(Danbom,1979:7).In1917,Elyintroducedtheconceptofthe‘a(chǎn)griculturalladder’asamodelofoccupationalprogressiontofarmownership.Theladdershowedhowtheagrarianvirtueofhardworkcouldallowalandless,unpaidfamilylaborertoprogressfrombeingahiredhandandtenantfarmertoanindependentowner-operator(Kloppenburg&Geisler,1985).Yet,theserfdom metaphor suggested just how tenuous such occupationalprogressioncouldbe.Late19thcenturyfarmersformedcooperativesinresponsetoexploitationorfailure.Althoughsuchexploitationaffectedfarmercostsandreturns,asaruleitdidnotimpingeonfarmers’understandingofthemselvesasentrepreneurialandindependent.Agrarianideologylaudedfamilyfarmersfortakingontherisksoffarmingwithafrontierattitudeofself-reliance.Suchfarmersansweredtonooneexceptthemselves.Thesmallfarmerwas“firstofallaself -directingindividualistwhocouldbecountedontoresistwithvigortheencroachmentsofoutsideauthority”(Robinson,1953:69).Industrialized agriculture brought a new institutional logictoagriculturebyputtingefficiencyandprofitabilityfirstandusingverticalintegrationtobypassfarmers’decision-makingpoweroveragriculture.Industrializationwasmarketdriven,seekinggrowthinidentifyingandsatisfyingconsumerpreferences.Researchhasindicatedthatthenormsandprescriptionsdictatedbyfamilylogicsareoftenatoddswiththeprescriptionsdictatedbymarkets(Greenwoodetal.,2011).Power, reflected in ownership and governance arrangements,determineswhichlogicswillmoreeasilyflowintoorganizationsandbewellreceived(Greenwoodetal.,2011).Familylogicsformallyembeddedintoanorganization'sownershipstructureareaveryeffectiveconduitforincreasingfamilialinfluenceswithintheorganization.Notfarmer-ownedcooperativesbelievedtheyhadamandatetoprotectandfosterfamilyfarming(Hogeland,2006).中文管理不確定性和期望：美國農(nóng)業(yè)合作社與農(nóng)業(yè)產(chǎn)業(yè)化朱莉·霍格蘭摘要20世紀(jì)的農(nóng)業(yè)產(chǎn)業(yè)化使美國農(nóng)業(yè)合作社面對(duì)很大的不確定性。-根據(jù)農(nóng)勞動(dòng)?！昂献魃纭钡碾[喻反映了合作社如何個(gè)性化合作社與農(nóng)民成員之間的聯(lián)系，從而將自己定位為農(nóng)奴制的完全對(duì)立面。Roessl（2005）和Goel（2013）提出的假設(shè)表明，家族企業(yè)的內(nèi)在特征，種意識(shí)形態(tài)造成的體制鎖定的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。20關(guān)鍵詞：合作社，農(nóng)業(yè)產(chǎn)業(yè)化，農(nóng)業(yè)主義，期望，家族企業(yè)，家庭農(nóng)業(yè)，隱喻，鎖定引言全球金融市場(chǎng)的近期波動(dòng)促使合作社領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人小組將不確定性確定為合作社未來所預(yù)期的主要管理難（BolanHogeland和2011年世紀(jì)的農(nóng)業(yè)產(chǎn)業(yè)化使合作社面臨著應(yīng)對(duì)他們既不Oliver（Olive，1991：170。這項(xiàng)研究認(rèn)為，合作社使用兩個(gè)隱喻“農(nóng)奴制”和“合作社”就像一個(gè)家庭，通過預(yù)測(cè)產(chǎn)業(yè)化的最終結(jié)果和合作社的生產(chǎn)者驅(qū)動(dòng)的報(bào)酬來管理不確定性。影響。Foreman和Whette2002623）/企業(yè)鴻溝上，這是基于合作社社區(qū)和貿(mào)易出版物中經(jīng)常提到的雙重性。作者發(fā)現(xiàn)，受訪者希望他們的本地合作社更注重業(yè)務(wù)，同時(shí)希望理想的合作社（例如，作為理想的組織形式）ForemanWhetten將雙截然不同的身份元素相關(guān)